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FOREWORD
The following study is an attempt to present a theory of collective security
from a legal point of view. Its main purpose is to show that collective security
is an essential function of law, national as well as international, and that,
therefore, there exists an intrinsic connection between international security
and international law in other terms, that collective security of the state within
the international community is, just as collective security of the individual
w ithin the state, by its very nature a legal problem.
The study does not intend to describe the historical development of collective
security as a problem of international organization; it is restricted to its
systematic analysis. Consequently, the material of positive international law
referred to in the text and especially in the notes does not lay claim to complete;

r

ness; but is to be considered as a selection of characteristic patterns illustrating
the most important statements.

Hans Kelsen.
Berkeley, Calif.
ii

PREFACE
of this series was inaugurated by the Naval War College
This is the forty-ninth volume in the series as numbered for index
purposes. This title has varied slightly from year to year. The preceding volume, International Law Documents, 1952-53, was published in 1954.
The present volume inaugurates a new form for this series. In 1953 a Chair
of International Law was established at the Naval War College. One of the
duties of the occupant of this Chair is the preparation of a study on a phase
of International Law that is of special interest to the U. S. Navy. This
volume on the legal theory of collective security, the first of a series sponsored
by the Naval War College, was prepared by Dr. Hans Kelsen, the 1953-54
occupant of the Naval War College Chair of International Law.
The many significant events in this era of rapid change in world conditions
have prompted the author to insert much new material into this volume before
its final release.
Thus, although for continuity purposes this volume is entitled International Law Studies, 1954, some of the material and notes contained herein represent the views of the author as of about October 1, 1956:.
The opinions expressed in this volume are not necessarily those of the U. Si

The publication

in 1894.

Navy

or the Naval

War

College.

Thomas H.

Robbins,

Jr.,

Rear Admiral, United States Navy,
President, Naval

War

College.

Newport, 1 December 1956.
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COLLECTIVE SECURITY
I.

THE CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY
1.

Security

INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY
is

the condition of being protected against, or not exposed
It is an objective condition of

man

which, rightly or
wrongly, man assumes to exist. The effect of this assumption is a
certain state of mind which may be described as freedom from fear,
the fear of a danger. There are different kinds of security which
may be distinguished according to the nature of the danger. Religion
affords a spiritual security, protecting man against the dangers threatening his soul during his lifetime and especially after his death. There
is a sanitary security established by health organizations to prevent
or restrict, as far as possible, epidemics. To guarantee economic secuto,

a danger.

rity is the ideal

from

which socialism

tries to realize in

order to free

man

means for satisfying his most
security with which this book deals is the protection
of man against the use of force by other men.
his fear of being deprived of the

vital needs.

The

"Collective" security

is

usually distinguished as the security of

states in their relation to other states,

security,

from individual security

sometimes called "international"

as the security of individual

beings in their mutual, inter-individual, relations.

human

1

Consequently, the
use of force against which states are supposed to be protected by a
system of collective, or international, security is the use of armed
force, especially that use

However,

known as war.

not quite correct to consider collective security, the
security of states within an international community, and individual
security, the security of the individual human beings within a state,
as opposite concepts. In the last analysis, the security of a state is the
security of the individual human beings who are members of a state.
it is

According to a generally accepted view, the state is a political organization. As an "organization" it is a normative order regulating
the mutual behavior of men. As a "political" organization it is a
coercive order because its specific means is the employment of force,
i. e., the threat and use of force.
This means that the norms of this
order provide for coercive acts as reactions against human behavior
considered to be harmful to society. Such reactions are the essence
of the law or of a legal order. If a legal order is centralized that is,

—

if it institutes special

organs for

its

creation and application and,

—the

especially, for the execution of the coercive acts, called sanctions

As a social order, the state is

not different from
what is usually called the law of the state or the national legal order,
for the state is a centralized legal order constituting a legal community.
In the language of political theory, the state is described as not
only a social order but also as an acting person. It is said that the state
creates, applies and, especially, enforces the law, that is, the norms
of the legal order. However, as an acting person, the state is only the
personification of this order. In this capacity, the state manifests its
existence in acts of state which are always acts of individual human
beings determined by the legal order constituting the community. The
acts concerned are those by which the coercive order is created and
subsequently applied to other individual human beings whose behavior
social order is a state.

thus regulated. The individuals performing these acts are "organs,"
organs of the legal order or, what amounts to the same thing, of the
is

state as a legal order, in contradistinction to the individuals to

the legal order

is

applied by the organs.

whom

These individuals are the

subjects of the legal order, or the subjects of the state as a legal order.

The statement

that the acts concerned are acts of the state

is

a figure

of speech which metaphorically expresses the idea that the state order
is created and applied by these acts, that it operates through the individuals performing these acts in their capacity as organs. This idea
implies the personification of the order, the construction of a person

which these

may

be imputed.

Since the order is a legal order,
the person is a juristic person. The concept of a juristic person is an
artificial device used to simplify the description of human relations
interpreted according to a normative order presupposed to be valid.
It stands to reason that neither the state as a social order, which
means the state as a system of norms, nor its personification can be
exposed to any use of force. Physical force can be used only against
physical beings, not against an order as a system of norms and force as
a psychic compulsion only against beings endowed with some kind of
reason, feeling and will. Hence, as a condition of being protected
against the use of force, security can be only the security of human
beings. If there is a security of a state, it can be only the security of
the human beings who are the members of the state that is, the individuals whose behavior is regulated by the state order either because
to

acts

;

—

organs or because they are its subjects.
The difference which exists between the security of the individual
within the state, i. e., the national legal community, and the security of
the state (as the security of individuals) within the international community consists in the fact that the former is guaranteed by national

they are

its

—
and hence may be properly called
national security, whereas the latter is guaranteed by international law
and for this reason is called international security. It is in both cases
collective security, because it is security afforded by a social order and
law, the so-called law of the state,

;

a social order always constitutes a certain degree of collectivization.
Collective security must be distinguished from the security which an
individual or a state may try to establish for itself. Because it is not
afforded by a social order, this latter security may be considered to be
individual security. It is only in this negative sense of being a noncollective security that individual security can be considered to be the
opposite of collective security. However, this individual security is
not true security at all, for an individual can never concentrate in his
hands a sufficient amount of power to protect himself for any length of
time against the united forces of several others. Furthermore, any
association with other individuals for the purpose of common defense
by mutual assistance is the first step towards a social organization
affording collective security. This is precisely the idea which the
natural-law doctrine of the 17th and 18th centuries tried to express by
inventing the fiction of a social contract. According to this doctrine,
men abandoned the state of nature as a state where no positive law was
established because of its complete lack of security. They abandoned
it by concluding a contract with the main purpose of protecting each
member of the community by providing for a collective reaction against
any violation of vital interests. In other words, the purpose of this
contract was to establish collective security.

The assumption that man existed originally in a state of nature is
highly problematical. Men have probably always lived in society, and
where there is society there is some kind of law ubi soeietas ibi jus
although the law may be more or less effective. Transient periods of

—

anarchy are possible and have actually existed in history. However,
they are characterized by the fact that no security exists, and the
attempts of single individuals to secure themselves against others are in
vain. As we shall see,2 the same is true with respect to any attempt by
an individual state to establish a non-collective security for itself.
Hence, since security can be only collective, collective security is a
pleonastic term.
If the security of the individual within the state (national security)
and the security of the state within the international community (international security) are both collective security because they are both
guaranteed by a social order, and if this order is in both cases a legal
order, collective security is by its very nature legal security in the sense
that it is a security established by law. 3 An attempt has been made to
distinguished two kinds of state or international security: legal or

and

According to this view,
legal security is defined as "a condition in which a state that observes
the objective law need not fear that its rights as a subject of inter*
national law will be violated without redress" while political security
is defined as a condition in which a state "regardless of its conduct,
need not fear a successful attack from without." The difference
between legal and political security is that only the former is guaranteed by the law. The latter is brought about by the state itself by
means which could also be applied if the state were not subjected to a
legal order in other words, if the state existed together with other
states in a condition of anarchy.
The question of whether so-called
political security is achieved in a legal or in an illegal way is irrelevant.
Hence, the so-called political security of a state is not collective security
juridical security

political security.*

;

—

but rather a typical case of individual security. The political security
of a state is the same kind of security which an individual human being

without being protected by a legal order and which, as
has been pointed out, is really not security at all.
tries to achieve

It has been maintained that the security of an individual within

a national community or state (national security) and the security

community (international security)
problems and that there is no real analogy

of a state within an international
are two totally different

between them, because "the first is a police problem, the
problem of social justice finding its protection in legislation."
ever, as

we

shall see later, international security is as

much

latter a
8

How-

a police

problem as national security is, and the latter is no less a problem
of social justice than the former. There is another argument that
has been advanced to justify the view that there is an essential difference between national and international security, and that consequently the latter cannot be modeled exactly after the former.
This argument has been formulated as follows: "The State requires
of the individual, in case of need, the sacrifice of his life in the interest of the

community.

In this case individual security

is strictly

subordinated to collective security. Not so in the international field.
Here collective security is the counterpart of individual security and
cannot be in opposition to it. The collectivity cannot require a state
to sacrifice itself completely in the interest of the collectivity." 6
This argument is based on an erroneous hypostatization of the personification called the "state." An international organization constituting a system of collective security cannot require a state to sacrifice
its life because a state is not a living organism like an individual
human being. However, there is no reason why an international
organization should not require a member state to sacrifice the lives
of its subjects in order to guarantee international security. Neither

the nature of the state

the community

—that

the national legal order constituting

is

—nor the nature of the international legal

order ex-

As

a matter of fact, an international securityorganization which provides for military sanctions necessarily imcludes such a request.

upon the member states.
its life means only that a

poses such an obligation
that a state sacrifices
to

war against another

state

may

its territory

the possibility that a state

state,

which resorts

state

cease to exist as a subject of inter-

national law by being defeated and by having

by the victorious

If the proposition

may

annexed

lose its life

Furthermore,
there is no reason why states should not be required to run such a
risk in the interest of international security.
However, since military sanctions are always organized as collective actions, the risk
practically does not exist if a system of international security operates
in conformity with its constituent treaty. The statement that "collective security is the counterpart of individual security and cannot
be in opposition to it," amounts to a complete rejection of international
certainly

exists

if

military sanctions are applied.

security. 7

If

it is

admitted,

of the individuals

first,

who

that the security of the state

are the

members of the

state,

is

the security

and, secondly,

community is
same sense as the security of the individuals,
within the national community (the state) because both are guaranteed by legal orders, a perfect analogy between them cannot bedenied. In both cases, security is established by the specific reaction
for which the legal order provides in case of certain harmful behavior by the members of the community. This behavior constitutes
a violation of the order, and in both cases the most conspicuous
that the security of the state within an international
collective security in the

violation

is

the illegal use of force.

difference between the national

To

be sure, there

is

a remarkable

and the international

legal order,
especially with respect to this reaction, that is the sanctions stipulated by these orders. However, if the normative order constituting

an international community of states is considered to be international
"law," and this means law in the same sense as the normative order
constituting a state, it must be possible to show that the structure of
both normative orders

is,

at least in principle, the

relevant to the security they afford ; and this
2.

same in

all

respecta

is possible.

SECURITY AND LAW

any legal order to protect certain interests of
the individuals subjected to it by providing for coercive acts as
sanctions to be applied as reactions against violations of these interIt is the purpose of

6
In this way, the law tries to prevent such violations. The most
important interest protected in this way by the law is man's interest
in maintaining his life. Since this interest of the individual is endangered by the use of force on the part of other individuals, the
sanctions of law are directed primarily but not exclusively against
this use of force (the term "force" meaning physical force).
By attaching a sanction to a certain behavior, especially to the use of force by
one individual against another, the law forbids this behavior which,
ests.

as the condition of a sanction,

is

to be considered as illegal, or, to use

a term covering all possible violations of the law or legally protected
interests

:

as a delict.

The sanctions consist

in the forcible deprivation

freedom or property of those responsible for the illegal use of
force or other violations of the law. However, these sanctions, too,

of

life,

Hence

constitute a use of force.

the use of force

is

not absolutely for-

bidden by the law. It is even authorized as a sanction; and not all
kinds of the use of force are forbidden. But there exists in the evolution of law a tendency to forbid not only the use of physical force
destroying or endangering the life of human beings, but also other
kinds of the use of force, to restrict, as far as possible, the use of force
which has not the character of a sanction by attaching a sanction to
it
so that, as a rule, the use of force is to be considered either as a
delict, that is, the condition of a sanction, or as a sanction, that is, the
reaction against a delict.
Consequently, there can be no law without force. For, by its very
nature, the law is an organization of force. The law organizes the use
of force in the relations of its subjects by determining the conditions
under which definite individuals are authorized to use force. Force
used under other conditions is to be considered as a delict. But in
using force under the conditions determined by the law, which means
in applying the sanction provided for by the legal order, the individuals determined by law execute the order and thus act as organs
of this order, or what amounts to the same, as organs of the community
constituted by the legal order. Hence the use of force the legal, but
not the illegal use of force may be imputed to the legal community
acting through its organs. If the use of force is legal only as a sanction, the legal order reserves the use of force to the legal community,
in other words, the legal order establishes a force monopoly of the legal
;

—

—

community.
If peace

of the law

is

defined as the absence of force,

it is

to guarantee peace in the relations

the community, the subjects of the law.

the essential function

among

the

members of

In guaranteeing peace by

protecting the members of the legal community against the use of force,
the law

—any

—guarantees

legal order

its

subjects security.

Hence,

,

an essential element of any
system of collective, and that means, legal security. Legal security
is identical with peace, or rather with that relative peace which a legal
order can secure. It is a relative, not an absolute security. It is
the prohibition of the use of force

is

not absolutely forbidden,
but also because no legal order can be so effective as to prevent the
illegal use of force completely.
system of collective and that
means legal security, the core of which is the prohibition of the use
relative not only because the use of force

is

—

A

—

meaningful only if the possibility of an illegal use of force
is presupposed.
However, the legal order which prohibits the use
of force may be more or less efficacious. The degree of its efficacy
depends in the first place on the degree of its centralization.
It follows that, by its very nature, the security afforded its subjects
by a legal order is collective security because it is a security established by a social order. By regulating the mutual relations of
of force,

is

—

—

individuals, every social order creates definite social relations

among

and thus brings about a certain collectivization conThe collective character
stituting a community as a collective body.
of the security established by a legal order manifests itself, firstly, in
the fact that the use of force is forbidden by the legal order which is
valid equally for all members of the community constituted by the
order, and, secondly, in the fact that the reaction against an illegal use
these individuals

of force

is

a collective action.

It is a collective action because

it is

an action performed by organs of the community and is therefore
imputable to the community, even if the individuals concerned are not
special organs, as is the case in both a primitive society under primitive law and the international community under general international
law. 8

In contradistinction to the law of a modern state (the national law)
the law of a primitive society does not institute special organs for the
creation and application of the law. There are no legislative organs.
The general legal norms are created by custom that is, by the habitual
behavior of the individuals subjected to the law. There are no courts
competent to ascertain the fact that the law has been violated and to
determine the person responsible for the violation. There is no sheriff
and no police to execute the law that is, to apply the sanctions for
which the law provides. All these functions are left to the subjects
of the law. In case of a murder that is, in case the members of a
group (especially a family) are of the opinion that one of them has
been the victim of an illegal use of force by a member of another
group the law authorizes the relatives of the victim to take revenge
on the murderer and his relatives, to use force in killing them. In

—

—
—

—

case of other delicts, incest for example, the law authorizes every

8

member

of the

community

to treat the delinquent as an outlaw

—that

is, to use any kind of force against him so that he is compelled to leave
the community, which means to perish. In case of certain material
damage by one individual to another's property, the law authorizes
the members of the group to which the injured individual belongs to
use force to deprive members of the group to which the delinquent
belongs of some property as compensation for the damage. In effect,
this means that the principle of self-help prevails.
The principle of self-help is a consequence of the complete decen-

In a decentralized legal order, the essential legal functions are not conferred upon special
or, what amounts
to the same, central organs which function according to the principle
of division of labor but are left to the individual members of the community. This does not mean that there are no legal organs at all under
a decentralized coercive order. The coercive acts provided for by
this order as reactions against its violation are sanctions, and the individuals authorized by the order to execute these sanctions act as organs
of this order or of the community constituted by it. However, these
individuals are not special organs who function according to the principle of the division of labor that is, they are not central organs. In
the mind of primitive men living under a completely decentralized
legal order, there is a clear distinction between an illegal and a legal use
of force, between a murderer who violates the law and an avenger who
executes it. However, in a concrete case, it is impossible to give an
objective answer to the question of who is a murderer and who an
avenger, or, more generally, whether a use of force is illegal (a delict)
tralization of a legal order.

—

—

—

or legal (a sanction). Nevertheless, the use of force as a sanction is
considered to be a reaction by the community against a delict, for even

under a decentralized legal order, where the principle of self-help
prevails, the use of force having the character of a sanction is considered to be reserved to the legal community. The force monopoly
of the community established by a legal order may be decentralized.

Even

a completely decentralized legal order affords its subjects a cer-

tain degree of collective security

;

but

it is

the lowest possible degree.

Since under a completely decentralized legal order the question as
to who is right and who is wrong in using force cannot be decided in
an objective way, the social situation established by such an order is
not clearly distinguishable from a situation where no security exists,
just as, in its application to a concrete case, a completely decentralized
coercive order is hardly distinguishable from a state of anarchy. This
is why some writers refuse to consider a social order as law as long as
that minimum of centralization constituted by the establishment of
courts is not achieved, and also why in traditional terminology we
speak of collective security only when the principle of self-help is

9
eliminated and replaced by a legal technique characterized by a certain
centralization. Thus the organization of collective security, in the
specific or narrower sense of the term, consists mainly, but not exclusively, in the centralization of the coercive order constituting the legal

community.
Since the extent of this centralization
may be established in different degrees.

may

vary, collective security

NOTES
Maurice Bourquin, "Le Probleme de la Securite Internationale."
Droit
International. Recueil des Cours. 1934. III. Tome 49,
Academie de
p. 473 and Collective Security, a record of the Seventh and Eighth International
Studies Conferences of the League of Nations. Paris 1934 London 1935. Edited
by Maurice Bourquin. Paris 1936, p. 131.
2. Cf. pp. 4, 34 ff.
3. Legal security in this sense must be distinguished from the "legal security"
which is the translation of the German term "Rechtssicherheit". The German
term designates the principle that the judicial and administrative acts of a
state must be determined by pre-established general legal norms. In English
terminology, this is called the "rule-of-law" principle.
4. Professor Ludwik Ehrlich in Collective Security, p. 152.
5. Memorandum of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, submitted
to the International Studies Conference 1934-35, Collective Security, p. 132.
6. Dietrich Schindler, in a memorandum on "The Notion of Neutrality in a
System Including Repression of Resort to War," submitted to the International
Studies Conference 1934-35 Cf. Collective Security, p. 26.
7. Prof. Schindler advocated the above mentioned doctrine mainly for the
purpose of justifying the maintenance of Switzerland's permanent neutrality
within a system of international security. Cf. p. 169.
8. Collective security is a function of law, regardless of the way in which the
Cf. e.

1.

g.,

—

;

:

;

law

is created, that is to say, with or without the participation of the individuals
subjected to the law. In opposition to this view, Sir Alfred Zimmern, "The

Problem of Collective Security" (in: Neutrality and Collective Security, edited
by Quincy Wright, Chicago 1936), asserts: "Collective Security," which means
"safety of all by all," "is a democratic notion" (p. 4). "Where there is no freedom
[meaning a democratic constitution] there can be no cooperation for collective
security" (p. 23). From this view follows that there can be no collective security
within a non-democratic state, nor within an international community which is
not composed exclusively of democratic states and is constituted by an international order which has not a democratic character.
However, Zimmern says
also The principle of collective security "as applied to the world as a whole"
means "a condition of law and order for the world" (p. 9). This statement is
compatible with the doctrine that collective security is a democratic notion only
under the presupposition that law is by its very nature a democratically created
social order, that a social order created in another way is no law.
Such a concept
of law is inadmissibly narrow and in open conflict with the general use of this
term for most of the social orders of the past, and many of the present day,
generally called "law" have no democratic character. If collective security is
protection against the use of force by one subject of the community directed at
another subject, and hence is established by an effective prohibition of this use
of force, historical experience does not support the doctrine that collective security can be guaranteed only by a democratic legal order.
:

;

II.

THE DIFFERENT DEGREES OF COLLECTIVE
SECURITY

Since collective security is the function of a legal order, its organization is closely connected to the fundamental relationship established
by the law between delict and sanction, the relationship between a
definite action endangering the security of the community and the
corresponding collective reaction. The action against which the collective reaction of an international security

usually characterized as "aggression."

may be narrowly

system

The definition
The degree of

is

directed is

of this concept

or widely delimited.
collective secudepends mainly on the extent to which the reaction is centralized.
However, the importance of this centralization depends on the scope
of the actions against which the more or less centralized reaction is
directed.
Hence, the degree of collective security increases not only
with the extent to which the reaction against certain harmful actions
which endanger security is centralized, but also with the scope of the
actions against which the reaction of the security system is directed.
The definition of aggression 1 is particularly important in this aspect.
rity

1.

THE SCOPE OF PROTECTED INTERESTS

With regard

which the members of a national community enjoy, it makes a remarkable difference whether the social
order constituting this community protects the members against every
use of physical force by attaching sanctions to all of them or protects
them only against that use of physical force which results in the destruction of life that is, protects them by providing punishment only
for murder. Even under the most primitive legal orders, murder is
not the only crime. The development of the law goes hand in hand
with an extension of the interests protected by sanctions directed
against their violations. These violations may consist of conduct
which does not have the character of a use of physical force. For example, non-payment of a debt and slander are both delicts under posito the security

—

tive law, but neither constitutes a use of physical force.

A legal order

which provides for civil execution to be directed against the property
of a debtor and imprisonment or fine to be inflicted upon a slanderer
guarantees the security of the individual to a greater extent than a legal
order which does not react against such conduct. All national legal
10

—
11
orders provide for sanctions not only against delicts which consist of
a use of force but also against other violations of interests. In other

words, these national legal orders also protect interests which may be
violated in a way other than by the use of force. However, no legal
order can protect all the possible interests of its subjects. It is always
up to the legal authority to decide which interests are worth being
protected. Hence, there are always interests the violation of which
This is another reason why the security guaranteed by
is not a delict.
the law

never absolute security.
Since the security guaranteed by the law consists of protection
against the violation of certain interests, 2 and since this violation is
not limited to the use of force, the question arises as to whether or not
the concept of legal, and this means collective, security may properly
be restricted to protection against the use of force. Such a definition
can be maintained only if the term "force" is meant to include not only
is

—that

any conduct by a subject of the legal order which is legally forbidden because of its harmful
effect on another subject and which is therefore performed against or
physical force but any illegal conduct

is,

without the will of this subject. It is inevitable that this broader
meaning of the term "force" be accepted if the sanctions provided for
by positive law the deprivation of life (capital punishment), of
liberty (imprisonment), and of property (fine and civil execution)
are to be conceived of as a use of force or as enforcement actions.
"Force," in the sense of physical force, is used to overpower an
individual who offers resistance. This is normally the case under a
primitive legal order when the execution of sanctions is decentralized

—

that

is,

when

the execution

is left

to the individual

members of the

community. However, if the execution of sanctions is centralized, as
under the law of a modern state, the individuals on whom these sanctions are inflicted normally offer no resistance, since the centralization
of the execution of the law makes any resistance ineffective. Hence,
these sanctions are a use of force (i. e., are enforcement measures, or,
as

usually formulated, are enforcing the law) insofar as they
are carried out against or without the will of the subject concerned.
it is

Consequently, physical force is to be used only in the very exceptional
case of resistance.
surgical operation performed by a physican
with the consent of a patient is not a use of force. However, an action
of the same kind performed against the will of a victim must certainly
be considered to be an enforcement action. In this sense, force is im-

A

plied in any illegal conduct of a person directed toward another person
against or without the will of the latter. This means that any delict,
just as any sanction, may be considered to be a use of "force."
Thus
the very concept of force, as it applies to the description of the essential

870624—57

2

—
12
function of the law which is to provide for a sanction against a delict
that is, to provide for a use of force to prevent a use of force changes
its

meaning under the influence of

—

centralization.

results in greater effectiveness of the

guaranteed by
2.

it.

Such centralization

law and the

collective security

3

THE CENTRALIZATION OF THE PROCEDURE FOR THE
ASCERTAINMENT OF A DELICT (I. E., AN ILLEGAL USE OF
FORCE) AND FOR DETERMINING THE PARTY RESPONSIBLE FOR IT

This centralization refers to the enforcement measures which are
taken under the legal order as a reaction, which means as a sanction,
against an illegal use of force, in either the narrower or wider sense of
the term. If a sanction is to be taken as a reaction against an illegal
act, the existence of such an act must first be ascertained. Only after
this function is performed, can a sanction be executed. These are the
two stages in which every legal order is applied. The system of collective security established by a legal order operates through the application of this order. Both stages may be more or less centralized, and
the centralization of one is not necessarily accompanied by the centralization of the other. In principle, the centralization of the application of the law is independent of the centralization of the creation
of the law that is, independent of the establishment of the general
The centralization of the
legal norms to be applied in concrete cases.
creation of the law is also important in determining the degree of collective security. This aspect of the problem will be discussed later.
The complete decentralization of the first stage of the application
of the law is a characteristic feature of a primitive legal order which
does not institute special organs competent to ascertain objectively the
fact that the law has been violated, i. e., that an illegal use of force,
an act of aggression, has taken place nor are special organs competent
to determine the individual or individuals responsible for such an act

—

;

The

individuals involved in the conflict arising from
a delict, either actually or allegedly committed, the conflict in which

of aggression.

the two parties are those violated by the delict and those

made responsi-

must decide the questions concerned themselves. If there
is no agreement between them that the law has been violated and no
agreement on the compensation for the violated interest, and for vari-

ble for

it,

ous reasons such an agreement

is

rarely possible, the only

way

to settle

by the resort to force by one party against the other.
The question remains undecided as to whether this use of force is legal
or illegal, whether it is a sanction or a delict, and, consequently, whether
the conflict

is

13
guarantees security or, on the other hand, is a factor of great insecuThis is the most serious defect of a legal system in which the
rity.
first stage of the application of the law, the ascertainment of the delict
and the determination of the party responsible for it, is decentralized.
It is more serious than decentralization in the second stage, the stage
it

in which the use of force is authorized by the law as a sanction, although decentralization in this stage also renders the security function
of the legal order problematical. The use of force operates as a

sanction and hence acts as a guarantee of security satisfactorily if it
normally results in overpowering the party against which it is directed.

This result is not secured if the function concerned is decentralized.
However, even if it is secured in some way, there must be a certain
guarantee that the enforcement measures provided for by the law as
sanctions are taken only against the party responsible for the delict,
i. e., only against the party responsible for the illegal use of force, that
Consequently, first of all, there must be a
is, against the aggressor.
legal procedure in which the decisive fact of the existence of a delict,
i. e., of an illegal use of force, is established and in which the party responsible for the delict, the aggressor, is determined in an impartial
way by a decision binding upon the parties. This is done by taking
the power of deciding the fundamental questions as to who is right and

who

is

wrong away from

the parties involved in a conflict and by con-

ferring this power on a special organ.
centralizing the legal function which

In other words, this
is

is

done by

the basis of all further steps

leading to the enforcement of the law.
An essential condition for the impartiality of the organ concerned is
that it be independent of the parties to the conflict as well as of other
organs of the community, particularly the government of the com-

munity. If the organ enjoys such independence, it has the character
of a tribunal, and an individual fulfilling this function has the character of a judge.

Then

the function of ascertaining the existence of

the delict and determining the individual or individuals responsible for
it is

a judicial function.

It is hardly possible to overestimate the

importance of this step in establishing a system of collective security.
As a matter of fact, historically it was the first step in the centralization
of this system as applied within the legal community. Tribunals were
the first central organs established within primitive society in time of
peace.
They functioned long before special legislative and executive
organs came into existence. They were first created only by agreement of the parties to the conflict and only for particular cases. Later
they became permanent institutions and assumed compulsory jurisdiction.
This meant that they became competent to decide cases brought
before them not only by an agreement of the parties but by one party or
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even by none of the parties but by a special organ, the public prosecutor.
The functions of tribunals were originally restricted to deciding
whether or not the law had been violated and who had been responsible
for the violation. They could recommend an agreement concerning
compensation for an illegally caused damage. However, they did not
have the authority to order and make binding the execution of the
sanction in case no such agreement could be reached, and they had no
means of enforcing the law at their disposal. This function was left
to the party injured by the delict ascertained by the tribunal.
Its

was the last step in the development of that system of
collective security which is the law of the modern state.
centralization

As long

as only the judicial function but not the execution of the

means for the
enforcement of the law are not concentrated in the hands of a special organ strong enough to overpower any delinquent
that is, to

sanction

is

centralized, in other words, as long as the

—

render successful resistance against the executive force of the community impossible in principle
cases where the law remains unenforced
because the delinquent is more powerful than his opponent may be
quite frequent. Hence, only a relatively low degree of security is
reached. Nevertheless, the importance of a centralization restricted to
the establishment of tribunals without the centralization of the execution of the sanction should not be underestimated. There is an essential difference between a situation in which the question as to which
party in a conflict between two parties is right and which is wrong cannot be decided in an objective and impartial way and a situation in
which it can. The chance of the law being obeyed is much greater in
the second situation than in the first even if the law cannot be enforced
by a central organ of the community. If a party is declared to
be wrong by decision of an impartial tribunal, it will be much less
inclined to enforce its illegal claim against a party declared to be right
by the tribunal or to refuse to comply with the legal claim of this party.
Where courts competent to decide this question exist, the readiness of

—

the parties to a conflict to settle this question by agreement

is

much

which authorizes each party to
decide this question for itself, thus enabling it to justify any enforcement action taken for the realization of its interests. The moral power
of courts has played a decisive part in the evolution of the law, and it
remains greatly important for the efficacy of a legal order and thus for a
collective security established by it.
From the point of view of this
greater than

it is

under a

social order

security, the value of the centralization of the executive function re-

not preceded by the centralization of the judicial function.
In other words, this value is problematical if the employment of force by the central organ of the com-

mains problematical

if this centralization is
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munity

not determined by the decisions of independent tribunals
applying pre-established law, if this central organ can use its power
not to maintain or restore this law but to realize political interests not
is

In the

necessarily in conformity with this law.

field of internal rela-

tions there are indeed systems of collective security

to this type of organization.

3.

which correspond

4

THE PREVENTION OF THE ILLEGAL USE OF FORCE BY
THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF CONFLICTS
The centralization of the first

of the two functions of the application

—the ascertainment by special organs of the violation of
the law and the determination of the party responsible for — the
of the law

it

most

effective

flicts.

means of bringing about the peaceful settlement of con-

The establishment

this respect

is

as

if,

is

of such organs

is

particularly effective in

usually the case, they are also competent to recom-

wrong by
was committed,
or, if this is not possible, to compensate for the illegally caused damage.
If the party concerned complies with this recommendation or order,
the use of force both by the parties to the conflict and by the community (i. e., the use of force as a sanction) is actually prevented.
Prevention of the illegal use of force is usually distinguished from
its repression by the legal use of force, i. e., the execution of sanctions.
However, this distinction is only relative. The purpose of repressive
mend, or even

to order, the guilty party to repair the

restoring the situation which existed before the delict

measures taken in a concrete case as a reaction against an

illegal use

prevent, by deterrence, the illegal use of force in the

of force

is to

future.

If special organs for the peaceful settlement of conflicts are

established,

and

if

the legal use of force

(i. e.,

tion) is permitted only after these organs

the execution of a sanc-

have ascertained the existe.,
illegal use of force) and determined the
it (i. e., the aggressor), and only after this party
has refused to comply with their decision, does the function of these
organs form a preparatory stage in the total procedure of applying the
law. This is just the procedure established within a system of collective security as a reaction against an illegal use of force (i. e., an act of
aggression). If there are no such organs established, a peaceful
settlement of conflicts is possible only on the basis of a voluntary
agreement by the parties involved in the conflict. However, for
reasons already discussed, such an agreement can rarely be reached.
As has been pointed out, the organ competent to ascertain the existence of a delict and to determine the party responsible for it may or
ence of the delict (i.
party responsible for

an
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may

not have the character of a tribunal. If it does not have this
it may be authorized by the legal order to settle the conflicts
brought before it by applying not only the existing law, pre-established by custom or legislation, but also other norms, especially princharacter,

ciples of political convenience.

the power only to

Such a

quasi-judicial organ

make recommendations

may have

to the parties concerning

the settlement of a conflict, so that a conflict can be settled finally only

by an agreement of the parties which comply with the recommendations.
However, if the decision of the quasi- judicial organ is legally
binding upon the parties, it constitutes an individual legal norm,
valid only for this particular case. If the organ has the character
of a tribunal,

it is

usually authorized to apply only the existing,

pre-established law.

However,

it is

possible that a legal order

i. e.,

may

also authorize a tribunal to decide conflicts brought before it

by

applying norms other than those of the existing law. For example,
a tribunal may be authorized to apply principles of justice or equity. 5
This means that the tribunal would be authorized by the existing law
to create new law for the case at hand. This principle has the advantage of rendering the legal system more flexible, for it enables the
tribunal to adapt the law in each case to those particular circumstances
which were not, and often could not have been, foreseen by the
legislator.

There can be no doubt of the fact that from the point of view of
security it is preferable to have conflicts decided by judicial decisions
legally binding upon the parties to the conflict. Furthermore, security
is guaranteed to a higher degree if the individual norm, constituted by
the judicial decision, is determined, as far as possible, by pre-established general norms of positive law rather than by principles of

—in contradistinction to the
norms of positive law, especially those established by legislation— are
justice or equity.

Since these principles

not objectively discernible, the power to resolve conflicts of interest
according to principles of justice or equity means that the conflict is
decided according to the subjective opinion of a judge as to what is
just or equitable.
Hence, the advantage of flexibility is gained at the
expense of security, for there is a higher degree of uncertainty concern-

ing the content of the decision the tribunal will issue, and that means
a lower degree of security, than there would be if the tribunal were
bound by pre-established general norms of positive law. If these
pre-established norms were applied, the decision could be foreseen, at
This is the conleast to a certain extent, by the parties concerned.
nection between the collective security guaranteed in general by a

and the above mentioned "legal security" (Rechtssicherestablished by the so-called rule-of-law principle.

legal order
heit)

—
17
It should, however, be kept in

mind

that the difference between a

judicial decision applying pre-established general
i.

e.,

norms of

positive,

customary or statutory law, and a judicial decision applying

principles of justice or equity,

sumed

to be.

The assumption

is

not as essential as

it is

usually as-

that there exists an essential difference

between the two kinds of judicial decision is based on the idea that the
judicial application of positive law has a merely declaratory character,
whereas the judicial application of principles of justice or equity has a
constitutive character, insofar as by the latter a positive obligation
and the corresponding right is created or abolished, whereas the
former has no such effect. According to this view a judge in deciding
a case by applying positive law does not create an obligation and the
corresponding right which did not exist, nor does he abolish an obligation and the corresponding right which did exist prior to the decision. In a dispute, either the existence of the fact to which an undisputed rule of law is to be applied or the existence of a rule of law to
be applied to an undisputed fact may be disputed. The judicial decision, according to this view, only ends the dispute by ascertaining in
an authoritative way either the existence or non-existence of the disputed fact, which implies that the undisputed rule of law is or is not
applicable in this case, or by ascertaining the existence or non-existence

of the disputed rule of law.
so to speak, disputed

law.

The

Thus the

judicial decision transforms,,

law into undisputed and,

fallacy of this doctrine

is

finally,

undisputable

that the authoritative ascertain-

ment of a disputed fact as well as the ascertainment of a disputed rule
of law is not merely a declaratory but a highly constitutive act.
In case a fact

is

disputed, the judicial decision, ascertaining that the

and consequently constitutes the applicability of the general rule of law referring to the f acL
In the sphere of law the fact "exists," even if in the sphere of nature
the fact has not occurred. If a court of last resort declares that an
individual has concluded with another individual a contract and has
not fulfilled it or that an individual has committed murder, the disputed nonfulfillment of the contract or the commission of murder are
fact has occurred, legally "creates" the fact

legal facts, even if in reality the defendant has not concluded a contract

or the accused has not committed the murder.

As

a "legal" fact

which the law attaches certain consequences (duties r
fact, and accordingly its consequences, are
"created" by the judicial decision; and it is only as a legal fact that
it counts.
In case a general rule of law is disputed, because the existence or the meaning of the rule is doubtful, the decision of the court

that

is,

as a fact to

rights, sanctions)

—the

interpreting the legal order or a special rule of that order is not less
creative than the authentic and definitive ascertainment of a fact as
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the essential condition of the application of a general legal rule.

The

application of a general norm to a concrete case is by its very nature
an individualization of this norm. That the judicial decision is legally
binding upon the parties means that it is a legal norm, an individual
legal norm constituting an individual obligation and the corresponding
individual right of the respective parties. This individual legal norm
is

created by the judicial act.

This becomes particularly evident when the meaning of a general
is disputed.
There are almost always two and sometimes
even several different interpretations which, from a logical point of
view, are equally possible. This means that the existing rule of law
is a framework of several different rules.
By choosing one of them
the law-applying organ excludes the others and thus creates, for the
concrete case, a new law. Prior to the decision, the question of law
with respect to the dispute could be answered by referring to several
rules equally applicable to the case, but after the decision the question
can be answered only by referring to one of them, the one chosen by
the law-applying organ.
There is, to be sure, a certain difference between a judicial decision
by which one of several different interpretations of a pre-existing rule
of positive law is chosen and a judicial decision by which a principle of
justice or equity
that is, a norm is applied which cannot be presented as one of several possible interpretations of a pre-existing rule
of positive law. However, this difference is not as strongly marked as
it seems to be.
It is an undeniable fact that under the pretext of interpreting the pre-existing law courts have applied new principles and
thus considerably changed the positive law. There is, indeed, only
a difference of degree between a judicial decision applying a general
norm of pre-established positive law and a judicial decision applying a
new principle, whether this new principle is called justice or equity or
something else. Even if a tribunal is not expressly authorized to decide cases according to principles of justice or equity, it is hardly possible to restrict its power completely to the application of the existing
law, to prevent the tribunal from creating new law, especially if the
tribunal is the supreme judicial organ and its decisions are endowed
with the force of law that is, if its decisions are final. The application of the law necessarily presupposes an interpretation of the law
to be applied, and even remarkable changes in an existing law may be,
and often are, presented merely as interpretations of the law.
rule of law

—

—

—
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4.

LEGAL (JUSTICIABLE) AND POLITICAL (NONJUSTICIABLE) CONFLICTS (DISPUTES)

The difference between settling a conflict by applying a general
norm of pre-established law and settling it by having the organ competent to settle a conflict establish a new law has led to the distinction
between two kinds of conflicts legal conflicts and non-legal or political
conflicts.
"Legal" conflicts are considered to be those conflicts capable of being settled by the application of a general norm of pre-established law, and consequently capable of being settled by tribunals
which normally are competent to settle conflicts only by the application
of the existing law. "Political" conflicts, on the other hand, are considered to be those conflicts not capable of being settled in this way
and consequently, if not settled by the use of force or by voluntary
agreement of the parties, capable of being settled by the decision of
an organ competent to create a new legal norm valid for the particular
case.
With respect to the capacity or incapacity of a conflict to be
settled by applying pre-established law, legal conflicts are considered
justiciable and political conflicts non- justiciable.
This distinction between legal or justiciable and political or nonjusticiable conflicts presupposes the view that there are conflicts which
cannot be settled by the application of a general norm of pre-established law because this law does not contain a norm referring to the
subject concerned that is, to the interest with respect to which the
parties are in conflict. Hence, according to this view, in this respect
there is a gap in the law. If there is a gap that is, if there is no gen:

—

eral legal

norm capable

—

—a

of regulating a definite subject

conflict

concerning this subject cannot be settled by the application of the existing law. Consequently, if it cannot be settled by agreement of the
parties, it can be settled peacefully only by a new legal norm to be
created expressly by the judicial or quasi-judicial organ to cover this
subject.

The view

that there are conflicts which cannot be settled by apply-

ing the law which exists at the time a conflict arises because this law
does not contain a general norm referring to the subject of the conflict is erroneous.
Whatever the content of a positive legal order,
there are only two possibilities with respect to applying it to a
conflict.

A so-called dispute,

i. e.,

a conflict which does not yet imply

the use of force and hence which can

be settled peacefully, consists of one party, the plaintiff, claiming that another party should
behave in a certain way, while this other party, the defendant, refuses to so behave. One possibility is that the existing law does
contain a norm imposing an obligation upon the defendant to behave
still
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in the

way

In applying the existing law, then,

the plaintiff claims.

the conflict would be decided in favor of the plaintiff.
possibility

is

The

other

norm
the way

that the existing legal order does not contain a

imposing an obligation upon the defendant to behave in
This would mean that the defendant would
the plaintiff claims.
be legally free to behave as he pleases, the plaintiff's claim would have
no legal basis, and, in applying the existing law to this case, the con-

would be decided in favor of the defendant, since the claim of the
There is no third possibility. This is
plaintiff would be rejected.
the consequence of the fundamental principle of a positive law that
what is not legally forbidden is legally permitted, or formulated in
flict

way

—

—

not legally obliged to behave in a
certain way, he is legally free to behave as he pleases, and this freedom
is a legal freedom, a freedom guaranteed by the law.
This means
that the subject matter of a dispute is regulated by the existing legal
order not only if this order contains a general norm obligating one
party to behave in a certain way towards the other party with respect
a positive

if a subject is

to this subject, but also if the legal order does not contain such a

norm. If the legal order does not regulate a subject in a positive
way, it regulates it in a negative way. Hence, there is no subject
which is not regulated either positively or negatively by a positive
legal order. There are no "gaps" in a positive legal order, or, what
amounts to the same, there are no cases where the law- applying
organ is forced to declare a non liquet, that is to say, refuse to
decide a dispute because there is no general norm applicable to it. 6a
Under a positive legal order there are no conflicts which, on account
of this subject, cannot be decided by the application of existing law
and which, in this sense, are not legal or justiciable but political conflicts.
The assumption that a positive legal order may not be ap-

—

—

plicable in a particular dispute because of a

not correct.

law

What

is

possible

is

—to be not satisfactory,

i.

in this legal order is

that the application of the existing

to a concrete case is considered

another

gap

e.,

—from

one point of view or

inequitable or unjust.

The

basic

and non- justiciable conflicts, which is usually presented as a "gap" in the existing law, is
really the difference between the positive law as it actually is established and a law as it should be established if it is to conform with

fact in the distinction between justiciable

What is presented as a logical impossibility is in
truth a moral-political insufficiency. Yet the judgment that the positive law, or its application in a concrete case, is inequitable or unjust
equity or justice. 6

a subjective value judgment by which any application of the law
may be disapproved. From the point of view of socialism, the
entire legal order based on the capitalist principle of private propis
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and unjust. The application of
the existing law is always unsatisfactory from the point of view of
the party whose claim is not confirmed by the decision which applies
the law and satisfactory from the point of view of the party in whose
favor the dispute is decided. Since, under the law of modern states,
tribunals have compulsory jurisdiction and consequently are competent
erty is unsatisfactory, inequitable

to decide a dispute even if only one party submits the case to the

and since normally at least one party to a dispute may expect
a favorable decision from an application of the existing law, a distinction between justiciable and non- justiciable disputes is of no
tribunal,

practical importance.

The

under
which tribunals are established by agreement of the parties to an existing dispute or, when already established prior to the coming into
existence of a dispute, under which tribunals have no compulsory jurisdiction.
Under these conditions, it is quite possible that one party,
by an agreement with the other party, would be willing to establish a
tribunal competent to settle their dispute, or, again by agreement, to
submit the dispute to an already established tribunal, but only if this
tribunal were authorized by the agreement to settle the dispute not in
conformity with the existing law but by a decision in which principles
of equity or justice would be applied. In this case, a distinction between disputes the parties want settled in conformity with existing
law and disputes the parties want settled in another way would be
justified.
If it is this difference which is meant by the terms "legal"
(justiciable) disputes and "political" (non- justiciable) disputes, the
situation

is

different in the case of a primitive legal order

distinction is acceptable.

When

a legislator, aware of the fact that he cannot foresee all pos-

and that consequently the application of the gennorms he has established may not be appropriate in some cases,
wants to authorize the tribunals not to apply these norms in these cases
but to decide them by creating a new and more appropriate norm, he
faces the problem of how to formulate the conditions under which the
sible circumstances

eral

judge should be authorized to act, exceptionally, as a legislator. It is
understandable that a legislator would not want to use the formula:
if the application of the existing law is not satisfactory.
This would
be authorization for the judge to set aside the existing law whenever
he does not consider this law to be satisfactory. On the other hand,
this authorization cannot be restricted to cases in which the legislator
considers the application of the existing law not to be satisfactory.
Such a restriction would be possible only if the legislator could specify
these cases, and if he could specify these cases he would not need to
substitute the judge for the legislator.
Hence the legislator has no
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choice but to allow the judge to decide for himself the question as to

whether or not the application of the existing law to a concrete case is
In effect, this means that the judge has the power to
satisfactory.
set aside the existing law and decide a case as legislator whenever he
does not consider the application of the existing law to be appropriate,
for there are always circumstances which may justify the opinion that
the application of the existing law is not appropriate and hence which
may lead to the assumption that the legislator had not foreseen them.
In order to avoid a formula which expressly confers such an extraordinary power upon a judge, the fiction of gaps in the law is used. The
legislator authorizes the judge to act as legislator if the existing law
cannot be applied to a concrete case because this law does not contain
a general

norm

applicable to the case.

Psychologically, this fiction

may have the

intended effect of restricting the authority of the judge,
for if the judge believes that he is allowed to act as legislator when the
law cannot be applied, he will make use of this authorization only in
very rare cases. 7

That there are gaps in the existing law because there are elements
in cases which the lawmaker has not foreseen is a juristic fiction. Its
purpose is to justify the fact that legislative power is expressly conThis justification applies particularly within a legal and political system based on
the principle of the separation of powers in general and on the prinThe power of the judge to act
ciple of the rule-of-law in particular.
as legislator constitutes a remarkable restriction of these principles.
On the other hand, it is the nearest approach to the ideal of a perfectly
flexible law.
If the judge makes use of this power, his decisions cannot be foreseen. As previously noted, this means that the degree of
security afforded by the law is reduced.
ferred upon, or actually exercised by, judicial organs.

5.

REMOVAL OF THE CAUSES OF THE ILLEGAL USE OF
FORCE

A

more effective method of preventing an illegal use of force and
thus of guaranteeing collective security than the establishment of
organs for the peaceful settlement of conflicts is the removal of circumstances which are the causes of these breaches of the peace. This
point is stressed particularly in the political doctrine of socialism.
Starting from the assumption that the main causes of the disturbance
of a social order, the breach of internal peace, are of an economic
nature, this doctrine arrives at the conclusion that only a social order

which guarantees its subjects the complete satisfaction of their economic needs is able to guarantee peace and that collective security is
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thus essentially economic security. Since only a socialist economic
system can afford this guarantee, only under socialism can collective
security be achieved, and achieved to such a degree that no coercion is
necessary to maintain the order. When the causes of a violation of
the order are removed, there is no reason for using force as a reaction
against such violations. The social order of perfect socialism, which
is called communism, is not a coercive order which means that it is
not a legal order.
communist society of the future would be a

A

stateless

and lawless

would not be
This

is

society.

The

collective security of

communism

legal security.

a Utopian scheme because its presupposition that violations

of a social order are caused only or mainly by its economic insufficiency
Even in a capitalist society,
is contrary to all our social experiences.
ambition and sexual desire are motives of violence which are no less
effective than hunger, and it is more than likely that they would play

an even greater part in a society in which economic motives for illegal
conduct were removed. It is therefore an illusion to believe that,
even if it could secure the satisfaction of all economic needs, a social
order could prevent all its violations (i. e., every possible breach of
peace by an illegal use of force) and thus make the legal use of force,
as a sanction, superfluous.
Hence, this concept of absolute security
is an illusion, the illusion of a social order without force.
It is necessary to be aware of this illusion because in the theory of international
security there is a strong tendency to consider economic circumstances
as the main causes of war and hence to assume that preventing war
by removing its economic causes is more important than attempting
to prevent war by providing for repressive sanctions to be imposed by
internationally organized enforcement actions. If the development
of collective security under national law can teach us anything with
respect to the development of collective security under international
law and there is good reason to assume that the latter will not be
essentially different from the former it is that there is a danger implied in overestimating the economic factors of social life and in

—

—

underestimating the necessity for a coercive order, that is, in underestimating the necessity for repressive enforcement measures for the
maintenance of peace, which means underestimating the necessity for
a legal system of collective security.
6.

THE CENTRALIZATION OF THE USE OF FORCE AS A
SANCTION

As has been

noted, the centralization of the second stage of the
procedure by which the law is applied to a concrete violation, the
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execution of the sanction (i. e., the use of force as a reaction against the
delict) either may or may not be preceded by the centralization of the
first stage,

the ascertainment of the delict and the determination of the

party or parties responsible for it. Furthermore, the second stage
may be carried out in different ways each constituting a different degree
of centralization. Even without instituting special judicial or quasijudicial organs for the first stage of the procedure, the legal order may
authorize not only the subject directly injured by a delict but also the

—

other members of the community to execute the sanctions that is, to
apply the enforcement measures provided for by the law. This means
that in case the legal order

munity have the right

is

violated, all the

members of the com-

to assist the victim in his legitimate reaction

—

that is, against the illegal use of
which,
in
narrower
the term, means only the illegal
the
sense
of
force
use of physical force, or, in the wider sense, means any violation of
legally protected interests. Even the most primitive legal order must
be interpreted as establishing this right. Under such a legal order,
several subjects may enter an agreement for the purpose of mutual

against the violation of his rights

This agreement may impose an obligation upon the parties
agreement to assist each other against an illegal use of force
either on the part of subjects not parties to the agreement or on the
part of members of the particular community constituted by the agreement. However, the legal order constituting the total community may
impose such an obligation upon all its members, and even the most
primitive legal orders do so, to protect the community against aggression from outside the community, especially against Avarlike enforcement action taken by a hostile community. Defense of an entire community against external aggression by another community requires
organization, and organization means centralization, for example, the
establishment of a special organ to direct defense, the appointment of
a military leader, etc. Military leaders were probably the first central
organs and military organizations for either defensive or aggressive
purposes the first attempts at centralization in the process of social
evolution. In the past, the centralization of the use of force by one
community in its war against another community undertaken to guarantee external security preceded the centralization of the use of force
within the community guaranteeing internal security.
The extent of the obligation imposed upon the members of a total
or partial community to come to the assistance of the victim of an
illegal use of force committed within this community may differ.
assistance.

to the

The members

of the

community may be obliged

to assist the victim

only by means short of the use of physical force, or they may be
obliged to give assistance by employing all appropriate means in-
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eluding the use of physical force. Whether the members of the community are only authorized or whether they are obliged to participate
in the defense of the immediate victim, and whether their assistance
is or is not limited to certain measures, the defense has a collective
character. It is collective and no longer merely individual or selfdefense.

To speak

of collective self-defense, a term used in Article

51 of the Charter of the United Nations,

is

The mem-

misleading.

ber of a community who, without being injured himself, comes to
the assistance of the victim of an illegal use of force (in either the

narrower or wider sense of the term) does not defend himself, he defends another. Only if the individual is identified with the other
members of the group to which he belongs can the defense of one member by the others be called collective self-defense. However, such identification, if admissible at all, is justified only within a group in which
the members are so closely connected that their thinking and feeling
have a thoroughly collectivistic character. This is the case within a
primitive family or tribe but not within an international community
like the United Nations. Collective defense against an illegal use of
force constitutes collective security. However, it is a very low degree
of security as long as neither the first nor the second stage of the application of the law is centralized that is, as long as neither special
organs for the peaceful settlement of conflicts nor special organs for
the legal use of force provided for as sanctions are established and

—

—

the principle of self-help prevails.

The establishment of a judicial

or quasi- judicial organ for the peace-

ful settlement of conflicts is a first attempt to

overcome this.

the decisive step in eliminating the principle of self-help

However,
is

the insti-

tution of a central organ whose competence refers to the execution of

the sanctions as reactions against violations of the legal order, or,

amounts

what

an illegal use of force in the widest sense
of the term. This executive organ may or may not be a government,
or it may or may not be subordinated to a government that is, the
to the same, against

—

community may or may not be so centralized that it has the character
of a state. Even if the executive organ does not have the character
of a government or is not placed under a government, it may be bound
in the exercise of its function by the decisions of an independent tri-

may

be able to take action only in case the tribunal
has ascertained the existence of an illegal use of force, and only
against a party which the tribunal has found responsible. However,
bunal, so that

it

an executive organ may have the power to decide these questions for
itself, not in conformity with the existing law as a tribunal is supposed to decide, but by applying principles of political convenience.
The organ may be competent only to make recommendations to the
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members of the community concerning the

exercise of their right, or

the fulfillment of their obligation, to assist the victim of an illegal use

of force.

At

a higher stage in the development of collective security,

upon the members of the community. As long
as the executive organ does not have its own means to perform enforcement actions at its direct disposal, it can only direct the actions which
the members of the community take to assist the victim of an illegal
use of force either by making recommendations to the members of
the community or by making decisions binding on the members of
the community. In this case, the difference between this stage of
collective security and the stage in which the principle of self-help still
its

decisions are binding

This is particularly true because the
members of the community must remain armed in order to be able to
prevails

is

not very great.

exercise their right, or fulfill their obligation, to assist the victim of

However, the executive organ may have a
A police force is a body of armed
individuals professionally trained and organized for the purpose of
applying the enforcement measures provided for by the law as reactions against an illegal use of force by a member of the community.
If the executive organ has such a force at its disposal, it can effect the
disarmament of the members of the community, one of the most important conditions for an effective system of collective security. Only
then is the complete centralization of the force monopoly of the community, and thus the highest degree of collective security, achieved.
an

illegal use of force.

police force at its direct disposal.

This stage has been reached only within the modern state.
It is important to note that the disarmament of the members of a

community is effected by the establishment of a police
force rather than by express prohibitions concerning the possession of
arms. Besides, such prohibitions are never absolute. Under the law
of modern states, the legal possession of arms, or at least of certain
arms, by private persons is normally possible if an individual obtains
a special license granted by the administration. In certain military
national legal

organizations, for example in the militia system of Switzerland, per-

sons belonging to the reserve are obliged to keep their guns in their
possession even during the period they are not in active service.
7.

With

SELF-DEFENSE

the establishment of a police force at the disposal of a central

organ accompanied by the disarmament or effective control of the
armament of the members of a community, the centralization of the
force monopoly of a community approaches its culmination. Nevertheless even at this stage the principle of self-help is not completely
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eliminated.

It is preserved in the right of self-defense

which

indi-

viduals have even under the law of the modern state, the order guaranteeing the highest possible degree of collective security. The right of
self-defense is considered to be an application of the principle of

which is an inherent or innate right of man.

According to the natural-law doctrine, the right of self-defense authorizes an
individual to protect his life, person and sometimes his property by
the use of physical force against an attempt by another individual to
This right
inflict injury on him by an illegal use of physical force.
may include the use of physical force for the purpose of defending not
only one's own life, person and property but also the life, person and
property of each of the members of one's own family. It may be
exercised not only in case of an actual but also in case of an imminent
However, it may be exercised only in
illegal use of physical force.
case of necessity that is, only if there is no other possibility of defendself-preservation

—

ing one's legitimate interest.
The right of self-defense presupposes that, in principle, the use of
physical force is legally forbidden. Hence, the use of physical force in
the exercise of self-defense constitutes an exception to this prohibition.
Under a social order which does not contain such a prohibition, no right
of self-defense, as the right to react by the use of physical force against
an illegal use of physical force, can exist. Under a primitive legal
order which does not centralize the employment of force, the right of
self-defense is implied in the principle of self-help which is the reaction
of an individual against any violation of his rights. Even under a
legal order which establishes a centralized force monopoly, self-defense
is

the indispensable

minimum of self-help.

It is indispensable because

a centralized security organization cannot function at the same time
that an illegal use of force

is

tralized function of the legal

community acting through the individual
community by using force in defending

attempted.

Since self-defense is permitted only as a reaction against an illegal use of force, its exercise
involves a certain risk if a legal authority must eventually confirm its
lawfulness. If it is lawful, its exercise may be interpreted as a decen-

who

enforces the law of the

himself.

There

is

a certain relationship between the right of self-defense and

the delict of aggression.
react

If the right of self-defense

by the use of physical force against an

is

the right to

act of aggression as

an

and the delict of
aggression are complementary: where there is an act of aggression
there is a right of self-defense; and there is a right of self-defense
only where there is an act of aggression. But within a system of colillegal use of physical force, the right of self-defense

370624—57
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may

lective security the right of self-defense

be restricted to the

reaction against an illegal use of physical force, whereas the legal
order constituting the security organization may prohibit as acts of
aggression not only the illegal use of physical force but other violations of protected interests. Then there may be acts of aggression
without a corresponding right of self-defense. 8
8.

THE CENTRALIZATION OF THE LAW-CREATING FUNCTION (THE PEACEFUL CHANGE OF ESTABLISHED LEGAL
RELATIONS)
The development of national law is characterized by

the fact that the

centralization of the law-creating function has been preceded by the
centralization of the law-applying function.

central executive organs

had come

Long after tribunals and

law of states was
by custom. The establish-

into existence, the

created, in a completely decentralized way,

ment of legislative organs was the last step in the process of centralization which led to the law of the modern state. Even when parliamentary bodies assumed the power to create general legal norms, great and
important parts of the legal order preserved the character of customary
law, e. g., the common law in the Anglo-Saxon countries. This is
evidence of the fact that from the point of view of collective security
the centralization of the law-creating function by establishing legis-

minor importance. However, in the theory of international security, it is still argued, and the argument is considered to be
of great weight, that the establishment of courts and the organization
of collective enforcement actions are useless as long as there are no
lative organs is of

international legislative organs to afford the possibility for a peaceful

change of established legal relations which have become unbearable for
one party for one reason or another. It is a widespread view that
centralizing the law-applying function without centralizing the lawcreating function results in conserving the status quo, and that the
attempt to maintain existing legal relations in spite of changing power
relations inevitably constitutes a serious threat to the peace, which
means a serious threat to security. This argument is not confirmed by
the development of national law which has actually led to the relatively
highest degree of collective security. Those who apply this argument
underestimate the decisive influence tribunals exercise on the formation
of the law, especially when these tribunals have compulsory jurisdicThe development of customary law stems mainly from the
tion.
practice of courts nor is statutory law immune from being changed in
the judicial process. Threats to the internal peace of a community
arise from concrete situations, especially those established by contracts,
;
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rather than from the insufficient content of general norms. In order to
remove the danger implied in a concrete situation, as a rule it is not

necessary to change these general norms by a legislative act. The
danger may be removed by creating an individual norm providing a

This

single exception valid only for the concrete case.

task of a tribunal.

whose function

is

is

the proper

It is not the proper task of a legislative

If such a judicial

to create general legal norms.

decision creating an individual

norm

organ

constitutes a precedent followed

in other judicial decisions of similar cases, a law-creating custom

is

established, and the general norm referring to these cases is abolished
and replaced by a new general norm adapted to the circumstances

which caused the precedent.

The change

justified if its application proves to

It

is justified if

norm

is

not

be unsatisfactory in only one case.

the circumstances which

factory exist in several cases.

of a general

make

its

application unsatis-

It is difficult to decide

whether the

adaptation of the existing law to changing circumstances is better
achieved by the function of the legislative organ within a system of
statutory law or by the practice of courts within a system of customary
law. However, there is no question that the necessary adaptation, and
hence peaceful change, of legal relations which have become a threat to
the peace is possible without the establishment of a legislative organ.
The adaptation can be made by the courts, provided that the courts

have sufficient jurisdiction to exercise this function.
9.

UNIVERSAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS

A security organization whose members are individual human beings
universal if it comprises the whole of mankind it is regional if it
comprises only a part of mankind. In this sense the difference between a universal and a regional security organization is that of a
total and a partial organization.
However, by "regional" security
organization may be meant not only a partial organization but also an
organization of individuals living on definite territory, or an organization whose security functions are limited to a certain geographical
area.
As long as no world state exists, security organizations whose
members are individual human beings must have a regional character.
The states which exist today and which are constituted by national
legal orders are regional security organizations in the sense that they
are organizations of only parts of humanity and that their members
are living on a definite territory. The security organization of a
state guarantees not only internal security, that is, protection against
internal aggression, the use of force by one subject directed against
another subject of the state, but also external security, that is, protec-

is

;
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tion against external aggression
internal security guaranteed

much higher degree than

:

use of force by another state.

by a state organization

is

The

evidently of a

can insure; the latter
reaches its highest degree only within a world state where, as a result of
the external security

it

the universality of the organization, external aggression

Even

if

the world state

had the character of a

is

excluded.

federal state within

which the member states were not completely disarmed, so that the
use of armed force by one member state against another were not absolutely excluded, this act of aggression would be, from the viewpoint
of the world state, an act of internal aggression. Such an act of aggression, however, would risk an effective reaction by the police force
of the world state and hence probably would be prevented by the
organization. Hence the tendency toward the universality of the security organization, the demand for a world state.
The international community constituted by general international
law is indeed a universal security organization, but its subjects are
This does not mean that individual human beings are not its
states.
members, but it does mean that individual human beings are only indirectly (as subjects of states) members of the international security
organization.

the security of

As has been pointed out, collective security is always
individual human beings, and the acts of states regu-

by an international security system are always acts performed
by individual human beings. However, these individual acts are not
determined directly by the legal order constituting the security syslated

tem, as

is

the case within the national security organization of the

but indirectly as the international legal order constituting the
international security system determines these individual acts through
the intermediary of the national legal orders.
state,

The

universal security organization constituted by general interna-

tional law, because of its

high degree of decentralization, guarantees

only the lowest possible degree of collective security (provided the
helium justum principle is positive law) 9 Where there exists a higher
degree of centralization and hence a higher degree of collective security
,

in the relations between states, it is established

by

by particular interna-

which not all of the states are contractCovenant of the League of Nations and the
Charter of the United Nations. Insofar as the one did not and the
other does not comprise all the states of the world, the one was and
tional law, that

is,

treaties to

ing parties, such as the

only a regional, not a universal, security organization.
But since the overwhelming majority of the states of the world were
members of the League and are members of the United Nations, and
since both organizations were established with a tendency toward
universality and the purpose to guarantee world peace, they may be
the other

is

—
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considered as quasi-universal security organizations. The question as
to whether and in what sense within such quasi-universal international
security organizations so-called regional security organizations are
possible, shall be discussed later. 10

NOTES
1.

2.

Cf. pp. 66 ff.
L. Ehrlich {Collective Security, p. 154) said: "Security, in the legal sense

of the term, means the actual protection of the interests which are safeguarded
by the existing legal system." This is a tautological definition. If interests
are safeguarded by the law, they are protected by the law. Security, in the legal
sense of the term (and there is no other sense in which this term may be considered ) means simply the protection of certain interests by the law.
3. As we shall see later, the question of the narrower or broader meaning of
the term "force" is also important in defining the right of self-defense that is,
,

—

—

the right to use force against some kind of aggression and in interpreting the
prohibition against the "threat or use of force" stipulated by the Charter of
the United Nations.

Cf. p. 57.

Cf. pp. 120 ff.
5. It is usual to distinguish between justice and equity; but there is hardly
any difference between them insofar as equity is supposed to be like justice
a system of norms different from positive law, conceived of as pre-established
4.

—

general norms created by custom, legislation or international agreement. In
a study on "Justice and Equity in International Relations" {Justice and Equity
in the International Sphere. The New Commonwealth Institute Monographs,
Series B, No. 1, 1936, pp. 1-13), Gustav Radbruch, one of the leading legal

and equity are identical (p. 5)
but tries to differentiate two normative systems by the method of acquiring
the knowledge of the principles concerned. The specific method by which the
principles of justice called "equity" are established is the case method of the
Anglo-American legal systems. This method does not consist, as Radbruch
asserts, in the general principle of justice, applied by the tribunal, being derived
from the nature of the concrete case that is, by an inference from that what
actually is to that what ought to be, or what amounts to the same from a
fact to a norm or from social reality to a social value. Such an inference is
based on a logical fallacy; nor can such a result be achieved by "intuition."
Intuition is a highly subjective, uncontrollable faculty of the human mind. Two
different judges, starting from the same case, by their intuition arrive at wholly
different and even contradictory principles of justice or equity.
To leave the
decision of a case to the intuition of the judge means to leave it to his unlimited
discretion, and this is indeed what the case method, at least to a certain extent,
amounts to. It is characterized by the fact that the first case is decided by the
application of a principle which the judge, within his subjective discretion,
considers as just. This decision becomes a precedent and, in this way, finally a
rule of customary law. It is the specific function of the case method to transform justice (or equity), and that means a principle which in the first case
of its application is considered by the judge as a principle of justice or equity,
into a rule of positive, namely customary, law which determines the decision
of the following cases. However, in deciding the first case the judge is not
determined by a pre-established general rule of positive law. The position of the
philosophers, admits that the principles of justice

—

—

—
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judge is the same as that of a legislator who, too, transforms a principle which
he considers just into positive law. It is in this respect that the case method,
as the specific method of customary law, differs from the method of statutory
law according to which no judicial decision is possible without a pre-established
general rule of positive law. Within this legal system, the rule-of-law principle
has no exception, whereas within a system of customary law there are necessarily cases, the precedential cases, which are to be decided without a preestablished general rule of positive law being applied.
It is of the greatest importance to be aware that the principle of justice or
equity applied in these cases is not as it is usually assumed to be as a matter
of course an objectively ascertainable value, a norm the cognition of which can
be acquired independently of the subjective preferences of the judging subject in
the same way that the knowledge of the rules of positive law is obtained. These
rules are objectively ascertainable because they are established by legislation,
custom or treaties that is, by facts perceptible by our senses under the control
of our reason. However, principles of justice or equity, applied in a first case,
before being transformed into a rule of customary law, are not established by
objectively ascertainable facts but are, in the last analysis, based on highly subjective, emotional elements of the human mind.
Consequently, there is not one
justice or equity as there is only one positive law one French, one American, one
international law but many different and contradictory systems of justice or
equity, each of them claiming validity for the same territorial and personal
sphere. The idea that there exists only one justice or equity is one of the most
misleading illusions, and to speak of justice or equity as most writers do as if
there were only one system of norms properly called justice or equity is either
an intellectual insincerity or a naive, but unpardonable, ignorance. Hence, to
establish a tribunal of equity means to establish a tribunal endowed with the
power of deciding at least first cases according to its free discretion. The
objection that even such a tribunal should be directed by considerations of
general welfare, commonweal, interest of the community, and the like, does not
All these terms designate values which are no less subjective than justice
hold.

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

:

—

or equity.
5a. It has been objected that the denial of the possibility of gaps in the law
and hence of a non liquet is limited to decisions of disputes that if the parties
without asserting any right in the matter of their conflicting interests ask a
court to decide the case, it may be that the court is not able to do so. Such a case
may arise, e. g., when the frontier between two estates or two state territories is
in question, insofar as there is between those parts of the two estates or state
territories which are not in question a piece of land the legal status of which is
uncertain. In these cases, too, there are only two possibilities. Either the court
can ascertain facts which according to the existing law constiute property or
sovereignty and consequently can, in applying the existing law, draw a definite
Or the court cannot ascertain
line between the two estates or state territories.
such facts because none of the parties can prove that it has with respect to the
piece of land in question performed acts which constitute property or sovereignty.
Then the legal status of the piece of land in question is that of res nullius or of
stateless territory, both statuses regulated by national and international law
;

respectively.

The

court, in applying this law, has to

make a

decision to this

There is no gap in the law, but there may be a gap in the knowledge of
facts.
But facts which are not known to the law-applying organ and hence
cannot be ascertained by it, legally do not exist.
effect.
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Sometimes the term "gap"

law

used to characterize merely technical
a statute provides that an assembly
must elect its chairman, and that it must be convoked by its chairman, but
contains no provision concerning the convocation of the first meeting of the
assembly. However, such technical "gaps" are not decisive as far as the above
mentioned doctrine is concerned.
7. The above mentioned fiction is used in the famous paragraph 1 of the Swiss
Civil Code which provides that in default of a provision of statutory law applicable (to the case at hand) the judge shall decide in accordance with customary law and in default of a rule of customary law in accordance with the rules
he would establish if he had to legislate.
8. Cf. pp. 59 ff.
9. Cf. pp. 34 eff.
10. Cf. pp. 258 ff.
t>.

in

defects in the drafting of a statute,

;

is

e. g., if

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

III.
1.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY UNDER GENERAL
INTERNATIONAL LAW
(a)

As

The Bellum

J us turn Principle

part of this study, international security
the collective security which states enjoy within the international

is

pointed out in the

first

community constituted by international

law.

As

it is

an essential

function of any legal order to afford security to the persons subjected
it, general international law, i. e., the system of norms binding upon

to

all

the states of the world, must also

that

it is

law in the

fulfill this

function, provided

which means law

specific sense,

in the

same sense

as national law, the law of an individual state.

The nature
be,

of the normative order called "international law"

and actually

is,

described in different ways.

tions in the first part of this study,

it

From

may

the considera-

follows that this description

depends mainly on the answers to two preliminary questions: (1)
does this order have a coercive character that is, do its norms provide

—

for the use of force as a sanction, as a reaction against a violation
of certain interests of the states, the persons subjected to this order;

and (2) is the use of physical force, which in international relations
means armed force, permitted only as a sanction? In other words,
is any use of armed force resorted to by one state against another to
be considered as illegal, i. e., as a delict, if it does not have the character
of a sanction

?

As far as the first question is concerned, there is no doubt that there
are enforcement measures provided for by general international law
General international law

to protect certain interests of the states.

authorizes the states to react against a violation of these interests by

Reprisals are usually defined as measures which
are normally illegal but are permitted exceptionally as a reaction by

acts called reprisals.

one state against a violation of

its

rights by another state.

A reprisal

by one state in the otherwise protected
sphere of interests of another.
reprisal is a forcible interference,
insofar as it is undertaken against the will of the state against which
the action is directed, and in this sense, it is an enforcement measure,
the term "force" used in its wider sense.
reprisal may even involve
the use of physical, i. e., armed, force, as, for example, in case of a
constitutes an interference

A

A
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However, this forcible interference in the
of another state must be limited to the violation

so-called pacific blockade.

sphere of interests

of certain interests, in contradistinction to that unlimited interference

undertaken by the armed force of a state against another state which
is called war.
A reprisal may be interpreted as being a sanction, because a reprisal is provided for by general international law as a
reaction against a violation of the law. Hence, general international
law may be considered to be a coercive order that is, a system of norms
providing for coercive measures as sanctions.
As far as the second question is concerned, the answer is rather

—

doubtful.

It is true that the limited use of force

is

considered to

it is not a reaction against a violation of
not a sanction. However, as far as the unlimited use of armed force, war, is concerned, two diametrically
opposed opinions are advocated in the theory of international law.

be illegal,

i.

e.,

—that

the law

a delict, if

is,

if it is

According to one, war

never a delict under general international
law. As a consequence of its sovereignty, every state may resort to
war against another state for any reason whatsoever without viois

lating international law, unless a state has assumed an obligation in

a treaty which restricts

Furthermore, war is not a sanction, for general international law does not
provide for war, as it does provide for reprisals as specific reactions
against the illegal conduct of a state. According to this opinion,
only a limited use of force, but not an unlimited use of armed force,
is a delict if it is not a sanction.
Hence, under general international
law there is no force monopoly of the community constituted by this
law, not even a decentralized one, analogous to the force monopoly
established by national law, constituting a community of individuals.
A state which resorts to war against another state, even if it
does so in defense against an attack, cannot be considered to act as
an organ of the international community enforcing the law against
a violator. In a war between two states, whatever the motive or
purpose of either enforcement action, there is no legal difference
between the use of force by one state and the use of force by the other
both are equally legal. The question of which of the belligerents is
the "aggressor" is irrelevant. Consequently, under a general international law which does not prohibit the resort to war, in case of war
there can be no right of self-defense in the specific sense of this term,
which means no right to use armed force against an illegal use of
armed force. Since a war of aggression is not illegal, a counterwar
is not a reaction against an illegal use of armed force.
Only a reprisal taken against an illegal action involving the use of limited
force may be considered to be an exercise of the right of self-defense.
its

freedom of action in

this respect.

—
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Reprisals are not possible against an aggressive war because in this
case they are not directed against an illegal use of force.

If interna-

law does not prohibit the resort to war, it is hardly possible to
maintain that it imposes upon the states the mutual obligation to
respect their territorial integrity and political independence. The
fact that war, as an unlimited use of armed force for the purpose of
overpowering the opponent and enforcing upon him the conditions
of peace, is not illegal, is incompatible with such an obligation. It
is even doubtful whether it can be assumed that under general international law states have any rights that is, any legally protected
interests if general international law does not prohibit that unlimited interference in the sphere of interests of a state which is called war.
If general international law does not stipulate the obligation that
states must refrain from resorting to war except as a reaction against
violation of the law, the mutual relations of states under this normative
order are not very different from their mutual relations in a state of
international anarchy. However, it must be admitted that only if war
is not prohibited, which means only if there is no difference between a
legal and an illegal war and all belligerents have the same legal status,
is the usual interpretation of the status of neutrality consistent.
Actional

—

—

cording to this interpretation, neutral states, the states not involved
in a war, have equal obligations and equal rights in relation to both
belligerents.
Strict impartiality of the neutral towards the belligerents is the essential element of the institution of neutrality. Furthermore, it must be admitted that only if all the belligerents are legally on
an equal footing is it appropriate to terminate a war by a treaty, a
so-called peace treaty concluded between two partners enjoying equality of rights. 1

The opinion

that under general international law

war

is

neither a

delict nor a sanction is advocated by the majority of writers on international law. If this view is correct, general international law is not
law in the specific sense of the term as defined in the first part of this
study. Since it is far from realizing the tendency toward a force
monopoly of the community, since it does not forbide that use of
armed force which is called war, this normative order does not guarantee any degree of security to the states subjected to it. International security can be established only within particular international
organizations on the basis of treaties imposing upon the contracting
parties at least the obligation not to resort to war, i. e., the use of
armed force, in their mutual relations except as a reaction against a
state which has resorted to war in violation of the constituent treaty
that is, except as a reaction against an aggressor.

—

—
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According to the opposite opinion, such an obligation is already
established by general international law which forbids the resort to
war in principle and permits it only as a reaction against a violation of
the law that is, only against a definite conduct of states determined
by international law. Like the limited use of force, which is called
a reprisal, the unlimited use of force, which is called war, is legal only
If it is not a sanction, it is a delict. This is the doctrine
as a sanction.
of helium justum or just war, the term "just" meaning legal or in
conformity with positive law.
Only if this doctrine is accepted, can general international law be
conceived of as law in the specific sense of the term. By prohibiting
war and by permitting this unlimited use of force as well as the limited
use of force, reprisals, only as sanctions, general international law
establishes a force monopoly of the international community, although
A state resorting to reit is only a decentralized force monopoly.
prisals or war in conformity with international law may be conceived
of as enforcing the law, acting as an organ of the community constituted by this law. In a war between two states, only one of the two
enforcement actions can be considered to be legal. The other is illegal.
Hence, if the helium justum principle is recognized, it is necessary to
distinguish between these two actions which may be termed war and
counterwar. Consequently, the problem of "aggression," as the illegal
use of armed or any other kind of force, is of the greatest importance.
If it is necessary to distinguish between a legal and an illegal war, it
is impossible to maintain the usual definition of war as a contest between two or more states by their armed forces that is, as a bilateral
action.
Only one of the two actions constituting the contest is legal or
illegal.
Hence, war must be defined as an enforcement action involving the unlimited use of armed force, and the unlimited use of armed
force has to be considered to be war even if it is not opposed by a counterwar. 2 War must be considered to be an employment of force directed by one state against another without regard to the counteraction

—

—

of the latter, not only when war is a delict, but also when war is a sanction. 3
This is of particular importance in case war is a collective
enforcement action involving the use of armed force taken by an international security organization as a reaction against a violation of in-

By

an action a "police action," we cannot deprive it of the character of war. If there is no legal equality in
the relations between the two belligerents, the legal consequence of
ternational law.

calling such

may

not be the strict impartiality of the nonbelligerents in relation to the belligerents. Hence, the possibility of
terminating a war by concluding a treaty between a state which is trythe status of neutrality
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ing to enforce the law and a state which is the lawbreaker becomes
problematical. 4
According to the helium justum principle, not only is the immediate victim of an international delict permitted to make war against
a delinquent state but the other states who are members of the international community are authorized to assist the victim in its legitimate reaction against a violation of the law. If the helium justum
part of general international law, this legal order guarantees a certain degree of security to the states as members of the
international community. However, it is a very low degree of security, for the international legal order is completely decentralized.
It does not institute special organs for the legal functions of creating
principle

is

and applying the law. There are no courts, no executive and no
All the legal
legislative organs under general international law.
functions are left to the individual states.

If there

is

a conflict be-

tween them, the states involved must decide whether or not the law
has been violated and which state is responsible for the violation.
If agreement cannot resolve these questions, each state may act in
conformity with its own answer that is, it may or may not resort
to either reprisals or war. Even if the law is on its side, a state will
not initiate such an enforcement action if its opponent is more
powerful. However, if an enforcement action taken by one state
meets with resistance in the form of an enforcement action by another
state, the question as to which of these two actions is a sanction and
which a delict remains open. For these reasons, many writers consider the helium justum principle useless as long as a certain minimum
of centralization, at least the establishment of a tribunal competent
to decide in an objective and impartial way which of the parties to a
conflict is right and which is wrong, is not yet achieved. They further
argue that even in this case the value of reprisals and war as sanctions
remains highly problematical if their execution is left to the victim

—

and

to the voluntary assistance the victim

may

get from other states.

Hence, the helium justum doctrine advocated by the followers of the
natural-law theory during the 17th and 18th centuries was almost
completely abandoned during the 19th century and was reassumed
only after the first World War, and then only by a relatively few
scholars.

This doctrine then

importance because, as a result of this
war, the use of armed force was forbidden by two treaties to which
almost all of the states of the world were contracting parties: the
Covenant of the League of Nations, 1919, (the first part of the peace
treaties with Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria) and the
lost its
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Treaty for the Renunciation of War, 1928, (the Pact of Paris or
Kellogg-Briand Pact). If in conformity with the opinion of the
majority of writers on international law the helium justum principle is not considered to be part of general international law, the
Covenant of the League of Nations together with the Kellogg-Briand
Pact constitutes the first attempt in the field of international relations
to establish a relatively universal system of collective security. As a
matter of fact, it was only after the two treaties had come into force
that the problem of collective security began to attract the attention
of scholars and politicians and that the term became commonly used

—

—

in the literature of international law. 5

However, as an effect of the second World War, the Covenant of
the League of Nations ceased to be valid. The second World War led
to the conclusion by the majority of the states of the world of the
Charter of the United Nations, by which not only war as the use of
armed force but also the threat of force was forbidden and a system of
international security established which displayed the highest degree
of centralization reached until that time in the history of international
law.

(b) Alliances and the Balance of

The

Power

idea of a universal international organization for collective

security

is

directed against the policy of alliances in general and the

so-called balance of

power in

particular.

Though intended

as a

means

of guaranteeing a kind of security to the states adhering to them, these
policies have ultimately led to war.
Alliance treaties are usually concluded for the purpose of preserving the status quo in the relationships between allied states and other

by preventing the latter from expanding their power at the
expense of the former. In this sense, they have a defensive character
as they are directed mainly against an aggression on the part of states
not parties to the alliance treaty. However, states may unite in an
alliance not for the purpose of preserving but for the purpose of
changing the status quo in their favor. The alliance then has an aggressive character. In a concrete case, it is hardly possible to distinguish a defensive alliance from an aggressive one, because the
purpose of an alliance depends on the intention of the allied governments, and an aggressive intention is never admitted. The official
purpose of an alliance is always defensive, although under general
international law, if the helium justum principle is excluded, a war
of aggression is not illegal. This is a fact which seems to prove that
states
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the principle concerned

is

at least recognized as a rule of international

morality.

If alliances really have a defensive character, there
larity

is

a certain simi-

between them and regional organizations for collective security.

An alliance treaty either expressly stipulates that the contracting parobliged to refrain from resorting to war in their mutual relations, which, in this respect, makes it a non- aggression pact, or it tacitly
ties are

presupposes such an obligation, at least in the moral sense of the term.
An alliance treaty always imposes upon the contracting parties the
obligation to assist each other in case of aggression. Hence, in this
respect, it is a mutual assistance agreement. Prohibition of war and
mutual assistance against aggression are essential elements of a collective security arrangement. However, it must be noted that a treaty
of alliance, in the specific sense of the term, provides for mutual assistance only in case of external aggression, whereas universal collective security organizations are directed only, and certain regional security organizations to some extent, against an illegal use of force within
the organization. In case one of the contracting parties to a mutual
assistance alliance violates the express or tacit obligation of nonaggression and attacks another contracting party, no obligation of
assistance applies. It is precisely because alliances are directed against
third states that they create an atmosphere of suspicion, lead to counteralliances and, in many cases, have led to war. This is the reason why
merely regional agreements for mutual assistance have been stigmatized as "camouflaged alliances." 6 It has been suggested that the
obligation of mutual assistance should be restricted to aggression originating within an organization in order to avoid the possibility that
a mutual assistance agreement will degenerate into a mere "alliance." 7
This demonstrates an important aspect of regional arrangements. An
agreement for mutual assistance can be an "alliance" only if it is regional that is, only if it is restricted to a relatively small group of
states on the basis of a common interest uniting them against another
If it is universal, it cannot be directed against
state or other states.
a state outside the organization. If it is almost universal that is, if
it unites an overwhelming majority of the states of the world including
aggression by a state outside
all or the majority of the great powers
the organization is so unlikely that the relationship of the organization
to non-member states is of secondary importance. Only regional organizations for mutual assistance and not universal or quasi-universal
organizations may be conceived of as "alliances."
Regional arrangements for international security also differ from
alliances in that the former provide for mutual assistance only in case

—

—

—
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of an illegal use of force whereas in alliance treaties concluded under
general international law, as it is usually interpreted, the legal or illegal character of the use of armed force is irrelevant, for aggression as

armed force does not

under a general international law which does not prohibit the resort to war. This means that
a regional organization for international security can be established
an

illegal use of

exist

only within the framework of a universal or quasi-universal organization whose constituent treaty prohibits, in principle, the use of armed
force, so that under this legal order particular agreements of regional
character providing for collective action against aggression as the
illegal use of armed force are possible. Under general international
law, a treaty binding only upon the contracting parties may oblige
these parties to assist each other in case of the use of force by a third
state directed against one of them, but it cannot make the use of armed
force by a third state an illegal act. Consequently, there can be no
regional organization for international security without a universal
or quasi-universal organization for collective security in the field of
international relations, provided the principle of helium justum is not
part of general international law.

What

has been said about alliances also applies to the so-called balance of power policy which is almost always realized by alliances and
counter- alliances. 8 By "balance of power," that political principle is
meant which maintains or brings about by all means considered appropriate by the policy-making state or alliance of states a situation in
which power is distributed with approximate equality between this
state or alliance of states and other states or another alliance of states.
Insofar as this policy aims at preserving the status quo and tries to
prevent the states against which it is directed from changing the existing distribution of power by the use of armed force at the expense of
the states parties' to the balance of power alliance, this type of alliance
seems to pursue the same purposes as any other organization for
collective security.

This purpose

is to

parties to the alliance against the use of

protect the states

who

are

armed force on the part of

other states and thus to guarantee to the former their territorial

In addition, the collective
measures provided for by the treaty which constitutes a collective security organization are supposed to outweigh the power of any
state or group of states as a potential aggressor.
Hence, the idea of a
certain balance of power seems to be implied in the principle of collective security. However, if a collective security organization is universal, or even almost universal, it differs from a balance of power
alliance in that the latter is always directed against states outside this
alliance.
Furthermore, even if a collective security organization is
integrity

and

political independence.
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only a regional arrangement within a universal or qua si- universal collective security system, it still differs from a balance of power alliance
as the latter pursues its purpose by all means, legal or illegal, without
regard to the question of whether the action undertaken or intended
by its adversary is legal or illegal, whereas a regional organization of
collective security is supposed to react only in a legal way against an
By its very nature, collective security is a legal
illegal use of force. Sa
principle, while the balance of power is a principle of political convenience. 9

The Opposition

(c)

to International Security

A universal or quasi-universal international organization for collective security is not a generally accepted ideal.

There

opposition to establishing such an organization, or

if

is

a remarkable

the organization

has been established as in the cases of the League of Nations and later
is opposition to consolidating it by making it
more centralized and thus more effective. The main arguments set
forth by representatives of governments at international conferences
the United Nations, there

and by writers of

texts

and monographs on international law and

international politics will be discussed in this section.

The

first

argument

is

that an international organization for collec-

tive security is neither desirable nor useful unless it is of limited

petence, because, by

its

very nature,

distribution of power; in reality

the purpose of which

is

it

it

com-

tends to preserve the existing

constitutes only a legal ideology

to justify a status quo policy in general

and a

balance of power policy in particular. The second argument holds
that because this ideology is in conflict with the nature of the state as a
sovereign power and particularly wT ith its egotistic interests, an international security organization cannot work in conformity with its

The

principles.

third argument

is

that not only

is

an international

security organization unable to prevent the use of force in international
relations,

it

also

Furthermore,

it

makes the use of force, especially war, inevitable.
prevents the localization of war and hence leads to

universal war. 10

As

argument that an international security organization tries
to preserve the status quo as it exists at a particular moment and hence
tries to prevent any change of this status, it must be remembered that
a collective security organization, whether national or international, is
to the

a legal order.

By its very nature, every

tendency which manifests

itself in

legal order has a conservative

the principle that relations between

the subjects, constituting a certain distribution of possessions (as under
national law) or of power (as under international law) shall be estab,

lished

and consequently

shall also be

changed only in conformity with
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norms of the legal order which prohibit the use of force.
Hence, the argument referring to the preservation of the status quo is
the general

directed not only against collective security but also against a legal

regulation of inter-individual or inter-state relations, and

is

based on

an exaggeration of the conservative function of the law in general and
of a collective security system in particular.
to preserve the status

quo does not mean that

That a

legal order tries

it tries

to prevent every

change but only that it prohibits a forcible change of existing legal
relations, a change brought about by an illegal use of force.
This also
applies to an international organization for collective security. Such
an organization preserves as much or as little of the status quo in the
relations among states as a legal order regulating the conduct of indi-

human

among its subjects.
Even under the law of the most primitive society of human beings, just
vidual

beings preserves in the relations

an international organization which guarantees the lowest
possible degree of collective security, there is always a possibility for a
peaceful change of the legal relations established among the members
of the community. It is true that this possibility varies according to
the stage in the development of the legal order. The more decentralized the legal order, the less chance there is of adapting an established
legal relation to changing circumstance.
The legal system guaranteeing collective security is less flexible if there is no central legislative
organ and no court with compulsory jurisdiction. Peaceful change of
an established legal relation can be brought about only by agreement of
the parties concerned, as is the case under general international law.
However, despite this, international law is not a static force, for nothas under

ing in the nature of this law, just as nothing in the nature of national
law, and consequently nothing in the nature of a national or international system of collective security, can prevent the establishment of
institutions

which promote the

established legal relations.

possibility for a peaceful

change of

It is highly significant that the opposition

to the establishment of these institutions, especially legislative or quasi-

and particularly to the establishment of courts with
compulsory jurisdiction which are the most effective instruments to
bring about peaceful change, emanates from just those politicians and
legislative organs,

writers

who

are opposed to collective security because of

its

alleged

tendency to preserve the status quo. If an international organization
for collective security, such as the League of Nations or the United
Nations, does not work, failure is due not to its allegedly necessary
tendency to preserve the status quo, erroneously supposed to be inherent in such organization, but to the lack of willingness to provide for
effective institutions for the peaceful change of legal relations within

To

the organization.
370624—57

4

a great extent, this lack of willingness

is

the
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same ideology which disparages collective security as a
Utopian scheme.
The conservative attitude which any legal order has in regard to any
change of established legal relations is quite understandable if one
takes into consideration the fact that preserving the status quo is not
justifiable only if this status is not satisfactory or is even injurious.
However, this is a highly subjective and relative value judgment. An
established legal relation which is satisfactory to one party and hence
considered to be just by this party may be unsatisfactory to the other
party and hence considered to be unjust by this party.
change of
this relation in favor of the latter may be very unsatisfactory to the
former. It is a Utopian illusion to believe that any change could be
made which would result in a distribution of possessions or power satisfactory to all parties concerned. Rightly or wrongly, a legal order
presupposes the idea that a change of established relations by the use
of force is more unsatisfactory than a situation in which a peaceful
change is difficult, though not impossible. An international legal organization for collective security presupposes the value of peace to be
a higher value than the value of justice. Hence, it allows a change of
established legal relations only by either agreement of the parties concerned or decisions by more or less objective central organs of the community. The opposition to collective security based on the argument
that it preserves the status quo is the consequence of an anti-legal,
which means an anti-pacific, ideology, which, consciously or unconsciously, directly or indirectly, advocates power policy.
If the preservation of the status quo which, to be correctly understood, should be stated as the prohibition of a forcible change of
established legal relations, is an essential function of every legal order,
and consequently also of an international organization for collective
security, there is no reason to disparage such an organization by characterizing it as an "ideology" aimed at justifying the preservation of
the status quo. "Ideology" is a specific concept of Marxian sociology.
It designates an incorrect, illusive reflexion of social reality in the
result of the

A

consciousness of man.

By

presenting a distorted picture of reality, it
tries either to justify or, on the contrary, to disqualify this reality.
According to Marx, bourgeois law is an ideology (or ideological superstructure set

up above

norm and thus

social reality) because it presents itself as a

tries to justify the actually established social relations

which constitute the economic exploitation of one class by another.
However, in truth the law neither justifies nor disparages it regulates
social relations, and insofar as it is effective, the law is itself a part of
the social reality. It is always only a specific theory which serves as
an ideology by distorting the legal reality for the purpose of justifying
;
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A legal

order establishing a system of international
security really preserves the status quo only insofar as it prohibits
changing established relations by the use of force. If there is an

or rejecting

it.

"ideology" at work, it is that theory of collective security which describes the legal reality as an attempt to prevent a change of the status
quo without insisting upon the fact that it is only the forcible change
which a system of collective security tries to prevent. An international security organization may not be effective and a state or a group

may

pretend to apply the norms of the constituent treaty,
although in reality they practice a balance of power policy directed
against other states. However, this does not mean that the legal
order constituting the organization is an ideology either justifying or
disparaging the reality of the balance of power policy. It means only
that a false interpretation of this legal order is used as an ideology to
justify a reality not in conformity with this order.
The view that a universal international security organization is
impossible because it would be incompatible with the sovereignty of
the state and with international law as an order regulating the mutual
relations of sovereign states, is the consequence of a doctrine which
of states

first World War.
According to this doctrine,
binding only upon states and not, as national law,
upon individual human beings. There is an essential difference between a state and an individual human being as the subject of a legal
order. Therefore, there is an essential difference between national and
international law. Consequently, what is possible under national law,

prevailed prior to the
international law

is

namely collective security achieved by a general prohibition of the use
of force and collective reaction against an illegal use of force, is impossible under international law.

To

only one characteristic
example, on the basis of this doctrine the Spanish jurist, Professor
Antonio de Luna y Garcia, declared in an address delivered at the
International Studies Conference on Collective Security at London in
1935 11
cite

r

"The idea of sovereignty

is

not obsolete.

.

.

.

But

since

sovereignty is not obsolete, there arises a truly dramatic situation in the international legal order, made up as it is of territorial units each of which is sole master of its own decisions
and actions: namely, the impossibility in such an order, of
ever realizing ... a security of the international society;
only an increase of national security is possible. If international law wishes to perfect itself, it must begin by committing suicide."

This means that the centralization of the international legal functions
is impossible because it would be contrary to the nature of international law.
Professor de Luna's conclusion was: "Peace by law is,

:
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then, a mirage."

12

Since

easy to prove and indeed was proved
that the doctrine at the basis of this oppo-

it is

prior to the first World War,
sition to international security is erroneous, it may be assumed that
the true reason for this opposition is not a theoretical consideration

but a political tendency hidden by an incorrect doctrine. This was
an essential element of fascist ideology.
characteristic document showing the attitude of this ideology
towards collective security was the memorandum "The Idea of Col13
presented by Professor Francesco Coppola to the
lective Security"

A

above mentioned conference. The author asserted that a state could
establish only its own security and that it could achieve this security
by a military policy, by a policy of special alliances, or by pursuing
both policies together. He spoke of the "myth of security," which
he characterized as a "nightmare," and said that it "has disturbed
and distorted political intelligence throughout the world and especially in Europe," and has acted as "a paralyzing burden on European
politics," constituting "one of the greatest obstacles to the establishment in the world, and especially in Europe, of a veritable peace." It
must be recalled that the main objection to collective security is that
it tries to preserve the status quo and thus immobilize history at a
given moment in its perpetual development. Consequently, Professor
Coppola postulated another system "giving elasticity and flexibility

up by the treaties" which follow a major
However, he did not answer the question of how to achieve

to the legal equilibrium set

war.

this " flexibility."

He

also suggested that instead of organizing the

war should be eliminated. However,
he did not say how this could be done. Although he tried to avoid
the impression of defending war as a legitimate instrument of national
repression of war, the causes of

policy, his attack

interpreted.

on

collective security could hardly be otherwise

He even tried to justify such a national

of natural-law doctrine saying that
state undertake

of

its

war "on behalf of

national interest."

its

However,

it

it

was

policy by a kind

quite "natural" that a

special interests,

w as
r

i.

e.,

on behalf

his opinion that according

to the principle of collective security

nations would be forbidden to make war on behalf
of their national interests, which are the only motives capable
of arousing their passions to the point of braving this terrible
danger and enduring suffering and death, while at the same
time they would be obliged, on the contrary, to be always
ready to engage in the terrible war of our time for reasons
which do not concern them, which they do not understand,
which do not by any means arouse their passions sometimes,
even, they would be obliged to fight for interests contrary to
their own historic interests, that is to say, they would be
".

.

.

;
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forbidden to make war according to nature; and they would
be ordered to make war against nature. This is evidently
anti-historic and anti-human, and since the nations are
made up of men and not of machines impossible."

—
—

In addition "a particular war would be transformed, always and
necessarily, into a world war."
These arguments against collective security were set forth at a
time when the international organization which had been established
for the realization of this idea, the League of Nations, was obviously
on the decline. However, similar arguments are advanced today by
distinguished and influential writers ten years after the establishment
of the United Nations, a security organization intended to be more
effective than its predecessor organization, the League of Nations.
The similar argument that is particularly proposed is that collective
security is incompatible with the national policy of a state the policy
on the part of a state to cultivate its own national interest and only
that interest and that, from a realistic point of view, only this national policy should be taken into consideration. It is asserted that
any system of international security is doomed to failure because it
demands that an individual nation forsake national policy which
serves its own national interest, and because, by imposing upon individual nations the obligation of mutual assistance, it expects them
to act in a spirit of self-sacrifice.
However, this is impossible, for
14
it is contrary to the only motive of national policy national egotism.
This argument is fundamentally wrong. For purely egotistic
reasons, a state may conclude with other states a treaty establishing
collective security and comply with all its provisions, just as an individual, for purely egotistic reasons, may comply with the norms
of national law, either because he wants to avoid the evil of the
sanctions or because he is aware of the fact that the effectiveness of
the system which protects his own interests depends on the obedience

—

—

:

of those subjected to

it.

An

international legal order establishing

the collective security of the states

is

neither

more nor less a system
which regulates the

for preserving the status quo than a legal order

mutual relations of individuals and thus guarantees their security.
Similarly, the former is neither more nor less incompatible with the
egotism of states than the latter is with the egotism of individual

human beings.
"Egotism"
of action.

a concept so broad that

is

No

attitude of

of government,

by

human

comprises all possible motives
beings, and consequently no policy
it

very nature, necessarily incompatible with
is actually motivated by "egotism"
in
other words, the actions of an individual are motivated by his inten"egotism."

is,

Every

its

attitude

—
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to be his

own

national interest.

On

what he considers

Hence r
the argument that something is incompatible with egotism has no
weight at all. No matter how a state acts, its action is motivated by
egotism. A state may fulfill its obligation to come to the assistance
of another state, of any other state, by resorting to war against an
aggressor because its government is convinced that only in this way
tion to realize

can the state secure
state

may

refuse to

its

own

fulfill this

obligation because

that this fulfillment would not be in

interest.

the other hand, a

government feels
In both cases, the

its

its interest.

state acts motivated by its egotism, its "sacro egoismo,'' to use the
terminology of Italian nationalism. That all actions of a state are
motivated by its egotism is an undeniable fact and the ascertainment
of this fact is a truism. However, the answer to the question of what
is in the interest of a state is the result of a highly subjective value
judgment. In the opinion of one government of a state a policy may
be in the interest of the state, while in the opinion of another government of the same state under another political party, this same policy
may not be in the interest of the state.

The view

that an international security organization

failure because sooner or later
interests of

some of

its

it

must come

is

doomed to

into conflict with the

members, could be accepted as an argument

against the principle of international security only

if

the

"own

interest

How-

of the state" were ascertainable by an objective value judgment.
ever, this is evidently not the case.

The opposite view

that an inter-

national security organization always furthers interests of
states

all

the

which are members of the organization cannot be excluded by

—that

a scientific

is,

objectively verifiable

—consideration,

nor

is

it

correct to argue that a treaty for collective security is impossible or

unnatural because by imposing the obligation of mutual assistance

upon nations

it

expects them to act in a spirit of self-sacrifice. 13

The

fulfillment of this obligation motivates a state to risk self-sacrifice

only

if

those

who

aggressors, are
is,

only

if

violate the constituent treaty, the aggressor or

more powerful than those who comply with

it

—that

the legal order constituting the security organization has

lost its effectiveness to the extent that it

to be valid.

validity of

A certain degree of

any

legal order,

and

may no

longer be considered

effectiveness is the condition for the
its

validity

As

is its specific

existence.

long as a collective security organization exists as a valid legal
order, the risk of a state's being destroyed by fulfilling its obligations
as a member of this organization is certainly less than its risk of being
destroyed if no such organization exists. It is just for the purpose
of diminishing this risk as far as possible in other words, of preserving their existence that states join a security organization.

—

—
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Hence, this argument does not militate against the idea of an international security organization but against the attitude of its members

which deprives this organization of its effectiveness.
The last argument which holds that an attempt to organize international security under contemporary conditions cannot prevent war
but, on the contrary, makes war inevitable and, by preventing the
localization of war, leads to a universal war is the same exaggeration
of an ideology which is hostile to the idea of international security
as the argument that this idea necessarily implies a tendency to preserve the status quo. The only statement which can be made from
the point of view of an unbiased analysis of international relations is
that up to date the international organizations which have been established for the purpose of collective security have not been effective
enough to prevent war, but, on the other hand, they certainly have
not made, nor will such organizations ever make, war inevitable.
Besides, the statement that an international system of collective
security makes war universal contradicts the statement that such a
system cannot prevent war, falsely presented by the exaggerated assertion that it makes war inevitable. It cannot prevent war because it

—

—

cannot force the members of the security organization to fulfill their
obligations.
security organization makes only that war inevitable

A

which is resorted to by a state in fulfillment of the obligation imposed
upon it by the organization. If a war between two states should
become universal, this universal war could be attributed to a security
organization only if this organization were so effective that it could
force the overwhelming majority of its members, including some of
the great powers, to fulfill their obligations to resort to war against an
aggressor. However, if it were so effective, a local war would come
to an end immediately, as soon as all the member states only showed
their readiness to come to the assistance of the victim of aggression.
Thus a war would not only be localized but even prevented. A universal war cannot be the effect of an international organization for
collective security.
effective.

It can take place only if this organization is not

16

NOTES
1.

Of. pp. 152

ff.

Even under general international law, when

it is interpreted as not containing the 'bellum, justum principle, it is admitted that a unilateral enforcement
action involving the use of armed force constitutes "war" if it is preceded by a
declaration of war by the state performing the enforcement action, or if the
2.

state against which the action is directed declares that it considers the action to
be an act of war. The question as to whether or not war is essentially a bilateral
action should not be confused with the question as to whether or not it is necessary to determine that war exists and to ascertain who is competent to make
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Like any fact to which international law attaches certain
this determination.
consequences, the fact of "war" must be ascertained by competent authorities.
As long as no objective authority is established, the states concerned must determine the existence of the fact of "war" in a concrete case. Hence, these states
must decide whether there is or is not war in their mutual relations. However,
a state attacked by another state may declare itself to be at war with an aggressor
without resorting to a counterwar and without the aggressor formally declaring
war. Consequently, the existence of a war does not depend on the existence of

a counterwar.
In the case of The Nyade (Great Britain, High Court of Admiralty, 1802, 165
The English Reports 602-603), the question arose as to whether or not Portugal,
an ally of Great Britain, was at war with France. The Court stated that "there
was a wish on the part of Portugal not to consider herself as being at war with
France," but declared that "it is by no means necessary that both countries
should declare war. Whatever might be the prostration and submissive demeanour on one side, if France was unwilling to accept that submission and
persisted in attacking Portugal, it was sufficient."
In The Eliza Ann (Great Britain, High Court of Admiralty, 1813, 1 Dodson
244), the Court stated "A declaration of war by one country only is not, as has
been represented, a mere challenge, to be accepted or refused at pleasure by the
other.
It proves the existence of actual hostilities on one side at least, and puts
the other party also into a state of war, though he may, perhaps, think proper
to act on the defensive only."
Article 16 of the Covenant of the Leage of Nations provided for sanctions in
case a member should "resort to war in disregard of its covenants" against another member. A delict conditioning a sanction was committed even if an
attacked member did not resort to a counterwar. It might omit doing so and rely
:

on action by the other members obliged by the Covenant to take enforcement
measures against a delinquent state.
The Kellogg-Briand Pact forbade war as an instrument of national policy.
However, only the employment of force by a state violating the pact and not a
counteraction against this state could be characterized as an instrument of
national policy.
It is highly significant that in the provision of the Charter of the United
Nations in which war is prohibited (Article 2, Paragraph 4), the term "war" does
not appear. The Charter imposes upon the members the obligation to refrain
from the use of force in their international relations. War, as the use of force
by one state against another state, is forbidden, regardless of the attitude of the

state against

which force

is

used.

Julius Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict, New York 1954,
304
f.
"The essentials of war under customary international law are two.
pp.
International war is a relation of one or more governments to at least one other
3.

:

government, in which at least one of such governments no longer permits its
relations with the other or others to be governed by the laws of peace. It is
involved in this statement, as has been wittily observed, that, while it takes
two to make a quarrel, it takes only one government to make a war."
If the definition of war as a bilateral action is maintained, then within a
system of collective security where war is permitted only as a sanction, the
concept of war has no place. Cf. C. A. Pompe, Aggressive War an International
Crime, The Hague 1953, pp. 35 ff. "The traditional concept of war was bilateral;
:
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same juridical concept cannot be used to indicate simultaneously a lawful
and an illegal proceeding. Today 'war' is either a sanction or a crime and therefore 'war' does no more exist." Cf. also Hans Kelsen, Principles of International
Law, New York 1952, pp. 25 ff.
the

152

4.

Cf. pp.

5.

Cf. Collective Security, p. 162.

ff.

Cf. Bourquin, op. cit., p. 522.
Bourquin, op. cit., pp. 522-23. He referred to the Treaty of Locarno (1925)
as a model of such regional agreements for mutual assistance.
8. Cf. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 2nd ed., New York 1954,
pp. 155 ff., 169 ff.
8a. Quincy Wright, "The Prevention of Aggression," American Journal of
International Law, Vol. 50 (1956), p. 517: "collective security seeks stability
through general observance of law, while balance-of-power politics seeks it
through the curbing of excessive power."
An Examination of Opera9. Ernest B. Haas, "Types of Collective Security
tional Concepts." The American Political Science Review, Vol. XLIX (1955),
pp. 40 ff., examines the question as to whether it is possible to maintain collective
security by "balancing of influence and power." By this formula he understands
the question whether it is possible to induce "the two chief antagonists to accept
compromise solutions to tension-laden problems." (Loc. cit., pp. 54 f.) This
is a political question, which may be raised from the point of view of that "deliberately non-normative approach to the issue of peace," which Haas applies in
his essay. It has nothing to do with the problem of collective security.
10. Cf. Morgenthau, op. cit., pp. 84, 175, 388 ff.
Cf. also Kenneth W. Thompson, "Collective Security Reexamined," The American Political Science Review,
Vol. XLVII (1953), pp. 770 ff.
6.

7.

:

11. Collective Security, p. 178.

12. Op. cit., p. 179.
13. Op. cit., pp.

144

ff.

Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 391. Cf. also Howard C. Johnson and Gerhart
Niemeyer, "Collective Security The Validity of an Ideal," International Organization, Vol. VIII (1954), p. 35: "The following findings, therefore, seem to be
justified: (a) In the present international order of armed states great powers,
according to their pattern of behavior, cannot be expected to accept clearly defined
legal commitments of universal collective security.
(6) Judging from the actual
14. Cf.

:

behavior of states in response to general principles of collective security the policannot be expected to measure up to what, according to the concept,
would be necessary if universal collective security were to become a working
reality,
(c) As far as our present experience goes, there do not appear to be
habit-forming effects from attempts to invoke collective security or permanent
advances in the attitudes and policies of governments toward the ideal standards
of collective security,
(d) Collective security, conceived in universal terms, is not
actually considered by the great powers as a remedy for the basic insecurity of the
present international system.
From these findings, we would venture to draw these conclusions: It is (and
has been) a mistake to work for an improvement of international relations by
starting from universal concepts and seeking to impose them, intellectually or
otherwise, on national policies. Collective security, in the definition here employed, is such a concept; its elements (world-wide obligation, a global common
cies of states

52
community of nations, world law, world security, aggression conceived
as a universal crime, indivisibility of peace, world solidarity against aggression)
represent universal standards and fail to allow for the particular situations that
make up the reality of international politics. Collective security has actually

interest, a

been possible in certain historical instances when those universal concepts and
standards happened so to coincide with configurations of the political forces that
some concrete action required in the interests of a number of nations could be
taken in the name of the universal principle. We should in soberness be aware of
the concrete conditions that govern the use and action of national power we
should continue to employ national power, in the concrete setting of political
forces, for the promotion of those human values for the sake of which governments
enjoy allegiance. Any further contribution that international organization may
make to the problem of security on a global scale will have to stem from new and
deeper insights into the problem of causation in international politics, and the
ways in which common values and interests relevant to the use of force could
actually take global shape. This would suggest the importance of providing the
United Nations with a new conceptual foundation if it is to develop its greatest
potential under present conditions as well as under more auspicious circumstances
which it is hoped history will provide in the future." The authors do not define
this "new conceptual foundation."
15. This is the essence of Walter Lippmann's objection against the idea of
collective security.
He w rote in his column of January 15, 1951 (quoted in:
Frederick L. Schuman, The Commonwealth of Man, New York 1952, p. 406)
"The trouble with collective security is
that when the issue is less than the
survival of the great nations, the method of collective security will not be used
because it is just as terrifying to the policeman as it is to the lawbreaker. It
punishes the law-enforcing states, at least until they have paid the awful price
of victory, as much as the law-breaking states. Therefore it cannot be used as
;

r

:

.

.

.

a method of ordinary and continuing enforcement.

.

.

."

16.
Frederick L. Schuman, op. cit., p. 345, says that the formula of collective
security "is based on false premises and has never worked in practice ;" it "cannot conceivably work in the very nature of our system of states." "That this

formula is futile and indeed productive of more, rather than less anarchy and
violence has been experimentally demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt in the
mind of reasonable men" (p. 369). The starting point of this pessimistic evaluais the identification of this concept with the "now
long familiar notion that peace among sovereignties can best be preserved by
having all sovereigns solemnly compact to wage war against any sovereign who
might take the sword" (p. 345). This, however, is not a definition of collective
security, but only of a very low degree of it. Schuman does not deny the possibility of establishing by international agreement permanent peace, the very
goal of collective security. He says " 'Permanent' peace is possible only through
a permanent termination of the game of power among rival sovereignties.
This goal is attainable only through the subjugation of all sovereignties by one,
with a World-State emerging out of victory or through the voluntary merging
of sovereignties in a global policy, with a World-State emerging out of agreeThe second
ment. The first solution ... is unattainable in our own [time]
solution has never been attained. Yet it deserves to be regarded (unlike 'collective security') as within the realm of the humanly possible" (pp. 419 f.). This
second solution must not be opposed to collective security, for it is only a higher

tion of collective security

:

.

—

.

degree of this very principle.

.

.

.

.
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2.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY UNDER PARTICULAR
INTERNATIONAL LAW
(a)

Defining the Use of Force

To Be Prohibited

Since collective security in international relations means primarily
protection against that use of armed force which is called war, and
since general international law does not prohibit war, if the helium
justum principle is not considered to be part of it, international security can be established only by treaties imposing upon the contracting
states the obligation to refrain

from resorting to war.

In an ideal

case,

war would be prohibited under all conditions with the exception of war
as a sanction that is, with the exception of war as a reaction
against a violation of the law in general and the treaty con-

—

stituting the international security organization in particular.

war

is

exceptionally permitted as a sanction,

exercise of self-defense, for self-defense

use of

armed

force.

is

it is

If

also permitted in the

a reaction against an illegal

However, a constituent treaty may permit war not

only as a sanction (including its use in self-defense) but also for other
purposes, or, what amounts to the same thing, a constituent treaty may
prohibit war only under definite conditions. For example, the con-

may assume

only the obligation not to resort to war
against each other without having previously submitted their conflict
to a special agency competent to make recommendations for a peaceful
tracting parties

settlement and not before a certain period of time after the decision of

agency has expired. If these conditions are fulfilled, a war
resorted to by one of the parties is not illegal. 1
Even if war is prohibited under all conditions (with the exception
of war as a sanction against an illegal resort to war), international
security is not satisfactorily established. Acts involving the use of
armed force but not having the character of acts of war as, for example, so-called pacific blockades
are left outside the system of collective
security that is, they are not under the specific sanctions provided
for by the treaty constituting this system as reactions against the use
of force prohibited by it. If a member of the security organization is
this

—

—

—

a victim of the use of armed force short of war, the treaty constituting
the security system does not apply.
applies,

Only general international law

under which the use of armed force short of war

only as a reprisal

—that

is

permitted

only as a reaction against a violation of the
law. However, reprisals are the only sanctions which may be taken
by the members of a security organization against such an illegal use
of force short of war if a resort to war is permitted only as a reaction
against an illegal resort to war. Moreover, the use of armed force is
is,

an objectively ascertainable

fact.

However, there

is

no objective

cri-
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by which an act of war can be distinguished from an act involving the use of armed force which is not to be considered as an act of
war. An act is an act of war if the state performing the act does not
intend to restrict its action against the other state to this act, if its
intention is an unlimited interference by the use of armed force in the
sphere of interests of the other state. If only acts of war are prohibited, the application of the specific sanctions, and this means the operation of the security system, depends on the answer to the question
concerning the intentions of the state concerned. In many cases, it
is impossible to answer this question immediately after the act has
been performed but only after this act is followed by other acts of
terion

armed force which have done irreparable damage to the victim. 2 There
can be no doubt that if a security organization is intended to be effective, at least to a certain extent, not only the resort to war but every
use of armed force must be prohibited by the constituent treaty that
is, the specific sanctions of the security system must apply not only
in case of a resort to war but in case of any use of armed force. Any
use of armed force may be considered to be a breach of the peace, and

—

the very purpose of a system of international security

is

to guarantee

peace.

However, there

is

a certain tendency not to agree with such a far-

going prohibition of any use of armed force. This tendency is based
on the opinion that an unconditional renunciation of the use of armed
force by an individual state in its relations with other states is not an
essential element of a system of international security and that preventive measures, such as procedures for the peaceful settlement of conflicts and measures for the removal of the causes of war, are more
important. 3 This opinion is not very different from that advocated
by those who are opposed in principle to the idea of international
security. As we shall see later, an obligation imposed upon states
to settle their conflicts by peaceful means is, so to speak, like a blank
cartridge, if it is not combined with an obligation to refrain from the
use of any kind of armed force. Furthermore, as has been noted, if
they are applicable at all, measures for removing the causes of war have
a rather limited

effect.

If a treaty constituting a system of collective security prohibits not
only the resort to war but also the use of armed force short of war,
it

parallels general international law as far as the second prohibition

In this respect, the only difference between the situation
under the security treaty and that under general international law
is that the special sanctions provided for by the treaty as reactions
against an enforcement action short of war are more effective than
those provided for by general international law. In addition, a seis

concerned.

:
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may

under its specific sanctions violations of
general international law other than the use of armed force short
curity treaty

also place

the violation of the rules concerning the treatment of
aliens or of the rule pacta stmt servanda. It may attach its specific
sanctions to all violations of international law, as it exists at the
moment the treaty enters into force, committed by members of the
of war,

e. g.,

and even to a conduct which was not a delict
under general international law as it existed prior to the treaty, e. g.,
to conduct which constitutes a mere threat to the peace, such as a
concentration of troops or an armament exceeding the limits prescribed
by the treaty. In other words, in addition to the obligation not to
resort to war and the obligation to participate in the execution of
sanctions, a security treaty may impose other obligations not established by general international law upon the members of a security
organization. This means that under such a security system a greater
sphere of interests of the state may be legally protected than under
security organization,

general international law.

It stands to reason that the further a

system of international security goes in this direction, the more refreedom of action of the member states, and the greater

stricted the

who

on the sovereignty of the state.
As has been noted, an extension of a security system from the protection of interests only against their violation by the use of armed force
to the protection of interests against their violation in any way including a way other than by the use of armed force, goes hand in hand
with an extension of the concept of force. "Force" is meant to include not only armed force, but any illegal action of one state which
violates the legally protected interests of another and which is underthe resistance of all those

insist

4

taken against the will of this other state. Hence, enforcement actions
involving the use of armed force are distinguished from enforcement
actions not involving the use of armed force. 5 This change in the
meaning of the concept of force implies a change in the meaning of
the concept of aggression. This latter concept is an essential element
of a system of international security insofar as the purpose of such
a system is protection against aggression.

NOTES
1. This was the case under the Covenant of the League of Nations which
declared in its preamble that a purpose of the organization was
"international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to
:

war

.

.

.

imposed upon the members not an unconditional obligation not to
obligation not to resort to war under the particular
conditions set forth in the following Articles of the Covenant
Akticle 12. 1. The Members of the League agree that, if there should arise
between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter
.

.

."

resort to

It

war but only the

—
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either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to inquiry by the Council, and they

agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the
arbitrators or the judicial decision, or the report by the Council. 2. In any case
under this Article the award of the arbitrators or the judicial decision shall be
made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made
within six months after the submission of the dispute.
Article 13. 1. The Members of the League agree that, whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognize to be suitable for submission
to arbitration or judicial settlement, and which can not be satisfactorily settled
by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration or judicial
settlement." ... 4. The Members of the League agree that they will carry out
in full good faith any award or decision that may be rendered, and that they
will not resort to war against a Member of the League which complies therewith.
In the event of any failure to carry out such an award or decision, the Council
shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto.
Article 15. 1. If there should arise between Members of the League any
dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration or judicial
settlement in accordance with Article 13, the Members of the League agree that
they will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the dispute may effect
such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the SecretaryGeneral, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and
consideration thereof. 2. For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the Secretary-General, as promptly as possible, statements of their
case with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Council may forthwith direct
the publication thereof. 3. The Council shall endeavour to effect a settlement of
the dispute, and, if such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public
giving such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms of settlement thereof as the Council may deem appropriate. 4. If the dispute is not thus
settled, the Council either unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and
publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommenations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto. 5. Any Member
of the League represented on the Council may make public a statement of the facts
of the dispute and of its conclusions regarding the same. 6. If a report by the
Council is unanimously agreed to by the Members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League
agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies
with the recommendations of the report. 7. If the Council fails to reach a report
which is unanimously agreed to by the Members thereof, other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League
reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary
for the maintenance of right and justice. 8. If the dispute between the parties
is claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council, to arise out of a matter
which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party,
the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement.
9. The Council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute to the Assembly. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute,
provided that such request be made within 14 days after the submission of the
dispute to the Council. 10. In any case referred to the Assembly, all the provisions of this Article and of Article 12 relating to the action and powers of the
Council shall apply to the action and powers of the Assembly, provided that a
report made by the Assembly, if concurred in by the Representatives of those

—

—

;
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Members
Members

of the

League represented on the Council and of a majority of the other

of the League, exclusive in each case of the Representatives of the
parties to the dispute, shall have the same force as a report by the Council concurred in by all Members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more
of the parties to the dispute."
481, correctly asserted that if the differentiainvolving
the use of armed force not having
tion between acts of war and acts
the character of acts of war, so-called "pacific measures of coercion," were in2.

Professor Bourquin, op.

cit., p.

troduced in a system of collective security, it would endanger the fundamental
which he defined as the prohibition of violence exerted
for the purpose of imposing one's own will on others. He referred to the fact
that "actually there is no external difference between an act of armed force
and an act of war. The materiality of the facts is exactly the same in both
cases; it is only the intention of the Parties which makes the difference. In
order to remain within the limits of pacific measures of coercion the two states
concerned must have the willingness not to allow a state of war to be born

principle of this system

among them."

He went on to

say

:

"To authorize armed coercive measures means
forms of coercion which may or may not

to permit the states to apply certain

be war according to circumstances not yet ascertained at the moment the event
takes place."
Professor Bourquin seems to ignore the fact that even if enforcement actions
short of war are not prohibited by the treaty constituting a system of collective
security, they are prohibited by general international law and are permitted
only exceptionally as reprisals.
3.

Cf. Collective Security, p. 10.

4.

Cf. p. 11.

5.

Article

the

2,

paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations imposes upon
obligation to "refrain in their international relations from

members the

the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the

United Nations." The wording of this Article can be interpreted to mean that
members are obliged to refrain from not only the use of armed force but the
use of any kind of force. A distinction between armed force and other kinds
of force necessarily follows from the provisions of Articles 39, 41, 42 and 50,
concerning the measures to be taken by the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. According to the provisions of
Articles 41 and 42, two kinds of measures are to be distinguished, and according to Article 50 both are to be considered as "enforcement measures" measures
"not involving the use of armed force" (Article 41), and measures involving the
use of armed force (Article 42). If there are "enforcement" measures involving
the use of armed force and "enforcement" measures not involving the use of
armed force, armed force that is, force exercised by the use of arms must be
distinguished from force exercised in another way that is, force not exercised
by the use of arms. There are two kinds of force not exercised by the use of
arms: (1) an action of a state directed against another state which constitutes
a violation of international law but which is not performed by the use of arms
(2) a reprisal which does not involve the use of armed force. Article 2, paragraph 4, refers to the "use of force." It therefore prohibits both kinds of force.
Hence, not only is the use of armed force prohibited but any action of a member
state illegal under general international law which is directed against another
state is prohibited by the Charter, and the member states are forbidden to resort
not only to war but also to reprisals.
:

—

—

—

58
The

However, the
is reserved to the Organization.
definition
The
very
clear.
concerning
sanctions
are
not
provisions of the Charter
of an action against which the Security Council may take enforcement measures
According
is not quite consistent with the provision of Article 2, paragraph 4.
to Article 39, the Security Council may take the enforcement measures referred
to in Articles 41 and 42 in case of a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or
act of aggression," whereas Article 2, paragraph 4, prohibits "the threat or use
of force." The use of non-armed force may be considered by the Security Council
to be a "threat to the peace" and may then constitute the condition of an enforcement measure to be taken by this organ as a sanction. However, if the violation
of international law is not committed by the use of armed force and hence is not
a breach of the peace or an act of aggression, and if it is not considered by the
Security Council to be a "threat to the peace," a sanction as an enforcement action
in conformity with Articles 39, 41 or 42 cannot be taken. It is true that the sanction stipulated in Article 6, the expulsion from the Organization of a member who
has violated the Principles of the Charter, is applicable in case of a use of force
as referred to in Article 2, paragraph 4, the term force used in the wider sense
comprising the use not only of armed force but of any kind of force. However,
Article 6 applies only if the Principles of the Charter are "persistently" violated
by a member, not if a member violates international law in a single case. If, as
the wording of Article 2, paragraph 4, seems to indicate, the Charter prohibits
any violation of international law on the part of the members and reserves the
application of sanctions to the Organization, the Charter should have provided
for sanctions to be applied by the Organization in case of any violation of international law. Since this is not the case, in contradiction to its wording, Article 2,
paragraph 4, may be interpreted as prohibiting only the use of armed force and
not as forbidding reprisals to be taken by member states.
application of sanctions

(b)
(aa)

The Problem

of Aggression

The military concept of aggression and

The term "aggression" was

the legal concept.

originally a military-technical concept.

means a first attack. A state which is the first to perform an act of
war against another state is an aggressor. The war to which this first
state resorts is an aggressive war, or war of aggression, whereas, in
resorting to a counter war to defend itself, the other state wages a defensive war or war of defense. This distinction assumes legal importance only when the resort to war is prohibited either conditionally
or unconditionally. The concept of aggression and the concept of illegal war are not identical. From a military-technical point of view,
a war may be aggressive because it constitutes a first attack. However,
For example, the law prothis does not necessarily make it illegal.
hibits the resort to war only under definite conditions. In conformity
with these conditions, a war against a state which refuses to comply
It

with the decision of an international tribunal

is

tribunal has issued in
the recalcitrant state

its*

is,

favor,

is

the

first to

use

In
which the

not forbidden.

this case the state which, in order to enforce the decision

armed force against

from a military-technical point of view, the
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aggressor but the

war

to

which

it

resorts is perfectly legal, while the

counterwar to which the other state resorts, is a defensive war but must
be regarded as illegal. The same is true with respect to a war which
the members of an international security organization are obliged to
wage against a member state which has resorted to war against another

member state in violation of the constituent treaty. The war which the
states who are not being attacked themselves wage against the delinquent state is an aggressive war but is legal, while the counterwar to
which the delinquent resorts is a defensive war but is illegal.
an outspoken tendency to
with
that of an illegal war or even
identify the concept of aggression
an illegal use of force, a tendency to substitute a specifically legal

However,

in legal terminology, there is

concept of aggression for the original military-technical concept.

The tendency

is to

designate as "aggression" that conduct of a state

which a treaty constituting an international security system prohibits
by attaching to it the specific sanctions of this system. Consequently,
the meaning of the term "aggression" changes with the scope of the
types of conduct against which an international security organization
tries to protect its members. Hence, if the constituent treaty prohibits
war under definite conditions, only a war resorted to under these
conditions

is

first attack,

considered to be aggression, while, even

a

war

resorted to under other conditions

if it constitutes
is

a

not so stigma-

Following the extent of the prohibition stipulated in the constituent treaty, any resort to war is regarded as aggression if the war
is waged for a purpose other than that permitted by the constituent
treaty, especially for a purpose other than the participation in the
execution of the specific sanctions of the security system or the exercise
tized.

of self-defense. 1

and self-defense
the use of armed force.

(bb) Aggression

as a restriction of the prohibition of

As

pointed out in a previous chapter, self-defense means the use
of force by the victim of an act of aggression as a reaction against
this aggression, i. e., as a reaction against an illegal use of force.
Hence, the right of self-defense presupposes a legal order prohibiting
in principle the use of force

by the subjects of the order, so that the

right of a subject to use force represents a restriction of this principle.

If general international law does not prohibit the resort to war as
the use of armed force, in other words if the helium justwn principle

not part of general international law, there can be no right of selfdefense under this law because there can be no use of armed force as
a reaction against an illegal use of armed force. There is no need to
is

justify the use of

370624—57

5

armed force

as self-defense, as a restriction of or
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exception to a general prohibition of the use of armed force,

such prohibition

exists.

as legal as the use of

If the use

armed

if

no

of armed force by an aggressor

force by a defender, self-defense

is

is

a

Just as under general international law,
if it does not contain the bellum justnm principle, there is no collective
security, there is no right of self-defense.
There is a definite connection between the two legal phenomena. If general international
law does not prohibit the use of armed force, an international right of
legally irrelevant concept.

self-defense

—that

armed force as a
armed force can be recognized only
prohibiting the use of armed force and thus establishis,

the right of a state to use

—

reaction against an illegal use of

under a treaty
ing a system of international security.

Since the right of self-defense represents a restriction of the prohibition of the use of force, and since this restriction

may

be of wide or

narrow scope, the right of self-defense should always be expressly
defined in the legal order establishing the system of collective security
in general

and in the treaty constituting the system of international

security in particular.

From

the point of view of legal positivism,

the widespread idea that the international right of self-defense, as a

consequence of the natural right of self-preservation, is always presupposed and hence does not need express stipulation, is without
foundation and is the source of serious difficulty in interpreting the
treaties prohibiting the use of

armed

force. la

system of international security, self-defense may be permitted only as a reaction against an illegal use of armed force, against
an "attack** which has actually begun. Hence, self-defense would be
"defense'' and the illegal use of armed force would be "aggression''

Within

a

in the military-technical sense of these terms.

However, self-defense

may also be recognized as a reaction against an attack which has not
yet actually begun but which may reasonably be expected imminently.
In this case, from a military-technical point of view, the use of armed
force in the exercise of self-defense

is

an act of aggression, while from

which self-defense is exercised
not considered to be imminent but

a legal point of view, the state against
is

the aggressor.

If an attack

is

only to be probable in the near future, a war resorted to in order to
forestall the attack is a preventive war. As a rule, a preventive war
is prohibited within a system of international security and hence

must be regarded

as aggression. lb

Within

use of physical force by the individual

a security organization, the

members

permitted to a
certain extent because the coercive machinery of the organization
cannot function at the same moment the attack starts or appears
imminent and hence the procedure of putting into operation the
special sanctions of the system requires time. However, if the attack
is
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has not yet started or is not imminent but is only considered probable
in the near future, and consequently if there is time to prepare the
operation of the coercive machinery of the security organization, there
Since it is difficult,
is no reason to permit the exercise of self-defense.
not impossible, to distinguish an international situation in which
an attack on one state by another is imminent from a situation in
which such an attack is only probable in the near future, the exercise

if

of the right of self-defense within a system of international security

may

be properly restricted to the case of an

armed attack which has

already begun.

In conformity with the terminology of the Charter of the United
Nations, a distinction must be made between individual and collective
self-defense. Individual self-defense is the action exercised by a state
which is the immediate victim of an armed attack. Collective selfdefense is the action by other members of the security organization
which, without being attacked themselves, come to the assistance of the
victim. Hence, collective self-defense is not "self-defense but the
defense of another, and if it consists of the use of armed force, it is
defense and not aggression only from a legal point of view and not

from a military-technical standpoint.

—that the right to come to the
assistance of the victim of an
use of armed force—may be
restricted to the case in which a state—member or non-member of the
organization — uses
own armed forces against a state which
a
So-called collective self-defense

is,

illegal

its

is

contracting party to the treaty constituting the security organization.
However, the treaty may authorize or oblige the members to come to the
assistance not only of another

member but

and not only in case the state
armed force by another state but

is

also of

any other

state,

the victim of an illegal use of

also in case another state directly or

indirectly supports revolutionary forces within the former, or even in

case of a revolution not supported

the security organization

may

This means that
members not only against

by a foreign

protect

its

state.

external and direct aggression but also against internal and indirect
aggression. 2

Since within a more or less centralized system of international
security the exercise of the right of individual and collective selfdefense must be permitted because the central organ of the organiza-

armed force
has taken place, the question of whether or not the use of armed force
which has actually taken place is illegal must be decided by the state
which claims to be exercising the right of individual or collective selfdefense. However, this is true only as long as the central organ of the
tion cannot interfere immediately after an illegal use of

security organization does not interfere.

As soon

as

it

does, this cen-
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organ must decide that question, and it may decide that question
way than the state which claims to be exercising its right of
self-defense. The central organ may decide that no armed attack
has taken place which would justify the exercise of the right of selfdefense, and that consequently the state claiming to be a defender is,
in truth, an aggressor. Consequently, a state can exercise the right
tral

in another

of self-defense only at
(cc)

Other exceptions

The

its

own risk. 3

to the prohibition of the use of

prohibition of the use of armed force

may

armed

force.

be restricted not
only by permitting the use of armed force in executing the specific
sanctions provided by the constituent treaty and in exercising selfdefense, but also in case a state comes to the assistance of its own
nationals abroad whose lives or property are seriously endangered.
The use of armed force may be prohibited by the constituent treaty
and may thus constitute aggression only if it has the definite purpose
of imposing the will of the state exercising the armed force on the state
state may resort to war
against which this action is directed.
against another state not in order to force this state to accept a change
of their relations which could be brought about legally only with the
voluntary consent of this state, but, on the contrary, in order to prevent
the latter from forcing its will upon the former. This is the case of a
preventive war which has already been discussed. Without resorting
to war, a state may also perform a single act of armed force, e. g., it
may occupy a definite place in the territory of a more powerful state
only for the purpose of securing its defense against an attack by this
state expected immediately or in the near future. This case differs
from the case of a preventive war, but the difference is irrelevant
within a system of international security. Whatever its purpose,
unless it is an act of self-defense against an armed attack or an act
of participation in the execution of the specific sanctions of the system,
any use of armed force is a breach of the peace. Hence, without regard
to its purpose, the use of armed force should be prohibited by a treaty
constituting an effective system of international security. However,
security treaties frequently prohibit the use of armed force only insofar is it may be directed against the territorial integrity or political
independence (i. e., the sovereignty) of another state, 4 which means
only if the purpose of the enforcement action is to violate the territorial integrity or political independence of another state. Since it is
hardly possible to use armed force against another state without
violating its territorial integrity or political independence, this restriction does not really impair the effectiveness of the security system.

A
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The purpose

of an act of

armed force performed by a

—

state

—to im-

pose its will upon another state is sometimes designated as the
"aggressive intention." 5 The question as to whether or not an act
of armed force is performed with such an intention or for this purpose must be distinguished from the question as to whether or not an

armed force

performed deliberately, or because of negligence,
error or accident. Whether or not a treaty constituting an international security organization should prohibit, and thus qualify as
act of

is

aggression, only acts of

armed force

deliberately performed, is not a

particular problem of collective security but a general problem of the

problem of the
the question of whether responsibility

legal technique of international law.

responsibility of the states,

It

is

really the

based on fault or whether absolute responsibility should be established
by international agreements. There is a general tendency in favor
of restricting the responsibility of a state to cases of deliberate violations of international law, although other cases establishing the abso-

lute responsibility of a state are not completely excluded.

Another general problem which is not particular to collective security but which may be considered to be relevant to it is the question
of whether a state should be made responsible only for acts violating
international law performed by the government, or by subordinate
organs at the command, or with the authorization of the government,
or also for acts performed by subordinate organs without the command or authorization of the government. If the principle is accepted that a state is to be made responsible for violations of international law committed by subordinate organs without command or
authorization by the government if the act constituting the violation

performed in connection with the normal function of
such acts

may

is

this organ, then

also be regarded as aggression if they consist of

an

armed force. A typical case is the invasion of the territory of a state by a part of the armed forces of another state undertaken by a comanding officer on his own initiative.
illegal use of

(dd) Aggression as conduct not including the use of armed force,'
indirect aggression.

not satisfactorily guaranteed if the ti eaty
constituting the security system provides its specific sanctions as a
reaction only against an actual use of armed force that is, if it protects the members of the security organization against violations of
their interests only by the use of armed force, or, what amounts to
the same thing, if aggression is constituted only by the actual use of
armed force. Hence, there is a tendency to extend the security system
so that it protects its members against a violation of interests committed in a way other than by the actual use of armed force, and to
International security

is

—
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qualify also a conduct not constituting the actual use of armed force
as aggression.

The

ma} prohibit as acts of aggresthe threat of armed force its prepara-

constituent treaty

sion not only the use but also

7

—

tion by military or economic mobilization, or even its planning or

The

extension of the prohibition, stipulated in the constituent treaty, to an indirect use of armed force, which is the basis of
initiating.

the concept of indirect aggression,6

is

of the greatest importance.

indirect aggression a state does not use its

own armed

In

forces but op-

armed persons performing hostile acts against another
state, seemingly on their own initiative.
The following actions are
examples of indirect aggression: the supporting by a state of the
revolutionary forces righting against the legitimate government of
another state, the arming by a state of organized bands for offensive
erates through

purposes against another state, the sending by a state of so-called
"volunteers*' to engage in hostilities against another state, the nonprevention by a neutral state of its own nationals from participating
as volunteers in a civil or international war against another state (an
action not forbidden by general international law), the undertaking
or encouragement by a state of terrorist activities in another state or
the toleration by a state of organized activities calculated to result
in terrorist acts in another state. 6a
An international security system may even protect the governments
of the contracting states against internal aggression by providing for
repressive measures to be taken either by the individual states who
are members of the security organization or by a central organ against
revolutionary movements within a member state not supported, directly or indirectly, by external forces. Such a system guarantees the
political and economic regimes of the members of the security organization which exist at the time the security treaty is concluded. Hence,
this system goes far beyond general international law which does not
guarantee the internal organization of states. If the enforcement
measures taken by the organs of the security organization against the
insurgents are considered to be sanctions, revolution against the legitimate government constitutes not only a violation of national law but
also an international delict.
Revolution understood to be internal aggression involves the use
of armed force. However, an undertaking of a state may be prohibited as aggression even if the use of arms is not involved at all, as, for
example, in poisoning a stream rising in a state's territory but flowing
through a neighboring country, or in altering its course and thus
depriving the inhabitants of the neighboring state of a vital means
of subsistence, or in using life-destroying rays against the population
of another state. 7
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If the security treaty imposes

upon the contracting

parties the

obligation to settle their disputes by peaceful procedures, the refusal
to submit a dispute to such procedures or to comply with the decision

of an organ competent to bring about

its

peaceful settlement or with

a provisional measure, e. g., a call to discontinue military operations,
may constitute a conduct against which the specific sanctions of the
security system are directed. In that case, such conduct may be considered to be aggression. 7a

One

which the use of armed force

case of aggression in

involved

is

not

so-called ideological aggression.

It consists of hostile

propaganda organized or permitted by one

state against another.

is

supposed to be an appeal to the inhabitants of the other state.
It may be disseminated by the press or by radio broadcasts, which
may be controlled by the government, or be effected by the dispatch
of pamphlets and the like. The propaganda may consist of imparting information or ideas or in discrediting a government. If it
violates the honor of another state or if its evident purpose is to instigate a revolutionary movement, it is illegal under general internaIt is

tional law. 8
It has been suggested that

any intervention in the internal or

exter-

nal affairs of another state should be prohibited as aggression in the
treaty constituting an international security organization by having

attached to

it

the specific sanctions of the security system.

It has also

been suggested that there is no reason why this security system should
not be extended to include protection against all violations of international law, as

it

existed at the time the treaty constituting the security

As has been

organization came into force.
treaty

may

pointed out, the security

prohibit a conduct, which was not illegal under interna-

tional law prior to

its

coming

into force.

Provided the helium justwm

not considered to be part of general international law, this
is the case with respect to the most essential element of any security
system the prohibition of war. It is certainly the case if the international security organization tries to protect its members against
principle

is

:

Economic aggression has been dewhich deprives another state of the eco-

so-called economic aggression. 9
fined as the conduct of a state

nomic resources derived from the fair practice of international trade
or which endangers its basic economy. Such conduct does not involve
the use of armed force and may be in complete conformity with international law as it existed prior to the treaty prohibiting it as aggression.
There can be little doubt that such a security treaty establishes a remarkable restriction on the freedom of action of the
contracting parties and confers extraordinary power on the organ
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competent to decide in a concrete case whether or not an act of
economic aggression has been committed.
If the treaty constituting the international security system places
under the specific sanctions of this system not only the violations of
the particular obligations stipulated by this treaty but also all violations of general international law, the concept of aggression

and the

It may then be
concept of international illegality may coincide.
advisable to distinguish not only between direct and indirect, but also
major aggression is a violabetween major and minor aggression.
tion of international law constituted by an enforcement action involv9a

A

ing the use of armed force, while a minor aggression means any other
violation which may also be characterized as an enforcement action, in
that it is taken against the will of the state which is the victim of the
action, although this action does not involve the use of armed force.
(ee)

The

defintion of aggression.

from the foregoing considerations, that the concept of
aggression may be defined in different ways, and that the definition
depends on what kind of conduct the treaty constituting an international security system does or should prohibit by attaching to it the
It follows

specific sanctions of this system.

Hence,

quite understandable

it is

that the definition of aggression plays an important part in the discussion of the problem of international security, for defining aggression

amounts

to determining the scope of the security system de lege

lata or de lege ferenda.

De

lege lata,

from the point of view of an

a treaty concluded for the purpose of granting
collective security to the contracting parties, it is a theoretical problem, the problem of describing by a general formula the acts which
the treaty prohibits by attaching to them the specific sanctions of the
established law, that

is

However, the treaty itself may contain such a
formula which would then have the character of a legal definition,

security system.

just as a penal code

may

contain a definition of theft.

from the point of view of a law
to be concluded

to be established

—the definition of aggression

is

De

—that

lege ferenda,

is,

of a treaty

a practical-political,

problem of determining the conduct of states
which should be prohibited, and especially of determining the conditions under which the use of armed force should be forbidden and
under what exceptional conditions it should be permitted. However,

legislative problem, the

strange as

it

may

seem, the question concerned

as whether or not aggression should be defined.

many governments and some

10

is

usually formulated

The

representatives

outstanding writers advocate the
opinion that aggression should not be defined, that a definition is not
desirable and is even dangerous, and that even if it should be defined
of
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almost overwhelmingly difficult. There is also a school
of thought which maintains that aggresion cannot be defined,11 that
it is a concept which by its very nature is not susceptible of definition.
There is even a doctrine which holds that it is both possible and desirable to eliminate the problem of aggression from the organization of
international security altogether. However, the opposite views have
the task

is

defended that the problem of aggression cannot be avoided,
and that aggression can and should be defined. It has also been held
that it can be defined but should not be because no politically satisfactory definition could be achieved, or that even if such a definition
could be achieved it would be superfluous, or that aggression can and
should be defined although the difficulties of defining it should not
also been

be ignored.
(ff )

The attempt

to eliminate the

problem of aggression.

The view that it is both possible and

desirable to eliminate the prob-

lem of aggression is advocated by those who suggest directing the
collective measures to be provided by the treaty constituting an international security organization not against the state guilty of an act
of aggression but against any state which has resorted, or is about to
resort, to war or to the use of armed force, without deciding the question of which state is the actual or potential aggressor. They contend
that a security system should react against the fact of war as such and
not against a specific act of aggression committed by only one state.
The advantage of such a method is that it would avoid the violation
of national honor inevitably involved in stigmatizing a state as an
aggressor. 12 This doctrine can easily be refuted. The problem of
aggression cannot be avoided within a system of international security.
If the member states of an international security organization are
obliged to apply only economic sanctions, as was the case under the
Covenant of the League of Nations, the equal application of these
sanctions to both states involved in a war may result in the defeat of
the economically weaker state by the economically stronger state,
which would be less affected by these sanctions. If one state is not
economically superior to the other, and hence both are affected equally
by economic sanctions, the militarily weaker state would be defeated.
Hence, if an economically or militarily weaker state were the victim
of an aggression, such a system is just the contrary of a security system.
It affords no protection against aggression and does not have the effect
of stopping or preventing war.

may

be that within a system of international security, for one
reason or another, it is not possible to determine the aggressor. Then
it may be inevitable to direct repressive measures against both states,
It
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the unidentified aggressor as well as the likewise unidentified defender. 13 However, such measures, especially those involving the use

of armed force, can hardly be taken without a so-called provisional

measure, a previous call to the belligerents to cease hostilities. In case
only one state is ready to comply with this call, the application of military measures to this state would not only be considered as unjust, it

would also be completely superfluous, and the state which refused to
comply with the call to cease hostilities should be considered to be
the aggressor.

It is in just such a case that a definition of aggression

which includes not only the use of armed force but also the non-compliance with a provisional measure is appropriate. Only if both belligerents refuse to comply with a call to cease hostilities is the application
of military measures against both of them justified. However, in this
case the actions of both fall within this definition of aggression.

Within an organization constituted by a treaty providing for economic and military sanctions to be directed against both states involved
in a war, no right of self-defense is recognized, even though the coercive
machinery of the organization, the main purpose of which is to stop
the war, cannot go into effect immediately after the outbreak of war.
This is highly objectionable, for if a state which is a victim of aggression does not offer resistance by the use of its armed force, in compliance with the prohibition not to resort to war,

it

will probably suffer

If in the case of a war between two states the
not decided which of them is the aggressor, an obligation to

irreparable damage.

question

is

repair the

damage caused by the war can be imposed only upon both

or upon none of the belligerents.
inflicted

upon the

state

An effective system

which

is

In either case gross injustice

is

not the aggressor.

of international security must provide for sanc-

tions not only in case of an actual breach of the peace

aggression but also in case of a threat to the peace.

by an act of

If there is not

an actual war between two states but only a danger of war because
two states have started to mobilize or have concentrated troops on
their frontiers, the central organ of the security organization must
be able to apply preventive measures. It must therefore be able to
call upon both states to stop their mobilization, or to withdraw their
troops from their frontiers, and to submit their conflict to pacific
procedures to be conducted by this organ or another organ of the
security organization or an organ to be established for this purpose by
the states in conflict. If one of the two states refuses to comply with
the call, or if one of them refuses to comply with the decision of the
organ competent to bring about a pacific settlement of the conflict,
then repressive measures that is, sanctions would be directed

—

—
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would be foolish to
which complies with the

It stands to reason that it

against this state.

direct repressive measures against the state

organ of the security organization or the decision of the
which the conflict has been submitted. Such measures would

call of the

organ to
not have the character of sanctions.

They could reasonably be applied

only to the state which refuses to comply with the call to stop mobilization, or to withdraw its troops from the frontier, or to submit the
conflict to a pacific procedure, or to comply with the decision of the

organ competent to bring about a pacific settlement of the conflict.
However, this state would be an aggressor according to the definition
of aggression referred to above. As far as repressive measures are
concerned, and repressive measures are indispensable to an effective
security system, such measures can reasonably be applied only as
reactions against aggression. However, by aggression not only the
use of armed force but also other illegal conduct, especially noncompliance with preventive measures taken by the (direct or indirect)
agencies of a security organization,

may be understood.

Consequently,

the problem of aggression must be included in a consideration of the

organization of international security. 14

(gg) Is the concept of aggression not susceptible to definition?

As

to the doctrine that aggression

is

a concept

which

is

not sus-

should be remembered that "definition" is a
term which may designate different things. "Definition" may mean
a statement determining the meaning of a term. Defining a concept
Insoconsists of determining the qualities belonging to this concept.
ceptible to definition,

far as a "concept"

be defined

is

is

15

it

the result of a definition, a concept which cannot

a contradiction in terms.

One

of the purposes of a

from another simiemploy a term desig-

definition is to enable us to distinguish one object

However, a definition may have to
nating an object which exists in different degrees such as size, temperature, density, and the like. Then it is inevitable that there are concrete cases in which it is not certain whether the definition applies to
concrete objects of which it is doubted whether they fall under the definition, as, for instance, whether or not a man is a giant, this concept being defined as a man of extraordinary size. To maintain that such a
lar object.

definition

is

not a definition,

is

as

much

a fallacy as to maintain that

no difference when there is only a difference in degree and not
in kind, or, what amounts to the same thing, only a relative but not an
absolute difference (the so-called black or white fallacy). This is the
there

is

fallacy implied in the statement that aggression cannot be defined, if
this statement is

based on the fact that there

is

no absolute difference
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but only a relative one between a conduct which may and a conduct
which may not be regarded as aggression and that there are intermediate states between these two kinds of conduct. However, aggression is
not this kind of a concept, and it can be defined in a way that never
makes it doubtful whether a concrete conduct, provided it is known,
does or does not constitute aggression. 15 If aggression could not be
defined, it would be impossible in a concrete case to apply the general
norm attaching a sanction to an act of aggression. Hence, it would
be impossible to determine an aggressor. The law-applying organ,
whether it be the government of an individual state or an international
agency such as a council or a court, can apply this norm to a concrete
case and thus determine the aggressor only if it is able to ascertain
that a concrete conduct of a state constitutes aggression, which means
that this conduct must exhibit all the essential qualities of the concept
concerned.
This presupposes that the law-applying organ has a
definition of aggression in mind.
If this organ does not find the
definition included within the general norm to be applied, it must
construct this definition itself. Furthermore, if the general norm
does not contain a definition of aggression, it must authorize the lawapplying organ to define that conduct which the general norm prohibits by attaching to it a specific sanction, just as a penal law prohibiting murder by attaching capital punishment to this conduct must
define it or leave the definition to the court competent to apply the
law in a concrete case of murder. If this were not done, the court
would be unable to ascertain the fact that a definite individual had
committed murder and to inflict the prescribed punishment on the
murderer.
(hh) The two ?nethods of defining aggression.

In regard to defining aggression, the only legitimate question is
whether the definition of aggression should be inserted into the general
norm attaching a specific sanction to aggression or whether this definition should be left to the organ competent to apply this norm in a
concrete case of aggression and thus competent to determine
the aggressor.
that

it

It is essential to a system of international security

contain such a general norm.

The

question of defining

not a question of the possibility and advisability of
defining it, as the question is usually presented, but rather of determining at what stage of the legal process the definition should be
established. The question is whether within a system of international
security the organ competent to ascertain that a concrete act of aggression has occurred and thus to determine an aggressor should be bound
by a pre-established definition of aggression or whether it should be
aggression

is

:
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authorized to construct this definition itself. The question of defining
aggression is implied in the general problem of the rule-of-law principle within a system of international security. As has been noted,
this is the principle which, as far as possible binds the law-applying

organs to pre-established general norms, and leaves these organs as
little discretion as possible in exercising their functions in order to
render their decisions calculable and thus reduce the uncertainty with
respect to these decisions and increase the so-called legal security as far

evident that if the definition of aggression is left
to the organs competent to apply the treaty constituting an international security system, the definition adopted in one case may differ
as possible.

It

is

from that adopted in another. Consequently, the states which are
members of an international security organization cannot foresee
what conduct will be regarded by the competent organ as aggression
and thus as illegal. As has been pointed out, this situation certainly
does not correspond to the ideal of international security. Of course,
this does not mean that an attempt to maintain the rule-of-law principle within a system of international security does not encounter

certain difficulties or that the realization of this principle does not

have certain disadvantages. In addition, it is understandable that
there should be some doubt as to which of the two methods is preferable to bind the law-applying organs to the definition of aggression
:

pre-established in the constituent treaty, or to leave this definition to
the law-applying organs. The choice between these two methods is a

and

and understandable that the government of a state would favor one method under certain political
circumstances and another under other circumstances. In the Sixth
Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, in explaining
his country's past and present position with regard to the question of
denning aggression, the representative of the United States declared
difficult one,

it is

quite possible

"A number of delegations had said the United States had
in 1945 argued the view which was now that of the Soviet
Union. That was quite true, and the United States did not
in any way pretend that it was not. In 1945, the United
States had been in favour of a definition of aggression because
at that time there had been every reason to believe that the
term 'international co-operation' would have a real connotation. Unfortunately, the state of international relations had
become such as to convince the United States that a definition
of aggression had become not only undesirable but even dangerous.
The United States delegation had not obeyed a
whim; it had adopted a position which was diametrically
opposed to the stand it had taken in 1945 and had done so in
view of international developments." 16
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There are good reasons for preferring one or the other method.
However, in order to make a reasonable choice, it is necessary to
formulate the two methods correctly. Hence, it is not the choice
between denning and not defining aggression that must be made,
because aggression must be defined anyway; nor is the choice to be
made the choice between a method of defining aggression and a method
of determining an aggressor, as it is sometimes formulated, 17 for an
aggressor can be determined only on the basis of a definition of
aggression, whether the definition is pre-established or left to the organ
competent to determine an aggressor. 18 No matter how important it
may be, the difference between these two methods is only relative and
not absolute.

Even

if

the constituent treaty contains a very detailed

definition of the prohibited aggression, the law-applying organ

is not
completely bound in determining an aggressor, for no definition can
determine its object, and no general norm can bind the law-applying
organ completely. Every definition contains elements, i. e., employs

terms, which themselves require definition.

It

able to object to a definition of aggression if

For example,

if in

a penal law,

murder

is

is

therefore not

it

employs such terms.

justifi-

defined as bringing about the

human

being intentionally, each term of this definiopen to interpretation. This means that each term has to be
defined by the court in each concrete case. Every application of a
general norm in a concrete case requires interpretation and so do the
definitions of the terms used in the general norm.
Consequently, a
certain degree of discretion is always left to the law-applying organ.
On the other hand, if the constituent treaty prohibits aggression
without defining this concept, the discretion of the law- applying organ
death of another

tion

is

in defining the concept

not unlimited. If a word like "aggression"
there is always a minimum of general under-

is

has any meaning at all,
standing, and it is only to achieve a maximum of understanding that a
determination of the meaning by definition is required. The meaning
of a word is a sphere with a relatively solid center, like the stone of
a fruit, and a more or less liquid, i. e., vague, periphery. Hence, even
if "aggression" is prohibited without being defined in advance, not
every conduct of a state can be regarded by the law-applying organ
as aggression. The difference between the two methods consists only
of the fact that much less discretion is left to the law-applying organ
in the case where aggression is defined in advance than in the case
where aggression must be defined together with the determination of
the aggressor. The difference is sometimes assumed incorrectly to be
that the former method is "automatic," 19 while the latter is not, which
means that if aggression is defined in advance, the determination of
the aggressor is, so to speak, self-acting because it does not depend
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on the will of the organ determining the aggressor, while in case
there is no pre-established definition, the determination of the aggressor cannot be performed without a conscious and deliberate action of
a competent organ morally responsible for this action. Such action
is

necessary in both cases.

No

general

norm can be applied automatically

in a concrete case,

because such an application always requires the creative function of
a law-applying organ. The procedure by which a general norm prohibiting aggression by attaching a sanction to this conduct

is

applied

in a concrete case can never be the automatic consequence of this norm,

even

if

the

norm

contains the most detailed definition of aggression.

of a sanction prescribed in the general norm is not poswithout the ascertainment of a fact that occurs only after the
general norm has been established: an act of aggression performed
by a definite state at a definite time and at a definite place. This ascertainment, as a function of the law-applying organ, is necessary
whether the general norm does or does not contain a definition of

The execution

sible

aggression, and

and deliberate action constituting the responsibility of the acting organ, whether its liberty of
action in determining an aggressor is more or less limited. It is true
it

requires a conscious

always limited, but only to a certain extent, since a certain
degree of discretion is always left to the law-applying organ. 20 However, it must be admitted that the moral responsibility of the organ
determining the aggressor is much greater if this organ must define
aggression itself than if the definition is pre-established and the discretion the organ may exercise in determining the aggressor is very
that

it is

limited.
(ii)

The arguments against a pre-established

definition of aggression.

Among the

arguments set forth against a pre-established definition
of aggression are some which can easily be refuted. One is that no
definition of aggression will discourage "major" aggressors whose
motives are military and political. 21 While this may be true, it is not
an argument against a particular method of organizing international
security but a pessimistic evaluation of the possible effectiveness of

any international security organization. The other argument was
presented in the famous statement made on 26 November 1927 by
Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons in which he said
that a definition of aggression (especially by enumerating the acts
of aggression) "will be a trap for the innocent and a sign-post fo*'
the guilty." The possibility that a state may accomplish a plan most
harmful to another state and yet evade the most carefully formulated definition of aggression can certainly not be denied.
However.
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be denied that this possibility may be restricted to a
certain extent if potential aggressors are informed in advance which
of their acts will probably lead to a most undesirable reaction on the
part of the security organization. Consequently, potential aggressors
may make some effort to alter their aggressive actions in order to avoid
these reactions. There is no legal prohibition which cannot be eluded
in some way, but this is certainly not sufficent reason to renounce a legal
regulation of human relations. During the discussion of the Report
of the Special Committee on the question of defining aggression in
neither can

it

the Sixth Committee, the representative of the United
fied his rejection of a pre-established definition also

"The

Kingdom

justi-

by the statement:

real safeguard against aggression lay not in definition, but in

disarmament."

The

22

It stands to reason that a definition in itself has

no

expected from the application of a legal rule
attaching a sanction to an act which, in accordance with a definition
contained in this rule, has been declared by the law-applying organ to
be an act of aggression. It cannot be denied that a legal rule which
precisely determines the act prohibited by it, may have a greater effect
than a rule which does not answer the question as to what exactly is
effect.

effect is

prohibited.

The arguments which may reasonably be

set forth for or against a

pre-established definition of aggression are, in principle, the same as

those which

may

be advanced for or against the rule-of-law principle.
The most important argument in favor of inserting into the treaty
constituting an international security organization a definition of
aggression, provided that this term is used in the treaty, or what

amounts

to the

same thing, the main reason why the constituent treaty

should determine as precisely as feasible the conduct of states against
which the sanctions stipulated by the treaty are to be directed, is that
all the members of a security organization have a legitimate right to
know in advance what conduct is prohibited. It cannot be denied
that a legal order is most unsatisfactory if it leaves its subjects in
complete uncertainty about the content of their obligations. 23 This
is especially true if the sanctions provided for by a legal order have
the character of punishment, if the law is penal law, if the constituent
treaty establishes individual criminal responsibility for all or even
some of its violations. 24 If such a treaty does not define the crimes

which constitute aggression, for the commission of which individuals

may

be punished, but leaves the definition of these crimes to the lawapplying organ, such crimes may very well be regarded, if not formally
at least substantially, as so-called crimen sine lege, and the punishment inflicted by the organ upon a person found guilty of such a

may very well be considered to be poena sine lege. This means
that establishing individual criminal responsibility for crimes con-

crime
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denning these crimes in advance implies
the violation of a fundamental principle generally recognized in the
field of criminal law nullum crimen et nulla poena sine lege, no crime
and no punishment without a pre-established general norm defining,
as precisely as possible, the crime as well as the punishment. This is
stituting aggression without

:

the application of the rule-of-law principle to criminal law. 25

If the opposite principle of leaving the definition of aggression to
the law-applying organ

adopted in a security system, it is usually
justified by the argument that it guarantees the flexibility of the legal
order. 26 There can be no doubt that lawmakers in general, and those
who on behalf of their states conclude a treaty constituting an international security system in particular, cannot foresee all the possible
circumstances under which a pre-established general norm has to be
applied and cannot provide for unforeseen circumstances in which an
application of the

problem

is

norm may

lead to unsatisfactory results.

However,

not particular to a system of international security,
but applies to any legal order. The disadvantage involved is a consequence of the rule-of-law principle and may be considered to be outweighed or at least compensated for by the advantages of this principle. In regard to this rule-of-law principle, it may be added that
the greater the discretion left to the law-applying organ, the greater
the possibility of its decisions being influenced by motives other than
the sincere intention of realizing the main purpose of a security system
which is to react against an aggressor, or, as it is usually formulated,
the greater the possibility of being influenced by political considerathis

is

An

organ competent to determine the aggressor, especially if
this function is left to the individual states, will hesitate to apply the
constituent treaty in conformity with its spirit if the state against
which the sanctions provided for by the treaty are to be directed is
very powerful or is united with the state competent to determine the
aggressor by a common interest other than an interest in the collective
security for which the international organization is established. If
the answer to the question of which state is the aggressor depends on
a definition of aggression by the law-applying organ, the state acting
as an organ of the security organization will naturally find justification for an attitude determined by its political interests.
tions.

(jj) Is

aggression a political concept and not a legal one?

It is because of this possibility that the

sion in advance is sometimes opposed.

method of defining aggres-

This opposition

is

frequently

by a doctrine which holds that aggression is not a legal conor not an exclusively legal concept, but a political concept or a

justified

cept,

partially political concept.

370624—57

6

The

conclusion this doctrine reaches

is
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that only legal, and not political, concepts can or should be defined in

advance

;

or, that as far as the

problem of

collective security in general

or the concept of aggression in particular are concerned, legal functions cannot be separated

from

political considerations; or,

assuming

that juridical considerations cannot be divorced from political fac27
tors,
that the treaty constituting an international security organiza-

not a legal but a political instrument and consequently has to be
formulated and interpreted in a political way and not from a strictly

tion

is

juridical standpoint.

In the opinion of the author these views are theoretically untenable.

A concept is legal if its object is a set of legal norms or social relationships constituted by legal norms, and a concept

is

norms other than legal norms or the
ships constituted by such norms. There is no reason
object

is

a set of

political concepts are less definable

legal concepts

must be more or

of whether or not a concept
is

definable,

is

is

that concepts employed in

concepts employed in legal
in order to allow the

organ

social relation-

to

assume that

than legal concepts or that only

The

less precisely defined.

definable

and

which has nothing

question

what extent

if it is, to

it

do with the
of a concept. It cannot be maintained
political norms, in contradistinction to
norms, should not be defined in advance
applying the political norms the greatest

a logical question

legal or political character

political if its

to

possible liberty of action, because a pre-established definition of a
legal concept

may

of the law that

it

be rejected for the same reason.

regulates

its

own

It is a peculiarity

creation and application.

However,

the creation and application of the law are always determined not

only by legal norms but also by non-legal, political norms, or, as it is
usually formulated, by political considerations. This is not particular
to a legal system of international security.
historically first constitution of a legal

The establishment

community, a

of the

state, for ex-

determined exclusively by political norms. The creation
of statutes under a constitution is determined by the legal norms of
the constitution but usually only insofar as the legislative procedure
in which the statutes are to be created is concerned. The content of
statutes is determined only by non-legal, i. e., political norms. The
application of statutes by courts and other law-applying organs is
determined to a much greater extent by legal norms (by the statutes
themselves) and to a much lesser extent by non-legal, political norms
than the creation of statutes. If discretion is left to an organ competent to create or to apply the law, in fulfilling its function the
organ may be influenced by other than legal norms that is, by
ample,

is

norms or, as
However, the

political
tions.

—

it is

usually formulated, by political considera-

influence of political

norms or

political con-
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siderations

must take place only within the framework of the

legal

norms determining the function of the organ. Since the function of
either a law-creating or a law-applying organ can never be determined
completely by legal norms, the legal function really cannot be separated from political considerations, except in the sense that political
considerations cannot be eliminated in that area of an organ's function

not determined by legal norms. In this sense, political considerations cannot be divorced from the function of a law-applying
organ within a system of international security, whether the constituent treaty prohibiting aggression does or does not contain a
that

is

definition of this concept.

However, there

is

more room for

political

considerations if the treaty does not contain such a definition.
the treaty

is

Since

a legal instrument, stipulating legal obligations and legal

rights of the contracting parties on the basis of general international

law, the concept of aggression employed in the treaty

However,
is,

is

a legal concept.

lawmakers—that
—are directed not by general international

in defining the concept of aggression, the

the contracting parties

law, if this law does not prohibit aggression, but by political principles.

Insofar as the concept of aggression is both a legal and a political
concept, just as the treaty itself is both a legal and a political instrument, the same is true if the definition of aggression is left to the
law-applying organ. This is a consequence of the fact that the legal
functions of creating and applying the law are always determined

not only by legal but also by non-legal, political norms.
As far as the interpretation of the constituent treaty, or the interpretation of any legal instrument, is concerned, it is neither legal nor

no interpretation is specifically legal or specifically
possible methods of interpretation are applicable to all

political because
political; all

possible objects of interpretation.

A constitution, a treaty, or a politi-

agreement which has no legal character at all can be interpreted
same way as the Bible or Shakespeare's Hamlet.
It follows from this analysis that the above mentioned view which
rejects a pre-established definition of aggression by referring to the
political character of the concept, or of the constituent treaty employing this concept, is open to argument. However, it does not follow
that a pre-established definition of aggression cannot be rejected.
What does follow is that such a rejection must be justified in another
way and can best be justified by arguments in favor of a high degree
of flexibility of a security system which, as pointed out, can be achieved
only at the expense of the degree of security. However, a reasonable
degree of flexibility of this system can be established without abandoning the attempt to define aggression in the treaty constituting the
cal

in the

international security organization.
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(kk) General or enwmerative definition of aggression.

Aggression may be defined in a constitutent treaty either by a general formula (a so-called general definition), by specifying the particular actions which constitute aggression (a so-called enumerative
definition), or by a general formula illustrated by the specifications
of certain actions which fall within the scope of the general definition (mixed definition). 28
typical example of a general formula defining aggression is the
statement aggression is any use of armed force by one state against
another for purposes other than self-defense or the execution of a
sanction stipulated by the treaty constituting a security organization. 29
It makes no difference whether the treaty contains an express statement defining aggression in this way, or whether it simply prohibits

A

:

any use of armed force by attaching

specific sanctions including en-

forcement measures involving the use of armed force to

it,

excluding

the application of these sanctions in the case of self-defense.

stands to reason that

if

a constituent treaty includes a general

It

norm

need not employ the term "aggression" at all, and
it would be superfluous to insert an express statement defining this
term into the treaty. The definition of aggression is implied in the
general norm and may be deduced from it by interpretation. Hence,
the fact that a definition is superfluous in this case cannot be used,
as it actually has been used, as an argument against a pre-established
definition of aggression; nor can such an argument be based on the
fact that a general definition, which is either implied in the general
norm or is expressly formulated, could not achieve the main object of
indicating precisely the cases in which aggression could be said to
have occurred, and that in spite of such a definition it would be impossible to say in advance whether or not a given act was an aggressive
30
The main object of a general definition is not to enable one to
act.
indicate precisely and in advance all possible acts of aggression. At
any rate, such a prediction is impossible. However, without doubt,
of this content,

there

is

it

a greater probability of foreseeing

acts of aggression

by law- applying organs

which

acts will be declared

a general definition of aggression inserted in the constituent treaty than if the treaty
forbids aggression without any express or implied definition of this
if

there

is

concept. 31

Because the general norm formulated above or an express definition
corresponding to such a norm does not allow a precise indication of

which are to be recognized as acts of aggression, a
security system of this type has a relatively high degree of flexibility.
all possible acts

It is flexible although

it is

not the definition of aggression, but the

;

:

;

:
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term used in the definition of aggression, the term
"armed force," which is left to the law-applying organ. There is no
doubt that this term can be defined in very different ways and that
a remarkable amount of discretion in defining the term is conferred
upon the law-applying organ competent to decide whether a concrete
definition of a

act does or does not constitute a use of

A

characteristic

armed force.

example of a so-called enumerative definition

the definition of agression contained in the proposal of the

is

USSR

Delegation submitted to the General Commission of the Disarmament
Conference (1932-1933) on 6 February 1933. The proposal did not
present a definition of aggression but a definition of the aggressor
which ran as follows (Doc. 1933. IX., 10, p. 237)
:

The aggressor

in an international conflict shall be considered that State which is the first to take any of the following actions
"1.

(a) Declaration of war against another State;
(b) The invasion by its armed forces of the territory

of another State without declaration of war
(c) Bombarding the territory of another State by its
land, naval or air forces or knowingly attacking the naval or
air forces of another State
(d) The landing in, or introduction within the frontiers
of, another State of land, naval or air forces without the permission of the Government of such a State, or the infringement of the conditions of such permission, particularly as
regards the duration of sojourn or extension of area
(e) The establishment of a naval blockade of the coast
or ports of another State."
;

To

enumeration of acts of aggression, intended to be considered
as exhaustive, the following provision was added
this

"No considerations whatsoever of

a political, strategical, or
economic nature, including the desire to exploit natural riches
or to obtain any sort of advantages or privileges on the territory of another State, no references to considerable capital
investments or other special interests in a given State, or to
the alleged absence of certain attributes of State organization in the case of a given country, shall be accepted as justification of aggression as defined in Clause 1."

There followed an enumeration of particular facts on which a justification for attack could not be based. Since the enumeration of the
acts of aggression in Clause 1 was exhaustive, the provision of Clause
2 as well as the enumeration of facts on which a justification of attack
could not be based, was superfluous from the point of view of correct
legal technique. 32

:

;

;;
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USSR

proposal was discussed by the General Commission and
after discussion submitted to the Committee on Security Questions,
which presented to the General Commission a report containing the

The

following Articles (Doc. 1935. IX. 4, p. 683)
"Article 1. The aggressor in an international conflict shall,

—

:

subject to the agreements in force between the parties to the dispute,

be considered to be that State which is the first to commit any of the
following actions:
(1) Declaration of war upon another State;
(2) Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration
of war, of the territory of another State

Attack by its land, naval or air forces, with or without a
declaration of war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft of another
(3)

State;

Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State
(5) Provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory which have invaded the territory of another State, or refusal,
(4)

notwithstanding the request of the invaded State, to take in its own
territory all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all
assistance or protection.

tions

—

No political, military, economic or other consideramay serve as an excuse or justification for the aggression referred

Article

2.

to in Article 1."

The most important

difference between the

USSR

the definition by the Committee on Security Questions

which added

latters point 5

USSR

definition
is

acts of indirect aggression.

and

found in the
32a

submitted to the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression the following draft resolution (A/AC66/L.2/Rev.l)

In 1953 the

:

The General Assembly, considering

necessary to formulate directives with a view to determining which party is
guilty of aggression, declares that
1. In an international conflict that State shall be declared
the attacker which first commits one of the following acts:
(a) declaration of war against another State; (b) invasion
by its armed forces, even without a declaration of war, of the
territory of another State; (c) bombardment by its land, sea
or air forces of the territory of another State or the carrying
out of a deliberate attack on the ships or aircraft of the latter
(d) the landing or leading of its land, sea or air forces inside
the boundaries of another State without the permission of the
government of the latter, or the violation of the conditions of
such permission, particularly as regards the length of their
stay or the extent of the area in which they may stay; (e)
naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State; (f)
it

:

;:
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support of armed bands organized in its own territory which
invade the territory of another State, or refusal, on being
requested by the invaded State, to take in its own territory
any action within its power to deny such bands any aid or
protection.
2. That State shall be declared to have committed an act
of indirect aggression which: (a) encourages subversive
activity against another State (acts of terrorism, diversion,
(b) promotes the outbreak of civil war within another
etc.)
State; (c) promotes an internal upheaval in another State or
a reversal of policy in favour of the aggressor.
3. That State shall be declared to have committed an act
of economic aggression which first commits one of the following acts: (a) takes against another State measures of economic pressure violating its sovereignty and economic independence and threatening the bases of its economic life; (b)
takes against another State measures preventing it from exploiting or nationalizing its own natural riches; (c) subjects another State to an economic blockade.
4. That State shall be declared to have committed an
act of ideological aggression which: (a) encourages war
propaganda; (b) encourages propaganda in favour of using
atomic, bacterial, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction; (c) promotes the propagation of fascist-nazi views
of racial and national exclusiveness, and of hatred and contempt for other peoples.
5. An act other than those listed in the preceding paragraphs may when committed by a State be deemed to constitute aggression if declared by resolution of the Security
Council
a particular case to be an attack or an act of economic, ideological or indirect aggression.
6. Attacks such as those referred to in paragraph 1 and
acts of economic, ideological and indirect aggression such as
those referred to in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 may not be justified
by any arguments of a political, strategic or economic nature,
or by the desire to exploit natural riches in the territory of the
State attacked or to derive any other kind of advantages or
privileges, or by reference to the amount of capital invested
in the State attacked or to any other particular interests in
its territory, or by the affirmation that the State attacked
lacks the distinguishing marks of statehood. In particular,
the following may not be used as justifications
A. The internal position of any State, as for example
(a) the backwardness of any nation politically, economically
or culturally (b) alleged shortcomings of its administration
(c) any danger which may threaten the life or property of
aliens;
(d) any revolutionary or counter-revolutionary
movement, civil war, disorders, or strikes; (e) the establishment or maintenance in any State of any political,
economic or social system.
B. Any acts, legislation or orders of any State, as for
example: (a) the violation of international treaties; (b) the
;

m

—

;
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violation of rights and interests in the sphere of trade, concessions or any other kind of economic activity acquired by
another State or its citizens; (c) the rupture of diplomatic
or economic relations; (d) measures in connexion with an
economic or financial boycott; (e) repudiation of debts;
(f) prohibition or restriction of immigration or modification
of the status of foreigners; (g) the violation of privileges
granted to the official representatives of another State;
(h) refusal to allow the passage of armed forces proceeding
to the territory of a third State; (i) measures of a religious
or anti-religious nature; (j) frontier incidents.
7. In the event of the mobilization or concentration by
another State of considerable armed forces near its frontier,
the State which is threatened by such action shall have the
right of recourse to diplomatic or other means of securing
a peaceful settlement of international disputes. It may also
in the meantime adopt requisite measures of a military
nature similar to those described above, without, however,
crossing the frontier.

The enumerative

definition formulated in this draft resolution is

characterized by the fact that

it

includes not only acts of indirect

but also of economic and ideological aggression. 33
It is evident that an enumerative definition of aggression (or the
aggressor) such as the one quoted above, restricts the {freedom of
action of the organ competent to apply the treaty containing such a
definition to a

much

greater extent, and thus renders the security

than the general definition mentioned above.
However, neither a general nor an enumerative definition of aggressystem

less flexible,

sion inserted into the constituent treaty attaching specific sanctions
to acts of aggression necessarily leads to an application of these

sanctions in all cases which, in the opinion of the law-applying organ,

within the scope of the definition, or, as it is usually but incorrectly formulated, to the "automatic" operation of the coercive
machinery of the security system. The law laid down in the constituent treaty may authorize the law-applying organ not to proceed
immediately to the determination of the aggressor but first to call
upon the parties to the conflict to cease hostilities and conform to
certain measures of conservation, such as the withdrawal of troops
beyond a certain line, or the acceptance of an investigation on the
spot by impartial authorities. The law may also authorize the lawapplying organ, once it has ascertained the existence of an act of
aggression, to apply peaceful measures to settle the conflict before
applying sanctions. The law-applying organ may even be authorized to abstain altogether from applying sanctions under particular
circumstances to be determined by this organ. However, in this
latter case the fact must be considered that, if a definite conduct is not
fall

;
;

:
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made

not illegal, and hence it is not
"aggression" in the sense of an action prohibited by the security
the condition of a sanction,

it is

treaty.

A mixed definition of aggression is the one proposed by the repre-

sentative of

Panama

on 20 October 1954

34
,

at the 406th meeting of the Sixth

Committee

which runs as follows

1. Aggression means any use of armed force by one State
against another State for any purpose other than individual
or collective self-defence, or in pursuance of a decision or
recommendation of a competent organ of the United Nations
2. In addition to any other acts that the competent organs
of the United Nations may declare to constitute aggression,
the acts enumerated below are specific acts of aggression if
committed for purposes other than those stated in the preceding paragraph: (a) invasion of the territory of a State
by the armed forces of another State; (b) armed attack
against the territory, population or land, naval or air forces
of one State by the land, naval or air forces of another State
(c) blockade of the coast, ports, or any other part of the
territory of a State by the land or naval forces of another
State; (d) the organization, or the encouragement of the
organization, by the authorities of a State, of armed bands
within its territory or any other territory for incursions into
the territory of another State, or the toleration of the organization of such bands in its own territory, or the toleration of
the use by such armed bands of its territory as a base of operations or as a point of departure for incursions into the territory of another State, as well as direct participation in or
support of such incursions; (e) the annexation by the authorities of one State or territory belonging to another State
by means of acts contrary to international law.
3. It shall rest with the General Assembly in the exercise
of its general powers or with the Security Council in the
exercise of the special power vested in it by Article 39 of
the United Nations Charter to declare, at such time as it may
deem appropriate, that the State that has directly or indirectly employed force in any of the ways set forth in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this resolution is guilty of aggression.

(11)

The

difficulties

in defining aggression

and

in determining the

aggressor.
It can certainly not be denied that defining aggression is difficult.

However,

to

overcome the

difficulties

a clear idea of their nature.

concerned,

First of

all, it is

it is

necessary to have

necessary to avoid a

confusion which almost always affects the discussion of the definition
of aggression: the confusion between the difficulties which exist in
defining "aggression" and those which exist in ascertaining that a
concrete act is an act of aggression or, what amounts to the same
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thing, in determining the aggressor in a concrete case in conformity

with the definition of aggression. That this confusion actually occurs
may be explained by the fact that if, and to the extent that, a definition
of aggression is not pre-established in a constituent treaty but left to
the law-applying organ, this function and that of determining the
aggressor are both performed by the same individual or individuals,
and hence the distinction between the two functions is not very clear
in their minds. As a result, the difficulties involved in determining
a concrete aggressor are mistaken for the difficulties involved in defining aggression, and vice versa.
From the foregoing it follows that the main difficulties which every
attempt to define aggression encounters are caused by the decision
concerning the scope of the definition that is, by the answer to the
question of how far the security system should go in prohibiting a

—

definite

conduct of states by attaching specific sanctions to

far as a pre-established definition

is

it.

As

concerned, the difficulty consists

of the fact that under particular circumstances which are not and

cannot be foreseen, a certain action which does not fall under the
definition may be, and an action which does fall under the definition
may not be, an appropriate condition for a sanction. In other words,
the difficulty is that the definition may prove to be too narrow or too
broad. "We have dealt with this problem which, as has been pointed
out, is a problem of all legislation, as the formulation of general norms.
The difficulty in an enumerative definition of aggression is that no exhaustive enumeration can be complete, especially in view of the modern
technique of warfare, and if an enumeration is not exhaustive but only
illustrative, the acts enumerated being only examples of aggression,
the enumeration is not a definition at all.
Totally different from the difficulties in defining aggression are the
difficulties in ascertaining that an act is an act of aggression, or, what
amounts to the same thing, in determining the aggressor, in conformity with a definition, whether the definition is established in
advance or is to be established by the law-applying organ competent
to determine the aggressor. These difficulties are exactly the same as
those encountered in any legal procedure for the ascertainment of a
fact to which the law attaches certain consequences. They are the
typical difficulties involved in gathering, examining and evaluating
evidence whether the question is which of the states involved in a
conflict was the first to use force, whether it is the intention of this
state, or whether it is any other question to be answered in connection
with the application of the general norm of the security system prohibiting aggression in a concrete case.
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In the procedure by which the treaty constituting the security
organization is to be applied, there are, as in any law-applying
procedure, two different methods of regulating the procedure for
ascertaining the legally relevant facts one consists of leaving the lawapplying organ completely free in this respect, the other of establishing definite rules concerning the means of evidence and their evaluation.
To adopt the first method within a system of international
security means to confer an extraordinary power upon the organ
competent to determine an aggressor. In this case, the position of
this organ is not very different from that which results from leaving
the definition of aggression to this organ. The restrictions imposed
upon the law-applying organ by a pre-established definition may be
outweighed by the organ's liberty in adjudging evidence. Attempts
may be made to restrict this liberty or, to look at the problem from
:

another angle, to facilitate the function of the organ. For this purpose, certain actions, indicated in the constituent treaty, may allow
the presumption that aggression has taken place, e. g., the invasion
of the territory of one state by the troops of another, or an attack on
a considerable scale launched by one state against the frontier of
another.

It is especially difficult to ascertain that

aggression

if

a definite intention of the state, which

an aggressor,

is

an element of this concept.

an act
is

is

an act of

to be stigmatized

Hence,

it

may

be con-

sidered advisable to insert into the constituent treaty an enumeration

of certain objective facts as

symptoms of such an

intention,

e.

g.,

economic or military mobilization, presence of the armed forces of
one state in the territory of another, or the refusal to submit the
conflict to a pacific procedure.
These facts would allow the lawapplying organ to presume that the intention exists. The presumption may or may not be conclusive that is, the inference as to the
existence of aggression or aggressive intention may or may not be
made peremptory by the existence of the indicated facts. If the presumption is conclusive, it cannot be reversed by any proof to the
contrary, however strong the proof may be.
It is irrebuttable, a
presumptio juris et de jure. The enumeration of facts as irrebuttable
evidence of the existence of aggression is equivalent to an enumerative
definition of aggression. 35
If the presumption is not irrebuttable,
(a presiiiriptio juris but not de jure), it can be rejected by a decision
of the law-applying organ. The Geneva Protocol, a draft treaty
adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations on 2 October 1924
but abandoned the following year, contains a series of presumptions
by which an aggressor may be determined "in the event hostilities
having broken out," but provides that these presumptions may be

—

rejected

by a unanimous decision of the Council. 36
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(mm) The problem
Finally,

it

of provocation.

should be mentioned that there

restrict the prohibition of the use of

is

a certain tendency to

armed force and hence the con-

cept of aggression to an unprovoked attack, so that a provoked use of

armed force would be permitted and could be justified as self-defense.
Provocation may consist of the use of armed force, or of the violation
of international law not involving the use of armed force, or of an
unfriendly attitude of a state towards another state which does not
constitute any violation of international law.
If a system of international security

is

to eliminate the principle of self-help as far as

armed force
by one state against another can justify the use of armed force by the
that is, only if provoked by the use of armed force by
state attacked
another state, would a state be justified in using armed force itself.
In this case, self-defense would be permitted only as a reaction against
the use of armed force, and any use of armed force which is not selfpossible, only a provocation

which

consists of the use of

—

defense (or the execution of a specific sanction of the security system)

would be aggression. If any violation of international law, and not
only the use of armed force, is recognized as a provocation justifying
the use of armed force by a single state that is, if the states are
authorized to resort to the use of armed force as a reaction against any

—

violation of their rights

—the principle of self-help prevails together

This means that the lowest possible
exists.
In this case, the concept of
the use of armed force as a reaction against an

with the bellwn justvmi principle.
degree of international security

—that

self-defense

illegal use of

armed force

is,

armed

is

—

force

is

of little importance, since the use of

legal as a reaction against

Hence, the concept of self-defense

may

be extended to include the re-

and the concept
the use of armed force which is not

action of a state against any violation of

of aggression

may

be restricted to

any violation of the law.

a reaction against a violation of the law.

its rights,

If even the unfriendly atti-

which does not constitute a violation of the law, is
recognized as a provocation which justifies the use of armed force, and
if a state may thus resort to the use of armed force as a reaction against
the conduct of another state which is not illegal, even the principle of
bellum justum does not prevail, and no international security whatsoever exists. In this case, the concept of aggression is not applicable
at all, since the use of armed force is not illegal, and the concept of
self-defense has no legal meaning.
tude of a

state,
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NOTES
1. The International Law Commission, established in pursuance of General
Assembly Resolution 174 (II) of 21 November, 1947, adopted in its third
( 16 May-27 July 1951 ) as a basis of discussion the following definition of
aggression "Aggression is the threat or use of force by a State or government
against another State, in any manner, whatever the weapons employed and

session

:

whether openly or otherwise, for any reason or for any purpose other than
individual or collective self-defence or in pursuance of a decision or recommenda-

However, when submitted to
Report of the International Law

tion by a competent organ of the United Nations."

the final vote the definition

was

rejected.

third session 16 May-27 July 1951. General
Assembly, Official Records: Sixth Session, Suppl. No. 9 (A/1858), pp. 9, 10.
la. Because the Kellogg-Briand Pact did not contain an express clause stipu-

Commission covering the work of

its

lating the right of self-defense, the contracting parties

concerning their right to resort to

war

had

to

make

reservations

in the exercise of self-defense.

It

was

generally assumed that the right of self-defense was presupposed by the Pact.
However, the extent to which this right could be exercised under the Pact

remained an open question which was answered in different ways by the various
signatories. Thus in a note of June 23, 1928, the United States Government
declared that the proposed treaty did not restrict or impair the right of selfdefense; but it justified this reservation by the doctrine that the right of selfdefense is established by natural law and hence does not need positive stipulation.
"That right is inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit in every
Every nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions to
treaty.
defend its territory from attack or invasion and it alone is competent to decide
whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defense." Treaty for the
Renunciation of War, Department of State Publication No. 468 (1933), p. 57.
Cf. Philip C. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations, New York 1948, p. 163. The statement that every nation "alone is competent to decide whether circumstances
require recourse to war in self-defense" is hardly compatible with Articles 51
and 39 of the Charter of the United Nations. Cf. infra, note 3.
lb. Article 51 of the Charter runs as follows "Nothing in the present Charter
shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of selfdefense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in
any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under
the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in
order to maintain or restore international peace and security."
The wording of this provision presupposes a natural right of self-defense
existing independently of the Charter and declares only that it is not in conflict
with this right "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right
of individual and collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
."
Member of the United Nations
(In the French text the term "droit
naturel de legitime defense" is used.)
However, in truth, the Charter does
not merely respect an already existing right but establishes a right and must
establish it as an express restriction to the provision of Article 2, paragraph 4,
which imposes upon the members the obligation to refrain in their international
relations from the use of force.
Since under Article 51 of the Charter the right
:

:

.

.

:

.
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if

may

be exercised only "if an armed attack occurs," that means
such an attack actually takes place, a preventive war on the part of a member

of self-defense

state is illegal.

According to the wording of Article

51, the exercise of the right of selfonly in case of an armed attack "against a Member of the
United Nations." However, according to an almost generally accepted interpretation of Article 51, the right of collective self-defense may also be exercised
2.

defense

is justified

an armed attack against a non-member state. Cf. supra, p. 61. Since
the Charter of the United Nations does not define the term "armed attack"

in case of

used in Article

51,

the

members

of the United Nations in exercising their right

may interpret "armed attack" to mean
not only an action in which a state uses its own armed force but also a revolutionary movement which takes place in one state but which is initiated or
supported by another state.
In this case, the members could come to the
assistance of the legitimate government against which the revolutionary moveof individual or collective self-defense

ment

is

directed.

Such an interpretation would be consistent with the fact that, according to
the wording of Article 39, in case the Security Council considers such a revolu-

movement to be a threat to or breach of the peace, it may take enforcement measures against the revolutionary forces as well as against the state
which has initiated or supported this movement, to assist the attacked government. Article 39 authorizes the Security Council to take measures "to maintain
or restore international peace and security." It says nothing about the party
against which these measures are to be taken.
tionary

According to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, the right
may be exercised only "until the Security
Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security." According to Article 39, the Security Council "shall determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression."
Hence as soon as the Security Council intervenes, it must decide which state
However, according to the wording
is the aggressor and which is the defender.
of Articles 39 and 51, the Security Council is not bound to take enforcement
measures only against the state which it considers to be the aggressor that is,
only against the state it considers to be guilty of an "armed attack." The Council may take any measures which it considers necessary to restore peace.
4. For instance, Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations stipulated "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against
external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence
of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any
threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means
by which this obligation shall be fulfilled." Cf. Article 2, paragraph 4, of the
Charter of the United Nations.
5. The question as to whether aggressive intent should be considered as an
essential element of the concept of aggression has been discussed in the Special
Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, established by Resolution 688
(VII) adopted by the General Assembly in its 408th plenary meeting on 20 December 1952. Cf. the Report of this Committee: General Assembly, Official Records:
Ninth Session, Supplement No. 11 (A/2638), p. 8.
6. Cf. the Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations entitled
Question of Defining Aggression. United Nations General Assembly. Seventh
Session.
Document A/2211, 3 October 1952, p. 55 (hereafter referred to as:
Doc. A/2211 )
3.

of individual or collective self-defense

—

:
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6a. The International Law Commission, in its Report Doc. A/1858, p. 9, declared itself in favor of including indirect aggression in the definition of aggression. The report speaks of "indirect forms of aggression such as the fomenting

of civil strife by one State in another, the

arming by a State of organized bands

for offensive purposes directed against another State, and the sending of 'volun-

engage in hostilities against another State." The report refers to
(V) of 17 November 1950, in which the General Assembly
"Solemnly reaffirms that, whatever the weapons used, any aggression, whether
committed openly, or by fomenting civil strife in the interest of a foreign Power,
or otherwise, is the gravest of all crimes against peace and security throughout
teers'

to

Resolution 380

the world."

Document A/2211, p. 48.
7a. The Draft Treaty of Disarmament and Security prepared by an American
Group (Declaration outlawing Aggressive War) stipulated: "Article 1. The
High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that aggressive war is an international crime. They severally undertake not to be guilty of its commission.
Article 2. A State engaging in war for other than purposes of defence commits
the international crime described in Article 1. Article 3. The Permanent Court
7.

Cf.

of International Justice shall have jurisdiction, on the complaint of any Signatory, to

make

a judgment to the effect that the international crime described in

Article 1 has or has not in any given case been committed.

The High
even when not

Article

4.

Contracting Parties solemnly declare that acts of aggression,
amounting to a state of war, and preparations for such acts of aggression, are
hereafter to be deemed forbidden by international law.
Article 5. In the
absence of a state of war, measures of force by land, by sea or in the air taken
by one State against another and not taken for the purpose of defence against
aggression or for the protection of human life shall be deemed to be acts of
aggression. General or partial mobilization may be deemed to be preparation
for an act of aggression. Any Signatory which claims that another Signatory
has violated any of the terms of this Declaration shall submit its case to the
Permanent Court of International Justice. A Signatory refusing to accept the
jurisdiction of the Court in any such case shall be deemed an aggressor within
the terms of this Declaration. Failure to accept the jurisdiction of the Court
within four days after notification of submission of a claim of violation of
this Declaration shall be deemed a refusal to accept the jurisdiction." League
of Nations. Official Journal. Special Supplement No. 26 (1924), p. 169.
The International Convention concerning the Use
8. Cf. Doc. A/2211, p. 57.
of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace, signed at Geneva on 23 September 1936,
imposes upon the contracting parties the obligations to refrain from broadcasting within their respective territories matter of "such a character as to incite
the population of any territory to acts incompatible with the internal order or
the security of a territory of a High Contracting Party" (Article 1), and to
ensure that transmissions "shall not constitute an incitement either to war
against another High Contracting Party or to acts likely to lead thereto"
(Article 2). In its Resolution 424 (V) adopted 14 December 1950, the General

Assembly "invites

all Governments to refrain from radio broadcasts that would
unfair attacks or slanders against other peoples anywhere and in so
doing to conform strictly to an ethical conduct in the interest of world peace
by reporting facts truly and objectively." Cf. also infra, pp. 210 f.
In the Nuremberg Trial "aggressive acts" were proved to have been committed against Austria and Czechoslovakia, although the Nazi-Government had

mean
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reached

its

goal without the use of

and the threat of
9.

violence.

Cf.

armed

Pompe, op

force,

cit., p.

by internal subversive actions
21.

Cf. Doc. A/2211, p. 58.

9a. Poinpe, op.

cit., p.

four categories of aggression "dependseen in direct conection with war and whether

53, distinguishes

ing whether or not aggression

is

or not aggression is considered as an exclusively military action. The first,
original concept indicates the military beginning of a war, the second includes

A

an aggressive policy which causes a war.

further extension of 'aggression'
comprises, in principle, every (illicit) use of armed force against another
State, including the threat of armed force. And finally there is the last category,
since at one time or another all sorts of either illegal, or merely unfriendly acts
harmful to other States have in the course of the last years been named
"

'aggression.'

Doc. A/2211, p. 36.
In his report on the Project of a Treaty of Mutual Assistance (Projet de
Traite d' Assistance Mutuelle) presented at the Fourth Assembly of the League
of Nations, Document A 111, 1923, IX (1st part), Mr. Benes declared: "Under
the conditions of modern warfare it would seem impossible to decide even in
theory what constitutes an act of aggression."
12. In a Memorandum on "The System of Sanctions of Article 16 of the
Covenant and the Future Role of Neutrality," presented to the International
Studies Conference on Collective Security (1934-1935), Dr. G. Cohn of the Danish
"The system of sanctions should be
Institute of History and Economics stated
directed against war as such, as a fact, without regard to its psychological basis.
From this point of view defensive war must be included as well as offensive war,
so that the states not involved in the conflict may not be obliged to make a choice
which would at the same time necessitate the moral condemnation of one of the
Powers, but may simply be confronted with the state of war as a fact which
must be prevented and combated, in the common interest of all the nations. It
is of little importance to determine who, from a purely formal standpoint, is
playing the part of the aggressor. War is forbidden in all cases and for all
parties, and it cannot provide any kind of advantage, whether economic, political
or legal
The Council should decide when sanctions are to be applied and
when they are to cease, so that the different Powers may not have on this point
any individual responsibility, and so that it may thus be quite clear that they are
not seeking an individual advantage and are not letting themselves be guided by
selfish sympathies, but are acting solely in the general interest of the League of
Nations as a whole. The decision of the Council should be binding on all, and
should be reached by a modified majority of three-fourths, for example and
under such conditions that the representatives on the Council of the belligerent
States (both the aggressor and the State which has been attacked) would not
have the right to vote. All dispositions, whether economic, political or military,
should proceed from the League of Nations as such, and not from its individual
Neo-Neutrality, New
members." Collective Security, pp. 402 f. In his book
York, 1939, Dr. Cohn dealt with neutrality as a part of the system of war-prevenAs such, he asserted that it "is essentially different from traditional neution.
trality.
The latter was based on an equal evaluation of the belligerents, with
consequent impartiality toward both under detailed rules for war and neutrality.
Traditional neutrality took a dependent and passive attitude toward war. It
was oriented by war. Neo-neutrality, on the other hand, is based on an equal
devaluation of the war in all cases it does not seek its own raison d'etre in reflections as to whether it has in one situation or another a moral or legal claim
10. Cf.
11.

:

.

.

.

—

—

:

;
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an exception in principle to
recognize
the supremacy of the law
not
participation in war in any form. It does
of war it replaces it instead with a system of combined sanctions and neutrality
which centers about an effort to suppress and prevent war of every kind. The
neo-neutral states are in reality those states which, without becoming a party to
to assert its nonparticipation as a right; it takes

;

war, are participants in the system of sanctions designed to prevent war. They
do not participate, and under no circumstances will participate, in war. Moreover, they do not recognize war as a legal situation, they recognize no obligation
of impartiality, and they are willing to apply any means to prevent or to stop
the war to the limit of their ability without themselves participating in it." Op.
Consequently a security system must provide only for economic
cit., pp. 253-4.
but not for military sanctions. Neo-neutrality asks in all cases of war "that the
peaceful sanctions which are available to the League be extended and made
Op. cit., pp. 29-30. Howsufficiently severe to compel cessation of the war."
ever, it is very doubtful that economic sanctions can be made "sufficiently severe."
Dr. Cohn did not go so far as to deny the right of self-defense within a system of
neo-neutrality. He said
"To Neo-neutrality, it is of interest only to state the
limits of what constitutes self-defense in international law. These limits are
to be determined by a study of the analogous situation of the limits of the concept
of self-defense in municipal penal law and have nothing to do with the traditional
rules of war or neutrality." Op. cit., p. 331. He thought that the right of self:

defense under international law was totally different from the right of self-defense under national law. He asserted that self-defense under national law, i. e.
"the right to use force for protection against an attack {vim vi defendere) is
subject to quite definite legal restrictions (depending upon the purposes) for
,

which there

The

is

no exact analogy nor application with respect to defensive war.

right of self-defense presumes the preexistence of a certain relation between

the object of the attack and the means of defense which can be used. These
limitations upon the right of self-defense naturally vary somewhat in different
penal codes nonetheless a common thought pervades them, which clearly indicates the distinct difference between this right and that of defensive war
But defensive war recognizes no limitations of this nature." Op. cit., pp. 196-7.
The international right of self-defense may be limited within an international
security system and thus be assimilated to the right of self-defense as established under national law, but it cannot be eliminated. If it exists, the distinction
between a permitted defensive war and a prohibited aggressive war is inevitable,
and then it is impossible to direct sanctions "against both belligerents," as the
principle of neo-neutrality requires. Op. cit., p. 282.
Cohn opposes his doctrine of neo-neutrality to the theory of aggression not
only because he wants to avoid the politically undesirable moral condemnation
of a state as an aggressor, but also because the theory of aggression makes concepts of criminal law such as "crime" and "guilt" the basis of a system of international security, and
as he assumes there is no room for concepts of criminal
law in international relations. He says: "The theory of aggression makes the
penal concepts of private law the basis of an international system of warprevention. Aggression is counted a crime, to be punished by the application
of sanctions ... It should be remarked, however, that no system of war-prevention can be founded upon the guilt of the individual leading statesmen in
the aggressor state nor upon the collective guilt of an entire people. The conception of guilt between nations cannot be built upon analogies in municipal
penal law. All the requisite conditions for a criminal arraignment of the aggres;

.

—

370624—57

7

—

.

.

—
;
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Neo-neutrality, on the other hand,
sor as in municipal law, are lacking
excludes in principle the question of guilt and of penal law concepts in the
suppression of war." Op. cit., pp. 332-3. The fundamental concept of criminal
.

law

is

human

.

.

that of punishment; the concept of crime is of secondary nature, for a
conduct is a crime if it is the condition of a punishment. Punishment is

as pointed out

—a reaction against a violation of the law, that

a
prevention by
deterrence, in contradistinction to a sanction the purpose of which is to repair the
damage caused by the violation of the law. The concept of "guilt" (intention,
negligence) is neither essential to nor specific of criminal law. There exists criminal responsibility not based on guilt, so-called absolute criminal responsibility
and there are rules of civil as well as international law which refer to intention or
negligence as conditions of sanctions. Besides, Cohn admits "the fact that criminal blame or responsibility may be connected with the outbreak of war."
(Op.
cit., p. 333.)
Since the sanctions established by general international law as
well as those stipulated in a system of international security are reactions against
violations of the law with the purpose of prevention by deterrence, there is no
essential difference between criminal and international law. Cohn defines neoneutrality as a specific system of sanctions designed to prevent war as an illegal
action. Hence his theory does not exclude penal law concepts in the suppression
of war.
The term "neo-neutrality" is misleading, for it designates a system of collective
security which tries to prevent war by means short of war and within which
neutrality in the traditional sense that is, implying the obligation of impartiality is abandoned.
13. At the Eighth International Studies Conference, London, 1935, Professor
Jessup suggested a way to terminate a war which has already broken out and to
"... a united neutral front against two unidentified
prevent future wars
aggressors or against two belligerents where judgment has not been reached as
to which is the guilty party." Collective Security, p. 426. He sought of economic
sanctions especially economic boycott of the belligerents by the neutral states.
He referred to the action of the League of Nations in the Chaco affair where at
least at the earlier stages an embargo was imposed upon both belligerents prior
to a judgment as to which party was at fault, and to the Argentine anti-war pact
of 1933 which provided for "a common and solidary attitude" of the neutrals
towards the belligerents without imposing upon the former the obligation to
take military measures against the latter. In his study A Modern Law of
Nations (New York 1948), pp. 197 ff., Professor Jessup discusses a hypothetical
situation, in which the Security Council in case of a military conflict between
two states cannot get immediately the information necessary to determine
the aggressor. He suggests that the Security Council in the meantime should
announce the existence of a state of emergency and establish a blockade by
land, sea and air, applied impartially to the area where the conflict is located and
to both parties.
He admits that this measure "would be hard on the state which
But until there has been time for determiis actually fighting in self-defense.
nation of the right and wrong of the case, no alternative is possible." Thus the
purpose of the suggested procedure is not to avoid the determination of the

The

sanction.

characteristic of this sanction is that its purpose

is to say, it is
is

—

—

:

aggressor.
14. In an article on "The Problem of Aggression and the Prevention of War,"
American Journal of International Law, vol. 31 (1937), pp. 244 ff., Mr. L.
Kopelmanas came to the conclusion "that in case of war or threat of war,
international society must possess an organ analogous to the internal police
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for the purpose of acting against acts of war, without raising the question as
It should not be forgotten that the
to which of the belligerents is at fault.
absence of discrimination between the aggressor and the victim would be of a

nature to facilitate the action against war through avoiding the wounding of
national susceptibilities." (p. 255). By "police" actions, Kopelmanas meant
injunctions directed at both states involved in a war or both states whose
attitudes constitute a threat of war. He also meant the enforcement of these
injunctions against the state which does not comply with them. In this case,
"the aggressive intent of a state may be indicated by its refusal to obey
the injunctions of the police, and the action can be directed against it alone.
But it must be remembered that the problem of aggression, as it is construed
The police acts against the eventual
in positive law, is not in question.

he said

:

aggressor

.

.

."

If repressive measures are to be taken against a state responsible for a
conduct which shows an intention to commit aggression, the problem of aggression is indeed involved. If the law provides for repressive measures to be
directed against a state which does not comply with the injunction of a competent organ, the conduct of this state is a violation of the law and the
repressive measures are sanctions, whether or not the organ is called the
"police" and its action a "police" action. To regard illegal conduct as evidence
of "aggressive intent" amounts to the same thing as regarding one's conduct
as an act of aggression, the concept of aggression used in the wider sense as
it is actually used in the theory and practice of international law.
Kopelmanas' doctrine is based on the erroneous idea that there is an essential
difference between the function of the police and the function of penal repression
of disorder. He said: "The penal judge intervenes only after order has been
re-established" by the police, whose task is "maintaining good order and security
in a given society." (p. 253). However, the "good order" and security maintained
by the police is exactly the same good order maintained by the penal judge,
namely, the law and the security guaranteed by this law. Furthermore, the
penal judge does not intervene until after order has been re-established by the
police.
Is order re-established before the murderer or thief is punished? Is
order re-established after an individual has been arrested by the police as a
suspected murderer or thief but has later been acquitted by the judge as innocent? The preventive measures taken by a "police" organ may also be taken
by a judge, especially by an international judge in case of war or threat of war,
and the question as to whether or not in this case the judge acts as a "police"
organ is simply a terminological question of minor importance. The repressive
measures taken by the police are either reactions against non-compliance with
its injunction and hence a sanction in exactly the same sense as a punishment
inflicted in a judicial procedure on a person for having violated the penal law,
or actions the purpose of which is to prepare and secure such judicial procedure.
15. The view that aggression is a concept not susceptible to definition has
been advocated most characteristically in a report entitled "The Possibility and
Desirability of a Definition of Aggression," presented by Mr. Spiropoulos to
the International Law Commission in its Third Session 16 May-27 July 1951.
(Doc. General Assembly, Official Records, Sixth Session, Supplement No. 9,
A/1858). In this report (Document A/CN. 4/44), the author came to the conclusion that the concept of aggression is a "notion per se" which "is not
susceptible of definition." He seems to have had the idea that there are two
kinds of concepts, those which are and those which are not definable. However,
he did not maintain this view, for he evidently presupposed the possibility of
:

:
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a definition when he stated that "whenever Governments are called upon to
decide on the existence or non-existence of aggression under international law
they base their judgment on criteria derived from the 'natural', so to speak,
notion of aggression
and not on legal considerations."
.

.

.

This means that a government can decide whether aggression exists or does
not exist only on the basis of definite criteria, and these criteria constitute the
definition of the concept of aggression. In the first place, why can this determination be made only by a government. Why not by any law-applying organ,
Secondly, how can this
e. g., an international agency, a court, and the like?
"natural"
only
concept be a
concept. It can be
a legal concept, the concept
of aggression referred to in the law to be applied, the definition of which has

been

left to the

The author

government,

or,

more

exactly, to the law-applying organ.

an analysis of this allegedly
"natural" concept of aggression that is, he tried to construct a definition of
this undefinable concept.
He said that the notion of aggression is composed
of both objective and subjective elements, namely, the fact that a state commits
an act of violence and is the first to do so, and the fact that this violence is
Hence, his definition
committed with aggressive intent (animus aggressionis)
of aggression is: an act of violence performed by the state which is the first
to do so with aggressive intent.
This is a logically objectionable definition, because in part it constituted a
the element to be defined, aggression, appears in the
so-called idem per idem
Howevpr, this defect could easily be avoided by restating the definidefinition.
tion as follows agression is an act of violence performed by one state with the
intention of imposing its own will on another state. The author went on to state
that the kind of violence, direct or indirect, or the degree of violence which
constitutes aggression cannot be determined a priori but depends on the circumstances of the particular case. This means that he added two other elements to
his definition: (1) the violence must have certain degrees, and (2) it may be
direct or indirect. The definition which he tacitly presupposed then runs as
follows: aggression is a direct or indirect act of violence, of a certain degree,
performed by the state which is the first to do so with aggressive intent (meaning with the intention of imposing its will on the other state). That the kind
of violence and its degree cannot be determined a priori does not mean that it
cannot be determined at all. If it could not be determined, the government
could not decide that aggression does or does not exist. What is meant is only
that the determination of these elements is left to the law-applying organ.
16. Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Sixth Committee,
286th meeting, paragraph 36.
17. Cf. Doc. A/2211, p. 12.
18. At its 408th plenary meeting on 20 December 1952, the General Assembly
adopted Resolution 688 (VII) which reads as follows
of the report then proceeded to

—

.

—

:

The General Assembly, having regard

(VI) of
31 January 1952, considering that the discussion of the question of defining aggression at the sixth and and seventh sessions of the General
Assembly and in the International Law Commission has revealed the
complexity of this question and the need for a detailed study of:
(a) the various forms of aggression, (b) the connexion between a
definition of aggression and the maintenance of international peace and
security, (c) the problems raised by the inclusion of a definition of
aggression in the Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of
to its resolution 599

;
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its application within the framework of international
criminal jurisdiction, (d) the effect of a definition of aggression on the
exercise of the jurisdiction of the various organs of the United Nations,
(e) any other problem which might be raised by a definition of aggression, considering that continued and joint efforts shall be made to
formulate a generally acceptable definition of aggression, with a view
to promoting international peace and security and to developing

Mankind and by

international law,
1. Decides to establish a Special Committee of fifteen members, each
Bolivia, Brazil,
representing one of the following Member States
China, Dominican Republic, France, Iran, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway,
:

Pakistan, Poland, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of
America, to meet at the Headquarters of the United Nations in 1953;

Requests the said Special Committee: (a) to submit to the Genits ninth session draft definitions of aggression or
draft statements of the notion of aggression; (b) to study all the
problems referred to above on the assumption of a definition being
adopted by a resolution of the General Assembly
3. Requests the Secretary-General to communicate the Special
Committee's report to Member States for their comments and to place
the question on the provisional agenda of the ninth session of the
General Assembly.
2.

eral Assembly at

This resolution seems, in the author's opinion, to presuppose the view that a
pre-established definition of aggression is possible and desirable. This was also
the opinion of many members of the Special Committee established by the
Resolution, but others held that the resolution "did not compel the Committee
necessarily to adopt one or more specific draft definitions of aggression or one
or more draft statements of the notion of aggression, but left it entirely free
to choose between several courses." Report of the Special Committee on the
Question of Defining Aggression (A/2638), pp. 2 f. During the discussion of
this Report in the Sixth Committee, the representative of the United States
declared at the 404th meeting, on 15 October 1954, after having referred to
the fact that previous attempts to define aggression have failed "the failure
of the various attempts made in the past showed that it was impossible to
reach agreement on an a priori definition of aggression. That had also been
the conclusion of the authors of the Charter. There were obvious dangers in
a priori definitions. A general definition would leave important concepts, like
self-defence, unelaborated, while a list of examples, even if it did not claim
to be all-inclusive, would have the disadvantage of singling out certain kinds of
aggression for special emphasis. A combination of the two types of definition
would run the risk of suffering from the defects of both. The United States
delegation also had a certain distrust of establishing a priori categories for
future situations. Rather, the law should develop empirically out of actual
cases. Aggression was not simply a combination of predefined elements in fact,
in order to determine whether aggression had occurred, it was necessary to
weigh a whole set of complex facts and circumstances. That was why paper
definitions had been avoided and the organs of the United Nations, particularly
the Security Council, by virtue of Article 39 of the Charter, and also the General
Assembly, under the Charter as indicated by Resolution 377 (V) entitled
'Uniting for peace' had been given responsibilities for deciding what constituted
:

—

;

—

—
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an act of aggression or a threat to peace
to adopt a paper definition
efforts
jeopardize
of
the
General
Assembly
and the Security Council
might
the
In the absence of a definition,
to maintain international peace and security.
there could be no doubt, as the General Assembly had noted at its sixth session,
that the existence of the crime of aggression might be inferred from the circumstances peculiar to each particular case.
The United States believed that
the history of efforts to define aggression and the various considerations already
referred to pointed to the conclusion that no constructive purpose would be
served at this time by the preparation of a formula. The General Assembly
should now consider that it had explored to the limits of usefulness the possibilities of defining aggression by a word formula prepared today for possible
applications in the future." United Nations. General Assembly. Ninth Session.
Official Records, Sixth Committee (A/C.6/SR. 404) p. 37.
The Special Committee did not suggest a definition of aggression and the
Sixth Committee in its Report of 2 December 1954 (Doc. A/2806) recommended
to the General Assembly to establish a new special committee.
Following the suggestion, the General Assembly adopted on 4 December 1954 Resolution 895 (IX),
in which it established a Special Committee comprising representatives of 19
states, and requested the Committee "to submit to the General Assembly at its
."
eleventh session a detailed report followed by a draft definition of aggression
This report is not yet published.
The Charter of the United Nations does not contain a definition of aggression.
Article 1, paragraph 1 declares as a Purpose of the Organization "to take
and
effective collective measures for the suppression of acts of aggression"
Article 39 authorizes the Security Council to "determine the existence of any
act of aggression" and then to make recommendations, or decide what
measures shall be taken as a reaction against such acts. That means that the
Charter leaves it to the Security Council to define in each case the concept of
aggression.
Only by an amendment could a definition be inserted into the
text of the Charter.
Such definition would certainly restrict the freedom of
action of the Security Council. This was the reason why some members of the
Sixth Committee were against a definition of aggression. Cf. the Official Records,
especially of the 408th meeting on 25 October 1954, p. 58.
.

.

.

;

.

.

;

.

.

.

Doc. A/2211, p. 37.
In a memorandum presented to the International Studies Conference
(1934-1935), Mr. Arnold Forster (of the British Coordinating Committee for
International Studies) declared: "A definition [of aggression] ... is of value,
but should not be regarded either as an all-inclusive formula or as an automatic
test which can always be relied upon to cut with precision through a tangled
political situation.
It may be of very substantial value as a means of crystallising and extending the new social ethic as to the use of national force, and
it should help in the process of curtailing the anarchic liberties too often
claimed by imperial Powers; but it will not work by itself automatically. It
must be used by an international authority; it must be treated as a guide
normally a decisive guide but not as an immutable law and in case of doubt,
the international authority should be empowered to impose obligatory peaceconserving measures, including an armistice." Collective Security, p. 308.
21. Cf. Doc. A/2211, p. 40.
22. Sixth Committee, 406th meeting (A/C.6/SR. 406) p. 47.
23. This is the case under the Charter of the United Nations.
Article 39
authorizes the Security Council to take enforcement measures in case of a
"threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression," but does not
19. Cf.
20.

—

;

:
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define these concepts, so that the Security Council has discretion in deciding
whether or not the conduct of a state constitutes a threat

in each concrete case

This regulation is parcalls a "threat to the
peace." A state cannot foresee what the Security Council may consider to be
a "threat to the peace," and consequently cannot adapt its conduct to the norm,
implied in Article 39, of refraining from acts which constitute a threat to the
to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.

ticularly objectionable with respect to

what the Charter

peace.
24. Cf. infra pp.

122

ff.

statement of the representative of Cuba at the 403rd meeting of
the Sixth Committee on 14 October 1954 (A/C.6/SR. 403, p. 35) and of the
representative of the Netherlands at the 410th meeting on 28 October 1954
(A/C.6/SR. 410) p. 72.
26. The principle of flexibility is sometimes opposed to the principle of law.
In his History of the Peace Conference of Paris (London 1920, Vol. VI, p. 441),
H. W. V. Temperley says with respect to the antagonism between the French
and the Anglo-American view of international security: "The real divergence
lay between the adherents of the rigid, the definite, the logical, in other words
the juridical point of view, and those who preferred the flexible, the indefinite,
the experimental, the diplomatic between those who feared human nature and
wished to bind the future, and those who believed in human nature and were
content to trust the future between those who desired written guarantees, and
those who desire moral obligations only; to be cynical, between those who
expected to receive under the Covenant, and those who expected to give; in a
word, betweeen the continental point of view and the Anglo-Saxon." There is,
however, no opposition between the juridical and the flexible point of view, for
the antagonism between rigidity and flexibility exists within the law. They
are two different methods of formulating a legal order nor is the identification
of the logical with the juridical point of view correct. A "flexible" legal order
must not be illogical. It has to be as logical as a rigid one. Besides, the
application of a general legal norm whether formulated in a flexible or in a
rigid way to a concrete case is not a purely logical operation. Moral-political
considerations are always more or less involved.
27. Cf. Doc. A/2211, p. 38.
28. Cf. Ibid. pp. 43 fif., and the Report of the Special Committee on the Question
of Defining Aggression (A/2638) pp. 4 f.
29. In the Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of States in Case of Aggression, published by the Harvard Research in International Law, American Journal
of International Law, Vol. 33 (1939) Supplement, pp. 823 ff., aggression is
defined as "a resort to armed force by a State when such resort has been duly
determined, by a means which that State is bound to accept, to constitute a viola25. Cf. the

;

;

;

—

—

,

tion of

an obligation."

observations on the Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and
Mankind and on the Question of Defining Aggression, the Netherlands
Government proposed that the concept of aggression should be defined as follows
"Aggression is the threat or use of force by a State or government against the

In

its

Security of

independence of another State or against a
any manner, whatever the weapons
employed and whether openly or otherwise, for any reason or for any purpose
other than individual or collective self-defence against such a threat or use of
force or in pursuance of a decision or recommendation by a competent organ of
the United Nations." Official Records of the General Assembly. Seventh Session,
territorial integrity or political

territory under international regime in
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Annexes, agenda item 54, documents A/2162 and Add. 1. Cf. also Report of the
Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression (A/2638), p. 12.
30. Cf. Doc. A/2211, p. 40.
31. In the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression a general
definition was criticized by some members. The representative of Poland maintained "that such a definition would serve no purpose as it would not refer to
the elements constituting the crime. Its vagueness would open the way for
dangerous polemics on the nature of a given act the aggressor could challenge
the description given of his act and take advantage of the necessarily lengthy
discussions arising out of a definition which was lacking in clarity and precision
to continue his aggressive activity. Moreover, that type of definition could not
;

help effectively to combat the many types of aggression." The representative
of the USSR stated "that a so-called general definition of aggression was inadequate, as could be seen from the specific proposals for such a definition. For
example, aggression had been defined as an international crime, which, in effect,
was rather like saying that aggression was aggression. Naturally, such an
approach would not help that Committee to carry out the task before it." Report
of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression (A/2638), p. 4.

In his criticism of the USSR definition, Professor Bourquin, op. cit., p. 510,
"Should the social reaction which ensues from the determination of the
aggressor be possible if public opinion, without the support of which such reaction
could not be understood, turned against the result of the operation, refusing to
associate itself with the injustice involved in it? Within a realm of this kind
[i. e., international relations] the algebra of formulas, even if passed by a convention, has little chance of offering resistance to the feeling of the people."
32.

said

:

refer? Does he mean the people of
which the sanctions are directed? There will always be feeling
against an action which imposes suffering on people, even if the action involves
no injustice at all. The feeling of the people who are to be protected by the

To which people does Professor Bourquin

the state against

reaction of a security organization will certainly not turn against this reaction
against an aggressor in conformity with the USSR definition.

if it is directed

The argument

of public opinion is highly problematical, because

it

presupposes

only one public opinion, whereas in reality there are almost always at least two
Professor Bourquin's criticism
of the USSR proposal could be used against any system of collective security

public opinions, often in opposition to one another.

which prohibits aggression by attaching sanctions to it.
32a. The definition of the Committee on Security Questions was followed in
the Convention Defining Aggression between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan,
Estonia, Latvia, Persia, Poland, Rumania, Turkey, signed at London on 3 July
1933. The territorial element plays a decisive part in this definition.
Cf. W.
Komarnicki, La Definition de V Agresseur dans le Droit International Modcrne.
Academie de Droit International. Recueil des Cours. 1949, II., Vol. 75, p. 50.
33. In the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression the representative of Poland stated that "an enumerative definition had the advantages
of setting forth the elements which constituted the crime, indicating unequivocally
the type of acts to be condemned, and placing the burden of proof upon the
aggressor instead of requiring the victim to prove that the action complained of
was aggression. In his opinion, the Soviet draft, from this point of view, was a
perfect solution of the problem. In the opinion of other representatives, such a
definition would be dangerous.
It would necessarily be incomplete and would
thereby inevitably imply that acts not enumerated did not constitute aggression.
That in turn would enable a State to commit aggression by circumventing the defi-
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The decisions of international organs would be rendered automatic and
the re-establishment of peace would thus be made more difficult." The representative of China "expressed the opinion that an enumeration could not be regarded
as a true definition. It would not be sufficiently scientific and could not serve
as guidance either for the organs of the United Nations responsible for the maintenance of peace and security, nor for the courts which might be set up to judge
the perpetrators of crimes against humanity. The generally accepted sense of
nition.

word 'define' showed that enumeration could not achieve the purpose sought
which was to make clear the essential nature of a concept. From a purely practhe

an enumeration of crimes could only cause criminals to change
Moreover, on the one hand, the competent political or legal
organs would tend to study the methods of aggression rather than the act
itself, and on the other, they would not have the proper perspective for judging
each individual case, and that was absolutely necessary to prevent the act or
tical standpoint,

their methods.

to punish the author."

of the United Kingdom emphasized that enumerative defimost deceiving. They were not so much definitions as incomplete catalogues of acts constituting aggression. Thus paragraphs 2, 3 and 4
not to mention the all-embracing provision of paragraph 5 had had to be added

The representative

nitions "were the

to the original text of the

USSR

proposal (A/AC.66/L.2/Rev.l).

He

questioned

the value of a definition which, after listing various acts constituting aggression,
stated that any other act declared to be aggression by the Security Council would
also come into that category. Either the matter should be left to the Council,

which case there was no need for a catalogue, or the catalogue was effective
which case a list such as that proposed by the USSR delegation
(A/AC.66/L.2/Rev.l) went too far. If applied literally, it would result in acts
being wrongly declared as constituting aggression, and governments might argue
that any act not covered in the text did not constitute aggression notwithstanding
any decision to the contrary by the Security Council."
"Some members of the Committee had been in favour of a mixed definition that
would start with a text in very general terms describing the characteristics of
aggressive activity. This general text would be followed by an enumeration
of specific acts, but the enumeration would be neither limitative nor exhaustive.
It would not be obligatory but would simply be a series of examples. The advantage of a mixed definition was that it combined the merits and the positive
aspects of the general and enumerative definitions. A mixed definition should
therefore start with a generic concept including elements specific in their sig."
nificance and be followed by an enumeration of the types of acts of aggression
This type of definition had been criticized by other members of the Committee
as embodying the defects of the two other types. The representative of the
United States said "that instead of trying to establish a general formula which
would probably be incomplete, it would be better to offer the competent organs
of the United Nations, and in the first place the Security Council, a list of factors
in

in itself, in

.

to be taken into account in deciding a given case.

Some other members

.

of the

Committee thought this idea constructive and worth examining." Report of the
Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression (A/2638), pp. 4 f.
Some members of the Committee decidedly rejected the inclusion of indirect and
especially of economic and ideological aggression in the definition of aggression.
Cf. op.
34.

cit.,

pp. 8

United

ff.

Nations.

General Assemoly.

Ninth

Session.

Sixth Committee, 406th meeting (A/C.6/SR. 406), pp. 45

f.

Official

Records,

:

:
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memorandum

presented to the Committee on Arbitration and Secu1924, by the Preparatory Commission for the
Disarmament Conference, Mr. Rutgers (Netherlands) rejected the principle of
defining the concept of aggression in advance. However, he considered that "it
would be
practical to enumerate some of the facts which, according to circumstances, may serve as evidence that aggression has taken place." He distinguished between acts which "constitute acts of aggression," such as the invasion
of the territory of one state by the troops of another or an attack on a considerable scale launched by one state on the frontiers of another, and "factors which
may serve as basis in determining the aggressor: (a) Actual industrial and
economic mobilization carried out by a State either in its own territory or by
persons or societies on foreign territory, (b) Secret military mobilization by
the formation and employment of irregular troops or by a declaration of a state
of danger of war which would serve as a pretext for commencing hostilities.
(c) Air, chemical, or naval attack carried out by one party against another.
(d) The presence of the armed forces of one party in the territory of another.
(e) Refusal of either of the parties to withdraw its armed forces behind a line
or lines indicated by the Council,
(f ) A definitely aggressive policy by one of
the parties towards the other, and the consequent refusal of that party to submit
the subject in dispute to the recommendations of the Council or to the decision
of the Permanent Court of International Justice and to accept the recommendation or decision when given." Series of League of Nations Publications IX.
Disarmament 1928. IX, 6, pp. 142 ff.
Records of the Fifth Assembly, Minutes of the First
36. League of Nations.
Committee (Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 24), p. 138 ff. Article 10
of the Protocol ran as follows
"Every State which resorts to war in violation of the undertakings contained
in the Covenant or in the present Protocol is an aggressor. Violation of the
rules laid down for a demilitarized zone shall be held equivalent to resort to
war. In the event of hostilities having broken out, any State shall be presumed
to be an aggressor, unless a decision of the Council, which must be taken
unanimously, shall otherwise declare
1. If it has refused to submit the dispute to the procedure of pacific settlement provided by Articles 13 and 15 of the Covenant as amplified by the present
Protocol, or to comply with a judicial sentence or arbitral award or with a
unanimous recommendation of the Council, or has disregarded a unanimous
report of the Council, a judicial sentence or an arbitral award recognizing that
the dispute between it and the other belligerent States arises out of a matter
which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the
latter State nevertheless, in the last case the State shall only be presumed to be
an aggressor if it has not previously submitted the question to the Council or
the Assembly, in accordance with Article 11 of the Covenant.
2. If it has violated provisional measures enjoined by the Council for the
period while the proceedings are in progress as contemplated by Article 7 of
35.

rity,

In his

established on 30

.

.

November

.

;

the present Protocol.
Apart from the cases dealt with in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the present
Article, if the Council does not at once succeed in determining the aggressor,
it shall be bound to enjoin upon the belligerents an armistice, and shall fix the
terms, acting, if need be, by a two-thirds majority and shall supervise its execution.

Any

its

which has refused to accept the armistice or has violated
terms shall be deemed an aggressor.
belligerent
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The Council shall call upon the signatory States to apply forthwith
against the aggressor the sanctions provided by Article 11 of the present
Protocol and any signatory State thus called upon shall thereupon be entitled
to exercise the rights of a belligerent."
(c)

(aa)

Sanctions

The concept of sanctions.

As pointed

out in a previous chapter, a social order guaranteeing
collective security is by its very nature a legal order, and a legal
order is a system of norms providing for sanctions. Hence, the organization of sanctions is one of the most important problems, if not
the most important problem, of collective security.

The term
sense, it

lating

"sanction" can have different meanings. In its widest
means any measure taken in support of a social order regu-

human

behavior.

The purpose

of a sanction

is to

bring about

that behavior which, according to the opinion of the social authority,

useful to society and hence

considered to be in conformity with
the social order and to prevent that behavior which, according to the
opinion of the social authority, is harmful to society and hence is
is

is

;

This purpose may be
achieved in two different ways: with the use of force or without it.
It is the essence of a legal order that it tries to bring about lawful
and to prevent unlawful behavior by coercive measures that is, by
the forcible deprivation of life, freedom, property or other values as
considered to be contrary to the social order.

—

a reaction against a violation of the order. The coercive character
of the measures concerned is established by the fact that they are
applied without or even against the will of the person against whom

they are directed and that physical force
resistance.

In this

may

be used in case of

sense, legal sanctions are coercive reactions against

A violation

may

be already committed and ascertained in a legal procedure, as in the case of a punishment which is inflicted upon a criminal by a penal court. Alternatively, a delict may be only suspected, and coercive actions taken as
provisional measures in order to prepare and secure the procedure for
the ascertainment of a violation of the law and the execution of a
sanction, as, for instance, in the case of arrest of a person by the police.
coercive measure may even be taken in order to prevent a violation
of the law which, with a certain degree of probability, is expected in
the future by the person against whom the measure is directed, e. g.,
the confinement of insane persons in an asylum, or the forcible internment of citizens of an enemy state in time of war in order to prevent
them from committing delicts against the state at war with their
a violation of the law.

A

or a delict

102

home

state.

In the widest

sense, legal sanctions are coercive reactions

against an actual violation of the law or against a possible violation,
"possible" meaning suspected or expected.

The

coercive reaction against a violation of the law

may have no

an evil on the delinquent in order to
deter him and others from committing similar delicts in the future.
Such a sanction is called a punishment. The usual punishments of
national law are capital punishment, imprisonment and fine, but the
punishment may also consist of the forfeiture of political rights, discharge from office, and the like. It may even be restricted to the ascertainment of the fact that a person has violated the law. In this case
one speaks of a "moral" sanction because its immediate purpose is to
bring about moral disapprobation of the delinquent in the opinion of
the public, although this measure may be a reaction provided for by
the law and hence a legal sanction. It may not be the primary purpose, or even the purpose at all, of a coercive reaction against a violation of the law to deter others from similar violations of the law. The
purpose may be to restore the situation which existed prior to a violation of the law, especially to repair the damage caused by the violation
of the law. This is characteristic of the specific sanction of civil law,
the so-called civil execution, which consists of forcibly depriving the
violator of the law of part of his property, and which differs from the
fine as a punishment of penal law in that the seized property or the
result of its forced sale does not go to the public treasury, as a fine
would, but to the damaged person. However, although this is not its
other purpose than to

main purpose,
aimed

inflict

civil execution, the forcible

from similar

deprivation of property,

is

Hence,
has a certain punitive character. The distinction between punishment and other sanctions is only relative. Sanctions, as evils forcibly
inflicted upon men, always have the function of preventing further
violations of the law and hence have a punitive character. However,
this character may be more or less emphasized.
There are also coercive measures provided by the law which have
no relation to an actual or possible violation of the law, such as the
forcible destruction of buildings or other property in order to prevent
the extension of a fire, or the forcible internment of persons inflicted
by a contagious disease in order to prevent or restrict an epidemic.
These coercive measures are not sanctions because they are not reactions against an actual or potential violation of the law. However,
they are applied only under conditions and by persons precisely determined by the law. In this sense, the use of force constituted by these
measures, like the use of force constituted by sanctions, is reserved to
the legal community.
it

at deterring persons

violations of the law.
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Like the sanctions of national law, the specific sanctions of international law, reprisals and war, consist of forcibly depriving the individuals who are subjects of the state against which a sanction is directed of life, freedom, property or other values. The sanctions of
international law differ from the sanctions of national law in their
collective character.

They

are not directed against a definite individ-

but against a group of individuals, the individuals belonging to a state, who are subjected to the
legal order constituting this state. This means that, in contradisual, like the sanctions of national law,

tinction to national law

which establishes individual

responsibility,

international law, as a rule, establishes collective responsibility for

However, in exceptional cases, individual responsibility for violations of international law is established by general as
well as by particular international law which provides for punishment
its violations.

or civil execution of definite individuals as a reaction against acts con-

Although the term "reand original sense means only enforcement

stituting a violation of international law.

prisals" in its specific

—that

actions directed against states
responsibility

—

it is

is,

actions constituting collective

sometimes used in a wider sense to cover also

sanctions constituting individual responsibility.

A disputed question which plays a certain part in the discussion of

whether reprisals and war, as international
sanctions, do or do not have a punitive character. The answer depends on the definition of punishment, and punishment can hardly be
characterized by any other criterion than by its function of deterrence.
Punishment is that reaction against a violation of the law which consists of forcibly depriving a person of certain values for the purpose
of deterring him and other persons from similar violations of the law.
If this definition is accepted, it cannot be denied that reprisals and
war, as sanctions of international law, have a punitive character. The
punitive character, which means the deterrent function, of a War
waged as a sanction is obvious. The same is true with respect to reprisals taken in time of war. If a belligerent reacts against the illegal
use of poison gas on the part of another belligerent by applying the
same measure, he does so in order to prevent his opponent from using
this illegal weapon again. Only in regard to reprisals taken in time
international security

is

of peace as a reaction against a violation of international law,

is

the

purpose of inducing a violator of the law to repair the damage caused
by a violation primary, as in the case of the civil execution of national
law. However, the function of preventing future violations of the
law by deterrence is not excluded.

The

rejection of the punitive character of international sanctions

in general

and of the sanctions provided for

in a system of inter-
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may

be explained by the fact that
under national law punishment has a certain defamatory connotation
and some penalties are actually combined with defamatory consequences such as the forfeiture of political rights. However, neither
this connotation nor these consequences are essential to the concept of
punishment. Consequently, the view that the sanctions of international law do not have, or that the sanctions of an international security system should not have, a punitive character is without foundation.
Nor is the requirement that the sanctions of an international
security system must not be vindictive of any practical importance.
They are vindictive if they are taken by the victim of aggression with
the intention of taking revenge on an aggressor. As an objectively
ascertainable action, revenge is a reaction against a wrong suffered
and hence is not distinguishable from a sanction. As a subjective
motive, revenge may be characterized by a feeling of resentment or
hatred, but such a feeling is legally irrelevant as long as its expression in an enforcement action directed against an aggressor remains
within the limits of a sanction. It is not the uncontrollable motive
of a reaction against an aggressor but the objectively ascertainable
reaction and its conformity or non-conformity with the law which
national security in particular

counts.

If within a system of international security not only

use of armed force

is

war but any

prohibited in principle and exceptionally per-

mitted only as a sanction, the two types of international sanctions
must be designated as enforcement measures involving the use of armed
or as military and non-military sancBy non-military sanctions, ecotions, but not as war and reprisals.
nomic, financial and diplomatic sanctions are usually meant. However,
force and those not involving

it,

sometimes the term "economic" sanctions covers all non-military sanc1
tions and includes financial and diplomatic sanctions.
(bb)

The execution of sanctions within an international

security

system.

The execution

of the sanctions

may

be left to the individual

bers of the international organization and these
as under general international law

members may

—be only authorized to

mem-

—just

fulfill this

function. However, within a system of international security which
prohibits the use of armed force, at least the execution of the nonmilitary, or so-called economic sanctions, should be obligatory. 2

A

higher degree of security is achieved if a central organ endowed with
a certain competence regarding the execution of sanctions is established. 3 This organ may be composed of representatives of all the
members of the organization, usually called an assembly, or of only
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some of them, elected by the assembly for a certain period of time,
4
Some members, especially the great powers,
usually called a council.
may have a permanent seat in the council, so that only the other members of the council are elected. The central organ may adopt its decisions either by a unanimous vote or by a majority vote. The majority
may have to include the affirmative votes of all the permanent members of the council so that each of the permanent members could have
a so-called veto right. The decisions of the organ may have the
character of mere recommendations or they may be legally binding
upon the members of the organization. The central organ may be a
committee of ambassadors, so that political considerations may prevail in adopting its recommendations or decisions, or the decision to
apply sanctions may be conferred upon an independent court and
only the execution of these decisions left to the assembly or council.
The possible relationships between such a court and the executive
organ will be discussed later. It stands to reason that international
security is guaranteed to a higher degree if the central organ is composed only of some and not of all the members of the organization,
if it may adopt its decisions by a majority vote and not unanimously,
if there is no veto right of permanent members, and if its decisions are
not mere recommendations but are legally binding upon the members.
It makes an important difference whether the central organ does or
does not have the means by which sanctions are to be executed at its
direct disposal. If these means are not at the direct disposal of the
central organ, sanctions can be executed only by the member states of
the security organization in conformity with the recommendations or
binding decisions of the central organ. Then there is no essential
difference between an enforcement action taken as a sanction by the

and the exercise of individual or collective selfdefense, especially if the question as to whether or not an illegal act
of aggression has been committed and if so which state is the aggressor,
is to be decided by the members executing the sanctions.
The difference consists only in the fact that in case of self-defense no central
organ of the security organization interferes and even this difference
is reduced to a minimum if the central organ has only the power to

security organization

;

make recommendations. On the other hand, the

exercise of individual
and, especially, of collective self-defense itself has the character of a
sanction, insofar as it is a legally authorized reaction against a violation of the law.

It

is,

as pointed out, a decentralized execution of

sanctions, the states exercising self-defense acting as organs of the

security organization.

This

is

particularly evident if collective self-

is, under the treaty constituting the security organization,
not merely a right but an obligation of the members, that is to say,

defense

—
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if the

member

states are obliged to

victim of an illegal aggression.

come

to the assistance of the

5

If the central organ of the security organization has not at

means by which the sanctions are to be executed,
and this means the operation of the
depends in the last analysis on the good will of the

direct disposal the

the execution of the sanctions

—

security system

its

—

member states. Hence, the execution of the sanctions may be seriously
endangered by the political considerations of the various governments,
especially the governments of great powers, if rightly or wrongly
they consider that the interests of their own state are not compatible
with their obligations under the security system. The situation is
different if the means by which the sanctions are to be executed are
at the direct disposal of the central organ and the execution of the
sanctions independent of the will of the individual members.
In this respect there is a certain difference between military and
non-military sanctions. Armed forces, the specific means by which
military sanctions are executed, may very well be placed at the direct
disposal of the central organ, without depriving the members of the
security organization of their character as sovereign states. However,
non-military, especially financial and economic sanctions, can be
directly applied only by the government of a state, because only a
state government controls the means by which these sanctions may be
executed, and if such control is conferred on the central organ of a
security organization, this organization comes near to that of a
super-state.
This is a consequence of the nature of non-military,

—

especially financial

and economic, sanctions.

not universal and, consequently, there are states which are not members of the organization
and hence are not bound by the provisions of the treaty constituting
the organization concerning the application of sanctions, these states
may support the organization without joining it by assuming the
obligation or expressing the willingness to refrain from any action
tending to defeat the execution of a sanction taken by or on behalf
If the international security organization

is

of the organization. 6
(cc)

Non-military sanctions.

As far as so-called diplomatic sanctions are concerned, it may appear
may apply these measures directly,
that is to say, not through the governments of the member states,
without losing its international character. The diplomatic means
which may be employed are a protest against an illegal conduct of a

that an international organization

:

state, the

withdrawal of the head of the embassy, the severing of

all
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diplomatic relations, and also of

consular relations the non-recog7
With the
nition of a situation established by an illegal action.
exception of cutting off consular representation, all these diplomatic
means may be applied by an international organization which exall

;

changes diplomatic representatives both with states which are

mem-

bers of the organization and states which are not. However, these
diplomatic means have no effect if they are not applied also by the
member states in conformity with a recommendation or binding
decision of the central organ of the security organization.
Financial sanctions consist of denying all financial assistance to a
state guilty of aggression and its nationals, cutting off long-term
loans, suspending short-term banking credits, and the like. Only an
authority which is competent to impose legal obligations upon public
and private banking institutions, which therefore can exercise legislative and executive power directly over individuals, can apply such
measures. To confer such powers upon a security organization would

hardly be compatible with its international character. 8 Financial
sanctions are less effective than other economic sanctions and consequently should be combined with them. These sanctions also presuppose legislative and executive powers which are characteristic of a
state government.
Economic sanctions may be applied in different degrees. The most
important economic sanction consists of prohibiting the commerce
in arms, ammunition and the raw materials essential to the production
of arms and ammunition and to the prosecution of hostilities between
the

member

states of the security organization

Among these prohibitions

and the aggressor.

embargo is of particular importance.
The refusal to accept exports from a state is an economic sanction
which may have a remarkable effect on the state against which it is

The

applied.

an

oil

highest possible degree of an economic sanction

is

achieved by prohibiting all commerce, which includes prohibiting the
nationals of the member states from entering the territory of the
aggressor, prohibiting the nationals of the aggressor state from entering the territory of the

member

states, controlling all

transport

and international exchanges of goods, and interrupting the diplomatic
and consular relations between the member states and the aggressor.
This

is

a complete international boycott of the aggressor. 9

It stands

to reason that the economic measures taken against the aggressor
should be accompanied by economic measures, especially those of a
financial nature, taken in favor of the victim, and that in this respect
every possible assistance should be given to the state which is the

victim of the aggression.

— 57

370624

8

108
doubt that economic sanctions are not very
the boycotted state has strong economic resources, if it

There can be
effective if

little

more or less self-sufficient, and especially if it is in possession of
the raw materials essential to the production of arms and ammunition
and has a prosperous armament-producing industry. A serious difficulty in executing economic, and especially financial, sanctions is the
possibility of retaliatory economic measures which may be taken by
the boycotted state against a boycotting state. Economically weak
Consequently,
states may be affected seriously by such measures.
is

economic sanctions directed against an aggressor should be complemented by mutual economic assistance to boycotting states. 10 States
which are the immediate neighbors of the boycotted state are particularly exposed to retaliatory measures by the latter, and the economic sanctions taken against a state may have undesirable effects
on its neighbors. Hence it may be necessary to exempt these neighboring states from the obligation of participating in the execution of
economic sanctions, which consequently cannot be universal. However, if economic sanctions are not applied by all states, or at least
by all the members of a security organization comprising the overwhelming majority of states, their value becomes highly problemati-

Furthermore, even if the organization is universal, it is hardly
possible to guarantee the effective cooperation of all members in the
execution of economic sanctions. From what has been said before,
it appears that the effective execution of a sanction depends on the
centralization of this function. Within an international security
organization, economic sanctions can be centralized only to a very
limited extent. Since the organization must remain "international,"
it cannot have the means by which economic sanctions are applied
at its direct disposal. Hence, the execution of economic sanctions
must be left to the individual members of the organization. They
may be obliged to execute the economic sanction decided upon by the
central organ under the direction of this organ. However, as has
been pointed out, this organ cannot rely on the strict fulfillment of
cal.

these obligations.

Another insufficiency of economic sanctions is that they cannot
have an immediate effect on the aggressor, and consequently this state
may inflict irreparable damage on its victim before economic sanctions
force it to stop its aggression. There can be little doubt that economic
sanctions alone cannot guarantee international security in a

way

which could be considered satisfactory, even from the point of view
of a very modest expectation. Within the League of Nations, the
stubborn resistance to the establishment and application of military
sanctions and the attempt to realize the purpose of the security
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organization by the application of economic sanctions only led to
the breakdown of this organization. Besides, in order to be effective,

economic sanctions cannot be isolated from military enforcement
complete economic boycott of an aggressor who has
measures.
a seacoast is hardly possible without a blockade which has to be
established by men-of-war and which consequently constitutes a use
of armed force.
As has been pointed out in a previous chapter,11 the treaty constituting an international security organization may protect the
members not only against aggression (in the wider sense of the term)
on the part of a member state but also against aggression by a nonmember state by providing that the sanctions stipulated in the treaty
are to be directed against any state which commits an act of aggression
against a member state. 12 In this respect, there is a difference between
sanctions which constitute enforcement measures short of war and
enforcement measures which have the character of war. Under general international law, enforcement measures short of war are permissible only as reprisals. That is, if they constitute the violation
of a right of the state against which they are directed, they are legal
only as a reaction against a violation of the law committed by this
state.
If under a security treaty all members of the organization are
obliged to take enforcement measures short of war against a nonmember state which has committed an act of aggression against only
one of them without violating a right of the others, the action of the
members whose rights are not violated by this act of aggression of the
non-member state is illegal under general international law if their

A

non-member state.
Some of the non-military sanctions provided for by a security treaty,
for instance diplomatic sanctions, may not violate any right of the
non-member state against which they are directed. However, economic sanctions may do so if, for example, they can be applied only
in violation of a treaty concluded between the non-member state and
a member state which is not a victim of the aggression. The blockade
of the coasts of a non-member state is certainly illegal under general
international law if it is not a reaction against a violation by the
action constitutes a violation of a right of the

blockaded state of a right of the blockading state not a victim of the
aggression. If an act of aggression, against which a security treaty
provides for enforcement measures short of war, does not constitute
a violation of general international law, for example, if military
mobilization or the refusal to submit a conflict to peaceful settlement
is considered to be an act of aggression, and if the members of the
security organization are obliged to take enforcement measures short

of

war against

a

non-member

state

which has committed such an act
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of aggression, the enforcement measures taken by the members are
illegal under general international law if they constitute the violation

of a right of the non-member state. In both cases, an opposite
opinion can be maintained only under the problematic presupposition
is also binding upon states which are not
contracting parties to it.
On the other hand, if they have the character of war, military sanctions stipulated by a security treaty may be directed against a nonmember state without constituting a violation of general international

that the security treaty

law by members which are not victims of the aggression and by all
members if the act of aggression for which the non-member state is
made responsible is illegal only under the security treaty to which
This is the paradoxical consequence of the view that the oellwn justum principle is not part of
general international law, and hence that any state may resort to war
against any other state for any reason whatsoever.
this state is not a contracting party.

(dd) Military sanctions.

THE OPPOSITION TO MILITARY SANCTIONS

(A)

Any

use of

national law

armed

force as a reaction against a violation of inter-

a military sanction, and if

armed force

used for this
purpose to an extent characteristic of war, a military sanction has the
character of war. The fact that armed force is used as a sanction does
not deprive this use of armed force of its legal character of war.
Hence the rules of international law regulating the conduct of war

apply to

The

it.

is

is

12a

opposition to providing military sanctions in a treaty consti-

tuting an international security organization

is

based on two kinds of

Governments are averse to imposing
the sacrifices involved in a military action upon their subjects if this
action cannot be justified as necessary for self-defense, and they are
disinclined to resort to or participate in a war which, from a purely
military point of view, is aggressive, if its outcome is doubtful. Howreasons: political and moral.

ever, as

we

shall see, a reasonable degree of certainty that a military

purpose and that those who execute this
sanction will be able to impose their will on the delinquent state, exists
only in case this sanction is highly centralized, and, for political
sanction will achieve

its

which encounters the strongest
resistance on the part of governments defending the so-called

reasons,

it is

just this centralization

sovereignty of their states.

The moral arguments
same

against military sanctions are partly the

as those set forth against capital

punishment human
:

life

should

Ill
never be destroyed, not even as a sanction. However, capital punishment can be replaced by a sanction which is only a little less effective,

namely, imprisonment and especially imprisonment for life, whereas
the only sanctions which can be substituted for military sanctions are
economic sanctions which are far less effective. The most impressive
argument against military sanctions is the undeniable fact that, even
if their destructive effect is restricted to the members of the armed
forces of an aggressor and even more if such restriction is impossible
as in the case of aerial bombardment, military sanctions bring about
the death and suffering of many individual human beings who by their
own voluntary acts did not commit the violation of the law against

which the sanction

is

However, this is an inevitable conseresponsibility which exists not only in

a reaction.

quence of the collective
the military but also in the economic sanctions of international law.
This consequence cannot be avoided by renouncing military sanctions

and by

restricting the reaction of the security organization against

In order to avoid the morally
undesirable consequences of collective responsibility, military and
economic sanctions both must be abandoned, and only those sanctions
provided for which can be imposed upon the individual persons who
by their own voluntarily performed acts committed the international
delicts which impaired international security. These sanctions will
aggression to economic sanctions.

be discussed
(B)

Different

later.

13

THE ORGANIZATION OF MILITARY SANCTIONS
ways of organizing military sanctions may be

distin-

guished according to the degree of centralization. Military action
against an aggressor may be left completely to the individual member
states which may not be obliged but only authorized to take such
action through their own armed forces without any interference on
the part of a central organ of the security organization. However, a
treaty constituting the security organization may establish a central
organ competent to make recommendations concerning the military
action of the member states 14 or to oblige them to execute the military
sanction decided upon by the central organ in conformity with its
directions. 15

If the constituent treaty stipulates such an obligation, the central
organ may entrust the execution of the sanction to one single state or to
some states, the territories of which are nearer to that of the aggressor
than the territories of the other members, or which have a particular
interest in maintaining and restoring peace within the area where the
aggression has taken place. In all these cases there is no armed force
at the direct disposal of the central

organ of the security organization.
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The armed

forces through

which the military sanction

is

to be

executed remain under the command of their national governments,
and consequently the coordination of their operations is very difficult,
if not impossible, to achieve. As in the case of the analogous organization of economic sanctions, the working of the coercive machinery
of the security system depends, in the last analysis, on the readiness
of the respective governments to exercise their rights or to fulfill their
obligations to take military action against the aggressor.

In order to place an armed force at the direct disposal of the security
organization the members may be obliged to make contingents or
"quotas" of their armed forces available to the central organ, and in
case

it

decides to take military action, this organ would be authorized

upon members to provide the armed forces in conformity with
their obligations and to use these forces in the military action against
the aggressor. The numerical strength, composition, armament and
location of the contingents may be determined in advance by the constituent treaty or by special agreements to be concluded between the
individual members on the one hand and the organization on the other.
to call

As

long as they are not made available to the central organ for the
purpose of a military action of the organization, the contingents of the
armed forces of the member states remain under the exclusive control
of their national governments. Only if they are actually placed at
the disposal of the central organ are they unified under the military
command of the central organ or of a commander in chief appointed
by this organ, and assisted by a military staff as an auxiliary organ. 16
The financial problems of this system are relatively simple. Each
member state has to bear the costs of its contingent in time of peace
and possibly also in case of a military action of the organization in
which its contingent takes part. However, the expenses for this
action may be paid out of the funds at the disposal of the organization
established by the financial contributions of the

The
in

member

difference between the contingent or quota system

which there

is

no armed force

states.

17

and a system

at the direct disposal of the interna-

tional organization is not as great as it

may

first

seem.

It

is

true

command, the cooperation of the difwould be much easier to achieve than if the armed
forces of the member states each operated under its own national
command. 18 However, it should not be ignored that, even if superior
in numerical strength and armament, an armed force composed of
contingents of the armed forces of different nations is always handicapped in a fight against a homogeneous armed force of an aggressor
state.
Although legally parts of an international force, the contingents would retain their national spirit. Their readiness to fight an
that, if placed within a unified

ferent contingents
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not a particular enemy of their country could leave
to be desired. 19 Since a many-headed international agency can-

opponent which

much

is

not satisfactorily fulfill the functions of military command, the appointment of a commander in chief is indispensable. For understandable reasons, this appointment

commander

is

a very

difficult

task especially if the

in chief is not appointed only for a particular military

action but as a

permanent organ of the international community.

A still greater difficulty consists in concluding the

agreements concerning the strength and composition of the contingent each member
state has to place at the disposal of the organization. 20 Even if this
difficulty is surmounted, the operation of the quota system would depend on the willingness of the member states to fulfill their main
obligation to respond to the call of the central organ by placing their
:

contingents at

The same political considerations which
government of a member state from resorting to

its disposal.

could prevent the
war against a state which has attacked another state, could prevent a
government from placing the contingent of its armed forces at the
disposal of the security organization. Hence, the central organ might
never know in advance which armed forces would be at its disposal,

and consequently the organ would not be in a position to base its military operations on a prearranged plan which is an essential condition
of quick and effective action. 21
Since the armed forces at the disposal of the organization must be
superior in numerical strength and armament to the armed forces
of any potential aggressor, universality or at least quasi-universality of
an essential condition of the effectiveness of the
In addition, the treaty constituting the security organ-

the organization

quota system.

is

must not stipulate expulsion from the organization as a sanction and not allow withdrawal from the organization. However, even
if the treaty does not contain a clause authorizing the members to
withdraw under certain conditions, or even if it does contain a prohibition expressly forbidding a member state to denounce the treaty
by a unilateral act, actual withdrawal of a member state and hence
ization

loss of its contingent

can hardly be prevented. 22

THE INTERNATIONAL POLICE FORCE ORGANIZED AS A PERMANENT AND SEPARATE ARMED FORCE AT THE DIRECT DISPOSAL OF
THE SECURITY ORGANIZATION

(C)

Most of the

difficulties

and

insufficiencies involved in the organiza-

tion of military sanctions discussed in the previous sections could be

avoided by placing at the direct disposal of the security organization
an international armed force which is not established on an ad hoc
basis, as under the quota system.
In other words, the international
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armed force would not be available only in case of a particular military action of the organization, but would be permanent and completely separate from and independent of the national armed forces of
the member states, a separate armed force belonging exclusively to the
security organization and not an armed force composed of parts of
the armed forces of the member states.
It is usual to designate such a permanent and separate armed force
at the direct disposal of a security organization as a true "inter-

national" armed force in contradistinction to the merely "joint" or
"collective" force which exists under the quota system. This termi-

not quite correct. An armed force composed of contingents
of the armed forces of member states is as "international" as a permanent and separate armed force of a security organization. There

nology

is

even an international armed force under a constituent treaty which
does not provide for contingents of the armed forces of member states
but only obliges or simply authorizes member states to take military
is

action through their
first place,

own armed

forces against the aggressor.

In the

the international character of an armed force depends on

the law under

w hich
T

armed force

the force

is

used.

If this law

is

international

an international force. Hence, if used in the
execution of a sanction provided for by international law, even the
national armed force of a state would have an international character. In the second place, this character depends on the international
character of the authority under the control of which the armed force
is operated, and this authority is "international" if it is established on
the basis of international law or if its functions are determined by
international law. Hence an armed force composed of the armed forces
of member states, but operated by the organ of a security organization
constituted by a treaty, is certainly an international force, and, if in
exercising a right conferred upon it or in fulfilling an obligation imposed upon it by international law, a state uses its armed force to
execute a sanction provided for by international law, this state may
very well be considered to be an international organ. Hence the
armed forces which execute sanctions provided for by any system of
international security, however organized, may be considered to be
law, the

is

international forces.

Another terminology, the correctness of which is doubtful, is to
designate as an international "police" force only a permanent and
separate armed force at the direct disposal of the central organ of
an international security community. A police force is an armed force
used in the performance of a police action. A police action is any
enforcement action performed by an organ of a community for the
welfare of its members, their health, morals, prosperity and, espe-
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However, it is not a sanitary police force or
a police force for the purpose of morals or economics, but a security
police force with which an international security organization is concially, their security.

cerned.

The specific functions of

a security police force are to prepare

and secure by enforcement actions the judicial or quasi-judicial procedure for ascertaining a violation of the law, and to execute the
sanction ordered by the judicial or quasi-judicial organ. There is a
difference between the so-called police force of a state and its "armed
force," the term designating its army, navy and air force. The former
is used to maintain order within the state, whereas the purpose of the
latter is to defend the state against external aggression. Hence the
armament of the two forces is not the same. Neither artillery nor
bombers are necessary to maintain order within a state as long as the
disturbance of the internal order does not assume the character of a
revolutionary movement. If it does, however, the army, navy, and
air force may be used, and if used for the maintenance of internal
order their function is a police function. The difference between a
"police force" for the maintenance of internal order and an "armed
force" for defense against external aggression

is

irrelevant within

an international security organization. The aggression against which
the armed force of this organization is used is always external aggression from the point of view of the state which is its victim and
internal aggression from the point of view of the international community, if this community is universal. If it is not universal, the
aggression is external aggression also from the point of view of the
is a non-member state and if
the constituent treaty also provides for enforcement action in this

security organization if the aggressor
case.

It is true that the constituent treaty

may

also provide for en-

forcement action in case an internal aggression takes place within a
member state that is, in case a revolution is directed against the
legitimate government. However, as has been pointed out, in this

—

government must use its armed forces itself, and
if it is assisted by the armed forces of the security organization, both
actions are police actions, insofar as they are taken to maintain or
restore the internal order of the state, although they are taken by
forces which are "armed forces" with respect to their armament. Consequently, any enforcement action taken in conformity with the legal
order constituting an international security system is a police action,
whether it is performed by the armed force of an individual state,
or by an armed force composed of contingents of the armed forces of
the member states, or by a permanent and separate armed force under
the direct control of a security organization. There is no cogent reason
case the attacked
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why

the term "police force" should be restricted to an

armed force of

this latter type.

There are some characteristic problems involved in organizing a
permanent and separate armed force at the direct disposal of a security
organization.

First of

all,

there

is

the question of recruitment. 23

In regard to recruitment, there are two possibilities. A security
organization may have the right to recruit directly with its own
organs in the territories of member states. Such a right requires the
corresponding obligation imposed on the member states by the constituent treaty to allow, and if necessary to support with their own
organs, the recruitment procedure. Of the two methods of recruitment, compulsory conscription and voluntary enlistment on the basis
a practical consideration. The
former is not excluded, but direct recruitment presupposes the power
of the security organization to impose by legislative acts the obligaof free contract, only the latter

is

upon the citizens of the member states to do military service in
the armed force of the organization. Hence, this direct recruitment
tion

not compatible with the international character of a security orLegislative power exercised directly over individuals
brings a security organization very near to being a super-state.
The other possibility is indirect recruitment. The recruitment of
the members of the international armed force may be left to the governments of the member states acting on behalf of the security organization and obliged to place at the disposal of the organization a certain
number of recruits, determined by agreement or by a binding decision
of the central organ of the organization. In the case of indirect recruitment, compulsory conscription is more feasible and practical than
If a state has the power to imit is in the case of direct recruitment.
pose by national law upon its subjects the obligation to do military
is

ganization.

service in its
this

way upon

own armed
its

force, it also has the

power

to impose in

subjects the obligation to do military service in the

armed
member. However, voluntary enlistment on the basis of free contract
is in both cases preferable to compulsory conscription, for the length
of time of military service in a separate and independent armed force
of an international security organization must be much longer than
that of military service in a national armed force. In contradistinction to the latter, the former can hardly have effective reserves at its
disposal. If a member of a separate and independent armed force
of an international security organization returns to civil life, he ceases
to be under the control of the international organization and hence
is not liable to call, unless this function is also performed by the governments of the member states on behalf of the international organiforce of an international organization of which this state is a
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For the same reason, in order to make the terms of enlistment
sufficiently attractive, the wages paid to the members of the armed
force of an international security organization must be much higher
than the small pay to which the enlisted men below the rank of commissioned and non-commissioned officers are entitled in a national
armed force. If an international security organization is so centralized
that it assumes the character of a federal state, its armed force may
be recruited in the same way as that of a national state.
Another problem of a permanent and separate armed force of an
zation. 24

the personal legal status of its
Since they owe allegiance only to an international organi-

international security organization

members.

is

zation, they should not be citizens of a particular state.

from

be released
the

armed

legally to

They should

their nationality during the time of their service in

and their status of belonging
the international community constituted by the security
forces of the organization,25

treaty, a legal status analogous to that of national citizenship, should

be recognized by the member states and certified by appropriate documents, such as passports. This problem is not particular to the organization of a permanent and separate armed force but applies to all
organs of an international security organization. 28 In order to guarantee complete independence of the governments of the member states,
the members of the armed forces should be exempt from the jurisdiction of the member states and should be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the international organization which should be endowed
with special organs competent to exercise this jurisdiction. 27

A most delicate

problem

is

the location of the armed forces.

The

inconvenience of stationing the armed force of an international security organization in the territory of a member state is obvious, and
stationing the force in the territory of a non-member, even if per-

manently neutralized,
sides, as

we

like Switzerland, is out of the question.

shall see later, the institution of neutrality

of permanent neutralization

Be-

and especially

not compatible with a universal or
quasi-universal security organization. The only satisfactory solution
of this problem is to locate the armed forces and the main organs of
the security organization in a territory which is under the direct
is

sovereignty of the organization and not under the sovereignty of an
individual state. This internationalized territory may be of relatively

small

size, like

that placed under the sovereignty of the Pope, the terri-

tory of the state of the Vatican City.

However, for purely strategic

reasons, military bases at different points all over the surface of the

earth would be needed.

Hence, it would be necessary to have not one
but several internationalized territories. Such territories could be acquired only with the agreement of the states in possession of them.

—
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This, of course, implies an almost insurmountable difficulty.

The independence

of the

armed force of the international

security

may

be seriously endangered by the fact that both the
manufacturing of armaments and the raw material necessary for the
execution of a military action would remain under the control of the
national governments.
The transfer of this control to the international organization would imply a restriction of the sovereignty of
member states and consequently constitutes another difficulty.
The question of the composition of the international armed f orce
that is, whether it should comprehend all three arms of the service,
land, sea and air forces, or whether there should be a preponderance of
one, especially of the air force, over the others is a purely militarytechnical problem. More important from the point of view of this
study is the financial question. There can be no doubt that the cost
of a permanent and separate armed force is very high. This cost
must be covered by contributions from member states as long as an
organization does not have the power of direct taxation, a power
incompatible with its international character. However, the contribution of a state would not be larger than the cost to a state of its own
armament, and the establishment of a permanent and separate armed
force of a security organization allows, and even imperatively requires,
a radical reduction of the armament of the member states. This is
an advantage which this method of organizing military sanctions
shares with no other. Because they are not exposed to the danger of
being weakened by the withdrawal of a member state and its armed
forces from the organization, enforcement measures taken by a separate and permanent armed force may really achieve the ideal purpose
of a sanction: to prevent the violation of the law against which it
is provided.
As the danger of aggression is reduced, to the extent
organization

—

that this

is

possible at

all,

the right of self-defense can be restricted

misuse very difficult. Only individual
and not collective self-defense may be permitted, and permitted only
against external aggression actually carried out by the armed forces
of another state.
If the international security organization has a permanent and

to a degree

which makes

separate armed force at

its

its

disposal far superior to the

armed

forces

which are reduced to the minimum necessary
to maintain internal order and to offer initial resistance to external
aggression, the danger of intervention by the organization in the
domestic affairs of the members must not be underestimated. Certain
of the

member

states

institutions protecting the

member

states against such intervention

should be established in the constituent treaty, e. g., the opportunity
of invoking an international court competent to decide the question
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of whether or not an action of the organization constitutes such inter*
vention and to order the organization to cancel it if the action is declared illegal. However, it must be admitted that within such a
system there is no absolutely effective guarantee for maintaining the
distribution of competence between the organization
laid

down

in the constituent treaty.

As has been

and

its

members

said before, this

system appears to imply a strong tendency of becoming transformed
The central organ which is in control of the
into a super-state.
permanent and separate armed force has a character not very different
from that of a state government, for the concentration of the means
of force in the hands of a central organ has, more than anything else,
the effect of conferring on this organ the power of a government in
the specific sense of the term.

If the central organ of a security organization has the character

of a government or quasi-government, the question of the form of
government, the dilemma: democracy or autocracy, becomes paramount. This question is of little or no importance as long as the
central organ of a security organization has no real governmental

power. If an international community is supposed to be organized
on a democratic basis, the problem of the representation of the member
states in the organs and especially in the main organ of the security
organization arises. The democratic principle of equal representation
can be applied in two quite different ways: on the basis of the
equality of states, or on the basis of the equality of the individuals
who are subjects of the states. If the equality of states is accepted
as the basic principle, the vote of each state, regardless of the number
of its subjects, must have the same weight as that of any other state.
If the equality of the individual subjects is accepted as the basic
principle, the vote of each state must be in proportion to the number
of its subjects. The application of both principles implies grave
inconveniences, and the choice as well as the attempt to find an acceptable compromise between them involves difficulties which seem to be
insurmountable in view of the circumstances that exist at present and
probably will exist in the foreseeable future.
therefore understandable that even the most enthusiastic defenders of an international police force do not dare to suggest a
It

is

monopoly of the security organization, which means that a permanent and separate armed force be at
the direct disposal of the organization and that there be complete
disarmament of the member states. What can be suggested as a
politically possible scheme is combining the quota system with a
relatively small permanent and separate armed force of a security
organization. The main function of the latter would be to come to
radically centralized armed-force
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the immediate assistance of a victim of aggression. In the course of
military operations the armed force of the security organization would
be supported by the contingents of the armed forces of the mem-

ber states which had been placed at the disposal of the security
organization. 28

under such a system no complete disarmament of the member states and not even a considerable reduction of
national armament, could be achieved. However, it has been suggested that this scheme be based on the principle of differentiation of
armament. 29 The most destructive and most mobile arms would be
reserved for the use of the permanent and separate armed force of
the security organization, the less destructive and less mobile arms
left to the armed forces of the member states. The most destructive
and, at the same time, most mobile weapons are those used by the air
force.
Hence, an air-force monopoly of the security organization
becomes a consideration. In view of the fact that civil aircraft can
easily be adapted to military purposes, such a monopoly is hardly
possible without the internationalization of civil aviation. 30 It is more
than doubtful that this internationalization of civil aviation is politically feasible on a universal basis. If restricted to a regional security
organization, a combination of the quota system and a permanent
and separate armed force of the organization may be nearer to political
reality than a completely centralized armed-force monopoly of a
universal or even regional security organization. However, it must
be admitted that this combination combines the difficulties of both
with the disadvantages of the quota system. 31
It stands to reason that

(D)

THE PROCEDURE PRECEDING THE EXECUTION OF SANCTIONS

The

execution of a sanction must be preceded by a procedure to

ascertain the delict, i. e., to ascertain the violation of the law against
which a sanction is provided as a reaction. This is especially true if
the delict is an act of aggression. The procedure is then referred to as

determining the aggressor. The execution of a sanction to be directeed
against the aggressor may also be preceded by a procedure to put into
operation certain provisional measures to prevent the aggravation of
the situation created by the delict, especially if this delict is an act of
aggression, actually committed or expected.
Under a relatively primitive system of international security, the
ascertainment of the act of aggression and hence the determination of
the aggressor

is left

organization and

to the states

who

who

are

members of the

security

are authorized or obliged to apply the non-

military or military sanctions provided for by the constituent treaty

without any interference on the part of a central organ. 32

The

dis-
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advantages of such a decentralization of the legal function have been
discussed in a previous chapter of this study. 33
One of the fundamental conditions of an effective system of international security consists of conferring upon a central organ the ascertainment of the act of aggression against which a sanction in the
constituent treaty is provided. This may be the same executive organ
as that competent to apply the sanctions, an organ composed of repre-

some or all of the states who are members of the organization, whereby these representatives are bound by the instructions
of their respective governments. 34 However, this central organ may
also be an international court composed of individuals who are not
representatives of any state but are independent judges. In view of
sentatives of

the fact that the ascertainment of the delict

which

is

a specifically legal func-

with the law established by the constituent treaty is essential to the security to be
achieved by the international organization, an independent court
would seem to be the most appropriate organ. If the ascertainment
tion, the fulfillment of

in strict conformity

of the delict, and especially of the act of aggression,

is

conferred upon

a court, in applying sanctions the executive organ must conform to
the decisions of the court.

This solution of the problem is strongly opposed by governments as
well as by writers on international law, especially with respect to the
determination of the aggressor. In the main, their arguments are
that the political interests involved in this function do not allow
decisions to be based only on legal considerations, and that a judicial
procedure is too slow if, as in case of an act of aggression, immediate
action is necessary. The first argument may be rejected by referring
to the fact that, as pointed out in another connection, political considerations are not excluded from the procedure in which an international court decides that an act of aggression has taken place. Of
course this is not so as far as the finding of facts is concerned. In
this respect the truth and nothing but the truth must be disclosed, and
it can hardly be denied that in this respect an independent and impartial court is more reliable than an agency which is exclusively
influenced by political motives. However, in qualifying the facts as
aggression, in deciding that the facts constitute aggression as deter-

mined by the law to be applied, the discretion left to a court by the
law may be very wide, and within the limits of this discretion political
considerations may legitimately be introduced and actually are introduced in

Hence,

probably not the possibility of introducing political considerations in general which is behind
the argument against a court as the organ competent to determine
the aggressor, but the wish to protect definite political interests of
all judicial decisions.

it is
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particular governments having decisive influence within the inter-

Indeed, these interests can be defended only
by the representatives of these governments as members of the organ
competent to determine the aggressor and not by independent judges.
national organization.

However,
is

this is not a legitimate

argument

as far as

an organization

concerned which has to guarantee security equally for

all

its

members.

The second argument concerning the slowness

of the judicial pro-

cedure is more serious. However, it is possible to solve this problem
by authorizing the executive organ to act without waiting for a judicial
decision in case of a prima facie aggression and at the same time
obliging this organ to submit the case to the court immediately after
action has been taken and to cancel the action if the court so decides.
This is the only way to guarantee the legality of the execution of
sanctions.

Provisional measures,

as,

for instance, a call to cease hostilities,

may

be taken prior to or after the determination of the aggressor, and

may

be taken by a court as well as by an executive organ. If the
act of the central organ has the character of a decision legally binding
on the parties, non-compliance with this decision constitutes a delict

they

entailing a reaction on the part of the security organization. 335

CONSTITUTING INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

<E) SANCTIONS

As

pointed out in a previous chapter, the economic and military
sanctions usually established within an international security system
are directed against a state as such and thus constitute collective re-

This means that the forcible deprivation of life, freedom, property and other values, implied in these sanctions, in the last
instance affects individual human beings who by their own voluntary
acts have not committed the delicts against which the sanctions are
directed. This is one of the main objections to military sanctions in
general. However, as has been pointed out, this objection could also
be raised against economic sanctions. The only way to avoid
the injustice of making individuals responsible for a delict which they
have not committed is to provide for sanctions which, unlike economic
and military sanctions, are not directed against a certain group of
individuals, namely, individuals belonging to the state the organ of
which has committed the delict, but only and exclusively against a
sponsibility.

definite individual, especially against that individual

who

in his ca-

pacity as the organ of a state or as a private person has committed
the delict.
fine,

Such

sanctions, capital punishment, imprisonment

and

for example, are usually provided for in national law, especially
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in the penal law of

modern

states.

If the sanction provided for as a

punishment, the delict

may

be called a
crime. The crimes which an international security organization tries
to prevent are crimes against international peace, or, what amounts to
the same thing, crimes against international security. There can be
no doubt that the main crime against security, the illegal use of armed
force by one state against another, can be committed only at the order
or with the authorization of the supreme organs of the state, the head
of the state or other members of the government, for only these
individuals have the legal power to make use of the armed forces of the
state. If individual responsibility for a crime against international
security is to be established, the treaty constituting the international
security organization must provide for punishment of the individuals
who, in their capacity as organs of a state and in violation of the
treaty, have ordered or authorized the armed forces of a state to take
action against another state, or have ordered or authorized or personally performed any act which must be considered as aggression,
especially the act of threatening with the use of armed force. For
this purpose, the constituent treaty must confer upon an international
court the power to try the individuals accused of a crime against
security and, if they are found guilty, to inflict a definite punishment
on them. This means a considerable deviation from the principle of traditional international law which holds that only states and
not individuals can be parties to a case before an international court. 36
To comply with the generally recognized principle of penal law that
no crime should be punished unless the punishment is determined by
a pre-established law, the constituent treaty should specify the penalties which the court is authorized to inflict upon guilty individuals.
Acts performed, ordered or authorized by the government are acts
of state. According to a principle of general international law, a
state can exercise jurisdiction over another state through its courts,
and this means jurisdiction over acts of another state, and thus make
reaction against a delict

is

the organ of another state individually responsible for a violation of
international law, only with the consent of this state.
international court

is

a

common

Insofar as an

court of the states which are con-

by which a court or its jurisdiction is
international
court can try individuals for having
an
established,
violated international law by acts of state, and this means in their
capacity as organs of a state, only with the consent of this state. In
other words, the state over whose acts an international court exercises
jurisdiction by inflicting punishment upon the individuals who have
performed these acts, must be a contracting party to the treaty estabtracting parties to the treaty

lishing the jurisdiction of the court or
370624—57
9

must express

its

consent to
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this jurisdiction in

some other way. If such a court

after aggression has taken place,

is

established only

stands to reason that only the
government of a state defeated in the war which was the consequence
it

of the aggression, will consent to the prosecution of former members
of its government. 37 Hence, individual criminal responsibility for

crimes against international security should be pre-established in the
treaty constituting the security organization. If the organization is
universal, there is no difficulty in applying the provision concerned.

However,
is

if

the organization

is

not universal and a non-member state

the aggressor, the prosecution of organs of this state for having

committed the

ment of

the

act of aggression is legally possibly only if the govern-

non-member

state consents.

It should be noted, however,

that according to an opinion advocated by some authorities, the rule

of general international law requiring the consent of a state to the

who

prosecution of an individual

in his capacity as an organ of this

by committing a crime against
by the practice of states,
especially by the Agreement signed on 8 August 1945 in London for
the prosecution of the major war criminals of the European Axis. 38
Whether individual criminal responsibility for violations of international law, and especially for crimes against international security,
should be extended to acts performed at superior order, is a delicate
question. If this question is answered in the affirmative, not only the
member or members of the government who ordered the illegal use of
armed force, but all members of the armed force who executed the
order, would be punishable. This, of course, is absurd. Hence, the
state has violated international law

international security, has been abrogated

principle of excluding the plea of superior order should be restricted

with respect to the crimes to which it may be applied, as well as with
respect to the conditions under which a crime committed at superior
order should be considered punishable. 39

Although individual criminal responsibility for violations of international law by acts of state is certainly a very effective means of
preventing these violations and especially of preventing the illegal
use of armed force, it is evident that the sanctions constituting this
responsibility do not suffice

by
and

if,

in spite of such responsibility established

an act of aggression has actually taken place
necessary to stop the aggression and save the

the constituent treaty,
a military action

is

victim, to the extent that this

is

possible.

Individual criminal responsibility for violations of international
law by acts of state is not a consideration in case of internal aggression
constituted by a revolutionary movement within a member state, for
revolutionary acts are not acts of state and violate only national law

and not international law.

The

situation is different if a security
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treaty provides for enforcement action against a revolutionary move-

ment within a member
a belligerent power.

lutionary

state

The

and

if

the insurgents are recognized as

internal aggression constituted

by the revo-

then analogous to aggression by a non-member

movement is
member

state, for

state against a

the government of the insurgents

cannot be considered to be a contracting party to the security treaty.
Consequently, the provisions of the treaty concerning individual
criminal responsibility for acts of aggression are not applicable to
the members of the revolutionary government. Only the collective
responsibility implied in the enforcement action taken against the
revolutionary movement applies. It should not be ignored that even
within the national law of modern states the principle of collective
responsibility cannot be completely replaced by that of individual
responsibility. There are cases where only the former is applicable.

SANCTIONS CONSISTING OF THE FORFEITURE OF RIGHTS

(F)

pointed out in a previous chapter, sanctions may consist of the
forcible deprivation of rights. The expulsion of a member state from
a security organization is such a sanction. It implies the forfeiture

As

of

all

the rights a state has in

its

capacity as a

member

of the organi-

However, the consequence of expulsion is that the state
is also released from the obligations imposed upon it by
the constituent treaty. 40 For this reason, expulsion is not an appropriate sanction within a security organization which intends to be
zation.

concerned

More appropriate

a forefeiture of rights not accompanied by a release from obligations, especially the forfeiture of
specific rights, e. g., the right to participate in the voting of a
collegiate organ in which the state is represented. 41
universal.

is
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NOTES
A

Report of a Group of
Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Oxford University
Press, London, New York, Toronto, 1938. Quoted in the following as Interna1.

Cf. the excellent

study

:

International Sanctions.

:

tional Sanctions.

This was the case under the Covenant of the League of Nations which
in Article 16, paragraph 1 (cf. infra, p. 134) imposed upon the members only an
obligation to take economic sanctions. As far as military sanctions were
concerned, the members were under no obligation they were only authorized
to take such action.
3. According to Article 16, paragraph 2, of the Covenant of the League of
Nations, the Council had the power to make recommendations concerning the
execution of the military sanctions. Under this Article the Council had no
competence with respect to the execution of the economic sanctions by the
members. However, Article 10 provided "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve against external aggression the territorial integrity
and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of
2.

;

:

:

126
any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the
Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled."
In so far as the "means" referred to in this Article had the character of economic
sanctions in the sense of Article 16, paragraph 1, the Council was competent
to make recommendations also concerning the execution of these measures.
Under the Charter of the United Nations the execution of the sanctions military
as well as non-military is reserved to the Security Council, and the members
are obliged to carry out the decisions of the Council. Article 39 provides
''The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42,
to maintain or restore international peace and security." Article 25 stipulates
"The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions
In addition,
of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."
Article 48 provides: "1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the
Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall
be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the
Security Council may determine. 2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the
Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members." Decisions of the
Security Council concerning enforcement measures involving or not involving
the use of armed force as sanctions are to be taken according to Article 27,
paragraph 3, by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring
votes of the five permanent members. If, however, the Security Council, because
of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its responsibility with respect to execution of sanctions, the General Assembly is authorized
by the Resolution "Uniting for Peace" (cf. p. 139) to recommend to the members
collective measures including, in the case of a breach of the peace or act of
aggression, the use of armed force.
"1. The Council
4. Article 4 of the Covenant of the League of Nations provided
shall consist of representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers
(United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan),

—

—

:

together with Representatives of four other Members of the League. These four
Members of the League shall be selected by the Assembly from time to time
Until the appointment of the Representatives of the four
in its discretion.

Members

of the League first selected by the Assembly, Representatives of
Belgium, Brazil, Greece and Spain shall be Members of the Council. 2. With
the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the Council may name additional
Members of the League, whose Representatives shall always be Members of the
Council; the Council with like approval may increase the number of Members
of the League to be selected by the Assembly for representation on the Council.
The Assembly shall fix by a two-thirds' majority the rules dealing with
3. bis.
the election of the non-permanent Members of the Council, and particularly
such regulations as relate to their term of office and the conditions of reeligi-

bilityr

Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations reads as follows: "1. The
Security Council shall consist of eleven Members of the United Nations. The
Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of
America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General
elect six other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the

Assembly shall
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instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the
2. The nonOrganization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.
permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two
years. In the first election of the non-permanent members, however, three shall
be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for
immediate re-election. 3. Each member of the Security Council shall have one
first

representative."

—

Covenant of the League of Nations

in contranot contain an express
provision concerning self-defense. This right is presupposed as self-evident.
The provisions of Article 16, paragraph 1, of the Covenant concerning economic
sanctions only transform the right of so-called collective self-defense into an
obligation, (the economic sanctions considered as a use of force not involving
armed force) and the provisions of Article 16, paragraph 2, confer upon the
5.

It is significant that the

—does

distinction to the Charter of the United Nations

;

Council only the power to make recommendations with respect to the exercise
of the right of collective self-defense by military measures.
The exercise of the right of individual and collective self-defense, expressly
stipulated in Article 51 in the Charter of the United Nations, differs clearly from
the execution of sanctions taken as enforcement measures by the central organ
The right

of the United Nations, the Security Council, under Articles 39-50.

of individual and collective self-defense

may

be exercised only as long as the

central organ of the United Nations, the Security Council, does not intervene
("until the Security Council has taken the

international peace

measures necessary to maintain

and security").

Under Article 51 so-called collective self-defense is a right of the memBy an agreement of the members, this right may be transformed into
an obligation. In this way regional security organizations may be established
within the framework of the relatively universal security organization of the
United Nations. (As to the question of whether or not these organizations are
"regional arrangements" within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the Charter, c/.
infra, p. 252). They constitute important implementations of Article 51 of the
Charter. Such an agreement is the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security at Rio de Janeiro on 2 September 1947. Article 3,
paragraph 1, of this treaty stipulates: "The High Contracting Parties agree
that an armed attack by any state against an American State shall be considered
as an attack against all the American States and, consequently, each one of
bers.

the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the
exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized
by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations." Another agreement imple-

menting Article 51 of the Charter is the treaty signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Great Britain at Brussels on 17 March 1948. Article
4 of this treaty provides "If any of the High Contracting Parties should be
the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will,
in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance
in their power." The most important treaty for the organization of collective
self-defense is the so-called North Atlantic Treaty signed at Washington on 4
April 1949 by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, United States of America,
and adhered to by Greece and Turkey. Article 3 of the Treaty stipulates "In
:

:
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order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties,
separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual
aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist
armed attack." Article 5 of the treaty runs as follows: "The Parties agree
that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America
shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that,
if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual
or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary,
including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the Security of the North
Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof
;

shall immediately be reported to the Security Council.
Such measures shall be
terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to
restore and maintain international peace and security." Article 9 provides:
"The Parties hereby establish a council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The
council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The
council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary in particular it
shall establish immediately a defense committee which shall recommend
measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5." It is important to note
that some of the contracting parties were, at the time the treay was concluded,
not members of the United Nations Italy and Portugal.
In conformity with Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the United States of
America concluded on the basis of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949
various Defense Assistance Agreements. The Agrement concluded with France
on 27 January 1950 contains in its Preamble the following statements: "The
Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of France ....
Taking into consideration the support that the Government of the United States of
America has brought to these principles by enacting the Mutual Defense Assistance
Act of 1949 which provides for the furnishing of military assistance to nations
which have joined with it in collective security arrangements desiring to set
forth the understandings which will govern the transfer of such assistance have
agreed as follows Article I. 1. Each Government, consistently with the principle
that economic recovery is essential to international peace and security and must
be given clear priority, will make or continue to make available to the other, and
to such other governments as the parties hereto may in each case agree upon,
such equipment, materials, services, or other military assistance as the government furnishing such assistance may authorize and in accordance with such
terms and conditions as may be agreed. The furnishing of any such assistance
as may be authorized by either party hereto shall be consistent with the Charter
of the United Nations and with the obligations under Article 3 of the North
Atlantic Treaty. Such assistance shall be so designed as to promote an integrated defense of the North Atlantic area and to facilitate the development of,
or be in accordance with, defense plans under Article 9 of the North Atlantic
Article II. In conformity with the
Treaty approved by each Government
principle of mutual aid, the Goverment of the Republic of France agrees to facilitate the production and transfer to the Government of the United States of
America, for such period of time, in such quantities and upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon, of raw and semiprocessed materials required by the
;

:

;

;

:

United States as a result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own
sources, and which may be available in France or dependent territories under

reits
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Arrangements for such transfers shall give due regard to
requirements for domestic use and commercial export of France." "Article VI.
1. The two Governments will, upon the request of either of them, consult regarding
any matter relating to the application of this Agreement or to operations or arrangements carried out pursuant to this Agreement. 2. Each Government agrees
to receive personnel of the other Government who will discharge in its territory the
responsibilities of the other Government under this Agreement and who will be
accorded facilities to observe the progress of assistance furnished pursuant to this
Agreement. Such personnel who are nationals of that other country, including
personnel temporarily assigned, will, in their relations with the Government of the
country to which they are assigned, operate as a part of the Embassy under the
direction and control of the Chief of the Diplomatic Mission of the Government of
such country."
On the basis of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, and
the Mutual Security Act of 1951, the United States concluded with Yugoslavia an
Agreement, signed at Belgrade on 14 November 1951, which contains among others
the following provisions: "The Governments of the United States of America
and the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia Desiring the foster international
peace and security within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations
through measures which will further the ability of nations dedicated to the
purposes and principles of the Charter to participate effectively in arrangements
for individual and collective self-defense in support of those purposes and
principles .... have agreed as follows Article I. 1. The Government of the
United States of America will make or continue to make available to the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia equipment, materials,
services or other assistance in accordance with such terms and conditions as may
be agreed. The furnishing of such assistance shall be consistent with the Charter
of the United Nations.
Such assistance will be furnished under the provisions,
and subject to all of the terms, conditions and termination provisions, of the
Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and the Mutual Security Act of 1951, acts
amendatory and supplementary thereto and appropriation acts thereunder.
The two Governments will, from time to time, negotiate detailed arrangements
necessary to carry out the provisions of this paragraph. 2. The Government
of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia will use the assistance exclusively
in furtherance of the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations for the
promotion of international peace and security and for strengthening the
defenses of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia against aggression. 3. The
administration.

;

:

Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia undertakes not to
transfer to any person not an officer or agent of that Government, or to any other
nation, title to or possession of any equipment, materials, information, or services,
received on a grant basis, without the prior consent of the Government of the
United States of America. 4. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of
Yugoslavia will provide the United States of America with reciprocal assistance by
continuing to facilitate the production and transfer to the United States of
America in such quantities and upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed
on, of raw and semiprocessed materials required by the United States of America
as a result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own resources, and which
may be available in Yugoslavia. Arrangements for such transfers shall give due
regards to requirements of Yugoslavia for domestic use and commercial export.
.... Article V. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia
agrees to receive personnel of the Government of the United States of America
who will discharge in its territory the responsibilities of the Government of the

.
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United States of America under this Agreement and

who

will be accorded facilities

to observe the progress of the assistance furnished pursuant to this Agreement.

It

understood between the two Governments that the number of such personnel
will be kept as low as possible.
Such personnel who are United States nationals,
including personnel temporarily assigned, will, in their relations with the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, operate as a part of the
Embassy of the United States of America under the direction and control of the
Chief of the Diplomatic Mission, and will have the same status as that of other
personnel with corresponding rank of the Embassy of the United States of
America who are United States nationals. Upon appropriate notification by the
Government of the United States of America full diplomatic status will be granted
to an agreed number of the personnel assigned thereto."
Mutual defense treaties analogous to the North Atlantic Treaty were concluded
between the United States and Far Eastern countries, as, for instance, the Treaty
concluded on 2 December 1954 with the so-called nationalist government of the
Republic of China (having its seat on Formosa) whose Article V provides "Each
Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against
the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and
safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance
with its constitutional processes. Any such armed attack and all measures
taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council
of the United Nations.
Such measures shall be terminated when the Security
Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international
peace and security."
Another treaty concluded for the purpose of collective defense is the Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty, signed on 8 September 1954 by France, New
Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of the Philippines, the Kingdom of Thailand,
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United
States.
(Text in: Disarmament and Security. A Collection of Documents
1919-1955. Subcommittee on Disarmament. Pursuant to Senate Resolution 93,
and continued by Senate Resolution 185, Eighty-fourth Congress. United States
Government Printing Office, Washington 1956 [thereafter quoted: Disarmament
and Security,] pp. 611 ff )
On 24 February 1955, at Baghdad, a Pact of Mutual Cooperation was concluded between Iraq and Turkey, to which Pakistan on 23 September 1955, the
United Kingdom on 5 April 1955, and Iran on 3 November 1955 adhered. The
Pact refers in its Preamble to the responsibilities borne by the contracting parties
"in their capacity as members of the United Nations concerned with the main."
tenance of peace and security in the Middle East region.
It contains among
others the following provisions "Article I. Consistent with Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter the High Contracting Parties will cooperate for their
security and defence. Such measures as they agree to take to give effect to this
cooperation may form the subject of special agreements with each other." "Article II. In order to ensure the realization and effect application of the cooperation provided for in Article I above, the competent authorities of the High
Contracting Parties will determine the measures to be taken as soon as the present
Pact enters into force. These measures will become operative as soon as they
have been approved by the Governments of the High Contracting Parties."
"Article V. This Pact shall be open for accession to any member of the Arab
League or any other state actively concerned with the security and peace in this
region and which is fully recognized by both of the High Contracting Par."
ties.
"Article VI. A Permanent Council at Ministerial level will be set
is

:

.

:

.

.

.
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up to function within the framework of
four Powers become parties to the Pact.
of procedure."
On 14 May 1955, at Warsaw, a Treaty
Assistance was concluded between the
Hungarian People's Republic, German
Republic,

Rumanian

when at
draw up its own

the purposes of this Pact

The Council

will

of Friendship, Cooperation

least

rules

and Mutual

Soviet Union and Albania, Bulgaria,

Democratic Republic, Polish People's
In the Preamble

People's Republic, Czechoslovak Republic.

the contracting parties express "their desire for the establishment of European
all European states irrespective
which would make it possible to unite their
efforts in safeguarding the peace of Europe" and declare to be "guided by the
objects and principles of the Charter of the United Nations Organization."
Article 1 stipulates: "The Contracting Parties undertake, in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations Organization, to refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force, and to settle their international disputes
peacefully and in such manner as will not jeopardize international peace and
security." Article 4: "In the event of armed attack in Europe on one or more
of the Parties to the Treaty by any state or group of states, each of the Parties

collective security

of their social

and

based on the participation of
political systems,

;

to the Treaty, in the exercise of its right to individual or collective self-defence

in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations Organiza-

immediately, either individually or in agreement with other Parties
to the Treaty, come to the assistance of the state or states attacked with all
such means as it deems necessary, including armed force. The Parties to the
Treaty shall immediately consult concerning the necessary measures to be taken
by them jointly in order to restore and maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken on the basis of this Article shall be reported to the Security
Council in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations
Organization. These measures shall be discontinued immediately the Security
Council adopts the necessary measures to restore and maintain international
tion, shall

peace and security." Article 5 "The Contracting Parties have agreed to establish
a Joint Command of the armed forces that by agreement among the Parties shall
be assigned to the Command, which shall function on the basis of jointly established principles. They shall likewise adopt other agreed measures necessary
to strengthen their defensive power, in order to protcet the peaceful labours of
their peoples, guarantee the inviolability of their frontiers and territories, and
provide defence against possible aggression."
Prior to the coming into force of the United Nations Charter, on 22 March
1945, a pact between the Syrian Republic, Transjordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the
Lebanese Republic, Egypt, and Yemen, constituting the Arab League, was
concluded. It provides for a Council composed of the representatives of the
:

member states (Article 3) and stipulates in Article 5: "Any resort to force in
order to resolve disputes arising between two or more member states of the
League is prohibited. If there should arise among them a difference which does
not concern a state's independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity, and if
the parties to the dispute have recourse to the Council for the settlement of this
difference, the decision of the Council shall then be enforceable and obligatory.
In such a case, the states between whom the difference has arisen shall not
participate in the deliberations and decisions of the Council. The Council shall
mediate in all differences which threaten to lead to war between two member
states, or a member state and a third state, with a view to bringing about their
reconciliation. Decisions of arbitration and mediation shall be taken by majority
vote." Article 6 runs as follows "In case of aggression or threat of aggression
:

)

;
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by one state against a member state, the state which has been attacked or
threatened with aggression may demand the immediate convocation of the
Council.
The Council shall, by unanimous decision, determine the measures
necessary to repulse the aggression. If the aggressor is a member state, his vote
If, as a result of the attack,
shall not be counted in determining unanimity.
unable
government
finds
itself
to communicate with the
of the state attacked
the
Council, that state's representative in the Council shall have the right to request
the convocation of the Council for the purpose indicated in the foregoing paragraph. In the event that this representative is unable to communicate with the
Council, any member state of the League shall have the right to request the
convocation of the Council."
On 13 April 1950 the members of the Arab League signed a Joint Defense and
Economic Cooperation Treaty, which provides in Article 2 "The contracting
States consider any (act of) armed aggression made against any one or more
of them or their armed forces, to be directed against them all. Therefore, in
accordance with the right of self-defense, individually and collectively they
undertake to go without delay to the aid of the State or States against which
such an act of aggression is made, and immediately to take, individually and
collectively, all steps available, including the use of armed force, to repel the
aggression and restore security and peace. In conformity with Article 6 of
the Arab League Pact and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the Arab
League Council and U. N. Security Council shall be notified of such act of
aggression and the means and procedure taken to check it."
(Full text in
Disarmament and Security, pp. 622 ff
Article 51 of the Charter has been implemented also by Resolution 378 (V)
Duties of States in the Event of the Outbreak of Hostilities, adopted by the
General Assembly on 17 November 1950, recommending: "(a) That if a State
becomes engaged in armed conflict with another State or States, it takes all
steps practicable in the circumstances and compatible with the right of selfdefence to bring the armed conflict to an end at the earliest possible moment
(b) In particular, that such State shall immediately, and in any case not later
than twenty-four hours after the outbreak of the hostilities, make a public statement wherein it will proclaim its readiness, provided that the States with which
it is in conflict will do the same, to discontinue all military operations and
withdraw all its military forces which have invaded the territory or territorial
water of another State or crosses a demarcation line, either on terms agreed
by the parties to the conflict or under conditions to be indicated to the parties
by the appropriate organs of the United Nations; (c) That such State immediately notify the Secretary-General, for communication to the Security Council
and to the Members of the United Nations, of the statement made in accordance
with the preceding subparagraph and of the circumstances in which the conflict
has arisen; (d) That such State, in its notification to the Secretary-General,
invite the appropriate organs of the United Nations to dispatch the Peace
Observation Commission to the area in which the conflict has arisen, if the
Commission is not already functioning there; (e) That the conduct of the States
concerned in relation to the matters covered by the foregoing recommendations
be taken into account in any determination of responsibility for the breach of
the peace or act of aggression in the case under consideration and in all other
relevant proceedings before the appropriate organs of the United Nations."
6. Cf. the declaration made by the representative of the United States of
America on 22 May 1933, at the League of Nations Disarmament Conference,
:

.

:

infra, p. 175.
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7.

The

principle of not recognizing

formulated in an

an

illegally established situation is

known

after the U. S. Secretary of State Stimson and
identical note to Japan and China of January 7, 1932 in which

as the Stimson Doctrine,

named

cannot admit the
the Government of the United States declared that it ".
legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or
agreement entered into between those Governments, or agents thereof, which
may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, in.

.

cluding those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial
and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international
policy relative to China, commonly known as the open-door policy and that it
does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement, which may be
;

brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact
of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which treaty both China and Japan, as well as
the United States, are parties." The principle of non-recognition has been confirmed by a resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations on 11 March
1932 which contained the following statement "It is incumbent upon the
Members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty, or
agreement, which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of
the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris."
The Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of States in Case of Aggression,
published by the Harvard Research in International Law, lays down the principle
that an aggressor does not acquire rights or relieve itself of duties by becoming
an aggressor (Article 2) Articles 3, 4, and 5 contain specific applications of
:

;

this principle.
8.

An

interesting suggestion concerning the centralization of financial sanctions

was made by M. Busch in two articles published on 22 and 23 September 1915
in the Neue Zuricher Zeitung, later presented by Camille Gorge, Une nouvelle
sanction du droit international. Le Pro jet Busch (1926), and Schiicking, Runland,

Bohmert,

Angreifer."

"Die

Organisation

der

Volkerbundsexekution

Zeitschrift filr Volkerrecht, 1932, pp. 560

ff.

The

of the suggestion (as formulated in the last mentioned article)

member

gegen

den

essential idea

was that each

would deposit a certain amount of gold, determined in proportion to the number of its inhabitants and its economic resources,
at the disposal of the central organ of the organization. Each member state
would then have the right to circulate bank notes which would have to be
covered by this amount of gold on deposit. In case a state were declared to be
an aggressor by the competent organ of the organization, its gold would be
of a security organization

confiscated and, if necessary, transferred to the victim of the aggression.

This

breakdown of the monetary
system of the aggressor state. Cf. also F. N. Keen, The World in Alliance, p. 58
(quoted by John A. Hobson, Towards International Government, London 1915,
"The States comprised in the international scheme might be required
pp. 94 f)
to keep deposited with, or under, the control of, the International Council sums
of money, proportioned in some way to their relative populations or financial
resources which might be made available to answer international obligations,
and an international bank might be organized which would facilitate the giving
confiscation of gold

would then probably lead

to the

:

of security by states to the International Council for the performance of their

obligations

and the enforcement of payments between one

state

and another
and

(as well as probably assisting in the creation of an international currency

discharging other useful international functions)."
According to
9. Cf. International Sanctions, pp. 24 ff., 60 ff., 76 ff., 91 ff., 106 ff.
this study, a complete international boycott involves: "(a) the complete closing

:;
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of land frontiers, even to mails, in either direction; (b) the severance of tele-

graphic, telephonic, and radio communication; (c) exclusion of the shipping and

from the harbours and airports of all other states
and prevention of the shipping of all other states from entering the harbours of the boycotted state (e) the prevention of all illicit communiaircraft of the boycotted state
(d) the prohibition

;

cations, by land, sea, or air

internment or the repatriation of all nations
of the boycotted state resident in other countries
(g) the withdrawal of all
diplomatic and consular officers on both sides." Op. cit., p. 109. The economic
sanctions stipulated in Article 16, paragraph 1, of the Covenant of the League of
Nations constituted a complete boycott. The provisions ran as follows
"Should
any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under
Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war
against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to
subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all
intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking
State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse
between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any
other State, whether a Member of the League or not." An analogous provision is
Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations which runs as follows "The
Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force
are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members
of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or
partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic,
radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic
;

(f ) the

;

:

:

relations."
10. Article 16, paragraph 3, of the Covenant of the League of Nations provided
"The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one
another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this
Article, in order to minimize the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above
measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special
."
measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking State
.

.

Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations stipulates: "If preventive or

enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any
other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself
confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those
measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a
solution of those problems."
11.

Cf. p. 61.

According to Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations, the enforcement measures to be taken by the Security Council in case of a threat to or
breach of the peace may be directed not only against a member but also against
a non-member state, and according to Article 51 the exercise of the right of
individual and collective self-defense is justified not only in case of an armed
attack launched by a member but also in case of an armed attack by a non12.

member state.
and Duties of States in Case
"Nothing in this Convention shall be deemed to excuse
any State for a violation of the humanitarian rules concerning the conduct of
hostilities, prescribed by international law or by a treaty to which it is a party."
This applies also to the conduct of hostilities against an aggressor.
12a. Article 14 of the Draft Convention on Rights

of Aggression stipulates

13. Cf., pp.

122

ff.

:

—

;

:
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14. This system of military sanctions was adopted by the Covenant of the
League of Nations, which in Article 16, paragraph 2, provided: "It shall be
the duty of the Council in such case [if a Member of the League resorts to war
in violation of the Covenant] to recommend to the several governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League

shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the
covenants of the League." The words "to contribute to the armed forces to be
." are misleading.
There were no armed forces other than those of
used
the members.
15. This is the case under the Charter of the United Nations.
Cf Note 16.
16. The first attempt to organize military sanctions on the basis of the contingent system was made in a proposal submitted by the representative of France
to the League of Nations Commission of the Peace Conference following the first
World War. This proposal contained the following provisions
.

.

"III:

MILITARY SANCTIONS
International Forces

(i.)

of the military sanctions on land or at sea shall be entrusted
force, or to one or more Powers members of the League

The execution
either to

an international

of Nations, to whom a mandate in that behalf shall have been given.
The International Body shall have at its disposal a military force supplied
by the various member States of sufficient strength
:

(1.)

To secure the execution

of its decisions

and those of the International

Tribunal
(2.)

to overcome, in case of need,

League of Nations

in the event of
(ii.)

shall determine the strength of the international

force and fix the contingents which

Each

of the

conflict.

Strength of International Contingents

The International Body

under which

any forces which may be opposed to the

armed

must be held

at its disposal.

member

its

The question

States shall be free to settle as
contingent shall be recruited.
of the limitation of

armaments

it

deems best the conditions

in each of the

member

States

will be dealt with elsewhere.
(iii.)

Permanent

Staff

A

permanent international Staff shall investigate all military questions affecting the League of Nations. Each State shall appoint the officer or officers who
shall represent

it

in a proportion to be

The Chief and Deputy Chiefs

determined

years by the International Body, from a
(iv.)

later.

of Staff shall be appointed for a period of three
list

submitted by the member States.

Functions of the Permanent Staff

It shall be the duty of the permanent international Staff to deal, under the
supervision of the International Body, with everything relating to the organisation of the joint forces and the eventual conduct of military operations.

It will in particular be

charged with the task of inspecting international forces

and armaments in agreement with the military authorities of each State, and
of proposing any improvements it may deem necessary, either in the interna-

136
tional military organisation or in the constitution, composition,

and methods

of recruiting of the forces of each State.

The

Staff shall report the result of its inspection, either as a matter of routine

or at the request of the International Body.

Military instruction shall be given
State in accordance with rules designed to procure, as far as
possible, uniformity in the armaments and training of the troops destined to
in each

member

act in concert.

The International Body shall be entitled, at any time, to require that the member States introduce any alteration into their national system of recruiting
which the Staff may report to be necessary.
(v.)

Commander-in-Chief and Chief of General Staff

When circumstances shall so require, the International Body shall appoint,
for the duration of the operations to be undertaken, a Commander-in-chief
of the international forces.
Upon his appointment, the Commander-in-chief shall nominate his chief of
General Staff and the officers who are to assist him.
The powers of the Commander-in-chief and his Chief of General Staff shall
cease when circumstances become such that an armed conflict is no longer
to be feared, or when the object of the military operations has been attained.
In either case, the date at which the powers of the Commander-in-chief and
the General Staff shall cease shall be fixed by a decision of the International
Body."

On 5 February 1932, at the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of
Armament, the French delegation submitted a set of proposals which contained
a plan for the establishment of an international armed force organized according
The object of this plan was to set up on behalf of the
to the contingent system.
League of Nations: "(1) an International police force to prevent war; (2) a
first contingent of coercionary forces to repress war and to bring immediate
assistance to any State victim of aggression,
(a) The police force will be
permanently available with complete freedom of passage to occupy in times of
emergency areas where a threat of war has arisen, and to assist the action of
commissioners of the League of Nations on the spot, and also to contribute to
all conservatory measures within the scope of the Convention to improve the
Means of Preventing War and of Article 11 of the League Covenant. This
police force will be made up of contingents furnished by each of the contracting
parties in a proportion to be determined. France is prepared to contribute a
mixed brigade, a light naval division and a mixed group of reconnaissance and
fighter aircraft.
The League of Nations will arrange for the command of the
international police force and will be entitled to inspect its component elements,
(b) The first contingent of coercionary forces would in conformity with the
undertakings to be assumed by contracting parties, be made up of elements of
strength varying according to the regions concerned. These undertakings
entered into by States towards the League of Nations would oblige them to come
to the help of any State victim of aggression with forces of definite strength
constantly available. The contracting parties would have the option of increasing this contribution on the recommendation of the Council of the League
(Paragraph 2 of Article 16 of the Covenant) or, in the event of aggression,
with a view to applying regional conventions of mutual assistance coming
within the scope of the Covenant. The undertakings of the various States
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a conflict concerning another
differ according to the place of the conflict
continent from that to which the State belongs; a conflict concerning the continent to which the State belongs a conflict in which the aggressor has a common
frontier with the contracting State. France is prepared to undertake the
following contributions In the case of a conflict outside Europe, a mixed brigade,

would

;

:

a light naval division, a mixed group of aircraft, material for land warfare
without personnel, and munitions for a conflict in Europe a division of all
arms, a naval division, a mixed group of aircraft, material for land warfare
with personnel, and munitions for a conflict in Europe in which the aggressor
has a common frontier with France the contingents provided for in the preceding paragraph and, in addition, forces, the strength of which would be decided
in each case in agreement with the League. As far as material for land warfare
is concerned, the contracting parties which possess tanks or similar armoured
implements, as well as heavy field artillery, undertake to contribute from them
to the forces which will be placed at the disposal of the League under the
conditions mentioned above. In these various eventualities the undertakings!
of each State would only become operative if the forces thus placed at any
moment at the disposal of the League reached a minimum total to be determined,
and if there were equitable proportion between the contributions of the principal
States." Series of League of Nations Publications, IX. Disarmament, 1932.
IX. 63 Vol. I, p. 115.
;

:

;

;

A

special subcommittee on international organization, appointed in 1943 by

Secretary of State Hull, prepared a Draft Constitution of International Organization which in its Article 10 contained the following provisions "1. Any menace
to the peace of nations, wherever it arises, is a matter of vital concern to all
:

The International Organization through its Executive Committee [composed of representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom,
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and China] or Council [composed of
eleven representatives, including one representative designated by the United
States of America, one by the United Kingdom, one by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one by China, two by the group of European states, two by
the group of American states, one by the group of Far Eastern states, one by
the states of the Near and Middle East, and one by the British Dominion] shall
take any action necessary to safeguard or restore peace. 2. In the event of a
breach, or imminently threatened breach, of the peace between nations, the
Chairman of the Council, on consultation with such members of the Executive
Committee as may be available, shall request the parties to desist from any
action which would further aggravate the situation and shall forthwith summon
a meeting of the Council. The Council shall request the parties to restore or
maintain the position existing before the breach or threatened breach of the
peace and to accept procedures of peaceful settlement. The state or states failing to comply with this request within the time specified shall be presumed to
intend a violation of the peace of nations and the Executive Committee or the
Council shall apply all the measures necessary to restore or maintain the peace.
3. Members of the International Organization undertake in no case to give a
state, declared by the Council to be threatening or committing a violation of the
peace, assistance of a character which in the opinion of the Council would aggravate the dispute. 4. Members of the International Organization agree to make
available for action taken under paragraph 2 to restore or maintain peace such
armaments, facilities, installations, strategic areas and contingents of armed
forces, and to afford such freedom of passage through their territories, as the
Council or the Executive Committee, advised by the General Security and Armastates.
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ments Commission, may determine

to be necessary for this purpose,

for the geographical position, regional or special obligations,

member

and

having regard

and

relative re-

states.
under
sources of
their national authorities subject to the general control of the Executive Committee and the technical coordination of operations provided by the General
Security and Armaments Commission. ... 8. Any action by the Council under
this Article shall require a two-thirds majority vote including three-fourths of

All national forces

facilities shall operate

the states members of the Executive Committee." Postwar Foreign Policy
Preparation 1939-1945. Dept. of State Publication 3580. General Foreign Policy
Series 15. Released February 1950. Washington, D. C, 1949, p. 478.
The contingent system is adopted by the Charter of the United Nations which
provides

:

"Article

43.

1.

All

Members

of the United Nations, in order to con-

and security, undertake to
make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a
special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, includtribute to the maintenance of international peace

ing rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international
peace and security. 2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers

and types of

and general location, and the nature
be provided. 3. The agreement or agreements

forces, their degree of readiness

of the facilities

and assistance

to

shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council.

between the Security Council and Members or between
Members and shall be subject to ratification
accordance
with their respective constitutional procthe
signatory
states
in
by
esses. Article 44. When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall,
before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in
fulfillment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if

They

shall be concluded

the Security Council and groups of

Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council
concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.
Article 45. In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military
measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action.
The strength and
degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action
shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or
agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance
of the Military Staff Committee. Article 46. Plans for the application of armed
force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military
Staff Committee. Article 47. 1. There shall be established a Military Staff
Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating
to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at
2. The
its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.
Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent
members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the
United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited
by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the
Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its
work. 3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security
Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal
Questions relating to the command of such forces
of the Security Council.
shall be worked out subsequently. 4. The Military Staff Committee, with the
authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate
regional agencies, may establish regional subcommittees. Article 48. 1. The

the
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action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members

some of them, as the Security Council may determine. 2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United
Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agenArticle 49. The Members of the United Nations
cies of which they are members.
shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided
of the United Nations or by

upon by the Security Council."

The Resolution 377 (V) A, entitled "Uniting for Peace," adopted by the
General Assembly on 3 November 1950, provides "that if the Security Council,
because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security
in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter
immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members
for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act
of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore
international peace and security.
If not in session at the time, the General
Assembly may meet in emergency special session within twenty-four hours of
the request therefor. Such emergency special session shall be called if requested
by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a majority of
the Members of the United Nations." The Resolution provides for the establishment by the General Assembly of a Peace Observation Commission composed
of 14 member states "which could observe and report on the situation in any
area where there exists international tension the continuance of which is likely
to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security"; and of a
Collective Measures Committee consisting of 14 member states.
This committee is directed to study and make a report "in consultation with the
Secretary-General and with such Member States as the Committee finds appropriate" on methods "which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the Purposes and Principles
of the Charter, taking account of collective self-defence and regional arrangements (Articles 51 and 52 of the Charter)." The Resolution "invites each
Member of the United Nations to survey its resources in order to determine
the nature and scope of the assistance it may be in a position to render in
support of any recommendations of the Security Council or of the General
Assembly for the restoration of international peace and security" and "recommends to the States Members of the United Nations that each Member maintain
within its national armed forces elements so trained, organized and equipped
that they could promptly be made available, in accordance with its constitutional
processes, for service as a United Nations unit or units, upon recommendation
by the Security Council or the General Assembly, without prejudice to the use of
such elements in exercise of the rights of individual or collective self-defence
;

recognized in Article 51 of the Charter."
Prior to the adoption of the Resolution "Uniting for Peace" by the General
Assembly of the United Nations, a resolution (the Thomas-Douglas Resolution
S. Con. Res. 52, 81st Cong., 1st sess.) was submitted, on July 8, 1949, to the
U. S. Senate. It contained the provisions ".
be it Resolved by the Senate
(the House of Representatives concurring), (I) That the Congress reaffirm its
:

.

.

faith in the United Nations as the cornerstone of the international policy of
the United States and as an institution which can progressively be made more

370624—57

10

;
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adequate to assure the security of its members; (II) That to this end the
Congress pledges its support to a supplementary agreement under Article 51
of the Charter open to all members of the United Nations, by which the signatories
agree, if the Security Council is prevented from fulfilling its duties, to come
to the aid of the victim of attack if requested to do so by a two-thirds vote of
the General Assembly, including three of the permanent members of the Security Council; (III) That such an agreement should specify the forces that
each signatory agrees to maintain, under the spirit of paragraphs 1 and 2 of
Article 43, for immediate use of the United Nations
(a) upon call of the
Security Council, or (b) upon call of the General Assembly by a two-thirds

—

vote, including at least three of the permanent members of the Security Council,
and (IV) That such an agreement should specify that if a matter pertaining
to a threat to or breach of the peace, or act of aggression, is on the agenda
of the Security Council, and the Security Council is prevented from fulfilling its
duties, the signatories who are members of the Security Council will take such
steps as may be required to remove it from the agenda of the Security Council
and (V) That such an agreement should come into force when ratified by a
majority of the United Nations including three of the permanent members of
the Security Council. Sec. 2. Such an agreement shall not in any way impair
the inherent right of the parties to engage in self-defense under Article 51 of

the United Nations Charter, individually or through other collective arrangements consistent with their obligations under the United Nations Charter, or
the North Atlantic Security Pact, or the Pact of Rio de Janeiro."
The Collective Measures Committee suggested in its first report (General
Assembly. Official Records: Sixth Session. Supple. No. 13 [A/1891,] New York,
1951) that the United Nations, "whenever it determines upon the use of collective
force," should appoint an "executive military authority" responsible for the
direction and control of its military operations. This agency "should be empowered to coordinate the efforts of individual States and to organize contributions of forces, assistance and facilities in order to initiate effective military
operations against the aggressor in the shortest possible time. Accordingly, upon
the determination to adopt measures involving the use of United Nations armed
force, the Organization should authorize a State or group of States to act on its
behalf as executive military authority, within the framework of its policies and
objectives as expressed through such resolutions as it may adopt at any stage
of the collective action." As to the relationship between the executive military
authority and the state victim of an aggression, the Report states "In some
cases, the victim State might itself be designated as the executive military authority, particularly when it is in a position to conduct its own defence with
only limited assistance from the United Nations. More often, however, it might
be appropriate for the executive military authority to consist of a group of States,
of which the victim State would be one. Finally, the executive military authority
might be a State or a group of States which would not include the victim State.
:

Special consideration should also be given to the inclusion in the executive military authority of States situated in, or contiguous to, the area of hostilities,
particularly when those States are participating in the United Nations action with
their full military potential." "In the theatre of operations the executive mili-

tary authority should have full responsibility for the coordination and strategic
direction and control of the United Nations forces, within the framework of the
policies

tions
its

and objectives as expressed through such resolutions as the United Naadopt at any stage of the collective action. ... In accordance with

may

responsibility,

the executive military authority should be authorized

to
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designate the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations forces and to replace
him. Where the executive military authority consists of a group of States, the
Commander-in-Chief should be designated by mutual agreement. The Commander-in-Chief's authority should be defined by the executive military authority,

and he should receive instructions from that authority." As to the identification
of the United Nations character of operations, the Report states "In identifying
military measures with the United Nations, the Security Council or the General
Assembly and the executive military authority should take action of several
First, the body deciding upon or recommending military measures should
types.
provide that the forces serving under the executive military authority will be
known as the United Nations Forces. The Commander-in-Chief should initiate
and conduct all operations as Commander of the United Nations Forces, and
should issue all orders, reports and instructions, and carry on all relationships,
:

in the

name

of the United Nations

Command.

The Security Council or the Gen-

Assembly should authorize the use of the United Nations flag in the field,
and the Commander-in-Chief should ensure that that flag, in addition to national
flags, is used in United Nations operations.
Arrangements should be made for the
proper identification of personnel and property of the United Nations in the
eral

theatre of operations.

Similarly, consideration should be given to providing a

United Nations service medal for the forces engaged in future United Nations
military action."

The Secretary-General of the United Nations submitted to the Collective
Measures Committee the proposal to create a "United Nations Volunteer Reserve." In its second Report (General Assembly.
Official Records: Seventh
Session. Suppl. No. 17 [A/2215] New York 1952), the Collective Measures Committee states "The Secretary-General proposed the creation of an international
organizational framework through which, in his opinion, some States would be
further enabled to contribute combatant or ancillary units. In addition, under
these proposals, in his estimation at least fifty or sixty thousand volunteers willing to serve the principles of the United Nations might well become available
through a United Nations Volunteer Reserve. Such a reserve would constitute
additional supplementary strength to other forces provided to a United Nations
Executive Military Authority at the time such an Authority was appointed to
resist aggression." "Volunteers to a United Nations Volunteer Reserve would be
recruited on behalf of the United Nations through the existing national military
establishments of States willing to participate in the proposal." They would be
"trained in advance on a part time voluntary basis."
17. The Charter of the United Nations provides in Article 17, paragraph 2,
that "the expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly." It seems that the expenses of a military action
taken by the Security Council are not to be considered as "expenses of the
Organization." This may be inferred from Article 50 "If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other
state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those
measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a
solution of those problems." This provision presupposes that each state must
bear the expenses of its own armed force which carry out the measures taken by
the Security Council. From Article 49, which stipulates that the members of the
United Nations "shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the
measures decided upon by the Security Council," may follow the principle of an
:

:

;
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equitable sharing of the burdens involved in collective measures.

Report of the Collective Measures Committee,

Cf. the

Second

p. 6.

18. It is assumed that the difficulty of cordination in naval operations is not
as pronounced as in land operations. International Sanctions contained the following statement "Division of effort between navies is more easily organized
:

than between armies, particularly in the type of operations that are likely to be
needed in common action against an aggressor state. Sea power is not the instrument of an aggressor of itself it can do little against any Great Power. It is
only when sea power is allied to land power that it has any strength for conquest
intrinsically, it is rather the weapon of collective defence against aggression.
Such naval operations as an aggressor undertakes are likely to be strictly local,,
in support of, or ancillary to, his main effort by land, whereas the naval action
taken against him may be widespread, and therefore easily apportioned between
various Powers without such close contact as is likely to involve the difficulties
;

of jealousy or divided
19. Cf.

20.

command." Log.

International Sanctions,

As a matter of

cit., p.

119.

p. 119.

fact, the special

agreements which, according

to Article

43

of the Charter of the United Nations, are to be concluded between the United

Nations, represented by the Security Council, and the member states for the
purpose of determining the numbers and types of forces to be placed at the
disposal of the Council, their degree of readiness and general location, and the

nature of facilities and assistance to be provided, have not yet been concluded,,
nor is it very likely that they will ever be concluded.
Under Article 39 of the Charter, the Security Council, after having determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression, may make "recommendations" or "decide" upon enforcement
measures involving or not involving the use of armed force (Articles 42 and 41).
The armed forces referred to in Article 42 are the armed forces to be placed at the
disposal of the Security Council according to Article 43. As long as the special
agreements referred to in Article 43 are not concluded, the Security Council is
not in a position to "decide" to take enforcement measures involving the use of
armed force. Consequently, when, on 25 June 1950, North Korean forces invaded
South Korea and the Security Council in its Resolution of 25 June 1950 (UN
Doc. S/1501) determined the existence of a breach of the peace, the Council did
not adopt a decision legally binding upon the members of the United Nations but,
in its Resolution of 27 June 1950 (UN Doc. S/1511), recommended "that the
Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea
as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace
and security in the area." Seventeen states actually contributed armed forces
to the action recommended by the Security Council. On 7 July 1950, the Security
Council adopted a Resolution (UN Doc. S/1588) in which the Council "1. Welcomes the prompt and vigorous support which governments and peoples of the
United Nations have given to its Resolutions of June 25 and 27, 1950, to assist
the Republic of Korea in defending itself against armed attack and thus to
restore international peace and security in the area 2. Notes that Members of
the United Nations have transmitted to the United Nations offers of assistance
for the Republic of Korea 3. Recommends that all Members providing military
forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under
;

;

4. Requests the United States to designate the commander
Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the
United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces con-

the United States;

of such forces;

5.

.
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currently with the flags of the various nations participating; 6. Requests the
United States to provide the Security Council with reports as appropriate on the
course of action taken under the unified command."
In spite of the fact that Article 42 of the Charter could not be applied, the
action in Korea was a police action of the United Nations, the execution of a
military sanction within the system of collective security established by the
Charter of the United Nations. As to the legal standing of the action, cf. Hans
Kelsen,

The Law

dt., pp. 228

of the United Nations,

London

1951, pp. 927

ff.,

and Stone, op

ff

Observations on the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance submitted
League of Nations by the British Government. League Document A. 35,

21. Cf. the

to the

1924, IX, p. 16, quoted in International Sanctions, p. 116.

In this respect the Charter of the United Nations differs from the
Covenant of the League of Nations. The latter provided in Article 1, paragraph
3 "Any Member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intention
so to do, withdraw from the League, provided that all its international obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the
time of its withdrawal," and in Article 26 "1. Amendments to this Covenant
will take effect when ratified by the Members of the League whose Representa22.

:

:

tives compose the Council and by a majority of the Members of the League
whose Representatives compose the Assembly. 2. No such amendment shall bind
any Member of the League which signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that

case it shall cease to be a Member of the League." The Charter of the United
Nations does not contain a provision concerning withdrawal from the organization.
However, the Report of Commission I to the plenary session of the San
Francisco Conference at which the Charter was signed contained the following
commentary adopted by Committee 1/2 of the Conference: "The Committee
adopts the view that the Charter should not make express provision either to
permit or to prohibit withdrawal from the Organization. The Committee deems
that the highest duty of the nations which will become Members is to continue
their cooperation within the Organization for the preservation of international
peace and security. If, however, a Member because of exceptional circumstances
feels constrained to withdraw, and leave the burden of maintaining international
peace and security on the other Members, it is not the purpose of the Organization
to compel that Member to continue its cooperation in the Organization.
It is
particularly,
that
withdrawals
dissolution
of
obvious,
the
or some other forms of
Organization would become inevitable if, deceiving the hopes of humanity, the
Organization was revealed to be unable to maintain peace or could do so only at
the expense of law and justice. Nor would a Member be bound to remain in the
Organization if its rights and obligations as such were changed by Charter
amendment in which it has not concurred and which it finds itself unable to accept, or if an amendment duly accepted by the necessary majority in the Assembly
or in a general conference fails to secure the ratification necessary to bring such
amendment into effect. It is for these considerations that the Committee has
decided to abstain from recommending insertion in the Charter of a formal clause
specifically forbidding or permitting withdrawal."
23. Cf. Lord Davies, The Problem of the Twentieth Century, 1930, Second Ed.,
1934, pp. 425 ff., 441 ff., and International Sanctions, p. 121 ff.
24. Cf. International Sanctions, p. 127.
However, Davies, op. cit., pp. 446 f.
suggested four categories of reserve formations. Recruits should be enlisted
".
at the age of seventeen for a minimum term of five years. At the end of this
period a proportion of, let us say, three-quarters of the total force would be eligible
.

.
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Their eligibility would be
determined by their conduct, achievements and the results of examinations during
the preceding period. The retiring contingent, representing twenty-five per cent
of the total force, would be relegated to a distinct category of reserves. Similarly,
another group would retire at the end of the second period of enlistment, a third
and fourth at the conclusion of fifteen and twenty years' service. The minimum
period would, therefore, be five years and the maximum period twenty years,
whilst the ages of retirement would be twenty-two, twenty-seven, thirty-two and
thirty-seven years respectively." However. Davies did not discuss the question
of how the international organization might force the reservists to reenter the
for reenlistment for a further term of five years.

military service in the international armed force.
25. Davies, op. cit., p. 441, suggested that each

member of the international
armed force ".
swear his oath of allegiance to the international authority.
From that moment until he is demobilized he becomes de-nationalized in the sense
that his services belong exclusively to the authority and that he recognizes no
other official claims upon his loyalty."
26. The Charter of the United Nations does not provide for a denationalization
of the members of the Secretariat. Article 100 stipulates only "1. In the performance of their duties, the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or
receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external
to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on
.

.

:

their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.

2.

Each Member

of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff

and not

to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities."
This provision is implemented by Article I, Rules of the Staff Regulations, which
"1.1.
runs as follows
Members of the Secretariat are international civil
servants. Their responsibilities are not national but exclusively international.
By accepting appointment, they pledge themselves to discharge their functions
and to regulate their conduct with the interests of the United Nations only in
view. 1.2. Staff members are subject to the authority of the Secretary-General
and to assignment by him to any of the activities or offices of the United Nations.
They are responsible to him in the exercise of their functions. The whole time
of staff members shall be at the disposal of the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General shall establish a normal working week. 1.3. In the performance
of their duties members of the Secretariat shall neither seek nor accept instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the
Organization. 1.4. Members of the Secretariat shall conduct themselves at all
times in a manner befitting their status as international civil servants. They
shall not engage in any activity that is incompatible with the proper discharge
of their duties with the United Nations. They shall avoid any action and in
particular any kind of public pronouncement which may adversely reflect on
their status. While they are not expected to give up their national sentiments
or their political and religious convictions, they shall at all times bear in mind
the reserve and tact incumbent upon them by reason of their international status.
Staff members shall exercise the utmost discretion in regard to all matters
1.5.
of official business. They shall not communicate to any person any information
known to them by reason of their official position which has not been made
public, except in the course of their duties or by authorization of the SecretaryGeneral. Nor shall they at any time use such information to private advantage.
These obligations do not cease upon separation from the Secretariat. 1.6. No
member of the Secretariat shall accept any honour, decoration, favour, gift or
:

.
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fee

from any government or from any other source external

to the Organization

Any member
1.7.
during the period of his appointment, except for war
of the Secretariat who becomes a candidate for a public office of a political
character shall resign from the Secretariat. 1.8. The immunities and privileges
attached to the United Nations by virtue of Article 105 of the Charter are conferred in the interests of the Organization. These privileges and immunities
furnish no excuse to the staff members who enjoy them for non-performance of
their private obligations or failure to observe laws and police regulations. In
any case where these privileges and immunities arise, the staff member shall
immediately report to the Secretary-General, with whom alone it rests to decide
whether they shall be waived. 1.9. Members of the Secretariat shall subscribe
to the following oath or declaration 'I solemnly swear (undertake, affirm, promise) to exercise in all loyalty, discretion and conscience the functions entrusted
to me as an international civil servant of the United Nations, to discharge these
functions and regulate my conduct with the interests of the United Nations only
in view, and not to seek or accept instructions in regard to the performance of
my duties from any government or other authority external to the Organization.'
1.10. The oath or declaration shall be made orally by the Secretary-General and
Assistant Secretaries-General at a public meeting of the General Assembly and
by all other members of the Secretariat before the Secretary-General or his
authorized deputy."
27. The Charter of the United Nations does not impose upon the member states
the obligation to grant complete exemption from their jurisdiction to the individuals who are organs of the organization. It provides only: "Abticxe 104.
The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal
capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment
of its purposes. Article 105. 1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of
each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the
fulfillment of its purposes. 2. Representatives of the Members of the United
Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and
immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in
connection with the Organization. 3. The General Assembly may make recommendations with a view to determining the details of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article or may propose conventions to the Members of the
United Nations for this purpose." These provisions are implemented by a convention on privileges and immunities of the United Nations, prepared by the
General Assembly in its Resolution of 13 February 1946 and the Headquarters
Agreement between the United Nations and the United States of America (on the
territory of which the Headquarters of the United Nations is established) of 26
June 1947 approved by the General Assembly in its Resolution of 31 October 1947.
28. Cf. International Sanctions, pp. 123 f., and Davies, op. cit., p. 376 ff.
29. Davies, op. cit., pp. 376 ff
30. The Internationalization of European civil and military aviation together
with the establishment of an international air-police for Europe was suggested by
Rear Admiral R. N. Lawson in his pamphlet, A Plan for the Organization of a
European Air Service. The New Commonwealth Institute Monographs. Series C,
No. 2, 1936.
31. The "United Nations Guard," proposed by the Secretary-General in his
report to the General Assembly of 28 September 1948 (A/656), was originally
intended to be a miniature police force organized to protect United Nations
missions in the field in troubled areas without incurring the suspicion of
partiality which the use of local police or national militia might engender. The
service.

:
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guard was to consist of 800 men. The nucleus of 300 men was to be located
and trained either at United Nations Headquarters or at an appropriate place
in Europe, and a volunteer reserve cadre of up to 500 men was to be recruited
multinationally and held in reserve in their home states at the call of the
Secretary-General as and when required. The General Assembly did not accept
this proposal, but, in conformity with a revised suggestion of the SecretaryGeneral, adopted a Resolution on 22 November 1949 (297 IV, A, B) in which it
confirmed the power of the Secretary-General to establish the "United Nations
Field Service" and authorized him to establish a "Panel of Field Observers."
According to the revised suggestion of the Secretary-General, the Field Service
was to consist of 300 persons who were to be part of the Secretariat and who were
to provide the following services providing land transport for missions and such
incidental air transport as might be required maintaining radio communications
for missions maintaining the security of United Nations premises and members
of missions, safe custody of supplies, records and archives maintaining order
during meetings, hearings and investigations performing guard duties at Headquarters. The members of the Field Service were not to be regularly supplied
with arms of any kind. The Field Reserve Panel was to be simply a list of
:

;

;

;

;

names of

qualified persons available for service only in response to a specific

decision of the General Assembly, the Security Council or an organ authorized

Their task was to be to assist United Nations missions in the functions
of observation and supervision.
The two services were not designed to act as
a military force or to enforce Security Council decisions. Cf. Yearbook of
the U. N., 1948/49, pp. 419 ff.
32. This was the situation under the Covenant of the League of Nations.
33. Cf. pp. 12 ff.
34. This is the solution of the problem by the Charter of the United Nations
which provides in Article 39 "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and
shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in,
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace
and security." The Security Council, not the individual members of the United
Nations, must ascertain the facts against which the Charter provides for enforcement measures. Only as long as the Security Council does not interfere, are the

by them.

:

member

states, exercising the right of individual or collective self-defense in

accordance with Article 51, authorized to determine the existence of an "armed
attack." According to the Resolution of the General Assembly "Uniting for
Peace" {cf. supra, p. 139), the General Assembly, too, is authorized to make,
under certain conditions, determined in this resolution, recommendations to
members for collective measures. In order to make these recommendations the
General Assembly must determine the existence of a threat to the peace, breach
of the peace, or act of aggression.
35. The Charter of the United Nations provides in Article 40: "In order to
prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before
making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in
Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional
measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall
be without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned.
The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such

provisional measures."

The

provisional measures referred to in this Article

may

be taken before or after the Security Council has determined the existence
it has taken the enforcement

of a threat to, or breach of, the peace, but before
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measures referred to in Article

39,

which have the character of sanctions.

How-

ever, after the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to,
it may not take these enforcement measures immedimay make "recommendations," which probably means recommendations
peaceful settlement of the conflict. These recommendations may also be

or breach of, the peace,
ately but

for a
considered as provisional measures.

maintained in the statute of the International Court of
organ of the United Nations. Article 34, paraof the Statute of the Court expressly stipulates "Only states may be

This principle

36.

is

Justice, the principal judicial

graph

1,

:

parties in cases before the Court."
37. The Peace Treaty with Germany terminating the first World War contained the following provision in Article 231
"The Allied and Associated
:

Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and
her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated
Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war
imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies." In ratifying
this treaty, the Government of defeated Germany admitted that Germany had
been the aggressor. Article 227 of the Peace Treaty established the individual
criminal responsibility of the former head of the German state. It stipulated
that the ex-Emperor, William II, should be brought before an international
criminal court "for a supreme offence against international morality and the
sanctity of treaties." The "offence" referred mainly to the act of aggression
committed by Germany in violating her obligation to respect the neutrality of
Belgium and Luxembourg which she had guaranteed. Article 227 stipulated
further that it will be the duty of this tribunal "to fix the punishment which it
considers should be imposed." Article 227 of the Peace Treaty was never applied.
38. Cf. the following note.
39.

The

principle of individual criminal responsibility for violations of inter-

was applied in the Agreement signed on 8 August
which was the legal basis for the so-called Nuremberg trial.
As stated in its Preamble, this treaty was concluded by the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Government of
the United States of America, the Provisional Government of the French
Republic, and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and
had as its purpose the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals
of the European Axis. The contracting parties were the states occupying the
territory of Germany after its defeat in the second World War.
They concluded the agreement not in their capacity as the joint government of Germany,
but, as declared in the Preamble to the Agreement, "in the interest of all the
United Nations." As a matter of fact, some of the United Nations adhered to
the Agreement in conformity with Article 5 which provided that "any Government of the United Nations may adhere to this Agreement." (By "United
Nations," those states which had signed the Declaration by United Nations of
1 January 1942 were meant). Neither of the European Axis Powers, Germany
and Italy, signed or adhered to the Agreement.
Article 1 of the London Agreement instituted "an International Military
Tribunal for the trial of war criminals whose offenses have no particular
geographical location, whether they be accused individually or in their capacity
as members of organizations or groups or in both capacities." According to
Article 2, "The constitution, jurisdiction and functions of the International
Military Tribunal shall be those set out in the Charter annexed to this Agreenational law by acts of state
1945, at London,

::

;

;
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nient,

which Charter

shall

form an integral part of

this Agreement."

to Article 2 of the Charter, the International Military Tribunal

of four members, each with an alternate.
to be appointed

tory

was

by each of the signatories.

One member and one
According to Article

According

was

to consist

alternate were
14,

each signa-

to appoint a chief prosecutor for the investigation of the charges against

and the prosecution of major war criminals.
Article 6 of the Charter stipulated "The Tribunal established by the agreement referred to in Article 1 hereof for the trial and punishment of the major
war criminals of the European Axis countries shall have the power to try and
punish persons who, acting in the interests of the European Axis countries,
whether as individuals or as members of organizations, committed any of the
following crimes. The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility
(A) Crimes against peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties,
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy
for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing
(B) War Crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such
violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of, or in,
occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on
the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton
destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military
:

necessity

(C) Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population, before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or
religious grounds in execution of, or in connection with, any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law
Leaders, organizers, instigators and acof the country where perpetrated.
complices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or
conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts
performed by any persons in execution of such plan."
Article 7 established individual responsibility for acts of state. It provided
"The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible
officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them
from responsibility or mitigating punishment." Article 8 excluded the plea
of superior order "The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of his
Government, or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may
be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that
:

justice so requires."

On the basis of the London Agreement, the International Military Tribunal
established by this Agreement declared in its judgment "The principle of international law, which under certain circumstances, protects the representatives
:

of a State, cannot be applied to acts

national law.
official

The authors

which are condemned as criminal by

inter-

of these acts cannot shelter themselves behind their
As to the question of

position in order to be freed from punishment."

under what conditions a violation of international law was to be considered
a punishable crime constituting individual responsibility, the International
Military Trbunal assumed that a violation of international law might be considered such a crime even if international law did not impose a penalty for
an act constituting a violation of international law. This meant that the
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question of whether or not an individual might be punished for having violated
international law by an act performed in his capacity as an organ of a state,
was to be decided within the discretion of the authority competent to apply
the international law in this case. According to the London Agreement, as
interpreted by the International Military Tribunal, this authority might be a
national court of one of the belligerents, or an international court established

without the participation of the state whose organ had violated international
law and was to be punished therefor. The principle that a state has jurisdiction
over acts of another state only with the consent of the latter was no longer
recognized as a rule of general international law.
In the trials of war criminals conducted by the military tribunals of the
Allied and Associated Powers in connection with the second World War, the
plea of superior order was raised by the defense more frequently than any other.

(Cf. Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Selected and prepared by the
United Nations War Crimes Commission [1949] XV, 157 ff.) In the practice
of these tribunals the test was "whether an order, illegal under international
law, on which an accused had acted was or must be presumed to have been
known to him to be so illegal, or was obviously so illegal ('illegal on its face'
to use the term employed by the Tribunal in the High Command Trial) or
should have been recognized by him as being so illegal. The general upshot of
a large number of decisions, and of the advice of Judge Advocates to British
or Commonwealth courts, is that, if the order comes within one or more of
these categories, then the accused cannot rely upon the plea of superior

orders."

In its Resolution of 21 November 1947 (177/11), the General Assembly of
the United Nations directed the International Law Commission to "formulate
the principles of international law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal." The International Law Commission formulated these principles as follows "I. Any person who commits
an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefor
and liable to punishment. II. The fact that internal law does not impose
a penalty for an act which constitutes a crime under international law does
not relieve the person who committed the act from responsibility under international law. III. The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime under international law acted as Head of State or responsible
Government official does not relieve him from responsibility under international
law. IV. The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or
of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law,
provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him. V. Any person charged
with a crime under international law has the right to a fair trial on the facts
and law. VI. The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under
international law: a. Crimes against peace: (i) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international
treaties, agreements or assurances; (ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned under (i). b.
War crimes: Violations of the laws or customs of war which include, but are
not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any
other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or
ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages,
plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or
villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity,
c. Crimes against
humanity Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman
:

:

:
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acts done against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial

or religious grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions are carried
on in execution of or in connection with any crime against peace or any war
crime.
VII. Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war
crime, or a crime against humanity, as set forth in Principle VI is a crime
under international law." General Assembly Official Records. Fifth Session,
Supplement No. 12 (A/1316)
In its sixth session the International Law Commission adopted the following
Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, in which
the principle of individual criminal responsibility for violations of international

law is applied: (General Assembly
ment No. 9 [A/2693] New York, 1954)

Official

Records: Ninth Session.

Supple-

:

Article 1

Offences against the peace and security of mankind, as defined In this code, are
crimes under international law, for which the responsible individuals shall be
punished.
Article 2

The following

and security of mankind
employment by the authorities of a
State of armed force against another State for any purpose other than national
or collective self-defence or in pursuance of a decision or recommendation of
(1)

Any

acts are offences against the peace

act of aggression, including the

a competent organ of the United Nations.
(2) Any threat by the authorities of a State to resort to an act of aggression
against another State.
(3) The preparation by the authorities of a State of the employment of armed
force against another State for any purpose other than national or collective
self-defence or in pursuance of a decision or recommendation of a competent
organ of the United Nations.
(4)

The

organization, or the encouragement of the organization, by the au-

thorities of a State, of

armed bands within

its territory

or

any other territory

for incursions into the territory of another State, or the toleration of the organization of such bands in its

armed bands

own

territory, or the toleration of the use

by such

of its territory as a base of operations or as a point of departure for

incursions into the territory of another State, as well as direct participation in
or support of such incursions.
(5)

The undertaking

or encouragement by the authorities of a State of ac-

tivities calculated to foment civil strife in another State, or the toleration by
the authorities of a State of organized activities calculated to foment civil strife
in another State.

(6)

The undertaking or encouragement by the

rorist activities in another State, or the toleration

authorities of a State of ter-

by the authorities of a State

of organized activities calculated to carry out terrorist acts in another State.
in violation of its obligations under a
designed to ensure international peace and security by means
of restrictions or limitations on armaments, or on military training, or on fortifications, or of other restrictions of the same character.
(8) The annexation by the authorities of a State of territory belonging to
another State, by means of acts contrary to international law.
(9) The intervention by the authorities of a State in the internal or external
affairs of another State, by means of coercive measures of an economic or politi-

(7) Acts

by the authorities of a State

treaty which

is

:

;

:

;

;

;
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cal character in order to force its will and thereby obtain advantages of any kind.
(10) Acts by the authorities of a State or by private individuals committed
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious

group as such, including
Killing members of the group
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
(iii) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
(iv) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
( v)
(11) Inhuman acts such as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation
or persecutions, committed against any civilian population on social, political,
racial, religious or cultural grounds by the authorities of a State or by private
individuals acting at the instigation or with the toleration of such authorities.
Acts in violation of the laws or customs of war.
( 12 )
Acts which constitute
( 13 )
(i) Conspiracy to commit any of the offences defined in the preceding
paragraphs of this article or
(i)

( ii )

;

Direct incitement to commit any of the offences defined in the preceding
paragraphs of this article or
(iii) Complicity in the commission of any of the offences defined in the
(ii)

;

preceding paragraphs of this article or
(iv) Attempts to commit any of the offences defined in the preceding para;

graphs of this

article.

Article S

The
official

Head of State or as responsible government
does not relieve him from responsibility for committing any of the offences

fact that a person acted as

defined in this code.
Article 4

The

fact that a person charged with an offence defined in this code acted

pursuant to an order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him of
law if, in the circumstances at the time, it was
possible for him not to comply with that order.
40. Article 16, paragraph 4, of the Covenant of the League of Nations stipulated "Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League
may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the
Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of the
League represented thereon." Article 6 of the Charter of the United Nations
provides "A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the
Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council."
41. The Charter of the United Nations stipulates in Article 5
"A Member of
the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been
taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights
and privileges of membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendaresponsibility in international

:

:

:

tion of the Security Council. The exercise of these rights and privileges may
be restored by the Security Council." Suspension from the rights and privileges of

membership

is

an additional sanction, insofar as the "preventive or

enforcement action" taken against a member state already has the character
of a sanction.
of the Charter.
is in

Article 19 stipulates a special sanction for a special violation
It runs as follows: "A Member of the United Nations which

arrears in the payment of

its financial

contributions to the Organization
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shall

if the amount of its arrears equals
amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two
The General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a Member

have no vote in the General Assembly

or exceeds the
full years.

to vote if

it is

satisfied that the failure to

pay

is

due

to conditions

beyond the

control of the Member."

(d) Peace Treaties and Neutrality
(aa) Peace treaties within a system of international security.

The fact that within a system of international security the use of
armed force, especially war, is, in principle, forbidden and is permitted
only as a sanction, has important consequences with respect to the
termination of this action and the obligations and rights of the states
not involved in it.
usual to terminate a war by a peace treaty concluded by the
belligerents.
The purpose of this treaty is expressed in a clause declarIt

is

ing that there shall be peace, or that the state of peace is established, or
that the state of war is terminated between the belligerents. This
clause implies that the contracting parties assume the obligation to
abstain from further acts of war. Sometimes this obligation is expressly stipulated.
peace treaty usually also contains other provisions, but the termination of the war by the stipulation of the obligation
just mentioned is its essential function.
If, in violation of a peace
treaty, a belligerent continues hostilities, a war is not terminated.

A

not quite correct to assume that a war is terminated by a
peace treaty. It is terminated by the fact that the belligerents definitively cease hostilities with the intention of terminating the war. This
intention is usually, but not necessarily, expressed in the conclusion of a
peace treaty. There are cases where no peace treaty can be concluded,
for instance when, as an effect of a war, one of the belligerents ceases to
exist as a subject of international law because its territory is annexed by
the victorious belligerent or because it is dismembered and new states
are established in its place. Treaties may be concluded regulating the
relationships between these new states on the one hand and the state
which was the opponent of the state succeeded by the new states established in its territory, on the other. However, these treaties are not
They are conreally peace treaties, although they may be so termed.
cluded after the war has been terminated. In these and in other cases
the termination of a war may be ascertained by a unilateral declaration
on the part of a belligerent. Without a peace treaty having been con-

Hence

it is

cluded, the Congress of the United States passed a resolution, approved

by the President on 2 July

1921, to the effect that "the state of

declared to exist between the Imperial

German Government and

war
the

United States of America by the joint resolution of Congress approved
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an end." This was an ascertainment of the fact that the war between the two states was terminated.
The treaty between the United States and Germany signed afterward,
on 25 August 1921, was not a peace treaty in the specific sense of the
term that is, it was not a treaty concluded for the purpose of termi-

April

1917, is hereby declared at

6,

—

nating a war but a treaty concluded "to restore friendly relations existing between the two nations prior to the outbreak of war." On 31
December 1946, the President of the United States proclaimed "the
cessation of hostilities of World War II," and in a statement explaining the proclamation said that the action did not have "the effect of

terminating the state of war iself ." However, by a joint resolution of
Congress, approved by the President on 19 October 1951, "the state of
war" which had been declared to exist between the United States and
Germany by the joint resolution of Congress approved on 11 December
1941 was declared terminated.
The practice of terminating a war, or, more exactly formulated, of
expressing an intention to terminate a war by concluding a peace
treaty

—that

is,

upon the belligerents the obligation
of war evidently presupposes that with-

a treaty imposing

—

from further acts
out assuming such an obligation the states concerned have the right
to wage war against each other.
Such a presupposition is possible
under general international law if the helium justwn principle is not
to abstain

part of

law or

it.

if

If this principle

war

is

is

recognized as a part of international

prohibited by a multilateral treaty, the conclusion of a

peace treaty for the purpose of terminating a war which has broken
out in violation of the helium justum principle or in violation of the
treaty,

may

still

be

justified.

The

conclusion of a peace treaty

is

which of the belligerents has violated its
obligation not to resort to war that is, the question as to which of the
belligerents is the aggressor and which the defender is not decided by
an objective and impartial authority and consequently if both belligerents may claim to be exercising the right of self-defense. However,
the situation is different under a treaty constituting an international
security organization, which not only imposes upon the members the
obligation not to resort to war against each other and which permits
war only as a sanction to be directed against a member violating the
treaty, but also confers upon a special organ the power to ascertain
the fact that the treaty has been violated, or, to term it differently,
gives the special organ the power to determine the aggressor. Within
such an organization, a member state which has resorted to war in
violation of the constituent treaty, as ascertained by the competent
organ, cannot assume the obligation to abstain from further acts of war

justified if the question as to

—

—

in a special treaty because this obligation is already implied in the
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general obligation imposed upon

it

in the constituent treaty.

Further-

more, a state engaged in a war waged as a sanction against a legally
determined aggressor cannot assume an obligation to abstain from acts
of war against a delinquent state in a treaty concluded with the other
state if it is its obligation to

perform these

However, even

acts.

if this

but only authorized, to resort to war against the
legally ascertained violator of the constituent treaty, a peace treaty
concluded between the state executing a sanction and the delinquent
state is quite inappropriate because, unlike the same situation under
general international law, the two belligerents are not on an equal
legal footing, since the war of one is illegal and the counter war of the
other legal, or vice versa. Such a peace treaty is particularly problestate is not obliged,

matical in case the

war against the delinquent

state is the action of

an

international police force under the direction of the central organ of a
security organization.

To terminate such a war by concluding

a peace

treaty between the international organization enforcing the law

the delinquent state

is

and

just as absurd as terminating a punitive action

taken by a court against a criminal by an agreement between the court
and the criminal. If war is a sanction, it can properly be terminated
only when it has achieved its purpose, and this may be ascertained by
a unilateral declaration of the authority executing the sanction.
(bb) Neutrality within a system, of international security.

The

question of to

what

extent, if at all, the legal institution of

compatible with a system of international security can
be answered in an unambiguous manner only after the concept of
neutrality has been clearly defined.
The considerable confusion
neutrality

is

usually found in a discussion of this question

due to the fact that
the term "neutrality" is used to mean different things. In the main,
it indicates the status of a state which is not involved in a war between other states. However, at the same time it is employed to
denote the consequences which international law attaches to this status,
the duties and rights a non-belligerent state has in relation to the
belligerent states and especially the duty of the non-belligerent to
observe an attitude of impartiality toward the belligerents, impartiality meaning the principle that a state not involved in a war between
other states shall fulfill its obligations and exercise its rights toward
all belligerents in an equal way.
Sometimes neutrality means nonbelligerency accompanied by impartiality, and there are writers who
even identify neutrality with impartiality. An example of the different possible meanings of neutrality is the treatment of that concept
in the two Hague Conventions which deal with neutrality. The term
"neutral" in the expression "neutral Powers" (Articles 5, 6 and others
is

:
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of Convention

V)

Powers not involved in a war,
"belligerent" Powers (Preamble of

refers to the status of

"neutral Powers" as opposed to

The term

Convention XIII).

"neutral" in this sense

defined in Article 16 of Convention

V

:

"The nationals of

is

expressly

a State which

not taking part in the war are considered as neutrals." However,
neutrality evidently means the rights
in Article 10 of Convention
of a non-belligerent state and the corresponding duties of belligerents
"The fact of a neutral Power resisting even by force attempts to
violate its neutrality cannot be regarded as a hostile act." Neutrality
can be "violated" only if it is an obligation or a right. The status
of not being involved in a war can be adopted or abandoned by a state
but it cannot be violated. The two Conventions distinguish between
is

V

and impartiality. Article 9 of Convention V provides:
"Every measure of restriction or prohibition taken by a neutral Power
in regard to the matters referred to in Articles 7 and 8 (that is to preneutrality

:

vent the export or transport of arms, munitions of war, or anything
which can be of use to an army or fleet, and to forbid or restrict the use
of telegraph or telephone cables or of wireless telegraphy apparatus)

Here imit to both belligerents."
with neutrality but is the manner in
which a neutral state must exercise its right to take certain measures
of restriction and prohibition. This term is used in the same sense
in Article 9 of Convention XIII, and the Preamble of this Convention
states "that it is, for neutral Powers, an admitted duty to apply these
rules [regulating the relations between neutral Powers and belligerent
Powers] impartially to the several belligerents." Here impartiality
must be impartially applied by
partiality

is

not at

all identical

:

characterizes the
duties

way

and exercise

in

all its

which a neutral Power must

fulfill all its

rights in relation to belligerent Powers.

In

accordance with this terminology, a neutral state may violate its
duty to treat belligerents impartially without losing its status of
neutrality. To quote a leading writer, Oppenheim 1 defined the concept of neutrality as follows: "Such states as do not take part in a
war between other states are neutrals." This means that neutrality
is the status of non-belligerency, i. e., the status of a state which does
not take part in a war between other states. Such a status may or may
not be accompanied by an attitude of impartiality on the part of a
neutral state toward belligerents.

Oppenheim analyzed the different types of neutrality which do not imply
the impartiality of the neutral states or imply only a restricted impartiality. He mentioned the fact that the impartiality demanded by
the theory and practice of the eighteenth century was not at all strict,
and that a state was considered not to have violated its obligations
as a neutral if
370624

—57

it

In

his preceding chapters,

furnished one of the belligerents with such limited
11

:
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assistance as

it

had previously promised by treaty or

of the belligerents to levy troops in
Grotius' concept of neutrality

3

its territory.

which was not

2

if it

allowed one

He

referred to

at all identical with his

concept of impartiality. Grotius formulated two principles concerning neutrality. The first was that neutrals shall do nothing which may
strengthen a belligerent whose cause is unjust or hinder the movement
of a belligerent whose cause is just. This concept is certainly contrary
to impartiality. Grotius' second principle concerning neutrality was
that neutrals shall treat both belligerents alike only
as to

whose cause

is

just.

if

there

is

doubt

However, immediately after defining

neutrality as non-belligerency,

Oppenheim

said

:

"Neutrality

may

be

defined as the attitude of impartiality adopted by third states towards

and recognized by belligerents, such attitude creating
rights and duties between the impartial states and the belligerents." 4
belligerents

Hence, neutrality is now identified with impartiality, but in discussing
the end of neutrality Oppenheim stated: "Neutrality ends with the
cessation of war, or through a hitherto neutral state beginning war
against one of the belligerents, or through one of the belligerents

commencing war against a hitherto neutral

State."

Neutrality which

ends in this way can be only the status of not taking part in a war.
It cannot be the attitude of impartiality. Oppenheim then emphasized that "the ending of neutrality must not be confounded with
mere violation of neutrality.
mere violation of neutrality does not
bring
neutrality
an
end." 5 In this statement, the term
ipso facto
to
"neutrality" is used in both senses, as the "duty of impartiality" and
as the "status of not taking part in a war." What this statement
means is that the status of not taking part in a war must not be conmere violation of the duty
fused with the duty of impartiality.
does not ipso facto end the status. Under the heading "Violation of
Neutrality," 6 Oppenheim distinguished between violations of neutrality in the narrower and in the wider sense of the term. He stated
"It is necessary for obvious reasons to discuss, not only violations of
the duty of impartiality of neutrals, but violations of all duties deriving from neutrality, whether they are incumbent upon neutrals or
upon belligerents." Here neutrality is far from being "the attitude
of impartiality" for impartiality is only one of the duties which de-

A

A

from neutrality.
Another writer has stated that "the notion of neutrality

rive

as merely

non-involvement in direct hostilities is inconsistent with the traditional concept and if it should come to have this meaning, the concept
would have been strikingly narrowed." 7 Nevertheless, the only way
to avoid the confusion just illustrated is to understand neutrality as
nothing else but the status of a state which is not involved in a war

:
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between other states, and impartiality as the principle according to
which a neutral state shall fulfill the obligation and exercise the rights,
which a neutral state has under general international law, equally
towards all belligerents. Of course, the theoretical suggestion that
neutrality should be defined as the status of non-belligerency does not
imply any political preference with respect to the desirable consequences of such a status for the neutral state. The question as to
whether or not the status of neutrality entails the obligation of the
neutral state to treat the belligerents impartially

is

a question of

and can be answered only by an analysis of this law.
In regard to the general international law of our time, the answer is
Under this law, a state is under no
certainly in the affirmative.
neutral
in
remain
a war between other states but if a
obligation to
state is neutral, the relationships between this state and the belligerents
are regulated by definite rules of general international law. The
main obligations a neutral state has in relation to belligerents are 8
the obligation to refrain from giving assistance to one of the belligerents which may be detrimental to the other; the obligation to
refrain from inflicting injuries on one of the belligerents which may
benefit the other the obligation to refrain from granting any facilities
positive law

;

whatsoever for military operations of the belligerents (however, the
neutral state is not obliged to prohibit its own nationals from supplying belligerents with such facilities) the obligation to prevent the
fitting out or arming of any vessel within its jurisdiction which it has
reason to believe is intended to cruise or engage in hostile operations
against either belligerent; the obligation to prevent the departure
from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise or engage in
hostile operations which has been adapted entirely or partly within
its jurisdiction for use in war; the obligation to prevent belligerents
;

from making use of

its

neutral territory and

its

resources for military

The most important obligations of the
obligation to refrain from making use of neutral

purposes during the war.
belligerent are the

territory for military purposes

and from interfering with the

legiti-

mate intercourse of the neutral states with the other belligerents, and
the obligation to refrain from appropriating neutral goods on enemy
ships with the exception of contraband. Belligerents have the right
to appropriate neutral merchant ships for breach of blockade and to
appropriate contraband on a neutral vessel.
It is evident that the legal institution of neutrality

—that

is,

the

and rights which general international law imposes or confers
upon the states not involved in a war between other states in relation
to the belligerents and upon the belligerents in relation to the neutral
duties

states, especially the principle of impartiality

—presupposes that the
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helium justum principle is not part of general international law that
each state has the right to resort to war against any other state for
any reason whatsoever; and, consequently, that if there is a war between two states there is no legal question as to which of the belligerents is wrong in using its armed force and which is right or
which is an aggressor and which a defender. Even if two states have
submitted their dispute to an international tribunal by a treaty and
even if, in violation of the treaty, one state refuses to comply with the
decision of the tribunal, and the other state consequently resorts to
war against the former, the counterwar is not illegal. Only the noncompliance with the judicial decision is illegal. The rules of general
international law concerning neutrality, and especially concerning the
principle of impartiality, are justifiable only if in a war between two
states both belligerents are equally right as far as the use of their
armed forces is concerned. It is significant that Grotius who recognized the helium justum principle did not consider impartiality as an
unconditional obligation of neutral states. 9
General international law which, according to the traditional doctrine, does not contain the helium justum principle, may be abrogated
by treaties imposing upon the contracting parties the conditional or
unconditional obligation not to resort to war. As treaties are in principle binding only upon the contracting states, a bilateral treaty in
which the parties assume the obligation not to resort to war against
each other, a so-called non- aggression pact, has no effect on third
states which means it has no effect on neutral states. If, in violation
of the treaty, one contracting party resorts to war against the other,
and thus commits an act of aggression, and if the other party resorts
to a counterwar, a war of defense, the relations between the neutral
states and the belligerents remain under general international law.
However, if the treaty imposing upon the contracting parties the
obligation not to resort to war has a multilateral character and if in
violation of its treaty obligation one party resorts to war against
another contracting party and this latter party consequently resorts
to a counterwar, the legal situation of the other contracting parties
not involved in this war, which means the legal situation of the neutral contracting parties, is different from that of neutral states under
;

By resorting to war in violation of the
not
only infringes upon the right of that
treaty, a contracting party
contracting party against which it uses its armed force, but also infringes upon the rights of all other contracting parties. Each con-

general international law.

tracting party assumes the obligation not to resort to

of the contracting parties in relation to

all

According to general international law, a

war against any

other contracting parties.

state

whose right

is

violated

—
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by another

state is authorized to resort to reprisals

—

—that

is,

to en-

forcement measures short of war against the state which has violated
its right, but these reprisals may be taken only against this state.

Hence the obligation of the neutral

states,

who

are contracting parties

an attitude of

to the treaty prohibiting the resort to war, to adopt

impartiality toward the belligerent contracting parties,

is

superseded

by the right they have under general international law to resort to
enforcement measures short of war against the violator of the treaty,
the aggressor, and thus to assist the victim of the aggression. This
means that without violating international law, the neutral states, contracting parties to the treaty, may take measures against an aggressor
constituting violations of the rights this state has as a belligerent in

Since these measures are taken as reprisals
and hence are legal, the aggressor state is not entitled to react by
retaliatory measures constituting violations of the obligations it has
as a belligerent in relation to the neutral state. However, if a state
violates its obligation not to resort to war, it will probably take retaliatory measures against neutral states, even if these measures are
relation to neutral states.

illegal.

The abrogation of the

principle of impartiality

which a multilateral treaty prohibiting the resort

is

to

a legal effect

war has under

The right to take enforcement measures
war as reprisals against a violator of the treaty is derived
directly from general international law and exists even if not expressly stipulated by the treaty. If the treaty stipulates an obligation of the contracting parties to come to the assistance of the victim
general international law.
short of

of an aggression with measures short of war, the contracting parties

not involved in the war resulting from the aggression are not only
entitled but are obliged to adopt an attitude which is not impartial
towards the belligerents. The treaty may expressly stipulate that the
prohibition of resorting to war does not apply to a war resorted to
against a state which has resorted to
that

is,

to a

war

war

in violation of the treaty

resorted to against an aggressor.

However, in

this

respect the situation of the neutral states contracting parties to the

from the situation of a neutral state under general international law which does not impose the obligation to remain
neutral upon states. 10 It must be noted that the abrogation of the
treaty does not differ

obligation of neutral states to adopt an attitude of impartiality to-

wards the belligerents applies only

to the relations

among

the states

contracting parties to the multilateral treaty prohibiting the resort
to

war and not

to the relation

and belligerents which

between neutral states which are not,

are, contracting parties to the treaty.

treaty prohibits the resort to

war only under particular

If a

conditions,
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an abrogation of the obligation also does not apply to a war the resort to which does not constitute a violation of the treaty. In all
these cases, the rules of general international law concerning the
obligations and rights of neutral states are not affected.
A multilateral treaty may impose upon the contracting states not
only the obligation not to resort to war against each other, but also
the obligation not to resort to war against any other state except
in the exercise of self-defense. This is a treaty in favor of third

In case of an

states.

illegal resort to

war by

a contracting party

against a non-contracting party, the legal situation of the neutral

which are contracting parties is the same as in the case of
resort to war by a contracting party against another
contracting party. The resort to war by a contracting party against
a state not a contracting party is, like a resort to war by a contracting
states

an

illegal

party against another contracting party, a violation of the rights
of all other contracting parties. However, the obligation of neutral
states which are not contracting parties to remain impartial is not
affected by the treaty, since no right of these states is violated by
a violation of the treaty to which they are not contracting parties.

A

multilateral treaty prohibiting the resort to

may

also claim to be binding

the treaty.

From

upon

war against any

state

states not contracting parties to

11

the preceding analysis

it

follows that a system of inter-

national security constituted by a multilateral treaty which imposes

upon the contracting states the obligation not to resort to war or
to any use of armed force in their mutual relations and the further
obligation to take enforcement measures short of war, especially

economic

(but not military)

sanctions

against the aggressor,

is

incompatible with the principle of impartiality to be applied according to international law in the relations between neutral states and
belligerents. The members of the security organization not involved
in the war against the aggressor may remain neutral, but they cannot
adopt an attitude of strict impartiality toward the belligerents. If
the constituent treaty imposes

upon the contracting

states the obli-

gation to resort to war against the aggressor or to participate with
their armed forces in a military action of the security organization

which has the character of war, the international organization is
incompatible even with a neutrality which does not imply the principle
of impartiality.

The

extent to which the neutrality or impartiality of neutrals in

excluded from, or is compatible with, a
system of international security, is different according to the nature
of the system.
relation to the belligerents

is
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Neutrality of the members of a security organization and
their strict impartiality towards the belligerents in case of a war
1.

between other members or between a member and non-members can
be maintained under any security organization as long as the aggressor has not been determined in accordance with the constituent
treaty. If the determination of the aggressor is left to the individual
members of the organization, even if obliged to resort to war against
the aggressor, each member may remain neutral until the moment
it

decides which of the belligerents

is

the aggressor and which the

defender, and during this time the neutral

member has

all

the duties

under general international law. However, it may surrender its status of neutrality by resorting to war.
It may give up its attitude of impartiality, even if it remains neutral,
if it takes measures short of war against that state which it con-

and rights of a neutral

state

siders to be the aggressor.

of

member

states

and

Within such a system, the neutrality

their obligation to adopt an attitude of im-

may

play an important part. 12
The situation is different if the function of determining the aggressor
is conferred upon a central organ of the security organization; but
under such a security system it might take some time for this organ
to fulfill its function and there may even be circumstances which
prevent its fulfillment altogether. 13 If the constituent treaty establishes not an obligation but a right of collective self-defense which
may be exercised in case of an act of aggression, especially in case
of an armed attack, as long as the central organ does not intervene,
the members of the organization not involved in a war between other
members or between members and non-members may remain neutral
as long as they please, and during this time they are under the rules
of general international law concerning neutrality. However, they
may surrender their neutrality by resorting to war or give up their
attitude of impartiality by taking measures short of war only against
the state which they consider to be an aggressor. 14 If the constituent
treaty establishes an obligation of collective self-defense, 15 the legal
situation of the members of the organization not involved in the
war following the act of aggression is not very different, for this
obligation comes into actual existence for each member only if it
arrives at the opinion that an act of aggression has taken place and
decides the question as to which state is the aggressor. Hence, the
answer to the question as to whether or not in a concrete case the
obligation concerned exists depends on the very subject of this obligation. There is a real difference between the status of having an
obligation to behave in a certain way and that of having a right to
partiality towards belligerents

still

.
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behave in this way only if the answer to the above mentioned question
does not depend on the subject of the obligation but on the decision
of an objective authority (which is not the case when collective
self-defense
2.

is

exercised)

Neutrality of the members of a security organization and their

towards the belligerents in case of a war between
other members or between members and non-members can also be
maintained under a security system constituted by a multilateral treaty
in which the general prohibition of war is restricted not only insofar as
war as a sanction is concerned (including war in self-defense) but also
insofar as war under other circumstances, determined by the treaty, is
permitted. Under such a security system there are cases in which a
war between members or between members and non-members is not
illegal on the part of both belligerents.
Consequently, the other members are under no obligation to resort to war or to take measures short
of war against one of the belligerents. Their relation to the belligerents is regulated by the unaltered rules of general international law
concerning neutrality. 16
strict impartiality

,

The

members of a security organization not
involved in a war between othe r members or between members and non3.

neutrality of the

members, but not their obligat ion to adopt an attitude of strict impartiality, can be maintained under a security system constituted by a
multilateral treaty which does not impose upon the members an obligation to resort to

war or to participate in a military

action of the organi-

zation but imposes only the obligation to apply measures short of war,

Under such a
organization not involved in the war may

especially economic sanctions, against the aggressor. 17

system, the

members of the

remain neutral, but they are not allowed to observe an attitude of strict
impartiality towards the belligerent. However, not all the members
not involved in the war may be obliged to take measures short of war
against the aggressor. For specific reasons or under definite circumstances certain members may be exempt from this obligation and hence
may observe strict impartiality toward belligerents. 18 Besides, the
incompatibility of the security system and the principle of impartiality
may be moderated by the fact that the constituent treaty may only
restrict and not abrogate completely the principle of impartiality.
With respect to the measures a neutral state must take under general
international law to the equal disadvantage or to the equal advantage
of both belligerents, a distinction may be made between military and
non-military measures that is, between measures which may and those
which may not be advantageous or disadvantageous to the military

—

operations of the belligerents

as,

for instance, preventing belligerents
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from using the territory of a neutral state as a base for military operations, or prohibiting the export and transport of arms and munitions
to belligerents, and measures which do not affect, at least not directly,
the military operations of belligerents, like merely economic measures.

The

may impose upon

members of the
organization or upon some of them no obligation which would prevent
them from adopting an attitude of impartiality with respect to military
measures, but would impose upon them only obligations to take nonconstituent treaty

the neutral

military, especially economic, measures disadvantageous to the aggres-

and advantageous to its victim. It has even been maintained that
the obligation imposed by general international law upon neutral states
to adopt an attitude of impartiality toward the belligerents refers only
19
However, the validity of this doctrine is doubtto military matters.
ful, and it is rather difficult to distinguish between measures taken by
neutral states which affect the military operations of the belligerents
and measures which do not. If the treaty constituting the security
sor

organization does not abrogate neutrality but only restricts or abolishes the obligation of impartiality neutral

general international law, one

members would have under

may

speak of their neutrality as quali20
fied, imperfect, partial, or differential neutrality.
This terminology
shows clearly that neutrality and impartiality are not identical, although it may be admitted that if a state not involved in a war between
other states is called neutral even though it is not obliged to treat both
belligerents impartially in every respect, the term "neutrality" is of
little

value.

The

and the obligation of neutral states to
adopt an attitude of impartiality toward the belligerents are com4.

status of neutrality

patible to a very restricted extent in the case of a security system con-

by a treaty prohibiting war under all circumstances (with the
exception of war as a sanction, which includes war in the exercise of
self-defense) and imposing upon the members of the security organization the obligation to apply not only non-military but also military
sanctions to the aggressor in conformity with the decisions of a central
organ. In addition to the case mentioned under paragraph 1, the
stituted

members not involved in
war between other members or between members and non-members
can be maintained if the central organ orders them to apply only nonmilitary sanctions to the aggressor and to come to the assistance of the
victim only with economic and financial measures. If the central
status of so-called qualified neutrality of all

a

organ orders only some of the members, but not all of them, to take
such action, the others are not excluded from preserving a neutrality
which may even be a perfect neutrality. Since it is not very likely
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that the central organ will order some of the

members not involved

war to apply military sanctions without ordering all of
members to take non-military sanctions, only a qualified neutrality
of the members not participating in the military sanctions is possible.
in the

the

It should be noted that if a

member

participates in the execution of

military sanctions, even if only with those contingents of

its

armed

which are at the disposal of the central organ of the security
organization, it cannot be considered to be neutral. Although the
execution of the military sanction is an action of the organization, it
is at the same time also an action of the member state whose contingents
are involved. 21 Only if the security organization has a separate and
permanent armed force at its disposal can military sanctions be exeforces

cuted without the status of neutrality of the

member states being

abol-

However, it will be only a status of so-called qualified neumembers are obliged to take non-military measures to
the disadvantage of the aggressor and the advantage of its victim.
ished.

trality if the
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those who keep out of a war to do nothing whereby he who supports a wicked cause
may be rendered more powerful, or whereby the movements of him who wages a
just war may be hampered. ... In a doubtful matter, however, those at peace
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Cf.

:

should show themselves impartial to either side in permitting transit, in furnishing supplies to troops, and in not assisting those under siege."
10. The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, signed at Paris on 28

August 1928 (the so-called Kellogg-Briand Pact, or Pact of Paris) to which almost
all the states of the world were parties provided: "Article 1.
The High Con-

names of their respective peoples that
they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and
renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.
Article 2. The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of
all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or whatever origin they may be, which
tracting Parties solemnly declare in the

may

arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means."
The Preamble stipulated that "any signatory Power which shall hereafter
seek to promote its national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits
furnished by this treaty." This meant that the Treaty authorized the con-

tracting parties to resort to war, as a sanction, against a violator of the treaty,

:
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However, as pointed out above, the states, contracting parties
to the treaty, which did not resort to war against an aggressor, could resort
to reprisals against this state that is, they could take enforcement measures
short of war. This meant that under the Kellogg-Briand Pact the principle
of impartiality in the relations between neutral states and belligerents did not
apply. This was also the interpretation of the Pact in the 38th Report adopted
by the Conferences of the International Law Association at Budapest in 1934.
Article 4 of this report ran as follows "In the event of a violation of the Pact
by a resort to armed force or war by one signatory State against another, the
other State may, without thereby committing a breach of the Pact or of any
rule of international law, do all or any of the following things
(a) Refuse to admit the exercise by the State violating the Pact of belligerent rights, such as visit and search, blockade, etc.
(b) Decline to observe towards the State violating the Pact the duties
prescribed by international law, apart from the Pact, for a neutral in relation
to a belligerent.
(c) Supply the State attacked with financial or material assistance, includ-

an aggressor.

—

:

ing munitions of war.

armed forces the State attacked."
Certain measures which the United States took during the second World War
to the advantage of Great Britain and her allies and to the disadvantage of Ger(d) Assist with

many might

be justified as reprisals against the violation of the Kellogg-Briand
Pact by Germany. The transfer of fifty over-age destroyers to Great Britain was
such a measure. In a message to the Congress on 3 September 1940 the President
declared "I transmit herewith for the information of the Congress notes exchanged between the British Ambassador at Washington and the Secretary of
State on September 2, 1940, under which this Government has acquired the right
to lease naval and air bases in Newfoundland, and in the islands of Bermuda, the
Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and Antigua, and in British Guiana also
a copy of an opinion of the Attorney General dated August 27, 1940, regrding my
authority to consummate this arrangement. The right to bases in Newfoundland and Bermuda are gifts generously given and gladly received. The other
bases mentioned have been acquired in exchange for fifty of our 'over-age
destroyers. This is not inconsistent in any sense with our status of peace.
Still less is it a threat against any nation.
It is an epochal and far-reaching act
of preparation for continental defense in the face of grave danger. Preparation
for defense is an inalienable prerogative of a sovereign state. Under present
circumstances this exercise of sovereign right is essential to the maintenance
of our peace and safety. This is the most important action in the reinforcement of our national defense that has been taken since the Louisiana Purchase.
Then as now, considerations of safety from overseas attack were fundamental.
The value of the Western Hemisphere of these outposts of security is beyond
calculation. Their need has long been recognized by our country, and especially
by those primarily charged with the duty of charting and organizing our own
naval and military defense. They are essential to the protection of the Panama
Canal, Central America, the northern portion of South America, the Antilles,
Canada, Mexico, and our own eastern and Gulf seaboards. Their consequent
importance in hemispheric defense is obvious. For these reasons I have taken
advantage of the present opportunity to acquire them." The American Journal
of International Law, Vol. 34 (1940), Supplement, pp, 183 f.
Other measures of this kind were certain provisions of the Act to Promote
the Defense of the United States, approved 11 March 1941.
{The American
:

;

—

:

——

:

:
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Journal of International Law, Vol. 35 (1941), Supplement, pp. 75 ff.) Section
3 of this Act stipulated
"(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President may,
from time to time, when he deems it in the interest of national defense, authorize
the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any other
department or agency of the Government
(1) To manufacture in arsenals, factories, and shipyards under their jurisdiction, or otherwise procure, to the extent to which funds are made available
therefor, or contracts are authorized from time to time by the Congress, or both,
any defense article for the government of any country whose defense the
President deems vital to the defense of the United States.
(2) To sell, transfer
title to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of, to any such government
any defense article ... (3) To test, inspect, prove, repair, outfit, recondition,
or otherwise to place in good working order, to the extent to which funds are
made available therefor, or contracts are authorized from time to time by the
Congress, or both, any defense article for any such government, or to procure
any or all such services by private contract. (4) To communicate to any such
government any defense information, pertaining to any defense article furnished
to such government under paragraph (2) of this subsection.
(5) to release for
export any defense article disposed of in any way under this subsection to any
such government."
Section 2 provided "As used in this Act
(a) The term 'defense article' means (1) Any weapon, munition, aircraft,
vessel, or boat; (2) Any machinery, facility, tool, material, or supply necessary
for the manufacture, production, processing, repair, servicing, or operation of
any article described in this subsection; (3) Any component material or part
of or equipment for any article described in this subsection; (4) Any agricultural, industrial or other commodity or article for defense. ... (b) The term
:

means any plan, specification,
any defenses article."

'defense information'

design, prototype, or infor-

mation pertaining to
In an address delivered on 27

May 1941, the President announced
"Our national policy today, therefore, is this: First, we shall actively resist
wherever necessary, and with all our resources, every attempt by Hitler to
extend his Nazi domination to the Western Hemisphere, or to threaten it. We
shall actively resist his every attempt to gain control of the seas.

We

insist

upon the vital importance of keeping Hitlerism away from any point in the
world which could be used and would be used as a base of attack against the
Americas. Second, from the point of view of strict naval and military necessity,
we shall give every possible assistance to Britain and to all who, with Britain,
are resisting Hitlerism or its equivalent with force of arms. Our patrols are

now to insure delivery of the needed supplies to Britain. All additional
measures necessary to deliver the goods will be taken. Any and all further
methods or combination of methods, which can or should be utilized, are being
devised by our military and naval technicians, who, with me, will work out
and put into effect such new and additional safeguards as may be needed."
Documents on American Foreign Relations, Vol. Ill, World Peace Foundation,
helping

1941, p. 55.

In an address delivered on 11 September 1941, prompted by the attack on the
United States destroyer Greer, the President stated
"In the waters which we deem necessary for our defense American naval
vessels and American planes will no longer wait until Axis submarines lurking
under the water, or Axis raiders on the surface of the sea, strike their deadly

—
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—

—
—

first.
Upon our naval and air patrol now operating in large numbers
over a vast expanse of the Atlantic Ocean falls the duty of maintaining the
American policy of freedom of the seas now. That means, very simply and
clearly, that our patrolling vessels and planes will protect all merchant ships

blow

—

—

not only American ships but ships of any flag engaged in commerce in our
defensive waters. They will protect them from submarines; they will protect
them from surface raiders." Documents on American Foreign Relations, Vol.
IV, 1942, p. 100.

In this way Article 2, paragraph 6 of the Charter of the United Nations
may be interpreted.
12. This is one of the facts which justifies the view that neither the KelloggBriand Pact nor the Covenant of the League of Nations abolished entirely the
legal institution of neutrality in the relations among the contracting parties,
for under both treaties each contracting party was authorized to decide for
itself whether or not a violation of the treaty had taken place.
13. This may be the case under the Charter of the United Nations which
confers upon the Security Council the function of determining the existence
of a threat to or breach of the peace (Article 39) but at the same time gives
each of the five permanent members of the Council a veto right, by the exercise
of which the Council may be prevented from fulfilling this function.
In this case, according to the resolution, "Uniting for Peace," the General
Assembly, an organ of the United Nations within which no member state has
a veto right, may assume the function not fulfilled by the Security Council
and determine the existence of a threat to or breach of the peace. However, it
is doubtful that a decision adopted by the General Assembly to this effect is
binding upon the member states. The General Assembly can only make recommendations to the members to take enforcement measures against an aggressor.
Since these recommendations are not legally binding, member states may remain
neutral and then must adopt an attitude of impartiality towards belligerents.
14. This is the case if Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations concerning collective self-defense applies. This Article sets forth the right of the
members of the United Nations to come to the assistance of a victim of an
armed attack by taking enforcement measures involving or not involving the
use of armed force against a state responsible for an armed attack.
Since, according to Article 51, the right of collective self-defense exists "until
the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security," the legal position of the members not involved in a war
following an armed attack does not change if the General Assembly intervenes
under the resolution "Uniting for Peace." The General Assembly can only
make recommendations to the Members to take measures involving or not involving the use of armed force against a state which the General Assembly has
determined to be an aggressor. These members may or may not comply with
the recommendations and thus may or may not remain neutral, or, if they do
remain neutral, they may give up their attitude of impartiality toward an
aggressor by taking measures short of war against this state. It is even doubtful
that the members not involved in a war following an armed attack are bound
to share the opinion of the General Assembly that an armed attack has taken
place and accept the finding of the General Assembly as to which state is the
11.

aggressor.

The right of collective self-defense established by Article 51 of the Charter
transformed into an obligation by certain treaties implementing Article 51.
Cf. Note 5, page 127.
15.

is
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16.

was

The Security System established by the Covenant of the League of Nations
The Covenant did not prohibit resort to war under all cir-

of this type.

cumstances. It is significant that in the Preamble "the acceptance of obligations
not to resort to war," not of the obligation not to resort to war was mentioned.
According to Articles 12 and 15, the members were obliged to submit their
disputes either to an international tribunal or to the Council. Submission to
an international tribunal presupposed agreement of the parties to the dispute.
The members were obliged to carry out the decision of the tribunal and not

war against a member of the League which complied therewith.
against a state which, in violation of its obligation, did not comply with
the decision of the tribunal was not excluded (Articles 12 and 13). In case

to resort to

War

agreement

was

to

submit a dispute

to a tribunal could not be reached,

each party

which was authorized to proceed
at the request of one party to the dispute. For this purpose no agreement was
necessary.
The Council was first to endeavor "to effect a settlement of the
dispute" by bringing about an agreement between the parties. However, if a
dispute could not be settled in this way, the Council was bound to settle a
dispute by making a recommendation to the parties. Only a recommendation
unanimously agreed to by those members of the Council who were not representatives of the parties to the dispute gave the recommendation of the Council
a legal effect. This effect consisted of prohibiting war against a party which
complied with the recommendation. War against a party which did not comply
with the recommendation was not excluded, nor was war excluded in case none
In case a
of the parties complied with the recommendation of the Council.
unanimous recommendation could not be reached by the Council, war was
expressly permitted by the Covenant, but only "for the maintenance of right
and justice" (Article 15, paragraph 7). Finally, war was not forbidden, or at
least not expressly forbidden, in case a dispute arose from a matter of domestic
In all cases in which war was not forbidden, the parties were
jurisdiction.
obliged not to resort to war until three months after a decision by an international tribunal or a report or recommendation of the Council (Article 12,
paragraph 1).
17. As the Covenant of the League of Nations in Article 16.
18. According to an interpretation of Article 16 of the Covenant of the
League of Nations adopted by resolution 9b of the Second Assembly of the
League in 1921, the Council had the power to exempt a member state from
participating in the sanctions taken against an aggressor, even if the member
concerned shared with other members the view that an act of aggression had
been committed by the state against which the sanctions were taken. Cf. Note 19.
19. Cf. Paul Guggenheim, "La securite collective et le probleme de la neuAnnuaire Suisse de droit international. Vol. II (1945), pp. 9 ff,
tralite."
and J. F. Lalive, "International Organization and Neutrality." The British
Yearbook of International Law. Vol. 24 (1947), p. 75. When Switzerland
joined the League of Nations, the Council of the League declared in its resolution
of 13 February 1920 that "the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland and the
guarantee of the inviolability of her territory as incorporated in the law of
nations, particularly in the treaties and in the Act of 1815, are justified by the
interest of general peace, and as such are compatible with the Covenant." It
entitled to submit the case to the Council,

was understood, however, that Switzerland, while refusing

to participate in

military action or to admit the passage of foreign troops, fully recognized the
dntieg of the solidarity she was incurring as a member of the League, particularly
the duty under Article 16 of participating in any economic action taken by
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the League against a covenant-breaking state. However, by a resolution of the
Council of the League of Nations adopted on 14 May 1938, Switzerland was
freed of the obligation to take any sanctions, even economic sanctions, against

the aggressor.

To

justify the attitude of

Switzerland, Professor Schindler

wrote in a memorandum presented to the International Studies Conference (cf.
"In entering the League of Nations, Switzerland did not abandon
supra, p. 9)
this political maxim, whose value has been proved to her satisfaction by an
age-long experience. It is indispensable to her in both foreign and domestic
policy. To participate in a war between other States means for Switzerland the
almost certain prospect of seeing her entire territory turned into a battlefield.
Surrounded by several very powerful States, Switzerland, if she were involved
in a modern war, would risk, more than any other country in the world, complete annihilation. Even in the course of a long war, a large State can hardly
:

be altogether destroyed." Collective Security, p. 420. The last argument is
A great power, the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy, was
not quite correct.
altogether destroyed in the course of a long war. In order to maintain its
permanent neutrality, Switzerland did not join the United Nations.
20. Cf. Collective Security, p. 26.

21.

The Charter

of the United Nations forbids the use of

armed

—

force,

and

hence forbids war, under all circumstances with two exceptions the exercise
and the execution of sanctions. In regard to members of the
organization not involved in a war between other members or between members and non-members or between non-members only, the Charter imposes
the obligation to resort to both military and non-military sanctions against
the aggressor in accordance with the decisions of the Security Council
Article 2, paragraph 5, provides: "All Members shall
(Article 39-50).
give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any
state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement
action." Article 25 stipulates: "The Members of the United Nations agree to
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with
the present Charter." In view of these provisions, it follows that in case of
a military action taken by the United Nations, constituting war between the
Organization and a state, or in case of a war between two states in which the
Organization intervenes by either a military or a non-military action, the status
of neutrality, or the principle of impartiality, is excluded in principle.
The
Report of the Rapporteur of the Subcommittee to Committee 1/1 of the San
Francisco Conference contains the following statement in reference to paragraphs 5 and 6 of Chapter II of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals which correspond
to Article 2, paragraph 5, of the Charter "The French Delegation proposed to
add to Paragraph 5 of Chapter II the following phrase which was conceived in
'Sans qu'un Etat puisse, pour s'y soustraire,
the French text as follows
invoquer un statut de neutralite'.
The French Delegate explained that what
he meant by 'statut de neutrality was that of permanent neutrality. From the
discussion that ensued, it was understood in the subcommittee that the status
of permanent neutrality is incompatible with the principles declared in paragraphs 5 and 6 of Chapter II, in that no state can avail itself of the statute of
permanent neutrality to be freed from the obligations of the Charter. The
subcommittee, on that understanding, tacitly accepted that the vote taken on
paragraphs 5 and 6 covers the French amendment." Although as a rule the
status of neutrality, or if not the status of neutrality at least the principle of
of self-defense

:

:

i
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impartiality, is excluded, there are nevertheless certain cases in

the other
1,

may

which the one or

be maintained.

First of all, the fact must be considered that according to Article 48, paragraph
of the Charter, the action of the Organization may be carried out by all the

members of the United Nations or by some of them, the determination as to which
members must carry out the Organization's decision is made by the Security
Council. Hence, the Security Council may call upon only some members to make
available to the Organization contingents of their armed forces to be employed in
a military action taken against a state at war with another state or guilty of an
act of aggression which does not consist of resorting to war, as in the case of a

The members not involved in the war between the aggressor
and its victim or in the war between the Organization and another state may then
remain neutral and may even adopt an attitude of strict impartiality towards the
belligerents, provided that the Security Council does not order them to apply nonthreat of force.

military sanctions to the state against which the military action of the organizaIf they must apply non-military sanctions, they can observe

tion is directed.

only a qualified neutrality. In case of a war between states, if the Security Council decides to take only measures short of war, especially measures not involving
the use of armed force, and if the Security Council calls upon only some members
to execute these measures, the other members which are not involved in this war
may observe a perfect neutrality, although the members called upon to execute the
decisions of the Security Council

may

observe only a qualified neutrality.

This

means that
the members are obliged to give the United Nations only that assistance which
they are ordered to give by the competent organ of the United Nations, and that
members are obliged to refrain from giving that state against which the United
Nations action is directed only that assistance which they are prohibited from

interpretation of the Charter presupposes that Article

2,

paragraph

5,

giving by the competent organ. However, the wording of Article 2, paragraph 5,
certainly allows another interpretation, one not quite consistent with Article 48,

paragraph

1.

According to this interpretation, members not called upon by the

Security Council to

measures short of

make available contingents of their armed forces or to take
war are obliged to take military or non-military measures

against the state against which the United Nations action is directed. In this
case, the choice of the appropriate means is left to the discretion of the individual
states.

may remain neutral,
say, they may observe a

Consequently, while these states

an attitude of impartiality, that

is to

they cannot adopt
so-called qualified

neutrality.

In view of the fact that the special agreements concerning the contingents of

armed forces which the members must place at the disposal of the Security
Council have not yet been concluded, in case of a war the Security Council would
not be in a position to take military measures by decisions binding upon the
members. However, according to the wording of Article 39, it could recommend
Since these
to members not involved in the war that they take such measures.
recommendations are not binding, the members concerned could choose whether
they did or did not wish to remain neutral. If a military action taken by a
member on the recommendation of the Security Council is considered to be an
action of the United Nations, Article 2, paragraph 5, would apply. If it is interpreted as imposing on each member the obligation to give the United Nations
the

every assistance in any action taken by the Organization even if the member is
not under an order issued by the Security Council in conformity with Article 48,
a member which does not comply with a recommendation to take military action
made by the Security Council in conformity with Article 39 would be obliged

—
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an action or enforcement measure not involving the use of armed
force under Article 2, paragraph 5. This paradoxical consequence can be avoided
if Article 2, paragraph 5, is interpreted to mean that the members are obliged
to give the United Nations only that assistance which they are ordered to give
by the Security Council in conformity with Article 48.
For one reason or another, especially because of the lack of unanimity of its
permanent members, the Security Council may be prevented from making such
recommendations or deciding upon non-military measures. In this event, Article
In case of a war, the members not involved in
2, paragraph 5, would not apply.
the war would be able to remain neutral and adopt an attitude of strict impartiality towards the belligerents. However, in case of an armed attack, they are
under Article 51, in the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, entitled
but not obliged to resort to war or to take measures short of war against the
state which they consider to be the aggressor, that is to say, to give up neutrality
or to observe a so-called qualified neutrality towards the belligerents. In case
of a war, if under Article 39 the Security Council determined the existence of
a breach of the peace or act of aggression, and thus determined the aggressor
but did not take any measures against this aggressor state, the members not
involved in the war which exercised their right of collective self-defense would
be bound by the decision of the Security Council insofar as they could no longer
decide for themselves which state was the aggressor.
Article 106 of the Charter stipulates "Pending the coming into force of such
special agreements referred to in Article 43 as in the opinion of the Security
Council enable it to begin the exercise of its responsibilities under Article 42, the
parties to the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, October 30, 1943, and
France, shall, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of that Declaration, consult with one another and as occasion requires with other Members of
the United Nations with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization
as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and
security." The states authorized to take joint action on behalf of the United
Nations are the five permanent members of the Security Council. Consequently,
to take such

—

:

not very likely that such action will ever be taken, since a "joint" action
members of the Security Council.
However, if it should take place in case of a war, it would have to be considered

it is

requires the unanimity of the five permanent

a military action of the United Nations to which Article 2, paragraph 5,
The question of the neutrality of the members of the United Nations not involved in the war would be answered according to which of the two

would apply.

interpretations of Article

2,

paragraph

(e)

5,

was

accepted.

Preventive Measures

Consultation.

(aa)

As

pointed out in a previous chapter of this study, the distinction
between repressive and preventive measures is not an absolute one.
As reactions against a violation of the law already committed, repres-

and especially sanctions, always also have a preventive
and some measures which, in principle, have a preventive

sive measures,
effect,

may

be applied after the delict has been perpetrated.
Consultation is such a measure.
character
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By consultation, any form of communication between governments
may be understood. As a specific means to be applied within a system
an exchange of views among
governments for the purpose of preventing or terminating the use of
armed force by one state against another. 1 Such consultation takes
place among states which are not involved in the conflict, but the
of international security, consultation

parties to the conflict
states concerned

may

may

is

also participate in the discussion.

The

consult each other in case of a mere threat to

the peace in order to consider the

means for

its

preservation.

In

this

has a preventive character. On the other hand,
take place in case of an actual breach of the peace.

case, the consultation

consultation

may

It then has a repressive character. 2

Consultation may take place outside a security organization or
within such an organization or between the organization and states
not belonging to it. Consultation outside a security organization may
be carried out either through the normal diplomatic channels or

through the mechanism of an international conference. 3 Consultation
within a security organization is an essential element of the procedure
of the organs competent to apply preventive or repressive measures
for the maintenance or restoration of peace. It necessarily precedes
the decisions concerning the application of repressive measures, especially the application of sanctions.

If not all the

members

are

represented in the organ, the member not represented may be invited
to participate in the discussion of the matter affecting the interest
of that member. 4

not universal, consultation is advisable between the organization on the one hand and the non-member
involved in the conflict with which the organization is dealing on
the other. 5 It is, however, not only consultation with a non-member
If the security organization

is

involved in a conflict but also consultation with a disinterested, especially a neutral, non-member which is of importance, especially if
the non-member is a great power, for the cooperation of all third
parties is essential to the effectiveness of consultation.* As the United
States was not a member of the League of Nations, consultation of
the United States with the League was a paramount political problem.

Since the United States

is

a

member

of the United Nations

and a permanent member of the Security Council, consultation between this organization and the United States is no longer a problem. 7
There can be no doubt that consultation through the mechanism
of an international security organization is preferable to that through
diplomatic channels and conferences. This is true, first, because
the latter, as Cooper 8 correctly points out, rest upon no recognized
authority and hence are "always open to the charge of being unwar-
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ranted and presumptuous." Another defect of consultation outside
a security organization is the absence of an established procedure and
the danger of conflicting with an action initiated by a security organ-

method of consultation," says Cooper, "is one
which includes all neutrals, which has an established and recognized
authority and organization, and which will not conflict with any

"The

ization.

ideal

other peace machinery." 9 It is evident that a universal or quasiuniversal security organization, such as the League or the United
the most adequate instrument of consultation. 10
an essential characteristic of consultation that it has no legal
Consultation does not imply any legal obligation whatsoever,

Nations,
It is
effect.

is

maintenance
or restoration of peace. Its purpose is political rather than legal.
treaty imposing upon the contracting parties an obligation to consult
together is of the same nature as a treaty imposing upon the contract-

especially

no obligation

to take a definite action for the

A

ing parties the obligation to enter into negotiations. Just as negotiations may or may not result in an agreement of the parties, consultation may or may not lead to action for the maintenance or restoration
of peace.

was always with a reservation that no commitment to take action
was implied, that the government of the United States accepted the
It

obligation of consultation.

Nevertheless, the opposition against con-

was very strong among

and others of a more
or less isolationist conviction. When at the London Naval Conference
of 1930, in a press release of the United States delegation on 26 March
that America had no objection to
1930, the statement was made ".
entering a consultative pact as such on the contrary, the United States
is already a party to a number of treaties involving the obligation of
consulting with other powers. It will not, however, enter into any
treaty, whether consultative or otherwise, where there is danger of its
sultative pacts

:

.

politicians

.

;

obligation being misunderstood as involving a promise to render mili-

tary assistance or guaranteeing protection by military force to another

Senator Borah, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee, declared: "A consultative pact is a security pact in disguise.
In a security pact you state in the pact what you are going to do
after you have consulted.
In a consultative pact you conceal what you
are going to do after you have consulted, but you will be forced by the
logic of the hour to do precisely what you expressly agreed to do in the
security pact.
consultative pact in which the parties would not go
forward and do whatever would be necessary to be done in accordance
with the realities of the situation would be a pious fraud and a fraud
which under the exigencies of the hour would be rejected ;" ** and Senanation,"

1X

A

—
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tor Shipstead stated "To agree to consult is to agree to decide. To
agree to decide is to agree to act. To agree to act is to agree that we are
going into the next war. They call this the road to peace. That is
what they called the Triple Alliance, and the Triple Entente, and the
:

Quadruple Alliance."

When

Disarmament Conference in
Geneva, 1933. the question of the commitment of the United States was
discussed, Professor John Bassett Moore wrote "The commitment of
the United States to such a 'consultative pact' as is desired at Geneva
would, I believe, constitute the gravest danger to which the country has
ever been exposed, a danger involving our very independence. ... It
would destroy the last vestige of the power to control our own destiny
that has heretofore been the most cherished part of our birthright.
... Of all conceivable devices the 'consultative pact' is the most pernicious.
It operates both as an incentive and as a lure.
While it
encourages the co-partner to do what he might otherwise refrain from
doing, it fails, by reason of its indefiniteness, to deter the co-partner's
antagonist from doing what he might not otherwise attempt. Numerous examples might be adduced to show this." 14
Within a universal or quasi-universal security organization mere
consultation implying no obligation of any action for the maintenance
13

at the

:

or restoration of peace

may

be useful

if it is able to crystallize

world

public opinion concerning an actual or potential aggression and the

However there

seldom, and almost never in
a world split into two ideologically hostile camps, only one public
opinion. There are almost always at least two opposite ones, and thus,
state responsible for

it.

is

under actual circumstances, the value of this means for the establishment of international security remains problematical.

NOTES
1. Cf. Russell M. Cooper, American Consultation in World Affairs for the
Preservation of Peace, with an Introduction by Dr. James T. Shotwell (New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1934), pp. VII, 23; and Philip C. Jessup, International Security.
Collective Action for Peace (New
The American Role
York Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1935), p. 64.
although not ex2. According to one interpretation, consultation was implied

m

—

:

— in

the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Cf. David Hunter Miller, The
Peace Pact of Paris, 1928, pp. 130-1 "Inevitably the Government of the United
States will be consulted, if not directly by Geneva, certainly by the Powers most
pressly stipulated

:

Whether such consultation comes in the name of the League
it comes in the name of Members of the League of Nations
as Parties with the United States to the Briand-Kellogg Treaty, is quite immaterial
it might take the form of discussions at Washington, or telegraphic exinfluential at Geneva.

of Nations or whether

;

changes, or a representative of the United States might sit with the Council the
consultation itself is certain and in any form it will be asked in fact by those
Powers which are trying to preserve the peace. No Government of the United
States could be indifferent to such an appeal any threatened breach of a treaty
;

;
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made to the United States must be a matter of grave concern, above
when peace is at stake of course there would be no legal duty on the part

obligation
all

;

of the United States to intervene still less would there be any obligation on the
part of the United States to use threats and I do not speak of sanctions because
I am considering intervention before a breach and not afterwards but no Gov;

;

;

ernment of the United States could refuse to use its influence in such a case in
cooperation with the League of Nations to preserve peace and at the same time
our own Treaty."
In June, 1932, both the Republican and the Democratic Parties required in
their respective platforms the implementation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact by provisions for consultation in case of a threatened violation of the Treaty. On 8
August 1932 Secretary Stimson declared in an address before the Council on
that consultation between the signatories of the Pact
Foreign Relations: ".
when faced with threat of its violation becomes inevitable. Any effective invocation of the power of world opinion postulates discussion and consultation.
That the Pact thus necessarily carries with it the implication of consultation has perhaps not been fully appreciated by its well-wishers who have been
so anxious that it be implemented by a formal provision for consultation. But
with the clarification which has been given to its significance by the developments of the last three years, and the vitality with which it has been imbued by
the positive construction put upon it, the misgivings of those well-wishers should
be put at rest. That the American people subscribe to this view is made clear
by the fact that each of the platforms recently adopted by the two great party
conventions at Chicago contains planks endorsing the principle of consultation."
Henry L. Stimson, The Pact of Paris: Three Years of Development, Department
of State, Publication No. 357, Washington, 1932, pp. 11-12.
to preserve the sanctity of

.

.

.

.

.

On

11 August 1932 President Hoover, in accepting the Republican nomination,
".
we have given leadership in transforming the Kellogg-Briand Pact

stated

:

.

.

from an inspiring outlawry of war to an organized instrument for peaceful settlements backed by definite mobilized world public opinion against aggression. We
shall, under the spirit of that pact, consult with other nations in times of emergency to promote world peace. We shall enter no agreements committing us to
any future course of action or which call for use of force in order to preserve
peace." New York Times, 12 August 1932.
And on 26 October, in a speech delivered at Pittsburgh, Secretary Stimson
"Whenever a breach of the treaty is threatened by approaching hosdeclared
:

tilities, it

among the other parties in order that
may be mobilized against the impending disaster of war." Henry
The Work of the United States Government in the Promotion of

implies a duty of consultation

public opinion
L. Stimson,

Peace During the Past Three Years, Department of State, Publication No. 398,
Washington, 1932, p. 11.
On 22 May 1933 Mr. Norman Davis, in his capacity as the chairman of the
American Delegation to the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, accepted a
British plan for disarmament which contained a provision to the effect that "in
the event of a breach or threat of breach of the Pact of Paris, a conference between the High Contracting Parties shall at once meet at the request of any five
of them, provided that at least one of the governments mentioned by name in
Article 4 joins in that request."
(Series of League of Nations Publications.
IX Disarmament, 1933, IX, 2, Conference Document 157, p. 2.) He declared
that the United States is "
willing to consult with the other States in case of a
threat to peace, with a view of averting conflict. Further than that, in the event
that the States, in conference, determine that a State had been guilty of a breach
:

.

.

.

;
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of the peace in violation of its international obligations and take measures

against the violator, then, if the U. S. concurred in the judgment rendered as to
the responsible and guilty party, it would refrain from any action tending to
defeat such collective effort which the States might thus make to restore peace."
Series of League of Nations Publications.
IX Disarmament, 1933, IX, 10, p. 475.
On 24 May the United Kingdom presented a revised text of its draft convention
which contained the following provisions "I. In the event of a breach or threat
of breach of the Pact of Paris, either the Council or Assembly of the League of
:

Nations or one of the parties to the present Convention who are not members
may propose immediate consultation between the
Council or Assembly and any of the said parties to the present Convention.
II. It shall be the object of such consultation, (a) in the event of a threat of a
breach of the Pact to exchange views for the purpose of preserving the peace
and averting a conflict; (b) in the event of a breach of the Pact to use good
offices for the restoration of peace and (c) in the event that it proves impossible
thus to restore the peace, then to determine which party or parties to the dispute
are to be held responsible. III. The provisions of the above article do not in
any way prejudice the rights and obligations of the members of the League, nor
conflict with nor limit the powers and duties of the Assembly and Council under
the Covenant." Records of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of
Armaments. Series B. Minutes of the General Commission, Vol. II. Series of
League of Nations Publications, IX, Disarmament, 1933, IX, 10, p. 494.
Mr. Norman Davis also accepted the new British plan and declared on 24 May
"Recognizing that any breach or threat of breach of the Pact of Paris (the
Briand-Kellogg Pact) is a matter of concern to all the signatories thereto, the
Government of the United States of America declares that, in the event of a
breach or threat of breach of this Pact, it will be prepared to confer with a view
to the maintenance of peace in the event that consultation for such purpose
and ... of Part I of the Disarmament
is arranged pursuant to Articles
."
(Ibid., pp. 495-6.)
The consultation referred to in the
Convention.
British draft convention and in the American declaration evidently had a
preventive as well as repressive character in that it would take place not only
in case of a threat of a breach but also in case of an actual breach of the Pact
of the League of Nations

;

:

.

.

.

.

.

of Paris.

The Argentine Anti-War Treaty of non-aggression signed at Rio de Janeiro
10 October 1933, to which the United States was a contracting party, contained
in Article 3 the following provision: "In case of noncompliance by any state
engaged in a dispute, with the obligations contained in the foregoing articles,
the contracting states undertake to make every effort for the maintenance of
peace. To that end they will adopt in their character as neutrals a common and
solidary attitude; they will exercise the political, juridical or economic means
authorized by international law they will bring the influence of public opinion
to bear but will in no case resort to intervention either diplomatic or armed
subject to the attitude that may be incumbent on them by virtue of other collec;

which such states are signatories." The first two Articles of the
Treaty were similar to the first two Articles of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Cf.

tive treaties to

Jessup, International Security,
3.

Cf. Cooper, op. oit., pp.

348

p. 76.
ff.

paragraph 5, of the Covenant of the League of Nations expressly
provided that any member of the League not represented on the Council should
be invited to send a Representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the
Council during the consideration of matters especially affecting the interests
4.

Article

4,
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of that member of the League.
Thus, consultation among the disinterested
members was secured along with consultation with the interested member.
Article 31 of the Charter of the United Nations stipulates that any member of the
United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate,

without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security
Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that member are
specially affected. Article 32 provides that any member of the United Nations
which is not a member of the Security Council, if it is a party to a dispute under
consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without
vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute.
5. According to Article 32 of the Charter, a state which is not a member of
the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the
Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion.
6. Cf. Cooper, op. cit., p. 352.
7. There are still a number of states not members of the United Nations, and,
according to Article 2, paragraph 6, of the Charter, the Organization shall ensure
that these states act in accordance with the Principles of the Charter so far
as this may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.
As far as the principle of settling disputes by peaceful means is concerned,
consultation with the non-member state involved in a dispute is secured by
Article 32.
With respect to enforcement measures to be directed against a
non-member state in case of threat to or breach of the peace, no previous consultation with this state is provided for by the Charter nor is any consultation
with a non-member state obligatory which, according to the principle laid down
in Article 2, paragraph 5, is supposed to give the United Nations every assistance
in any action the Organization takes in accordance with the Charter and to
refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations
However, it may be assumed that
is taking preventive or enforcement action.
consultation with the non-member state, especially in the latter case, is not
;

excluded.
8.

Cooper, op.

9. Ibid., p.

The

cit., p.

349.

352.

by which the United States legally committed itself to conwith other states under certain conditions were the Four-Power Treaty, signed
13 December 1921 by the United States, the British Empire, France and Japan
concerning insular possessions in the Pacific and the Nine-Power Treaty, signed
6 February 1922 by the United States, Belgium, the British Empire, China,
France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Portugal concerning the principles
and policies to be followed in matters concerning China. Recently, the United
States accepted special obligations of consultation in defense treaties such as
the North Atlantic Treaty signed at Washington on 4 April 1949 which contains
in Article 4 the following provision
"The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened"; the Security Treaty
concluded by Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America, signed
at San Francisco on 1 September 1951, Article III of which stipulates: "The
Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is
threatened in the Pacific" the South-East Asia Collective Defense Treaty, signed
on 8 September 1954 by the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia,
New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan, which contains the
following provisions Article 4, paragraph 2 "If, in the opinion of any of the
10.

first treaties

sult

:

;

:

:
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parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or

independence of any party in the treaty area or of any other state or
territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to
time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected
or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the
area, the parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures
which would be taken for the common defense." Article 5 "The parties hereby
establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider
matters concerning the implementation of this treaty. The Council shall provide
for consultation with regard to military and any other planning as the situation
obtaining in the treaty area may from time to time require. The Council shall
be so organized as to be able to meet at any time" {Disarmament and Security,
pp. 611 ff ) and in the Treaties for Mutual Defense Assistance concluded on the
basis of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 (Public Law 329, 81st
Congress; 63 Stat. 714). For instance, Article VI, paragraph 1, of the Mutual
Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States of America and France,
signed at Washington on 27 January 1950 (Department of State Publication 3769),
stipulates: "The two Governments will, upon the request of either of them,
consult regarding any matter relating to the application of this Agreement or
to operations or arrangements carried out pursuant to this Agreement." Similar
provisions are contained in other Mutual Defense Assistance Agreements.
Consultation as a means for the preservation of peace has played an important
part in the Pan-American movement. The Inter-American Conference for the
Maintenance of Peace, Buenos Aires, 1936, recommended "The procedure of
mutual consultation in order to find means of peaceful cooperation in the event of
war or threat of war between American countries," and recognized "that every
act susceptible of disturbing the peace of America affects each and every one of
the American Nations and justifies the initiation of the procedure of consultation."
At the Eighth International Conference of American States, Lima, 1938, these
political

:

.

;

:

"That in case the peace, security or territorial integrity of any
American republic is threatened by acts of any nature that may impair them, they
proclaim their common concern and their determination to make effective their
solidarity, coordinating their respective sovereign will by means of the procedure of consultation, using the measures which in each case the circumstances
may make advisable." Declaration Fourth of the Act of Chapultepec, 8 March
1945, reads as follows "That in case that acts of aggression occur or there may be
reasons to believe that an aggression is being prepared by any other State against
states declared

:

:

the integrity or inviolability of the territory, or against the sovereignty or political

independence of an American State, the states signatory to this declaration will
consult amongst themselves in order to agree upon measures they think it may be
advisable to take." The Inter- American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Rio de
Janeiro, 2 September 1947, to which the United States of America is a contracting
party, stipulates "Art. 7. In the case of the conflict between two or more American States, without prejudice to the right of self-defense in conformity with
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, the High Contracting Parties,
meeting in consultation shall call upon the contending States to suspend hostilities
and restore matters to the status quo ante oellum, and shall take in addition all
other measures necessary to re-establish or maintain inter-American peace and
security and for the solution of the conflict by peaceful means. The rejection of
the pacifying action will be considered in the determination of the aggressor and
in the application of the measures which the consultative meeting may agree upon.
Art. 8. For the purposes of this Treaty, the measures on which the Organ of
:
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may

agree will comprise one or more of the following: recall of
breaking of diplomatic relations breaking of consular relations partial or complete interruption of economic relations or of rail,
sea, air, postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and radio-telephonic or radio-telegraphic
communications and use of armed force. Art 9. In addition to other acts which
the Organ of Consultation may characterize as aggression, the following shall be
considered as such a. Unprovoked armed attack by a State against the territory,
the people, or the land, sea or air forces of another State o. Invasion, by the
armed forces of a State, or the territory of any American State, through the
trespassing of boundaries demarcated in accordance with a treaty, judicial decision, or arbitral award, or, in the absence of frontiers thus demarcated, invasion
affecting a region which is under the effective jurisdiction of another State.
Art. 10. None of the provisions of this Treaty shall be construed as impairing the
rights and obligations of the High Contracting Parties under the Charter of the
United Nations. Art. 11. The consultations to which this Treaty refers shall be
carried out by means of the meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the
American Republics which have ratified the Treaty, or in the manner or by the
Organ which in the future may be agreed upon. Art. 12. The Governing Board
of the Pan American Union may act provisionally as an organ of consultation until
the meeting of the Organ of Consultation referred to in the preceding Article takes
place. Art. 18. The consultations shall be initiated at the request addressed to
the Governing Board of the Pan American Union by any of the Signatory States
which has ratified the Treaty. Art. 14. In the voting referred to in this Treaty
only the representatives of the Signatory States which have ratified this Treaty
may take part. Art. 15. The Governing Board of the Pan American Union shall
act in all matters concerning this Treaty as an organ of liaison among the Signatory States which have ratified this Treaty and between these States and the
United Nations. Art. 16. The decisions of the Governing Board of the PanAmerican Union referred to in Articles 13 and 15 above shall be taken by an
absolute majority of the members entitled to vote. Art. 17. The Organ of Consultation shall take its decisions by a vote of two-thirds of the Signatory States which
have ratified the Treaty. Art. 18. In the case of a situation or dispute between
American States, the parties directly interested shall be excluded from the voting
referred to in the two preceding Articles. Art. 19. To constitute a quorum in all
the meetings referred to in the previous Articles, it shall be necessary that the
number of States represented, shall be at least equal to the number of votes necessary for the taking of the decision. Art. 20. Decisions which require the application of the measures specified in Article 8 shall be binding upon all the Signatory
States which have ratified this Treaty, with the sole exception that no State shall
be required to use armed force without its consent. Art. 21. The measures agreed
upon by the Organ of Consultation shall be executed through the procedures and
agencies now existing or those which may in the future be established."
The Charter of the Organization of American States, Bogota, March 30-May
2, 1948, contains the following provisions: "Chapter XI: The Meeting of Con8ultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Art. 39. The Meeting of Consultation
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall be held in order to consider problems of
an urgent nature and of common interest to the American States, and to serve
as the Organ of Consultation. Art. 1^0. Any Member State may request that
a Meeting of Consultation be called. The request shall be addressed to the
Council of the Organization, which shall decide by an absolute majority whether
a meeting should be held. Art 41. The program and regulations of the Meeting
of Consultation shall be prepared by the Council of the Organization and subConsultation

chiefs of diplomatic missions

;

;

;

;

:

;

:
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mitred to the Member States for consideration. Art. 42. If, for exceptional
reasons, a Minister of Foreign Affairs is unable to attend the meeting, he shall
be represented by a special delegate. Art b8. In case of an armed attack within
the territory of an American State or within the region of security delimited
by treaties in force, a Meeting of Consultation shall be held without delay.
Such Meeting shall be called immediately by the Chairman of the Council of
the Organization, who shall at the same time call a meeting of the Council
Art. 44- An Advisory Defence Committee shall be established to advise
itself.
the Organ of Consultation on problems of military cooperation that may arise
in connection with the application of existing special treaties on collective
Art. ^5.
security.
The Advisory Defence Committee shall be composed of the
highest military authorities of the American States participating in the Meeting
of Consultation. Under exceptional circumstances the Governments may appoint
substitutes. Each State shall be entitled to one vote. Art. 46. The Advisory

Defence Committee shall be convoked under the same conditions as the Organ
of Consultation, when the latter deals with matters relating to defence against
aggression. Art. 41. The Committee shall also meet when the Conference or
the Meeting of Consultation or the Governments, by a two-thirds majority of
the Member States, assign to it technical studies or reports on specific subjects."
An obligation of consultation is imposed upon the contracting parties by the
Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective SelfDefense, signed at Brussels on 17 March 1948 by Belgium, France, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands and the British Empire, which contains the following provisions
"Art. 1. Convinced of the close community of their interests and of the necessity
of uniting in order to promote the economic recovery of Europe, the High
Contracting Parties will so organize and coordinate their economic activities as
to produce the best possible results, by the elimination of conflict in their
economic policies, the coordination of production and the development of commercial exchanges. The cooperation provided for in the preceding paragraph,
which will be effected through the Consultative Council referred to in Article 7
as well as through other bodies, shall not involve any duplication of, or
prejudice to, the work of other economic organizations in which the High
Contracting Parties are or may be represented but shall on the contrary assist
the work of those organizations. Art. 2. The High Contracting Parties will
make every effort in common, both by direct consultation and in specialized
agencies, to promote the attainment of a higher standard of living by their
peoples and to develop on corresponding lines the social and other related
services of their countries. The High Contracting Parties will consult with the
object of achieving the earliest possible application of recommendations of
immediate practical interest relating to social matters, adopted with their
approval in the specialized agencies. They will endeavour to conclude as soon
as possible conventions with each other in the sphere of social security." "Art. 7.
For the purpose of consulting together on all the questions dealt with in
the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties will create a Consultative
Council, which shall be so organized as to be able to exercise its functions
continuously. The Council shall meet at such times as it shall deem fit. At the
request of any of the High Contracting Parties, the Council shall be immediately
convened in order to permit the High Contracting Parties to consult with regard
to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area
this threat should arise, with regard to the attitude to be adopted and the
steps to be taken in case of a renewal by Germany of an aggressive policy or
with regard to any situation constituting a danger to economic stability."

—

;
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Other treaties concluded for the purpose of economic and cultural cooperation,
also contain the obligation of consultation. An example is the Agreement establishing the South Pacific Commission concluded by Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom and the United States, Canberra, on
6 February 1947 for cooperation in promoting the economic and social welfare
advancement of the peoples of the non-self-governing territories in the South

According to Article IV "The Commisadvisory
body to the participating Governments
sion shall be a consultative and
in matters affecting the economic and social development of the non-self-governing territories within the scope of the Commission and the welfare and advancePacific region administered

ment

by them.

:

of their peoples."

London Naval Conference: Speeches and Press Statements by Members of
American Delegation, January 20-April 29, 1930 (Department of State Publi-

11.

the

•cation,
12.

Conference Series, No. 3)

,

p. 35.

New York Times, 28 March 1930.

13. Ibid.
14.

Cf. Jessup, International Security, p. 70.

John Bassett Moore, "An Appeal

to Reason," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 11 (July

1933), pp. 571-2.
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The peaceful settlement of

international disputes.

An international dispute exists if one state claims that another state
should behave in a certain way, and the latter rejects the claim of the
former.
Disputes between states, just as disputes between human beings, 1
may be settled peacefully either by agreement of the parties to the
dispute or by the decision of an agency which is binding upon the
parties.

The agreement may be brought about through

direct negotiation

by

the states, parties to the dispute, or through the friendly intervention

of a third state or some third states.
called

good

offices

or mediation.

This friendly intervention
The purpose of both procedures

is

is

an agreement of the parties to the dispute. Some writers speak of mediation, in contradistinction to good offices, if one or
more third states try to bring about an agreement of the parties to
the dispute on the basis of concrete proposals made by the mediator.
In both cases the suggestions made to the parties to the dispute are not
to bring about

binding.

If a dispute arises from a difference of opinion on points of fact it
be submitted to an international commission of inquiry estab-

may

by a special agreement between the parties to the dispute. The
function of the commission of inquiry is restricted to a statement of
lished
facts.

The

parties to the dispute

may

or

may

not accept this state-

ment.
If the commission

competent not only to ascertain disputed facts
but also to make recommendations for the settlement of the dispute,
one speaks of conciliation. The commission of conciliation may be
is

—
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composed as follows: each party to the dispute appoints one or an
number of members and, by agreement, these members appoint
a chairman. 2 The commission may adopt its decision by majority
vote, but settlement of the dispute is brought about only if the parties
accept the recommendations of the commission, which implies that
they have come to an agreement.
Within a more or less universal security organization the function
of conciliation is conferred by the constituent treaty upon a central
agency of the organization composed of representatives of all, or
equal

only of some, of the members of the organization. The party to a
concrete dispute, which is not a member of the agency, may be authorized to send a representative to participate in the discussion of the
case.

The

representatives of the parties

to participate in the decision.

The function

may

or

may

not be entitled

3

of the agency has the character of conciliation if

its

decisions constitute only recommendations which are not legally bind-

ing upon the parties. 4 If its decisions are binding upon the parties,
the function has a quasi- judicial character and differs from that of
a tribunal insofar as

its

members are

not, as in the case of a tribunal,

independent judges but representatives of the governments by which
they are appointed and hence bound by instruction given to them by
their governments.
The constituent treaty of an international security organization
may impose upon its members the obligation to submit their disputes
even disputes with non-members to the conciliation procedure provided for by the treaty. This means that if one party to a dispute
submits a case to the competent organ the other party is obliged to
recognize the jurisdiction of this organ. In other terms: the constituent treaty may establish compulsory jurisdiction of a special
organ for the pacific settlement of disputes by conciliation. If the
conciliation procedure does not lead to an agreement among the parties
and hence to a settlement of the dispute, the constituent treaty may
leave it to the parties to submit the case to an arbitral tribunal established by their agreement or to an international tribunal established
by the constituent treaty itself as a judicial organ of the security
organization organized as a permanent court. 5 The parties to the
dispute may even be obliged to submit their disputes to the tribunal
if the conciliation procedure fails or they may be obliged to submit
only certain disputes, normally so-called legal disputes, to the judicial
procedure either in case of the failure of a conciliation procedure or
without such a procedure being necessary at all. 6
The judicial organ of the security organization, 7 its permanent
court, may be composed of members elected by the assembly or by

—

;
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8
Since these organs are
the council of the organization or by both.
composed of the representatives of the member- states appointed by
the governments concerned, these governments have a considerable

on the composition of the court, especially if the organs of
the security organization have to elect the judges from a list of candidates nominated directly or indirectly by the governments of the
influence

member

order to achieve the highest possible degree
of independence for the judges, this influence is to be eliminated as
far as possible, a procedure may be adopted in which the decisive
states. 9

If, in

function within the process of the appointment of the judges

is

not

conferred on the governments of the states but on their supreme
courts, law schools, or international scientific organizations for international law and the like. 10

be elected for

life or until

For the same purpose, the judges should
they reach a certain age limit but not for

a limited period of time so that the question of a possible re-election

Only the professional and moral qualification of the
candidate should be required. The president of the court may be
elected by its members or this office may be filled by rotation. 12
As to the procedure of the court, it stands to reason that it must
adopt its decision by majority vote. 13 Collective security is guarandoes not arise. 11

teed most effectively if

its

compulsory means that

if

jurisdiction is compulsory. 14

That

it is

one party to a dispute submits the case
to the court the other party is obliged to recognize the court's
jurisdiction, even if there is no previous agreement by the parties
to the dispute concerning the jurisdiction of the court in this case.
The constituent treaty may even authorize the court to proceed under
certain circumstances and with respect to certain matters ex officio,
on its own initiative without its jurisdiction being invoked by any
party. The court should be open not only to states and international
organizations but also to private individuals, not only as plaintiffs
in case of a violation of their rights established by treaties, but also
as defendants especially if they are accused of having committed
punishable violation of international law; that is to say, the court
should have criminal jurisdiction. 15
Either the treaty constituting an international security organiza-

permanent court may stipulate that in
settling a dispute brought before it, this court must apply the rules
of existing international law unless the parties to the dispute agree
upon the application of principles of justice or equity. By such an
tion or the statute of its

agreement, the tribunal

new law

is

authorized to create within

its

discretion

However, the constituent treaty
or the statute of the court may distinguish two categories of disputes namely, legal and political disputes and provide that, with-

—

for the case at hand. 16

—

—
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out regard to the wishes of the parties, legal disputes shall be settled
in accordance with positive law and political disputes in accordance

with justice or equity. 17

There are two ways

to define the concept of legal disputes.

One

is

the general definition adopted by the so-called Locarno Treaties

that

is,

the treaties of conciliation and arbitration signed by

Germany

on the one hand and b} Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France and Poland
on the other, in London on 1 December 1925. In Article 1 of these treaties, legal disputes are defined as disputes with regard to which the
7

This formula is
not quite satisfactory, because it refers only to "rights," and "rights"
may or may not be "legal" rights, and especially because it does not
One state has
refer to legal obligations which are mainly involved.
a right only if the other has a corresponding obligation and there is
a dispute only if one claims to have a right and the other denies being
under a corresponding obligation. The legal character of a dispute
depends on the attitude of the parties whether one party justifies its
claim and the other party rejects this claim by referring to existing
international law, which implies that the parties agree to have their
dispute settled by the application of existing international law. The
other way consists in enumerating certain categories of disputes—
namely, disputes concerning the interpretation of a treaty any question of international law; the existence of any fact which if established would constitute a breach of an international obligation; the
nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an
international obligation. This enumerative definition is adopted in
Article 13, paragraph 2, of the Covenant of the League of Nations and
in Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice. 18 The enumeration is, logically, very problematical, since
one of the enumerated matters, "any question of international law,"
parties are in conflict as to their respective rights.

;

:

;

covers the three others.

not depend on
It is legal if

its

it is

Besides, the legal character of a dispute does

subject matter but on the

norms

to be applied to

it.

by the application of the rules of existe., political) if it is to be settled by the

to be settled

ing law. It is not legal (i.
application of other principles, such as justice or equity, or if, as a
consequence of the attitude of the parties, it is not to be settled in a
peaceful way at all. The political question as to whether or not a dispute should be settled as a legal dispute that is, by the application of

—

—must not be confused with the legal question as to whether or not a dispute can be settled by the application of
existing international law— that
whether a dispute
or
existing international law

is,

not justiciable.

is justiciable,

It has been pointed out in a previous connection

19

that there are no disputes which, by their very nature, are not justici
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—that

able

is

to say, which, as a consequence of the subject matter to

which they refer, cannot be settled by the application of existing
law because these subject matters are not regulated by the existing
law or, what amounts to the same thing, because there are gaps in
the existing law. It has been shown that there is no objective
criterion at the basis of the distinction between legal and political, justiciable and non- justiciable disputes, and that the distinction between disputes which are to be settled in accordance with
existing law and disputes which are to be settled in accordance with
justice or equity
that is, in accordance with new law to be created by

—

the court for the concrete case

—can be

justified only if the application

of the existing law, although legally possible,

is,

according to the opin-

ion of the parties concerned or the competent tribunal, politically not
satisfactory

;

and that the

flexibility of the legal system,

which

is evi-

dently the purpose of such a distinction, can be achieved only at the
expense of the security to be guaranteed by it.
The doctrine that there are international conflicts which, by their

very nature, cannot be settled by judicial means has recently been presented in a new version. There are, this new version asserts, conflicts
of such a nature that "they will generally be not even formulated in
legal terms," 20 that is to say, in terms of concrete obligations and
rights, and hence they will not be settled by international tribunals
because a tribunal can settle a conflict only by deciding the question of
whether or not a definite state has a concrete obligation and, consequently, whether or not another state has the corresponding right.

Such "unformulated"

which stand in relation to a
the issue of which is "the overall

conflicts are those

general "tension" between two states,

power" between them, the opposition between "the
maintenance of the status quo and its overthrow." The situation
which existed in the relation between Germany and Czechoslovakia
in 1938 is an example of such a "tension."
The real issue of the conflict between these two states was not sovereignty over the Sudetenland but Hitler's claim to the military and political domination of
distribution of

Central Europe.

The

conflicts in question

—in the example just given the "unformuprecisely formulated —but because they cannot be

cannot be formulated at
lated" conflict

is

are "unformulated" not because they

all

formulated in legal terms. This simply means that a state which
intends to overthrow the status quo of the distribution of power by
extending its control over territories legally under the sovereignty
of other states, or over an entire continent, or even over the whole
world is not in a position to present its claim in conformity with existing international law. If such a conflict were subjected to a judicial
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procedure, the tribunal applying the existing law could come to no
other conclusion but to reject the claim and to condemn any attempt
to realize it

the reason

procedure.

by force as a violation of international law.

why

This

is

a state will never submit such a claim to a judicial

This

is self-evident.

But

new

the statement that such "unfor-

a "tension"—that
—
doctrine "cannot be settled

mulated conflicts," the issue of which

is

is,

the "politi-

by judicial
means," i. e., by the application of existing law, is incorrect if it means
more than the truism that if there is no court with compulsory jurisdiction such conflicts will actually not be settled by judicial means.
It is just as incorrect as the analogous statement concerning political
disputes within the meaning of the old doctrine. From a scientific
point of view, the only statement that can be made with respect to
"tension" conflicts is exactly the same as that which can be made with
respect to political conflicts of the old doctrine. This is the statement that a judicial settlement of such conflicts, although legally
possible, is politically not satisfactory to the state whose claim to
overthrow the status quo of distribution of power creates the "tension."
The "tension" theory of political conflicts does not contribute a new
aspect to the problem of judicial settlement. It may be that a state
which wishes to overthrow the existing status quo of the distribution of
power will refuse to submit the "unformulated" conflict even to an
international agency competent to apply principles other than those
of existing international law, principles of justice or equity, because
the state concerned cannot assume that its claim is justifiable even
according to these principles, just as a band of gangsters who want
to rob a bank will not "formulate" the conflict which exists between
their interest and that of the bank and hence will not submit it to a
tribunal of law or equity but will simply try to get what they want
by force. Just as the function of a national legal order is to prevent
the crime and, if this is not possible, to punish the criminals, the
very purpose of an international security organization is to prevent
a state which intends to overthrow the status quo by force from
realizing its intention and, if prevention is not possible, to react
against it by enforcement measures effective enough to restore the
law.
The "tension" doctrine of political conflicts may be correct as
a mere description of international relations as they actually exist,
but it is not correct as a justification of the thesis that these conflicts
are not justiciable.
cal" conflicts of the

is settled by the decision of an interbinding
upon
the parties, the latter are obliged
national agency
to carry out the decision. If, in violation of its obligation, one party
within an international security organization does not comply with

If an international dispute

:
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the decision, the enforcement of the decision should not be left to
the other party but should be a function of the organization itself

performed by its executive organ. This may be the same organ as
the one which has settled the dispute by its decision so that both
functions: the decision by which the dispute is settled and the enforcement of this decision, are conferred upon one and the same organ
of the organization, composed of representatives of the members.
If, however, the dispute must be settled in conformity with existing
law, the competent organ should have the character of a tribunal.
An agency composed of representatives of states and not of independent judges always has the tendency to settle conflicts in accordance with political convenience rather than by applying the rules
of existing law. If a dispute is settled by the court of an international
security organization, the judgment may be enforced against the
recalcitrant party by the executive agency of the organization on
the request of the other party or of the court. Since non-compliance
with the decision of the court is a violation of the constituent treaty,
the action taken for the purpose of enforcing the decision has the
character of a sanction. On the other hand, all enforcement measures
of an international security organization, especially those involving
the use of

armed

force, should, as a rule, be taken only as the execution

—that

of a judicial decision

is,

only as a reaction against a violation of

the law ascertained in an objective and impartial procedure.

The

executive organ of the security organization should, as a rule, act

only as the sheriff of the court. 21 The usual objection to this suggestion, that if enforcement measures are to be preceded by a judicial pro-

cedure they may be too late to restore the law, especially in case
of an armed attack, has been discussed in a previous chapter. 22

NOTES
1.

Cf. pp. 15

ff.

Germany and Switzerland at Berne on
3 December 1921 is typical "The contracting parties shall appoint one member
each of their own choice, and nominate three other members by mutual agreement. These three members shall not be nationals of the contracting parties,
nor shall they be domiciled on their territory, nor employed in their service.
The contracting parties shall by mutual agreement elect the president from
among these three members."
3. Article 4, paragraph 5, of the Covenant of the League of Nations stipulated
"Any Member of the League not represented on the Council shall be invited to
send a Representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the Council during
the consideration of matters specially affecting the interests of that Member
of the League."
Article 32 of the Charter of the United Nations provides "Any Member of
the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state
which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under
2.

Article 14 of the Treaty signed by
:

:

370624—57

13
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consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without
The Security Council shall lay
down such conditions as it deems just for the participation of a state which is
not a Member of the United Nations."
vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute.

According to Article 27, paragraph 3, members of the Security Council which
are parties to a dispute shall abstain from voting on a decision taken for the
purpose of the pacific settlement of disputes under Chapter VI of the Charter.
4. According to the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Council was competent to make only recommendations for the settlement of a dispute. However,
a recommendation unanimously adopted by the Council had a certain legal effect.
In this respect, Article 15, paragraph 6, provided "If a report by the Council
is unanimously agreed to by the Members thereof other than the Representatives
:

more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League agree
that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with
the recommendations of the report."
of one or

According to the Charter, too, the Security Council is authorized to make only
recommendations for the settlement of disputes. These recommendations
may be adopted, according to Article 27, by an affirmative vote of seven
(of the eleven) members including the concurring votes of the permanent members. It must, however, be taken into consideration that the Security Council,
according to Article 39, may consider the non-compliance of a party with its
recommendations as a threat to the peace and hence may take enforcement
measures in order to maintain international peace. If these measures are to be
considered as sanctions, the so-called recommendations of the Security Council
have the character of a decision which may be binding upon the parties.
5. Under the Covenant, the members had the choice of submitting their dispute
to the conciliation procedure of the Council or to the decision of an international
tribunal (tribunal of arbitration or the Permanent Court of International
Justice).

Article 12 stipulated

The Members

:

between them
matter either to
arbitration, or judicial settlement or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree
in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators
or the judicial decision, or the report by the Council. 2. In any case under this
Article the award of the arbitrators or the judicial decision shall be made within
a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months
after the submission of the dispute." Article 15, paragraph 1 "If there should
arise between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture,
which is not submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement in accordance with
Article 13, the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter
to the Council. Any party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving
"1.

any dispute

of the

League agree

that, if there should arise

likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the

:

notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary-General,

who

will

make

necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof."
The Charter provides in Article 33, paragraph 1 "The parties to any dispute,
the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international
peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry,
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."
Article 37, paragraph 1 "Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article,
they shall refer it to the Security Council."
all

:

:

:
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judicial means is concerned, the members have the
submitting
the
dispute
to the International Court of Justice or to an
choice of
Article 92 of the Charter
arbitral tribunal established by their agreement.
provides: "The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial
organ of the United Nations. It shall function in accordance with the annexed

As far as settlement by

Statute, which is based upon the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and forms an integral part of the present Charter." Article 95
"Nothing in the present Charter shall prevent Members of the United Nations
from entrusting the solution of their differences to other tribunals by virtue of

agreements already in existence or which may be concluded in the future."
6. The General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes adopted
by the Ninth Assembly of the League of Nations on 26 September 1928 stipulated
that legal disputes shall be submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement and
that other disputes, provided that conciliation does not lead to an agreement of
the parties, shall be submitted to an arbitral tribunal. The most important provisions of the General Act were Article 1 "Disputes of every kind between two
or more Parties to the present General Act which it has not been possible to
settle by diplomacy shall, subject to such reservations as may be made under
Article 39, be submitted, under the conditions laid down in the present Chapter,
Article 2: "The disputes referred to in the
to the procedure of conciliation."
preceding article shall be submitted to a permanent or special Conciliation Commission constituted by the parties to the dispute." Article 17 "All disputes
with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights shall,
subject to any reservations which may be made under Article 39, be submitted
for decision to the Permanent Court of International Justice, unless the parties
agree, in the manner hereinafter provided, to have resort to an arbitral tribunal.
It is understood that the disputes referred to above include in particular those
mentioned in Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Article
Article 20, paragraph 1
Justice."
1, disputes of the kind referred to in Article 17 arising between parties who have
acceded to the obligations contained in the present Chapter shall only be subject
Article 21 "Any disto the procedure of conciliation if the parties so agree."
pute not of the kind referred to in Article 17 which does not, within the month
following the termination of the work of the Conciliation Commission provided
for in Chapter I, form the object of an agreement between the parties, shall, subject to such reservations as may be made under Article 39, be brought before an
arbitral tribunal which, unless the parties otherwise agree, shall be constituted
in the manner set out below." Article 28 "If nothing is laid down in the special
agreement or no special agreement has been made, the Tribunal shall apply the
rules in regard to the substance of the dispute enumerated in Article 38 of the
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. In so far as there
exists no such rule applicable to the dispute, the Tribunal shall decide ex aequo
et bono."
The last sentence of Article 28 presupposed that there were gaps in
existing international law which could be filled by principles of equity.
Cf.
Article 39 of the General Act contained an extensive enumerapp. 19 f., 32, 189.
tion of the reservations which a state might make in acceding to the Act. By
these reservations the following disputes might be excluded from the procedure
described in the Act: "(a) Disputes arising out of facts prior to the accession
either of the Party making the reservation or of any other Party with whom the
said Party may have a dispute; (b) Disputes concerning questions which by international law are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of States; (c) Dis:

:

:

:

:

:
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putes concerning particular cases or clearly specified subject-matters, such as
territorial status, or disputes falling within clearly defined categories."

The Resolution 268

A

(Restoration to the General Act of 26 September
J 928, of its original efficacy) adopted by the General Assembly at its 199th
Plenary Meeting on 28 April 1949, instructed the Secretary-General "to prepare a revised text of the General Act," including certain amendments mentioned in the resolution, "and to hold it open to accession by States, under the
title

The

(III)

'Revised General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.' "
amendments mentioned in the resolution "will only apply as between States

having acceded to the General Act as thus amended and, as a consequence,
will not affect the rights of such States, parties to the Act as established on

26 September 1928, as should claim to invoke

it

in so far as it

might

still

be

operative."

Neither the Covenant nor the Charter imposes upon the members of the
security organization an obligation to submit disputes to a judicial procedure.
The Member states may do so by agreement, and they are free to submit the
dispute either to the Permanent Court of the Organization or to an arbitral
tribunal established by their agreement.
7. The judicial organ of the League of Nations was the Permanent Court of
International Justice established in accordance with Article 14 of the Covenant
by the Protocol of Signature of the Statute of the Permanent Court of Interna-

December 1920. The judicial organ of the United Nations
International
Court of Justice established by the Charter. Its Statute
is the
forms an integral part of the Charter. It is not very different from that of
the Permanent Court of International Justice.
tional Justice of 16

8.

According to Article 2 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,

the Court is composed of a body of independent judges, elected regardless of
their nationality from among persons of high moral character, who possess the
qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the

highest judicial offices, or who are jurisconsults of recognized competence in
international law. According to Article 3, the Court consists of fifteen members,
no two of whom may be nationals of the same state. According to Article 4,
the members are elected by the General Assembly and by the Security Council
from a list of persons nominated by the national groups in the Permanent Court

of Arbitration. A "national group" is formed by the persons (four at most)
selected by the contracting parties to the Hague Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes of 1907, according to Article 44 of this Convention.
In the case of members of the United Nations not represented in the
Permanent Court of Arbitration, candidates are nominated by national groups
appointed for this purpose by their governments under the same conditions as
those prescribed for members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration by Article
44 of the Hague Convention of 1907. No national group may nominate more
than four persons, not more than two of whom shall be of their own nationality
(Article 5). Those candidates who obtain an absolute majority of votes in the
'General Assembly and in the Security Council are considered as elected
(Article 10).
9.

The members

of the "national groups," competent to nominate the candi-

dates which may be elected members of the International Court of Justice, are
appointed by the governments concerned.
10. Article 6 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice only recommends that each national group should consult its highest court of justice,
its legal faculties and schools of law, and its national academies and national

191
sections of international academies devoted to the study of
the nomination of candidates.

law before making

According to Article 13 of the Statute, the members of the Court are
and may be re-elected. Their independence and impartiality
no member of the Court may exercise
is guaranteed by the following provisions
any political or administrative function, or engage in any other occupation of
a professional nature (Article 16, paragraph 1) no member of the Court may
act as agent, counsel, or advocate in any case; no member may participate in
the decision of any case in which he has previously taken part as agent, counsel,
or advocate for one of the parties or as a member of a national or international
court, or of a commission of enquiry or in any other capacity (Article 17,
paragraphs 1 and 2) no member of the Court can be dismissed unless, in the
unanimous opinion of the other members, he has ceased to fulfill the required
conditions (Article 18, paragraph 1). The members of the Court, when engaged on the business of the Court, enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities
Every member of the Court shall, before taking up its duties, make
(Article 19)
a solemn declaration in open court that he will exercise his powers impartially
and conscientiously (Article 20). If, for some special reason, a member of the
Court considers that he should not take part in the decision of a particular case,
he shall so inform the President. If the President considers that for some
special reason one of the members of the Court should not sit in a particular
If in any such case the member of
case, he shall give him notice accordingly.
the Court and the President disagree, the matter shall be settled by the decision
of the Court (Article 24). Judges who are of the nationality of the parties to
the case before the Court are not excluded from sitting in the case. However, if
"the Court includes upon the Bench a judge of the nationality of one of the
parties, any other party may choose a person to sit as judge.
Such person
shall be chosen preferably from among those persons who have been nominated
as candidates as provided in Articles 4 and 5. If the Court includes upon the
Bench no judge of the nationality of the parties, each of these parties may
proceed to choose a judge as provided in paragraph 2 of this Article" (Article
This is the institution of "national judges."
31, paragraphs 2 and 3).
12. According to Article 21 of the Statute, the Court elects its President and
11.

elected for nine years

:

;

;

.

Vice-President

they

;

may

be re-elected.

According to Article 55 of the Statute, all questions shall be decided by a
majority of the judges present. In the event of an equality of votes, the President or the judge who acts in his place shall have a casting vote.
14. The International Court of Justice has no compulsory jurisdiction.
As
pointed out, the members of the United Nations, and other states which may
become parties to the Statute on conditions to be determined (according to
Article 93 of the Charter ) by the General Assembly upon recommendation of the
Security Council, are not obliged to submit disputes to the Court. But they
may do so. A case may be brought before the Court by a special agreement
of the parties to the dispute. In this way any dispute whatsoever may be submitted to the Court. Such a special agreement is not necessary and the case may
be brought before the Court by a written application addressed by one party to
the Court (Article 40, paragraph 1), if the parties to the dispute have previously made a declaration determined in Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute,
which provides "The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: a. the interpretation of a
13.

:

:

192
any question of international law c. the existence of any fact which,
if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; d. the
nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international
This declaration "may be made unconditionally or on condition
obligation".
of reciprocity on the part of several or certain states, or for a certain time"
(Article 36, paragraph 3).
The jurisdiction of the Court recognized by a declaration made under Article
36, paragraph 2, of the Statute is not a true compulsory jurisdiction as it is called
in this article, for if a state which has made such a declaration brings a dispute with another state before the Court by a unilateral application in contreaty

b.

;

;

formity with Article 40 of the Statute, the other party is obliged to recognize the
jurisdiction of the Court only if it, too, has made the same declaration. This
means that the jurisdiction of the Court in this case is based, not on a special
agreement referring to this concrete case, but on a general agreement of the
parties to the dispute constituted by their declarations made under Article 36,
paragraph 2. Declarations under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute have
been made by several states, some of them under reservations which deprive
them of almost all practical value.
Thus, e. g., the United States recognized the jurisdiction of the Court in disputes concerning the matters enumerated in Article 36, paragraph 2, of the
Statute "Provided, that this declaration shall not apply to (a) disputes the
solution of which the parties shall entrust to other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in existence or which may be concluded in the future; or (b) disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by the United States of
America; or (c) disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (1) all
parties to the treaty affected by the decision are also parties to the case before
the Court, or (2) the United States of America specially agrees to jurisdiction;
and Provided further, that this declaration shall remain in force for a period
of five years and thereafter until the expiration of six months after notice
may be given to terminate this declaration." That the jurisdiction of a court
recognized under these reservations is not "compulsory" is quite evident.
15. According to Article 34, paragraph 1, of the Statute, only states may be
parties before the International Court of Justice.
16. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides
"1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized
by the contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decision and the
:

;

;

teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 2. This provision shall
not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the
parties agree thereto."
That the Court has to apply the existing conventional and customary law
(clauses [a] and [b]) is self-evident and did not need to be stipulated. As to
"the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" (clause [c]),
it is doubtful whether such principles common to the legal orders of the civilized

which separates the communist from the capitalist and the autocratic from the demoIf the Court assumes that a general principle of law
cratic legal systems.
nations exist at

all,

especially in view of the ideological antagonism

:
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recognized by civilized nations exists, the question of under what conditions
the Court is supposed to apply this principle to the case at hand arises. If
there is a treaty to which the states involved in the dispute are contracting
parties, and if the treaty refers to the dispute, the treaty is to be applied

customary international law is
to be applied (clause [b]). This, as pointed out, is always possible, but clause
(c) evidently presupposes the idea that there are gaps in international law. This
means that the Court is authorized to apply a rule which the Court considers
to be a general principle of law in case the Court deems the application of
particular conventional or general customary international law not to be satisfactory, which implies an almost unlimited discretion on the part of the Court.
It is, however, doubtful whether the framers of the Statute really intended
Article 38, paragraph 1,
to confer such an extraordinary power upon the Court.
expressly stipulates that the function of the Court is "to decide in accordance
with international law."
Hence, it might be argued that "the general principles of law" are applicable
only if they are part of international law, and that means part of the law
referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of Article 38. Then, clause (c) is superfluous.
Clause (d) does not refer to rules of international law to be applied by
the Court it establishes only a principle of interpretation. Article 59, to which
clause (d) refers, stipulates that the decision of the Court has binding force
only between the parties and only in respect to the particular case. Hence, a
decision of the Court cannot have the character of a precedent.
17. Cf. pp. 16, 31 f
The Charter of the United Nations, just as the Covenant of
the League of Nations, only recommends to the members that they refer their
legal disputes to a judicial procedure. Article 13 of the Covenant provided
"1. The Members of the League agree that, whenever any dispute shall arise
between them which they recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration
or judicial settlement, and which can not be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy,
they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration or judicial settlement.
2. Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international
law, as to the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute
a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the
reparation to be made for any such breach, are declared to be among those
which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement.
3. For the consideration of any such dispute, the court to which the case is referred shall be the Permanent Court of International Justice, established in
accordance with Article 14, or any tribunal agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in am,y convention existing between them. 4. The Members
of the League agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award or
decision that may be rendered, and that they will not resort to war against a
Member of the League which complies therewith. In the event of any failure
to carry out such an award or decision, the Council shall propose what steps
should be taken to give effect thereto."
Article 36 of the Charter stipulates "1. The Security Council may, at any stage
of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature,
recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment. 2. The Security
Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the
dispute which have already been adopted by the parties. 3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties
(Clause [a]).

If there is no treaty, general

;

.

:
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to the International

Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the
Statute of the Court"
As to the definition of legal disputes, Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute
(cf. p. 191) follows Article 13, paragraph 2, of the Covenant.
18. Cf. p. 191.

19. Cf. pp.

19

f.

Morgenthau, op. cit., pp. 40CM.0.
Under the Covenant of the League of Nations, the enforcement of judicial

20. Cf.,
21.

decisions against a recalcitrant party was left to the other party. The Council
had the power only to make recommendations. Article 13, paragraph 4, stipulated "The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good
faith any award or decision that may be rendered, and that they will not resort to
war against a Member of the League which complies therewith. In the event
of any failure to carry out such an award or decision, the Council shall propose
what steps should be taken to give effect thereto." Enforcement measures to be
taken as reactions against violations of the Covenant (Article 16) were not to
be preceded by a judicial decision.
The Charter of the United Nations stipulates "Article 94. 1. Each Member
of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party. 2. If any party to a
case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered
by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which
may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to
:

:

be taken to give effect to the judgment."
The Security Council is only authorized, not obliged, to enforce the judgment
of the Court. Instead of enforcing the judgment of the Court, the Council may
even settle the dispute concerned by a recommendation made in accordance with
principles of political convenience. As far as decisions of other tribunals are
concerned (Article 95), the Security Council has no competence, but it may consider non-compliance with such a decision as a threat to the peace and take
enforcement measures in conformity with Article 39.
22. Cf. pp. 121 f.
(cc)

The

peaceful

change

of

legally

established

international

relations.

Closely connected to the problem of the peaceful settlement of international disputes

is

a problem which

is

usually presented as the peace-

ful change of legally established international relations.

If the

relations are established

by international agreements, one speaks of

the revision of treaties.

It is a widespread view that, in order to pre-

vent war, an international security organization should have institutions to alter situations which are so unbearable to one or the other
state that they

manifests

may endanger

itself in a concrete

may be solved by

the peace.

dispute between two states, the problem

settling the dispute in one of the

However, such a situation may
crete dispute.
ter,

If the dangerous situation

The

just described.

exist without materializing as a con-

may have a more or less general charactwo but many states being involved in it as a

situation

with not only one or

ways
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consequence of the actual status of general international law, although
the situation becomes an imminent danger to the peace only in
the relation between two definite states. In this event, the only
radical solution of the problem lies in a change of the general

law which are at the basis of the situation.
This is possible under existing international law only by a general agreement, and to reach such an agreement is so difficult
that it is practically out of the question. Only an international
legislative organ competent to adopt general rules of law by a maIf only two states
jority vote decision could fulfil such a function.
rules of international

are involved in the situation, especially if the situation

is

constituted

not the changing
of a general rule of international law but the altering or abolishing
of a concrete obligation of one state and the corresponding right of
the other. This is possible under existing law only by an agreement

by a treaty concluded by these

of the states concerned, but

states,

it is

the problem

is

just the fact that such

an agreement

cannot be reached that creates the danger to the peace. If the constituent treaty of a security organization should institute a legislative
organ that is, an agency composed of representatives of all or some
of its members, competent to adopt by a majority vote decision general
rules of law binding upon the members the organization would
assume the character of a super-state, and it is more than likely that
for the time being most states, and particularly the great powers,
would refuse to become parties to such a treaty. Only an organ with

—

—

a

power

restricted to altering or abolishing the concrete obligation

and

the corresponding right of a definite state has a chance, and even then

only a very modest chance, of being accepted as an institution of
an international security organization. This organ may be the
assembly of the organization, composed of representatives of all

members; or
of some of them

composed only of representatives
or it may be a special organ established for
this particular purpose and composed in a way similar to the
assembly or the council. The organ may act on its own initiative
or only if it is requested to act by a party. The more important question is whether it may adopt its decision, binding upon the
parties, by a majority vote or whether unanimity is required.
It
stands to reason that only in the former case can an effective function
of the organ be expected. 1 There can be no doubt that the establishment of an international agency endowed with the power to deprive
a state of a right acquired under existing law or to impose upon a
state an obligation without its consent constitutes a considerable limitation of the sovereignty of this state, and that for this reason many
states will be reluctant to submit their relations with other states to

the

its

;

council,

—
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the authority of such an international agency.

However, they may

be willing to confer this power on an international court in order to
Sovereignty
effect a peaceful change of established legal relations.
is essentially the principle that a state can be legally bound only by,
and not against, its own will, but international courts are as a mat-

—the only organs the procedure of which

—

not subjected
States do not consider their submission to the
to this principle.
decision of an international court to be incompatible with their sovter of fact

is

may

be due to the fact that international courts
unless expressly authorized to decide ex aequo et bono are bound
to apply only existing international law and hence it is assumed
that their decision has a declarative, rather than a constitutive,
ereignty.

character.

This

They cannot

—

abolish or create obligations

and rights but

can only ascertain in an authoritative way which obligations or rights
a state has under the existing law. As pointed out in a previous
connection, 2 this assumption is an illusion. Even in applying a general norm of positive law, a court creates new law, an individual legal
norm which did not exist prior to its decision. No application of a
general norm is possible without interpretation, and there is no clear
borderline between a mere interpretation and an alteration of the law.
The history of law shows that the most remarkable changes of the
existing law have been brought about by its interpretation. This is
especially true if the law- applying organ is a court of last resort
endowed with compulsory jurisdiction. There can be little doubt that
a court with compulsory jurisdiction, established by the constitution of
an international security organization, would serve not only as a most
adequate organ for a peaceful settlement of disputes but would also
fulfill the function of effecting a peaceful change of established legal
relations.

NOTES

"The
1. Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations stipulated
Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the
League of treaties which have become inapplicable, and the consideration of
international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the
:

This provision proved to be entirely

first, because the
because unanimity was
required. In Article 14, the Charter of the United Nations authorizes the
General Assembly to "recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any
situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general
welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from
a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes
and Principles of the United Nations." A decision of the General Assembly
under Article 14 may be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present
and voting. However, the decision is not binding upon the members it is
merely a recommendation.
2. Cf. pp. 17 f.

world."

Assembly had the power only

inefficient,

to "advise" and, secondly,

;
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(dd) Disarmament.

DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY
Disarmament

is

not an isolated problem. 1

It is essentially con-

nected with the problem of international security. 2 It can be solved
only within an effective international security organization. 3 Dur-

ing the discussions of the reduction and limitation of armament which
took place within the League of Nations and later within the United
Nations, the relation between disarmament and security was generally

In particular, the French government insisted and still
insists on this aspect of the problem. 4
Resolution XIV adopted by
the Assembly of the League of Nations in September, 1922, expressly
ascertained the fact that "in the present state of the world many
governments would be unable to accept the responsibility for a serious
reduction of armaments unless they received in exchange a satisfactory guarantee of the safety of their country." This means that security is a condition of disarmament and that there can be no disarmament without security. However, on the other hand, it is no
less true that there can be no perfect security without disarmament.
Hence, Resolution XIV suggested the conclusion of a defensive treaty
of mutual guarantee open to all states but provided that "previous
consent" to a general reduction of armaments should be "the first
condition for the Treaty," that is to say, the guarantee would apply
only after the reduction of armaments had been carried out according to a general plan. 5 Article 1 of Lord Robert Cecil's Draft Treaty
of Mutual Assistance submitted to the Permanent Advisory Committee and included in the report of the Temporary Mixed Commission of 30 August 1923 stated that if any one of the signatories was
recognized.

attacked, "all the others will forthwith take such action as they

may

respectively have agreed to take in accordance with this Treaty

and

any Treaty supplementary hereto, provided that this obligation shall
be conditional upon the reduction of the military forces of the party
attacked." 6 The Geneva Protocol 7 of 2 October 1924 (1) prohibited
war in any circumstance; (2) established means for determining the
aggressor whereby the aggressor should be presumed to be that state
which refused to resort to arbitration, or to comply with an award, or
refused to comply with the provisional measures prescribed by the
Council; (3) made the applications of sanctions compulsory after
the determination of the aggressor; (4) provided that all disputes
should be terminated by a binding decision pronounced by the Permanent Court of International Justice, the Council of the League or
a board of arbitrators. It also contained in Article 21 the following
clauses

:

"If within such period after the adoption of the plan for the
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reduction of armaments as shall be fixed by the said Conference [International Conference for the Reduction of Armament, provided for
in Article 17], the plan has not been carried out, the Council shall

make

This declaration shall render the
present Protocol null and void. ... A signatory State which, after
a declaration to that

effect.

the expiration of the period fixed by the Conference, fails to comply
with the plan adopted by the Conference, shall not be admitted to

by the provisions of the present Protocol." The General Assembly of the United Nations, too, recognized the relation between
disarmament and security. Its Resolution 41 (I) concerning Regulation and Reduction of Armaments, adopted on 14 December 1946
contains the following statements: "The General Assembly, regarding the problem of security as closely connected with that of disarmament, recommends the Security Council to accelerate as much as possible the placing at its disposal of the armed forces mentioned in
Article 43 of the Charter." 8 It must be noted that Article 43 of
the Charter is still not implemented since it proved impossible to conbenefit

clude the special agreements determining the contingents of the
armed forces which the members were to place at the disposal of the

Hence, the security system intended by the Charter is still a fragment.
As is the case with the more general problem of international security, the problem of disarmament has two different aspects: a poSecurity Council.

litical

aspect and a technical one.

The

political

forces,

respon-

during a quarter of a century
to solve this problem have been without result, are well known and
do not need to be discussed. The work of the League, continued by
the United Nations, has shown that no insurmountable technical difficulties stand in the way of a satisfactory legal solution. With regard
to the most difficult topic technically, that of the control of atomic
energy, the Scientific and Technical Committee of the Atomic Energy
Commission declared: "We do not find any basis in the available
scientific facts for supposing the effective control [of atomic energy]
9
is not technologically feasible."

sible for the fact that the serious efforts

PHYSICAL DISARMAMENT

—

disarmament referring
waged, such as men, material

It is usual to distinguish between physical

means by which war is
and money and moral disarmament referring to the state of mind
which tolerates and even leads to war. However, it is generally recognized that there is no physical disarmament without moral disarmament and no moral disarmament without physical disarmament.
to the external
;

—
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Direct and indirect disarmament.
brought about indirectly or directly.

—Physical disarmament may be

The indirect method consists in
attempting to remove the causes of war and thus to create a situation
10
As
in which disarmament will take place, so to speak, by itself.
pointed out in a previous connection,11 this is a Utopian scheme. However, there is a particular cause of war upon which disarmament has
There can be no doubt that armaa direct bearing armament itself.
:

ments, although certainly not the only cause, are one of the causes of

war, especially if the manufacture of war materials is in the hands
of private firms. 12 This view is evidently at the basis of Article 8,
paragraph 5, of the Covenant of the League of Nations "The Members
of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of
:

munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections." It
has been argued that the armaments of one country are caused by and
hence directed against the armaments of a definite other country.
They have the immanent tendency of increasing steadily and thus of
imposing a financial burden upon the respective countries. When
this burden becomes unbearable it may lead to the desperate attempt
by one party to unburden itself by waging war against the other in the
hope of disarming the opponent and forcing him to remain disarmed,
thus removing, at least for a certain time, the main cause of the finanThe principle of preventing war
cially disastrous armaments race.
by armaments the slogan generally opposed to disarmament, si vis
pacem para helium is in the author's opinion rather problematical.
It cannot be denied that its application may in some cases have the
desired effect but neither can it be denied that it may under certain
circumstances bring about just the opposite result. 13
If armaments are a possible cause of war, the direct method of disarmament must be considered to be appropriate. It consists of bringing about the reduction, limitation and even prohibition and elimination of armaments by an international convention imposing upon the
contracting parties corresponding obligations the fulfillment of which
is guaranteed by adequate measures of control and sanctions.

—

—

;

The

object of disarmament :
ing of the term "armaments" ?

constituting armaments?

armaments

defined.

—What

What are the facts,

is

the mean-

factors or elements

There are three: a personal, a material
and a financial element: the men (effectives), the materials and
establishments used by them, and the expenditures required. With
respect to disarmament, the distinction between peacetime and wartime armaments is of importance in so far as reductions, limitations
and prohibitions may be restricted to peacetime armaments, or those
referring to wartime armaments may differ from those referring to
peacetime armaments. In this respect, as far as the personal element

;
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concerned, it is necessary to distinguish between the forces in actual
service in peacetime that is, the permanently organized armed
is

forces

—

— and

the forces prepared for wartime

reserves; and, as far as the material element

—namely,

the trained

concerned, to distinguish the war material and establishments actually used in peacetime

from the material

in reserve

—that

is,

is

the stock of

war material and

preparations- of every description undertaken with a view to war.

As

and the material in reserve, there are two opposite views.
According to one, trained reserves and material in reserve are to be considered as wartime armaments and hence not to be
subject to restriction and limitation. According to the other view,
they are to be considered as peacetime armaments and hence to be subThis divergence of opinion played
ject to reduction and limitation.
an important role in the disarmament discussions within the League
to the trained reserves

of Nations. 14

In addition to the forces and material used in peacetime and prepared for wartime, those ultimate war forces must be considered
which are created during hostilities by means of the general resources
These resources are not themselves
at the disposal of each country.
16
The forces of a country which can be transarmaments so-called.
ferred from peace to war aims are the elements which constitute the
In addition, there are other factors which
so-called war potential.
must be taken into consideration in order to judge the war power of
a nation, such as the size of the territory the number of inhabitants
the military system whether there is a voluntary and professional
army or a conscript army based on obligatory military service; and
certain imponderables such as patriotism, religious faith, internal
cohesion, physical and moral courage, general and technical intelligence, tradition and strength of institutions and the like. 16 There is
a strong tendency to restrict disarmament efforts to permanent peace
armaments whether they are dealing with effectives, materials or ex;

—

penditures, since only these factors are susceptible to effective control. 17

"trained reserves" may include all persons who receive military (naval, air) or pre-military training either under or not under
the control of the government and so-called para-military forces,

The

men
in

in the service of the

arms factories may

forces.

An

merchant marine and in

civil aviation.

also be considered as belonging to the

armed

18

important distinction

effectives.

As

is

that between reducible and irreducible

"irreducible" effectives, the police force

to be necessary for the maintenance of internal order,

force

Men

may

Arms

is

considered

but the police
has one or more
other than individual

be included in the total of effectives if it

of the following characteristics: "(a)

19
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(machine-pistols, Lewis guns, machine-guns

paniment,

etc.)

;

(b)

and weapons of accom-

Training of a military nature, other than

close-order drill, physical training or technical training in the use

of individual arms; (c) Transport, signalling or engineer equipment

of a suitable nature and on a sufficient scale to enable

emCases which might appear
it

to be

ployed by units in tactical operations."
to be doubtful may be decided by taking into account the following
conditions: "(i) Quartering in barracks (ii) Training in groups of
100 men or more; (iii) Organization on a military basis; (iv) Previous military training; (v) The possession of the arms referred to
in sub-paragraph (a) above in such number as to permit of the tacti;

employment of the

them as military units." 20
With respect to the stationing of armed forces, those stationed in
the homeland may be distinguished from those stationed overseas and

cal

forces possessing

those stationed in foreign countries.

War

materials consist of arms (weapons), munitions and imple-

ments of war, as well as the raw material from which they are manufactured. There are three categories of arms and munitions: arms
and munitions designed exclusively for land, sea and aerial warfare;
arms and munitions capable of being used both for military and for
other purposes and arms and munitions having no military value. It
is usual to distinguish between conventional armaments in contradistinction to atomic armaments and other armaments adopted to mass
;

destruction. 21

At

arms of mass destruction are in the foreground of disarmament discussions. Arms of mass destruction are weapons "capable of destroying at a single blow a total number of human lives
greatly exceeding, by a ratio to be established, those which a single
conventional armament could destroy, or those which render the
enemy incapable of righting by means other than the effect of metals
or of explosives." 22 In particular, disarmament discussions revolve
around nuclear (atomic and hydrogen) weapons as well as the raw or
source material necessary for their manufacture: uranium and thorium, whether containing or not containing other important constituents, and the nuclear fuel, whether produced for beneficial or destructive purposes.
Bacterial and chemical weapons and material also
occupy an important place in contemporary disarmament proposals.
In order to be effective, disarmament conventions must deal not
only with the use of arms, munitions and implements of war, but
also with their manufacture and trade as well as with the production
of the raw material, especially the location, mining, milling and dumping of nuclear source material (uranium and thorium ores).
present,
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and in the air, land, sea and air
armaments may be distinguished from each other but their interdependence must not be ignored. Nevertheless, there are tendencies
to restrict disarmament to one of them or to apply different principles

As war

is

waged on

land, at sea

As

23
to the three different types of armaments.

a consequence of the

and aggressive wars, armaments for
defensive purposes may be distinguished from armaments for aggressive purposes. This distinction is of importance in so far as the
aim of disarmament is considered to be to decrease the offensive power
of arms, but to leave untouched the defensive power. 24 Thus, the
problem arises as to how to establish a reliable method of ascertaining
that a force is organized for aggression or for defense only and especially how to find a criterion to distinguish between weapons whose
character is offensive and those whose character is defensive, so that
only the former can be prohibited and eliminated or reduced and
However, it has been argued that weapons of aggression
limited. 26
per se do not exist, and that only weapons of mass destruction,
whether tactical or strategic, 26 should be defined and abolished. As
to atomic weapons, there is a divergence of opinion. According to
one view, atomic weapons are weapons of mass destruction but not
weapons of aggression; they may be used for defensive purposes.
According to the other, atomic weapons are not weapons of defense
but weapons of aggression, for they are intended not for use in the
differentiation between defensive

own territories, but in foreign territories; they are
much to armies in the field as to civilian populations. 27

defense of one's
a threat not so

A more general

aspect of the problem

is

the distinction between the

quantity and the quality of armaments and, consequently, between
quantitative and qualitative disarmament that is, between reducing

—

and limiting only the numerical strength of the armed forces and the
quantity of war material on the one hand or reducing, limiting or even
prohibiting certain categories of armaments (armed forces and war
material) on the other. 28

As

far as the financial aspect of disarmament

generally recognized that there

is

is

concerned,

it is

a certain relation between the size

—

of armaments and the armaments expenditure that is, the sums spent
on the personal and material element of armaments, the so-called na-

Reduction and limitation of expenditure are the most tangible proof of a reduction and
limitation of armaments. This problem will be discussed later. 29

tional defense expenditure or military budget.

THE AIM OF DISARMAMENT
Total or partial disarmament.

There

is

a fundamental conflict

between the view that disarmament should include not only peacetime

;

;

;
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but also wartime armaments and the view that disarmament efforts
should be restricted to permanent peacetime armaments (effectives,
30
Rematerial and expenditure) and not affect wartime armaments.
striction to peacetime armaments has been justified by the assertion
that only this kind of armament is capable of effective control. For
this reason, trained reserves, to be considered as part of wartime armaments, should not be prohibited or limited, and the question of war
31
potential should not be considered.

Another difference of opinion concerns the question of whether disarmament should refer to land, sea and air armaments or only to one
or the other. 32

The disarmament

effort

may aim

—of

—that

at a complete abolition

is,

kinds of armaments. If suc33
The disarmacessful, it would thus affect all states of the world.
ment effort may aim only at a reduction and limitation of armaments. 34
the prohibition and elimination

It

would thus

affect only

Reduction presupposes a

all

states possessing
final level of

substantial armaments.

armaments and especially of
to bring armaments down to a

armed forces. The aim of reduction is
minimum, recognized as necessary, representing the final military
position of each state. Limitation means that, as of a certain date, no
increase in armaments and especially no increase in armed forces is
permitted, and total strength and total amount of equipment is frozen

by disclosure and verification. 35
The reduction and limitation of armaments may be combined with
the complete prohibition of certain types of armaments or of specific
categories of arms and their use in warfare such as nuclear weapons
and other weapons adaptable to mass destruction M chemical and
bacterial weapons 37 submarines, 38 tanks and large mobile guns 39
and aircraft, especially bombers. 40
A kind of partial disarmament is so-called geographic disarmament that is, the limitation or prohibition of armaments and armed
at a level determined

—

forces in certain definite territorial areas or the establishment of

demilitarized zones. 41

There are two reasons why total disarmament is not considered
to be possible: first, the need of each state to have at its disposal a
certain armed force for the maintenance of internal order that is
to say, a national police force, a so-called irreducible component;
second, the necessity of sanctions, especially enforcement measures

—

involving the use of armed force as reactions against violations of
the legal order constituting the security organization and in particular as reactions against violations of the provisions concerning the

reduction and limitation of armaments. 42
are to be executed by the
370624—57
14

As long

as these sanctions

members of the organization employing their

—
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own

national

armed

forces,

no real disarmament

establishment of an international police force

is

—that

The
an armed

possible.
is,

force at the direct disposal of the international organization and
different from, as well as independent of, the armed forces of the

—

members is an essential condition of an effective attempt to reduce
and limit the latter. The only question is whether the abolition
that is, the prohibition and elimination of certain types of armaments or categories of arms mentioned above, must be restricted to
national or may be extended to international armed forces. If the

—

abolition were extended, certain armaments- or arms,

chemical, bacterial weapons, and

e.

bombardment from the

nuclear,

g.,

air,

would be

prohibited even in the execution of international sanctions.

If the

would not be an absolute abolition
but rather an internationalization of these types of armaments or of
the production, possession, and use of such weapons. In this respect,
abolition were not extended, there

the internationalization of military aviation plays an important part
in the discussion of disarmament. 43

Immediate, complete or gradual {progressive) disarmament. One
of the most important conflicts of views in the discussion of the disarmament problem is the conflict between immediate and complete
disarmament and gradual (progressive) disarmament. It is understandable that a state, and especially a great power, would be reluctant to accept the obligation of immediate disarmament because it
would be afraid to become the victim of another state, especially, a
great power, which would not fulfil its obligation. Hence, a plan
of gradual disarmament would have a far better chance of being suc44
In this respect, the question arises as to the relationship
cessful.
between the reduction of armaments and the establishment of an
effective organization for its control.
There is a divergence of opinion between those who suggest that a convention for the reduction
and limitation, or even for the total or partial prohibition and elimination of armaments, should precede the organization of control,
and those who prefer a reverse procedure because they think it a
hopeless attempt to impose upon states the obligation to disarm
without having previously established a legal system guaranteeing the
fulfillment of this obligation.

The

question of the priority of con-

trol plays a decisive role in the discussion of nuclear

hydrogen) disarmament.
posite views

is

45

(atomic and

A kind of compromise between

these op-

the proposal to put into force a convention for the re-

duction and limitation of armaments and for the abolition of nuclear
weapons, simultaneously with the establishment of an effective
control machinery. 46
4
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Proportional or balanced disarmament. In contradistinction to
proportional 47 reduction, the balanced reduction of armaments aims
at avoiding the dangerous situation of disequilibrium between the
different categories of armaments of one state and between the total

armaments— and hence

war power

the

—of different

states.

Only

if

been argued by the representative of France in Committee 1 of the United Nations Disarmament
Commission, might countries "pass from one stage to another without
this disequilibrium is avoided, it has

any danger

to or even

any lessening of their

security.

Each interme-

diate step after the initial balance should be marked by increasing security until a final balance was reached in which no state could menace

the life of

its

neighbors.

Balanced reduction was inconsistent with

proportional reduction. The essential task was to render war imIf peace was threatened by a disequilibrium between cerpossible.
tain armaments, it was not evident how proportional reduction could
lead to security."

48

GEOGRAPHICAL DISARMAMENT
The term "geographical disarmament" has been suggested by
Marshall- Cornwall

49

H.

to designate "the restriction or prohibition of

armaments and armed forces in certain
is

J.

definite territorial areas," that

to say, the demilitarization of particular zones of territory.

There

are two types of demilitarization: 1) the prohibition imposed upon
states against erecting fortifications and stationing troops in certain

zones of their territories in time of peace 2) the exclusion of a certain
part of state territories from any military operations in time of war. 50
;

The purpose

type of demilitarization is to prevent a future
The purpose
conflict by a regime maintained during time of peace.
of the second is to restrict and localize hostilities once they have broken
51
This second type is sometimes termed the "neutralization" of a
out.
definite zone of territory (to be distinguished from the permanent
neutralization of an entire state territory, such as the neutralization of
Switzerland) or, to use a terminology suggested by Marshall-Cornwall, the "immunization" of a definite zone of territory from war. 52
Both types of demilitarization may be effected by international agreement or by the decision of the agency of an international security
of the

first

organization.

Demilitarized zones are normally placed on the frontier between
two states. 53 They may be restricted to the territory of one state
only, as in the case of the unilateral demilitarization of the Rhine-

land in the peace treaty of Versailles, 54 or they may be established
on the territories of two neighboring states on both sides of their
common frontier so that the demilitarized zone is determined, as
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Marshall-Cornwall 55 formulates it, by three lines: the political frontier between the two states and, parallel to it and at a certain distance
on either side, the boundaries of the demilitarized zone. "Although
the zone boundaries are in principle parallel to and equidistant from
the political frontier, they must in practice conform to the local topographic, economic, and military circumstances and must be precisely
demarcated on the ground." 56

REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF EXPENDITURES
armaments may be brought about
not only directly by the reduction and limitation of effectives and
war material but also indirectly by, the reduction and limitation
of the sums to be spent on armaments that is, by the reduction and
limitation of the armaments expenditures or, as it is usually termed,
the national defense expenditures. This term may be defined as
"all expenditure necessitated or entailed by the creation, maintenance and training in time of peace of armed forces and formations
organized on a military basis and by measures immediately connected with the preparation for national mobilization." 37 Although
the reduction and limitation of expenditure are the most tangible
proof of the reduction and limitation of armaments, there can be little

The reduction and

limitation of

—

doubt that the limitation of expenditure is not in itself an adequate
measure of disarmament. Hence, a combination of the reduction
and limitation of effectives and war material and a reduction and
limitation of expenditure is advisable. 58 There may be a limitation
of the total expenditure or limitation by categories that is, by the
separate limitation of expenditure for land, sea, air armaments or
the separate limitation of expenditure for effectives as distinguished
from expenditure for material, the expenses in manufacture, purchase, and upkeep of weapons and other war material. 59 As far
as the distinction between peacetime and wartime armaments is concerned, it would seem that budgetary limitations can be effectively
established only for peacetime armaments.
Some writers hold that an essential condition for an effective
limitation of expenditure is publishing the budget, either the military budget only or the total budget. Some governments which have
not been in favor of budgetary limitations have wished to restrict
budgetary regulations of a disarmament convention to publishing
the budget. There is a divergence of opinion with respect to the
question of whether budgetary limitations should be introduced immediately or should be preceded by a period of years during which
only a system of budgetary publicity is established. The working
of such a system would show to what extent budgetary limitation

—
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The

with which the establishment of budgetary limitations is confronted are, in the main, the fluctuations in the
purchasing power of currency and the differences in the budgetary
systems of the different states. Consequently, unification of the military budget has been suggested. 61
In connection with budgetary publicity and limitation, the abolition
of secret funds has been suggested.
On 29 August 1955, the French government submitted to the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission a draft
agreement on the financial supervision of disarmament and the allocation for peaceful purposes of the funds made available. In this
proposal reductions of military expenditures are combined with the
allocation of the funds made available by these reductions for the
improvement of levels of living and the development of underdeveloped areas. 62
is feasible.

60

difficulties

DEROGATIONS
under certain circumstances a party
to the disarmament convention may be permitted to go beyond the
limits of armaments laid down in the convention. There is a tendency to restrict such permission to the case of an unprovoked aggression.
To provide derogation for any war without any qualification
whatsoever makes any limitation of armaments illusory. Other circumstances under which it has been suggested that derogation might
take place are a civil war, a threatened attack by another state, an unforeseen circumstance such as a new weapon, a radical change in military laws, a radical change in the political organization of a neighboring state, an alteration in the value of money. Such derogation may
be possible only with the consent of the central organ of the security
organization competent to decide the question as to whether these
It is generally recognized that

:

circumstances exist in the concrete case. 63 If the decision is left to
the state concerned the provisions of the disarmament convention
concerning the reduction and limitation of armaments can hardly be
considered to be effective.

CONTROL
Another condition of an effective disarmament convention is an
appropriate measure of control or supervision. In view of the close
connection between control and sanctions it is understandable that
the antagonism of opinions regarding the latter applies also to the
former. There is a view that treaties rest on mutual confidence and
that their fulfillment should not be supervised because any such attempt would only cause suspicion between states, while according
to another view a disarmament convention which does not provide

208
for the establishment of a well organized control system

is

a blank

which is a
64
necessary prerequisite for disarmament.
Control implies two functions: disclosure and verification. The international control agency
must get all the necessary information concerning their armaments
from the states concerned and must have the power to verify them
by inspection and investigation in order to know not only the declared
but also the clandestine activities of the states which are parties to
the disarmament convention. The term "control," especially if applied to atomic disarmament, is sometimes used in a wider sense meaning not only disclosure and verification by inspection but also certain
measures constituting participation of the international control
agency in the direction or management of the undertakings, especially
international ownership of the material essential for the production
cartridge.

It does not guarantee that degree of security

of atomic energy. 65

knowledge of all the facts relevant
to the armaments or disarmament of states is an essential condition
of all disarmament etForts. Hence, the states must be obliged to furnish the necessary information to the international control agency
which may publish it. 66 This information can be verified effectiveh
only by an inspection carried out on the territory of the state whose
armaments are to be investigated. The most important question in
this respect is whether such investigations should have an obligatory
character with the states which as parties to the disarmament convention are obliged to allow on-the-spot inspection, or whether inspection
by the international control agency should be possible only with the
It stands to reason that full

T

consent of the state concerned given in each concrete case.

Inspection

may

be organized as a regular institution on a continuous basis, involving investigating at least once a year and whenever the control

agency considers it necessary, or it may consist only of occasional investigations conducted by the control agency in case of suspicion,
especially at the request of one or more members of the security organization and/or the suspected member itself. It may be conducted not only as a field inspection but also by aerial surveys and
operated by a corps of technically qualified inspectors partly stationed permanently in the countries adhering to the disarmament
program. 67

The reduction and

limitation of

armaments are not possible with-

out the control of the manufacture of, and the trade

and other war material.

in,

arms,

ammu-

There are two different ways of organizing this control: direct national control of manufacture and
trade exercised by the government of each state within its country
under the supervision of an international control agency—that is,

nition,
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or direct international control of
manufacture and trade without the interposition of direct national
indirect international

control;

control.

If the manufacture of arms and ammunition remains in the hands
of private enterprise, it may be controlled by a system of licensing,

with the licenses issued by the national government responsible for
the strict handling of this system to an international control agency
which must be kept informed by the national governments through
detailed reports covering the production by value, number and
weight of licensed private manufacture. The results of these reports should be published. Publishing the results of private
manufacture is an essential element of this system.
National control of the manufacture of arms and ammunition is
perfect if private manufacture is abolished and a state monopoly
of manufacture established. Publicizing state manufacture is a prerequisite of its international control.
The reports submitted to the
international control agency may be verified by inspection on the
spot, but the international control agency may be authorized to call
for explanation only if it has reason to believe that the information
is not reliable or, in case the national manufacture is limited by convention, that the imposed limits have been exceeded.
National control of the trade in arms and ammunition may be exercised by a system of export and import licenses to be issued by the
government. As to publishing and verifying these licenses, the same
principles apply as in the case of manufacture.
Direct international control of private manufacture may be exercised by a system of licenses to be issued not by the national governments but by the international control agency. International control
of this phase of the armaments process reaches its highest degree in the
internationalization of the manufacture of arms and ammunition. Direct international control of the trade in arms and ammunition may be
exercised by having the international control agency issue export and
import licenses; by completely prohibiting the export and import of
war material, except that states unable to manufacture the quantities
allotted to them should be permitted to import the necessary quantities
from abroad; by prohibiting the export and import of certain categories of arms and ammunition, or the import to certain territories by
prohibiting the export to private persons and permitting such export
only to governments. In this case, the question of the recognition of
government arises which, in case of a civil war, may be answered in
;

different

ways by

different authorities.

The

principle of publicity

applies also to a direct international control of the trade in

ammunition.
dispensable. 68

In order to be

effective, inspection

arms and

on the spot

is in-

;
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As

far as the

main organ competent

to carry out the

disarmament
organ be dif-

program is concerned, the first question is should this
ferent from the central organ of the international security organization, and, if so, what should be the relationship between them?
In
view of the fact that disarmament is an essential and probably the
:

most important function of a security system, subordinating the disarmament organ to the central security agency would seem to be adequate. If a special organ for the control of atomic energy is established, the same principle applies to the relationship between this
organ and the disarmament agency. The composition of these organs
may follow the patterns which have been indicated with respect to
the composition of the central organ of a security organization. 69
A highly disputed issue is that of the procedure in the disarmament
agency. In particular, there is the question of whether or not the
principle of the unanimity of the permanent members the so-called
veto right should apply to the decisions of the atomic energy control agency.
It seems that, with the exception of the Soviet Union
and of some other communist governments, most governments agree
that the application of sanctions to be directed against a state which
violates its obligations under the convention concerning control of
atomic energy should not be prevented by the exercise of a veto right. 70

—

—

MORAL DISARMAMENT
Since in the course of the social evolution of civilized nations the
almost general conviction has been formed that destroying human life
is immoral, except as a sanction, it may be possible to bring the mass
of the people to the belief that war, like murder,
If this

is

is

a detestable crime.

achieved, the fundamental principle of the Charter of the

United Nations may become not only the content of an international
convention but also the content of the conscience of mankind. This
71
is the ultimate goal of moral disarmament.

As

means of achieving this goal, an international agreement might
be concluded in which the contracting states would assume the obligation to take certain legislative and administrative measures in the
fields of social and especially political life
that is, in the fields of
press, broadcasting, stage, cinema and, above all, education
for the
a

—

—

purpose of influencing public opinion in favor of the maintenance of
a durable peace. The most drastic measure in this agreement would
be the application of penal law to certain acts dangerous to the peace.
As punishable acts of this kind the following might be considered:
undertakings calculated to disturb international relations, especially
those whose purpose is incitment to war propaganda against peace
agitation with a view to exerting pressure on the government in favor
;
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of

war while negotiations

for the peaceful settlement of a conflict are

founding or directing or even only belonging to an association whose aims are dangerous to the peace; publishing in the
press false and tendentious reports on the international situation. In
addition to a law providing for the punishment of those responsible
for such reports, there would have to be legal provisions stipulating
the right of having a reply to such reports published in the newspaper
concerned or even authorizing the government to suppress the selling
or spreading of the press products containing such reports. Governmental control of broadcasting, theatrical performances, and
cinema shows with a view to preventing any abuse of these instruments of public opinion for the purpose of political propaganda incompatible with the idea of moral disarmament would also be
in progress;

necessary.

The most important means

for effecting such disarmament

is

the

organization of the education of youth and the training of teachers
in a

way

that they

may

inspire the ideal of international peace and

mutual respect between nations.

In this connection,

it

would be neces-

sary to control schoolbooks, especially those dealing with history,

with a view to eliminating everything capable of arousing hatred of
other peoples, and instruction in the basic principles of international
law and in the organization and purposes of the United Nations would
have to be compulsory. 72
Some of these measures would constitute a radical restriction of the
individual freedoms guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic
It may
states, especially the freedom of opinion and its expression.
be very difficult to find a satisfactory compromise between this political
ideal and that of moral disarmament. A still more serious difficulty

confronting every intellectual movement directed against international war is the fact that, in almost all of the states of the world,
there are political parties fostering a revolutionary ideology. As long
as the actual circumstances of social life are such that a considerable
part of the population considers, rightly or wrongly, civil war to be
justifiable or even to be a necessary and inevitable means of improving
their economic and political situation, the attempt to convince them
that international

war should be condemned under

all

circumstances

remains problematical.

NOTES
1.

Cf.

Salvador

De Madariaga, Disarmament

fore hopeless to try to solve the problem of

(1929), pp. 217 ff. "It is therein isolation from the
:

armaments

remaining problems of the world.
There is only one way of solving the
problem of disarmament, and that is by considering it, in the admirable French
saying, as the organization of peace"
.

.

.
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2.

Some modern

international law and politics are rather
disarmament on international security.
speaks ironically of "the slogan 'arbitration, security and

writers in the

field of

sceptical about the possible effect of

Stone, op.

cit., p.

100,

disarmament'." He agrees with the opinion that this "slogan" was "one of the
reactions to the messianic view that arbitration might be a specific against war.
From this aspect the insistence of the slogan that all three elements were inter-

dependent was a brilliant diplomatic device for shaking off tlie hounds of pacifist
idealistic public opinion." Morgenthau, op. cit., pp. 383 ff., says "At the foundation of the modern philosophy of disarmament there is the assumption that men
fight because they have arms" but, so he objects, "Men do not fight because they
have arms. They have arms because they deem it necessary to fight.
Reducing
the quantity of weapons actually or potentially available at any particular time
could have no influence upon the incidence of war; it could conceivably affect
its conduct.
Nations limited in the quantity of arms and men would concentrate
all their energies upon the improvement of the quality of such arms and men
as they possess. They would, furthermore, search for new weapons that might
compensate them for the loss in quantity and assure them an advantage over
:

;

.

.

.

The elimination of certain types of weapons altogether would
have a bearing upon the technology of warfare and, through it, upon the conduct
of hostilities. It is hard to see how it could influence the frequency of war or
do away with war altogether." This pessimistic evaluation of a policy aiming
at disarmament starts from a wrong premise. Such a policy is not necessarily
based on the illusion that disarmament will have the effect of making war impossible. Its reasonable aim is to make war as a profitable enterprise more difficult, and, as far as qualitative disarmament is concerned, to make the conduct
of war more human. Disarmament is not the condition of peace but, as Marion
W. Boggs (Attempts to Define and Limit "Aggressive" Armament in Diplomacy
and Strategy. The University of Missouri Studies, Vol. XVI, no. 1, 1941, p. 104)
Morstates, "only one among the several indispensable conditions of peace."
genthau admits "Disarmament or at least regulation of armaments is an indistheir competitors.

:

pensable step in a general settlement of international conflicts. It can, however,
not be the first step. Competition for armaments reflects, and is an instrument of,
competition for power. So long as nations advance contradictory claims in the
contest for power, they are forced by the very logic of the power contest to advance
contradictory claims for armaments. Therefore, a mutually satisfactory settlement of the power contest is a precondition for disarmament. Once the nations
concerned have agreed upon a mutually satisfactory distribution of power among
themselves, they can then afford to reduce and limit their armaments. Disarmament, in turn, will contribute greatly to the general pacification." However, an
agreement on "a mutually satisfactory distribution of power" necessarily implies
an agreement concerning a mutually satisfactory "disarmament or at least regu"In international
lation of armaments." For, as Morgenthau says (p. 27)
politics
armed strength as a threat or a potentiality is the most important
material factor making for the political power of a nation." His attempt to
:

.

.

.

power from military power is of no avail. He defines popower as "the mutual relations of control among the holders of public
authority" (p. 26) and by "control" he understands "a psychological relation
between two minds" (p. 27). This relationship, he says, "is of the essence of
political power." From this assumption he concludes that political power "must
be distinguished from force in the sense of the actual exercise of physical vioarmed strength, that is military power, is essenlence." But if as he affirms
tial to political power, political power cannot be separated from military power.
distinguish political

litical

;

—

—

:
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On

the other hand, even the "actual exercise of physical violence" implies "a

Weapons,
is, political power.
dead things. As instruments of military or police
power they must be operated by men directed by the holders of public authority.
If military power is an essential element of political power, the settlement of the
power contest cannot be a precondition for disarmament, because the former is
not possible without the latter.
3. The idea that disarmament is an essential element of an effective system
of international security was at the basis of the Covenant of the League of
Nations in which the provisions concerning disarmament were placed immediately after those concerning the organization of the League and preceded
psychological relation between two minds," that
prisons, electric chairs are

They read as follows
"Article 8. 1. The Members of the League recognize that the maintenance
of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations. 2. The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments. 3. Such clans
shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every 10 years. 4. After
these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of
armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the
Council. 5. The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private
enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The
Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can
be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those Members of the
League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of
war necessary for their safety. 6. The Members of the League undertake to
interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments,
their military, naval and air programs and the condition of such of their indusArticle 9. A permanent Comtries as are adaptable to warlike purposes.
mission shall be constituted to advise the Council on the execution of the
provisions of Articles 1 and 8 and on military, naval and air questions generally."
In this respect there is a remarkable difference between the Covenant and
the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter does not, as the Covenant did,
recognize that the maintenance of peace requires disarmament. It contains,
however, two Articles which deal with this problem. One is Article 11, paragraph 1, which authorizes the General Assembly to "consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security,
including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments" and to "make recommendations with regard to such principles to the
Members or to the Security Council or to both." The other is Article 26, which
runs as follows
"In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of
international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the
world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred
to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for
the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments." The Charter
recognizes that a certain relationship exists between peace and disarmament,
but only in so far as the maintenance of peace should be promoted with the
"least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources."
Consequently, in the same sentences in which it refers to disarmament, it provides for the establishment of principles or the formulation of plans for the
those concerning the settlement of conflicts.

—

:

regulation of armaments.

:
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Nevertheless, an interpretation of the Charter

is

possible according to which

may

be subjected to much stricter obligations with respect to their disarmament than were the members of the League.
The latter could be obliged to disarm only under the "plan" formulated by
the Council under Article 8, paragraphs 3 and 4, that is to say, the obligation
the

members

of a

of the United Nations

member to reduce its own armaments could be
The same seems to be true with respect to

consent.

established only with

its

Article 26 of the Charter.

The "plans" formulated by the Security Council "for the establishment of a
system for the regulation of armaments" may provide for reduction of armaments they must be "submitted to the Members of the United Nations." That
means that they are binding upon the members only if accepted by them. The
obligation is established by a treaty concluded by the Members with the Organi;

zation.
Unlike Article 8, paragraph 4, of the Covenant, Article 26 does not
provide expressly for the "adoption" of the plan by the member, but if the
plan of the Security Council is to be submitted to the members, it can be only
for the purpose of being adopted by them. According to Article 26 if inter-

—

—

preted as an isolated provision of the Charter the members are free to
accept or not accept the plan formulated by the Security Council and submitted
to them.
The situation appears in a different light if Article 39 is taken into
consideration. The fact that a member refuses to accept the plan providing for
a reduction of its armament may, in the opinion of the Security Council, constitute a threat to the peace and consequently may lead directly or indirectly
(through the intermediate stage of a non-accepted recommendation of the Security Council) to an enforcement action. If this measure is interpreted as a
sanction and if the obligation to behave in a certain way is considered to be
constituted by a sanction to be executed in case of contrary behavior, the
Security Council, in submitting the plan referred to in Article 26 to a member,
may impose upon it the obligation to act in conformity with this plan; in
other terms, the Security Council has the power to enforce its plans for the
establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments which may provide
for disarmament.

The same interpretation may be applied to Article 11, paragraph 1. According to the wording of this provision, the members are free to accept or not to
accept the "recommendations" made to them by the General Assembly with regard to the principles governing disarmament and the regulations of armaments.
However, under Article 39, the Security Council may determine that the refusal
to accept the recommendation of the General Assembly is a threat to the peace
and may enforce this "recommendation." Such enforcement of the disarmament plans of the Council was impossible under the Covenant.
4. A memorandum on "French Opinion and the Problem of Collective Security" by Georges Scelle and Ren6 Cassin [Collective Security, pp. 66 ff.] contains the statement that "the French government upholds the formula security
first, then disarmament or at least disarmament in proportion to the degree of
security obtained," and at the 32nd meeting of the First Committee of the
General Assembly of the United Nations on 3 December 1946 the representative
of France declared
"It must be recognized that disarmament is impossible
without security organized along parallel lines. The French position on this
point between the two World Wars was well known and had been justified by
:

:

:

siibsequent events".

Journal of the United 'Nations, No.

The full text of Resolution XIV runs as follows
"(a) The Assembly, having considered the report

48, pp. 197-8.

5.

of the

Temporary Mixed

Commission on the question of a general Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, being

of

;
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opinion that this report can in no way affect the complete validity of all the
Treaties of Peace or other agreements which are known to exist between States
and considering that this report contains valuable suggestions as to the methods

by which a Treaty of Mutual Guarantee could be made^ effective,

is

of the opinion

that:
1.

No scheme

for the reduction of armaments, within the meaning of

Article 8 of the Covenant, can be fully successful unless

it is

general.

2.

In

the present state of the world many Governments would be unable to accept the
responsibility for a serious reduction of armaments unless they received in

exchange a satisfactory guarantee of the safety of their country. 3. Such a
guarantee can be found in a defensive agreement which should be open to all
countries, binding them to provide immediate and effective assistance in accordance with a prearranged plan in the event of one of them being attacked, provided that the obligation to render assistance to a country attacked shall be
limited in principle to those countries situated in the same part of the globe.
In cases, however, where, for historical, geographical, or other reasons, a country
in special danger of attack, detailed arrangements should be made for its
defense in accordance with the above-mentioned plan. 4. As a general reduction of armaments is the object of the three preceding statements, and the Treaty
of Mutual Guarantee the means of achieving that object, previous consent to
This reduction
this reduction is therefore the first condition for the Treaty.
could be carried out either by means of a general Treaty, which is the most
desirable plan, or by means of partial treaties designed to be extended and open
In the former case, the Treaty will carry with it a general
to all countries.
reduction of armaments. In the latter case, the reduction should be proportionate to the guarantees afforded by the Treaty. The Council of the League,
after having taken the advice of the Temporary Mixed Commission, which will
is

examine how each of these two systems could be carried out, should further
formulate and submit to the Governments for their consideration and sovereign
decision the plan of the machinery, both political and military, necessary to
bring them clearly into effect.
(b) The Assembly requests the Council to submit to the various Governments the above proposals for their observations, and requests the Temporary
Mixed Commission to continue its investigations, and, in order to give precision
to the above statements, to prepare a Draft Treaty embodying the principles
contained therein."
6. Cf. the Historical Survey of the Activities of the League of Nations regarding the Questions of Disarmament 1920-1937.
United Nations, General Assembly, Doc. A/AC.50/2, 18 June 1951 (hereafter referred to as Doc. A/AC.50/2),
p. 27.
7.

Cf. pp. 85, 100.

The

full text of Resolution 41 (I) of the General Assembly runs as follows:
In pursuance of Article 11 of the Charter and with a view to strengthening
international peace and security in conformity with the Purpose and Principles
of the United Nations,
The General Assembly,
Recognizes the necessity of an early general regulation and reduction of
8.

"1.

armaments and armed
"2.

forces.

Accordingly,

The General Assembly,
Recommends that the Security Council give prompt consideration to formulating the practical measures, according to their priority, which are essential to
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provide for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces
and to assure that such regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces
will be generally observed by all participants and not unilaterally by only some
of the participants. The plans formulated by the Security Council shall be submitted by the Secretary-General to the Members of the United Nations for consideration at a special session of the General Assembly. The treaties or conventions approved by the General Assembly shall be submitted to the signatory States
for ratification in accordance with Article 26 of the Charter.
"3. As an essential step toward the urgent objective of prohibiting and eliminating from national armaments atomic and all other major weapons adaptable now
and in the future to mass destruction, and the early establishment of international
control of atomic energy and other modern scientific discoveries and technical
developments to ensure their use only for peaceful purposes,
The General Assembly,
Urges the expeditious fulfilment by the Atomic Energy Commission of its
terms of reference as set forth in section 5 of the General Assembly resolution of
24 January 1946.
"4. In order to ensure that the general prohibition, regulation and reduction of
armaments are directed towards the major weapons of modern warfare and not
merely towards the minor weapons,
The General Assembly,
Recommends that the Security Council expedite consideration of the reports
which the Atomic Energy Commission will make to the Security Council and that
it facilitate the work of that Commission, and also that the Security Council
expedite consideration of a draft convention or conventions for the creation of
an international system of control and inspection, these conventions to include
the prohibition of atomic and all other major weapons adaptable

now and

in

the future to mass destruction and the control of atomic energy to the extent
necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes.
"5. The General Assembly,
Further recognizes that essential to the general regulation and reduction
of armaments and armed forces, is the provision of practical and effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against
the hazards of violations and evasions.
Accordingly,
The General Assembly,
Recommends to the Security Council that it give prompt consideration to
the working out of proposals to provide such practical and effective safeguards in
connection with the control of atomic energy and the general regulation and
reduction of armaments.
"6. To ensure the adoption of measures for the early general regulation and
reduction of armaments and armed forces, for the prohibition of the use of atomic
energy for military purposes and the elimination from national armaments of
atomic and all other major weapons adaptable now or in the future to mass
destruction, and for the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to
ensure its use only for peaceful purposes,
There shall be established, within the framework of the Security Council,
which bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security, an international system, as mentioned in paragraph 4,
operating through special organs, which organs shall derive their powers and
status from the convention or conventions under which they are established.

;

;
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The General Assembly,
Regarding the problem of security as closely connected with that of
armament,
"7.

dis-

the Security Council to accelerate as much as possible the
placing at its disposal of the armed forces mentioned in Article 43 of the Charter
Recommends the Members to undertake the progressive and balanced with-

Recommends

drawal, taking into account the needs of occupation, of their armed forces stationed in ex-enemy territories, and the withdrawal without delay of their armed
forces stationed in the territories of Members without their consent freely and
publicly expressed in treaties or agreements consistent with the Charter and not
contradicting international agreements
Further recommends a corresponding reduction of national armed forces,
and a general progressive and balanced reduction of national armed forces.
"8. Nothing herein contained shall alter or limit the resolution of the General
Assembly passed on 24 January 1946, creating the Atomic Energy Commission.
"9. The General Assembly,
Calls upon all Members of the United Nations to render every possible assistance to the Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission in order
to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and collective security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human

and economic resources."
9. Atomic Energy Commission.
port to the Security Council
10. Cf.
11.

Madariaga,

op.

Official

(New York,

cit., p.

Records.

Special Supplement.

Re-

1946), p. 37.

84.

C/.p.23.

Madariaga, op. cit., pp. 8 ff.
Madariaga, op. cit., pp. 11 ff. says " 'If you want peace, prepare for war.'
That is, if you want something, get ready for the reverse of it. Such is the
slogan generally opposed to disarmament efforts. Now, there was a time when
circumstances may have given some practical justification to this theoretically
untenable position. Nations small and sparsely distributed over unorganized
territories, small armies, simple weapons, little or no international faith, unstable compacts, personal influence on international policies, may have made the
method of preparedness the cheapest, safest, and most practicable, nay, the
only one available. To-day, the situation is the very reverse. The world has
grown small for our power and resources. Only one opinion and only one
market cover the face of the earth. Wars absorb the whole population of the
countries which engage in them, exact all their resources and consume all the
raw materials which human ingenuity has wrung from the recesses of the earth.
In this condition, preparing for war means securing indefinite stocks of food
and raw materials of all kinds and/or absolute control over the sources of supply and communications. Short of that, preparing for war is a worthless slogan
or a misleading falsehood. Preparedness leads therefore to the scramble for
raw materials and territories, and thence to increasing causes of friction and
possibilities of war."
14. Doc. A/AC.50/2, p. 40.
12. Cf.
13.

:

15. Cf.,ibid., p. 39.

Madariaga, op. cit., pp. 42 ff.
Doc. A/AC.50/2, p. 49.
18. The Problem of pre-military training and military training given outside
the army was considered by the Technical Committee of the League of Nations
16. Cf.,
17. Cf.

:

;

:

:

:
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Disarmament Conference in connection with the question of effectives. The
Technical Committee gave the following definition of pre-military training
"Pre-military training shall be deemed to mean all kinds of training involving military instruction given in any form whatsoever (voluntary or compulsory) to young men aged 18 years at least, prior to their possible incorporation in the armed forces."
The Technical Committee defined military training elsewhere than in the
army as being training having the following principal characteristics
"(1) Technical and tactical training in the use of individual and collective

arms used

in

war

Training for

field service in varied terrain.
In addition, individual cases will have to be examined, taking into account especially the following criteria
(1) Training of cadres in indoor (on the map) and outdoor exercises;

(2)

(2)

Use of military means of

Doc. A/AC.50/2,

liaison

and

signalling."

p. 104.

The Draft Convention adopted in the first reading by the General Commission
League of Nations Disarmament Conference (Conf. D, 163 (1) Geneva,
Series of League of Nations Publications IX. Disarmament,
Sept. 22nd, 1933.

of the

1935, IX/4, pp. 600

Part

II,

ff.

[hereafter referred to as Draft Convention] ), contained in
"Article 9.
I, Effectives, the following provision

Disarmament, Section

:

understood that effectives consist of (a) all officers, officer cadets, N. C. O.s,
soldiers, sailors, airmen, reservists and all other persons (such as military
It is

:

officials

of the administrative, sanitary or veterinary services or military agents)

of equivalent status
forces; (b) Persons
tions

who perform a day's duty in the land, sea and air armed
who perform a day's duty in police forces or similar forma-

under the conditions prescribed

least 18 years of age

who

in Article 12; (c) All other persons of at
receive military training under the control of the

is taken to mean any training given to persons of at
age under the military regulations in force in each country or
under regulations containing similar provisions, with a view to preparing those
who receive it for performing military duty in the armed forces. The main
characteristics of this training are as follows: (1) Technical and tactical training in the use of individual and other than individual arms used in war; (2)
training in field service over broken ground. Furthermore, in the examination
of special cases, account will be taken, in particular, of the following criteria
(1) theoretical (by map) and field training of cadres; (2) use of military
methods of communication and signalling. Physical and sports training in the
strict sense of the term, for whatever purpose given, shall not be regarded as
military training." As to Article 12, cf. p. 200 and note 20.
19. According to a proposal made on 20 June 1932 by President Hoover to
the General Commission of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation
of Armaments. Doc. A/AC.50/2, p. 88.
20. According to the Draft Convention, Part II, Section I, Article 12.
Article
13 ran as follows: "The following naval effectives should be included among
effectives of the land armed forces: (a) Effectives employed in land coast defense; (b) Marines who are normally in excess of those assigned to, or destined
for, service afloat; (c) Effectives coming within the classification of similar
formations (as defined in Article 12). Naval personnel serving ashore in the fleet

State.

Military training

least 18 years of

services (training, administrative, etc.), as well as those assigned to, or destined
for, service afloat, will

be included in the effectives of the sea armed forces."

.
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21.

On

12 August 1948, the Commission for Conventional

Armament

to advise the Security Council "1. that it considers that all

armed

resolved

armaments and

atomic weapons and weapons of mass destruction, fall within
and that weapons of mass destruction should be defined to include
atomic explosive weapons, radio-active material weapons, lethal chemical and
biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have charits

forces, except

jurisdiction

acteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other
weapons mentioned above. 2. that it proposes to proceed with its work on the
basis of the above definition." Doc. S/C.3/32/Rev. 1. 18 August 1948.
22. This definition was formulated by the representatives of France in Committee 1 of the United Nations Disarmament Commission on 4 April 1952.
United Nations Disarmament Commision. Official Records. Special Supplement No. 1. Second Report of the Disarmament Commission (hereafter
referred to as Second Report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission),

pp. 49-50.
23. Treaties on limitation of naval armaments are the Treaty signed by the
United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan at Washington on 6 February 1922 the Treaty signed by the same Parties at London on 22
April 1930 the Treaty signed by the United States of America, France and Great
Britain at London on 25 March 1936 the Agreement concerning Limitation
of Naval Armament and the Exchange of Information concerning Naval Construction between Great Britain and Germany, London, 17 July 1937 and the Agreement signed at the same date between Great Britain and the Soviet Union.
24. Cf. Doc. A/AC.50/2, p. 68.
25. Cf. Boggs, op. cit., passim and p. 99.
26. Second Report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, p. 50.
:

;

;

;

;

27. Ibid., pp. 50, 59.

Boggs, op. cit., pp. 13 f. "When quantitative disarmament is applied, the
absolute magnitude of the various categories of the armed forces is fixed at certain
levels, all forces in excess of that limit being disbanded or destroyed, and their reestablishment prohibited. This involves at the outset definition of an armament
ratio, or determination of the relative quantities of armaments permitted to
various states after the entry into force of a disarmament convention." The
qualitative principle "involves the abolition or reduction, or alternatively, the internationalization in a world police force, of those classes of weapons and forms of
military organization deemed 'aggressive,' or 'offensive,' or of greater utility to the
28.

:

attack than to the defense."
29. Cf. pp. 206 f
30. In its report to the Assembly of the League of Nations on 7 September
1922 the Temporary Mixed Commission established by the Council on 25 February 1921 laid down the principle that limitation of armaments must be based
Cf. Doc. A/AC.50/2, p. 16.
of the French Draft Convention submitted to the
basis
the
31. Principles at
Preparatory Commission on 23 March 1927. Cf. Doc. A/AC.50/2, pp. 49-50;

on peacetime strength.

Cf. also loc.

cit., p.

39.

The first concrete proposal for disarmament considered by the Temporary
Mixed Commission and submitted by Lord Esher (United Kingdom) suggested
32.

a definite scale of reduction of peace effectives to be adopted by the various
governments of Europe and was based on a fixed ratio of standing military

and
p. 89,

air forces.

It did not refer to sea

and Doc. A/AC.50/2,
370624—57

15

p. 16.

armament.

Cf.

Madariaga,

op.

cit.,
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At the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission for the DisarmaConference
(established on 12 December 1925 by the Council of the League
ment
of Nations) which opened on 30 November 1927 the delegation of the U.S.S.R.
proposed measures for the complete and immediate abolition of all land, naval
and air forces along the following lines: "(a) The dissolution of all land, sea
and air forces and the non-admittance of their existence in any concealed form
whatsoever; (b) The destruction of all weapons, military supplies, means for
chemical warfare and all other forms of armament and means of destruction
In the possession of troops or in military or general stores; (c) The scrapping
of all warships and military air vessels; (d) The discontinuance of calling
up citizens for military training either in armies or public bodies; (e) Legislation for the abolition of military service, either compulsory, voluntary or
33.

recruited;

(f)

Legislation prohibiting the calling-up of trained reserves;

(g)

The destruction of fortresses and naval and air bases; (h) The scrapping
of military plans and factories and of war industry equipment in general
industrial works; (i) The discontinuance of assigning funds for military purposes both on State budgets and those of public bodies; (k) The abolition
of military, naval and air ministeries, and the dissolution of general staffs and
military administrations, departments and institutions of every kind; (1) The
legislative prohibition of military propaganda and military training of the population and of military education both in State and public bodies; (m) The
legislative prohibition of the patenting of all kinds of armaments and means
of destruction with a view to the removal of incentives to the invention of

the same;

(n)

Legislation

making the infringement of any of the above
(o) The withdrawal or corres-

stipulations a grave crime against the State;

ponding alteration of

both of national or international
Doc. A/AC.50/2, pp. 51-2.
34. The President of the League of Nations Preparatory Commission, opening
the general discussion of the problem of disarmament on 21 March 1927 declared
that the Commission's task was to consider reduction of armaments and not
all

legislative acts,

scope, infringing the above stipulations."

"disarmament" which has a false ring, as in the present state of affairs it
must be regarded as difficult of achievement. Doc. A/AC.50/2, p. 47.
35. Second Report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, p. 50.
36. Resolution 1 (I) of the General Assembly concerning the establishment of
the Atomic Energy Commission, adopted on 24 January 1946, provided "The
Commission shall proceed with the utmost despatch and enquire into all phases of
the problem, and make such recommendations from time to time with respect to
them as it finds possible. In particular, the Commission shall make specific proposals: (a) for extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific
:

information for peaceful ends; (b) for control of atomic energy to the extent
necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes; (c) for the elimination
from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons
adaptable to mass destruction (d) for effective safeguards by way of inspection
and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and
evasions. The work of the Commission should proceed by separate stages, the
successful completion of each of which will develop the necessary confidence of the
world before the next stage is undertaken." And in Resolution 808 (IX) adopted
on 4 November 1954, the General Assembly, "Reaffirming the responsibility of the
United Nations for seeking a solution of the disarmament problem .... 1. Concludes that a further effort should be made to reach agreement on comprehensive
;

—

,

to be embodied in a draft international disarmament
convention providing for: (a) The regulation, limitation and major reduction

and coordinated proposals
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armed forces and all conventional armaments (b) The total prohibition of
the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of
every type, together with the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for
peaceful purposes; (c) The establishment of effective international control,
through a control organ with rights, powers and functions adequate to guarantee
the effective observance of the agreed reductions of all armaments and armed
forces and the prohibition of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and to
ensure the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only; The whole programme to be such that no State would have cause to fear that its security was
of all

;

—

endangered

.

.

."

Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare signed at Geneva
17 June 1925 contains the following provisions "Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or
devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world
and whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in Treaties to which
the majority of Powers of the world are Parties and to the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of International Law, binding
alike the conscience and the practice of nations [the signatories] declare That
the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to Treaties
37.

The Protocol

for the Prohibition of the

:

;

;

:

;

prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to
the use of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between

—

themselves according to the terms of this declaration. The High Contracting
Parties will exert every effort to induce other States to accede to the present
Protocol. Such accession will be notified to the Government of the French Republic, and by the latter to all signatory and acceding Powers, and will take
effect on the date of the notification by the Government of the French Republic.'*
The League of Nations Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference adopted on 23 April 1929 the following text to be included in a draft
convention on disarmament "The High Contracting Parties undertake, subject
to reciprocity, to abstain from the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases and of all analogous liquids, substances or processes.
They undertake unreservedly to abstain from the use of all bacteriological methods of
warfare." Doc. A/AC.50/2, p. 57.
The Draft Convention contained in Part IV. Chemical Warfare, among
"Article 47.
The following provision is acothers, the following provisions
cepted as an established rule of International Law The use of chemical, incendiary or bacterial weapons as against any State, whether or not a party to
the present Convention, and in any war, whatever its character, is prohibited.
This provision does not, however, deprive any party which has been the victim
of the illegal use of chemical or incendiary weapons of the right to retaliate,
subject to such conditions as may hereafter be agreed." "Article 51. All preparations for chemical, incendiary or bacterial warfare shall be prohibited in time
of peace as in time of war."
A United States Working Paper (DC/15) setting forth a summary of proposals
made by the United States representative in the United Nations Disarmament
Commission on 15 August 1952 contains the following passage "It is proposed
that appropriate stages in an effective system of disclosure and verification
agreed measures should become effective providing for the progressive curtailment of production, the progressive dismantling of plants, and the progressive
:

—

:

:

:

destruction of stockpiles of bacterial weapons and related appliances. Under this
programme, with co-operation in good faith by the principal States concerned, all
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and appliances connected therewith should be
completely eliminated from national armaments and their use prohibited." Second Report of the Disarmament Commission, pp. 154-5.
38. On 22 February 1932 the United Kingdom submitted to the League of Nations Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments the prohibiDoc. A/AC.50/2,
tion and abolition of submarines as a humanitarian measure.
bacterial

weapons and

all facilities

p. 83.

39.

On

22 June 1932 the United States delegation proposed the abolition of all
and of large mobile guns to the Conference. Doc.

tanks, of chemical warfare

A/AC.50/2, p. 88.
40. The United Kingdom draft convention submitted to the League of Nations Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments provided for
the complete abolition of bombing from the air except for police purposes in
certain outlying regions. It was recognized that a complete abolition of military and naval aircraft must depend on an effective supervision of civil aviation.
Doc. A/AC.50/2, p. 106.
205 f.
April
42. On 24
1952 the representative of the United States submitted to the
United Nations Disarmament Commission proposals entitled "Essential Principles for a disarmament programme" (DC/C.1/1). Point 3, referring to the
41.

Cf. pp.

goal of disarmament, reads as follows

"To reach and keep this goal, internamust be entered into by which all States would reduce their
armed forces to levels, and restrict their armaments to types and quantities,
necessary for (a) The maintenance of internal security, (b) Fulfilment of
obligations of States to maintain peace and security in accordance with the
United Nations Charter." Second Report of the Disarmament Commission,
:

tional agreements

p. 63.

Cf.

note46.

During the debate on the program of work in committee 1 of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the representative of France declared the
forces strictly necessary to a state within the framework of a collective security
system may be determined as follows: "(a) police forces required for the security of metropolitan territory;

(b)

forces required for the security of geo-

graphically separated dependent territories; (c) reserves for the foregoing
Secforces, and (d) forces to be placed at the disposal of the United Nations."

ond Report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, p. 51.
43. The Report on International Sanctions contains, on p. 125, the follow"Many believers in the idea of an international police have
ing statements
been led to concentrate on the air arm by a knowledge of the tremendous
advance that has been made in the technique of aviation since this weapon was
The greatest preoccupafirst employed for military purposes in the Great War.
governments
and
peoples
to-day
is
fear of an attack from
tion in the minds of
the air an attack which can be launched at almost a moment's notice, which
can strike immediately at the heart of a nation, and against which many military
•experts and responsible statesmen have declared there can be no sure defence.
It is felt that the danger of such an attack can be removed only by the abolition
of national air forces, but that nations cannot be expected to renounce the use
of the air weapon unless they are assured of the support of an international
air force in case of unprovoked aggression on their territory."
44. On 24 March 1928 the Preparatory Commission for the League of Nations
Disarmament Conference adopted the following resolution: "The Preparatory
Commission for the Disarmament Conference Having examined the bases of
the Draft Convention for Immediate, Complete and General Disarmament sub:

—

:

:

;
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mitted by the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, notes that the immense majority of its members are of opinion that this draft, while in harmony with the
ideals of mankind, is under existing world conditions incapable of being carried
into execution, that it can only be realized when international organization is
strengthened in respect both of methods of pacific procedure and the system of

by the Comalong
the lines
pursued
mission as a basis for its work, which work must be
already mapped out." Doc. A/AC.50/2, pp. 54, 55. On 19 April 1932 the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference, created on 8 February 1932,
adopted the following resolution "In view of the opinions expressed during the
discussion at the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments,
the General Commission considers that the reduction of armaments, as provided
for in Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, shall, after this Conference has taken the first decisive step of general reduction to the lowest possible level, be progressively achieved by means of successive revisions at approsanctions,

and

that, consequently, the said draft cannot be accepted

:

Log.

priate intervals.'

tit. p. 89.

In a draft resolution submitted to the Subcommittee of the UN Disarmament
Commission (Doc. DC/SC. 1/15/Rev. 1, 8 March 1955, and DC/SC. 1/22, 1 April
1955), Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States suggested that
the disarmament program should be carried out in the following stages
"I. After the constitution and positioning of the control organ which shall be
carried out within a specified time, and as soon as the control organ reports that
it

is

able effectively to enforce them, the following measures shall enter into
(a) conventional armament and overall military manpower shall be

effect:

December 1954, or such other date as may be
agreed at the World Disarmament Conference, (b) overall military expenditure,
both atomic and nonatomic, shall be limited to amounts spent in the year ending
31 December 1954, or such other date as may be agreed at the World Disarmament
limited to levels existing on 31

Conference.

As soon as the control organ reports that it is able effectively to enforce
them, the following measures shall enter into effect: (a) one-half of the agreed
reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces shall take effect (b) on
completion of (a) the manufacture of all kinds of nuclear weapons and all other
prohibited weapons shall cease.
III. As soon as the control organ reports that it is able effectively to enforce
them, the following measures shall enter into effect: (a) The second half of the
agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces shall take effect
i. The total prohibition and elimination of nuclear
(b) On completion of (a)
weapons and the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear materials for peaceful
purposes shall be carried out ii. The total prohibition and elimination of all other
prohibited weapons shall be carried out; The measures mentioned in subparagraphs II and III above shall be accompanied by consequent reductions in
II.

;

:

:

;

over-all military expenditure."

Second Report of the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission, Annexes 4 and 11.
On 4 May 1956, Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States of
America submitted to the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission a
Declaration (DC/SC.1/46), which contains the following statements: "(1) The
programme [of disarmament] should proceed by stages. Progress from one state
to another must depend upon the satisfactory execution of the preceding stage
and upon the development of confidence through the settlement of major political
problems. (2) The programme should begin, under effective international con-

;
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trol, with significant reductions in armed forces, to such levels as are feasible in
present unsettled world conditions. There should be corresponding reductions in
conventional armaments and in military expenditures. Further reductions would
be carried out as world conditions improved. (3) The programme should provide

an appropriate stage and under proper safeguards, the build-up of stockweapons would be stopped and all future production of nuclear
material devoted to peaceful uses.
(4) The programme should provide for a
that, at

piles of nuclear

strong control organization with inspection rights, including aerial reconnaissance, operating from the outself and developing in parallel with the disarmament
measures. The control measures should also provide against major surprise
attack. This is particularly important so long as it is impossible to account for
past production of nuclear material. (5) Preliminary demonstrations of inspection methods on a limited scale would help to develop an effective control system
and could bring nearer agreement on a disarmament programme. (6) Provision
should be made for the suspension of the programme, in whole or in part, if a
major State failed to carry out its obligations or if a threat to peace under Chapter
VII of the United Nations Charter should occur." Third Report of the SubCommittee of the Disarmament Commission (Doc. DC/83, 4 May 1956), Annex
10.

45. In its Third Report, adopted on 17 May 1948 (AEC/31), the Atomic
Energy Commission declared that it had reached an impasse in its work caused
by the fact that the U. S. S. R. held that a convention outlawing atomic weapons
and providing for the destruction of existing weapons must precede any control agreement on the ground that the prohibition of atomic weapons would be
the only valid reason for the establishment of a control system, whereas the
majority of the Commission considered that such a convention, without safeguards, would offer no protection against non-compliance.
46. The majority of the members of the United Nations was always of the opinion that effective control is an essential condition of reduction and limitation of
armaments and especially of the prohibition of nuclear weapons. Resolution 192
(III), adopted by the General Assembly on 19 November 1948, contains the
statement "that the aim of the reduction of conventional armaments and armed
forces can only be attained in an atmosphere of real and lasting improvement in
international relations, which implies in particular the application of control of

atomic energy involving the prohibition of the atomic weapon." In Resolution
299 (IV) adopted on 23 November 1949, the General Assembly "Calls upon
Governments to do everything in their power to make possible, by the acceptance
of effective international control, the effective prohibition and elimination of
atomic weapons"; and in Resolution 290 (IV) adopted on 1 December 1949, the

General Assembly "Calls upon every nation" "To agree to the exercise of national
sovereignty jointly with other nations to the extent necessary to attain international control of atomic energy which would make effective the prohibition of
atomic weapons and assure the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only."
By resolution 502 (VI) adopted by the General Assembly on 11 January 1952
the Atomic Energy Commission was dissolved and the Disarmament Commission
of the United Nations established. In this resolution the General Assembly
declared that "in a system of guaranteed disarmament there must be progressive
disclosure and verification on a continuing basis of all armed forces including
para-military, security and police forces and all armaments including atomic"
and that the implementation of this disclosure and verification "is recognized as

—

—

a first and indispensable step in carrying out the disarmament programme
envisaged in the present resolution'' (Italics supplied). In its Resolution

:
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914 (X), adopted on 16 December 1955, the General Assembly declared that
"a control system" "is the keystone to any disarmament agreement."
47. On 23 March 1928 the delegation of the U.S.S.R. submitted to the Prepatory Commission for the League of Nations Disarmament Conference a draft
convention for the reduction of armaments, the principles of which were stated
by the representatives of the U.S.S.R. on 17 April 1929 as follows: "(1) The
substantial reduction of existing armaments; (2) the carrying out of reduction on proportional principles, with certain deviations in favour of less protected
and smaller countries; (3) the establishment at once of a coefficient for proportional reduction." In response, the Commission declared on 19 April 1929
that it "has not seen its way to adhere to the method of reduction based on
the proportional principle" and to accept "numerical coefficients for the reducThe
(Doc. A/AC.50/2, p. 55)
tion of armaments" constituting this method.

Resolution 502 (VI) adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations
on 11 January 1952 required a "balanced" reduction of all armed forces and
all

armaments.

The representative
group of States was

France declared also "The security of a State
indivisible.
Effectives and conventional armaments
or
could not be separated from atomic armaments because the latter contributed
Proportional reduction
to national security as long as they were not prohibited.
could not be considered since there was neither
(1) equilibrium between
atomic armaments nor (2) equilibrium between conventional armaments and
armed forces. The existing disequilibrium in one area compensated for the
48.

of

:

—

disequilibrium in the other.

The

U.S.S.R. proposals for prohibition of atomic

weapons and proportional reductions of conventional weapons would reduce the
security of some instead of increasing the security of all. The only way to
meet the problem was to group atomic and conventional elements and to take
the precarious initial balance resulting from the excess of atomic bombs on
one side, and the excess of divisions on the other, as a point of departure. If
there were an excess of one thousand atomic bombs on one side and
an excess of one hundred divisions on the other, the suppression of the atomic
bomb should involve the dissolution of the hundred divisions. By this means
a first balanced reduction would have been effected with a general increase
of security. After that, matters would be simpler, since all armaments would
be conventional. Reduction might take place in three stages, in each of which
each country would reduce its arms by one-third of the difference between the
minimum levels set for it and the forces existing on the completion of the first
reduction."
Second Report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission,
pp. 51, 52.

On

May

Kingdom and the United States submitted
Disarmament Commission a Working Paper setting
forth proposals for fixing numerical limitations of all armed forces.
(United
Nations Disarmanent Commission Doc. DC/10, 28 May 1952.) It contained the
following working formula fixing numerical ceilings for China, France, the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of
America
"(a) There should be fixed numerical ceilings for China, France, the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of
America which should be worked out with a view to avoiding a disequilibrium of
power dangerous to international peace and security among themselves or with
other States and thus reducing the danger of war. It is tentatively suggested
that the maximum ceilings for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United
to

28

1952 France, the United

the United Nations

;

:

:

;

;

;

:
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States of America and China should be the same and fixed, at, say, between
and 1.5 million, and the maximum ceilings for the United Kingdom
and France should be the same and fixed at, say, between 700,000 and 800,000.

1 million

(b) For all other States having substantial armed forces there should be
agreed maximum ceilings fixed in relation to the ceilings agreed upon for the
Five Powers. Such ceilings should be fixed with a view to avoiding a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security in any
area of the world and thus reducing the danger of war. The ceilings would
normally be less than one per cent of the population. Moreover, they should
be less than current levels except in very special circumstances."
A Supplement to this Working Paper (DC/12, 12 August 1952) reads as

follows
"I. It is

of

armed

contemplated that any agreement for the numerical limitation

forces would necessarily

comprehend

:

(a) provisions to ensure that production of

of

armaments bear a

direct relation to the

armaments and

quantities

amounts needed for permitted armed

forces
(b) provisions for composition of permitted armed forcas and armaments in order to prevent undue concentration of total permitted armed forces
in a manner which might prejudice a balanced reduction
(c) procedures in conformity with the directive contained in paragraph
6 (b) of General Assembly Resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952, for the
negotiation within overall limitations of mutually agreed programmes of armed
forces and armaments with a view to obtaining early agreement on these matters

among

States with substantial military resources.
Procedures should be worked out to facilitate the development under the
auspices of the Disarmament Commission, of mutually agreed programmes of
armed forces and armaments to be comprehended within the treaty or treaties
referred to in General Assembly Resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952.
II. One possible procedure, advanced for the purpose of initiating discussions,
might be
(a) Upon acceptance of the proposals set forth in Working Paper DC/10
with respect to fixing numerical limitation of all armed forces, arrangements
might be made for a conference between China, France, Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, United Kingdom and the United States of America with a view to
reaching tentative agreement among themselves, by negotiation, on
(1) the distribution by principal categories of the armed forces that
they would consider necessary and appropriate to maintain within the agreed
numerical ceilings proposed for their armed forces
(2) the types and quantities of armaments which they would consider
necessary and appropriate to support permitted armed forces within the proposed
numerical ceilings
(3) the elimination of all armed forces and armaments other than those
expressly permitted, it being understood that provision will be made for the
elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for the
effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of
atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.
The distribution of armed forces within stated categories and the types and
volumes of armaments would not necessarily be identic, even for States with
substantially equal aggregate military strength, inasmuch as their needs and
responsibilities may be different. The objective of the agreements would be to
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reduce the possibility and fear of aggression and to avoid a disequilibrium of
to international peace and security.
Such agreements would
necessarily be tentative, as they would have to be reviewed in the light of further
tentative agreements to be reached, as indicated in the following paragraph.
(b) When tentative agreement is attained at the conference referred to in
paragraph II (a), regional conferences might be held, to be attended by all
governments and authorities having substantial military forces in the respective
regions, for the purpose of reaching similar tentative agreement on
(1) the overall numerical ceilings for the armed forces of all such
governments and authorities, as proposed in paragraph 5 (b) of the Tripartite
Working Paper on numerical limitations,
(2) the distribution of the permitted armed forces within stated

power dangerous

categories,
(3) the type and volume of armaments necessary and appropriate to
support the permitted armed forces, and
(4) the elimination of all armed forces and armaments other than those
expressly permitted, it being understood that provision will be made for the
elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for the
effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic
weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.
(c) Thereafter a draft treaty might be worked out, as contemplated in
operative paragraph 3 of General Assembly Resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January
1952, comprehending and bringing into a balanced relationship all essential
components of the programme.
III. The timing and co-ordination of the reductions, prohibitions and eliminations should ensure the balanced reduction of overall armed strength and
should avoid creating or continuing any disequilibrium of power dangerous to
international peace and security during the period that the reductions, prohibitions and eliminations are being put into effect. In particular, the initial limitations or reductions in armed forces and permitted armaments and the initial
steps toward elimination of prohibited armaments should commence at the same
time.
Subsequent limitations and reductions should be synchronized with subsequent progress in elimination of prohibited armaments. An international control authority should be established at the commencement of the programme and
it should be in a position to assume progressively its functions in order to ensure
the carrying out of such limitations, reductions, curtailments and prohibitions.
Thus, when the limitations and reductions in armed forces and permitted armaments provided by the treaty or treaties are completed, production of prohibited
armaments will have ceased, existing stockpiles of prohibited armaments and
facilities for their production will have been disposed of, atomic energy will be
utilized for peaceful purposes only, and the international control authority will

have assumed its full functions."
49. J. H. Marshall-Cornwall, Geographic Disarmament, A Study of Regional
Demilitarization (London, 1935), pp. v, vi.
50. Cf. Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law, 7th Ed., Vol. II, p. 244;
Marshall-Cornwall, op. cit., p. 49; John Fischer Williams, Chapters on Current
International Law and the League of Nations, 1929, p. 111.
Marshall-Cornwall, op. cit., p. 49.
Marshall-Cornwall, op. cit., p. 50.
53. It has been asserted (cf. Paul de Lapradelle, La Frontier e, 1928, pp. 14
ff.
and Marshall-Corn wr all, op. cit., p. 174) that an international frontier cannot
be expressed by a line, that it is, from a fiscal and especially from a military51.
52.

;
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strategic point of view, by its very nature a zone

which may extend to a depth

of several miles.
54. The provisions of the Treaty of Versailles concerning the demilitarization
of the Rhineland ran as follows "Art. 42. Germany is forbidden to maintain or
construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right
bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometres to the east of the Rhine. Art. 43.
:

In the area defined above the maintenance and the assembly of armed forces,
either permanently or temporarily, and military manoeuvres of any kind, as well
as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilization, are in the same way
forbidden. Art. 44. In case Germany violates in any manner whatever the provisions of Articles 42 and 43, she shall be regarded as committing a hostile act
against the Powers signatory of the present Treaty and as calculated to disturb
the peace of the world." Example of provisions by which the prohibition of
fortifications is imposed upon a defeated state, is Article 47 of the Peace Treaty

with Italy, 10 February 1947, which runs as follows:

"1.

(a)

The system

of

permanent Italian fortifications and military installations along the FrancoItalian frontier, and their armaments, shall be destroyed or removed, (b) This
system is deemed to comprise only artillery and infantry fortifications whether
in groups or separated, pillboxes of any type, protected accommodation for
personnel, stores and ammunition, observation posts and military cableways,
whatever may be their importance and actual condition of maintenance or state
of construction, which are constructed of metal, masonry or concrete or excavated in the rock. 2. The destruction or removal, mentioned in paragraph 1
above, is limited to a distance of 20 kilometers from any point on the frontier
as defined by the present Treaty, and shall be completed within one year from
the coming into force of the Treaty. 3. Any reconstruction of the above-mentioned fortifications and installations is prohibited. 4. (a) The following construction to the east of the Franco-Italian frontier is prohibited permanent
fortifications where weapons capable of firing into French territory or territorial
waters can be emplaced permanent military installations capable of being used
to conduct or direct fire into French territory or territorial waters; and permanent supply and storage facilities emplaced solely for the use of the abovementioned fortifications and installations, (b) This prohibition does not include
other types of non-permanent fortifications or surface accommodations and
installations which are designed to meet only requirements of an internal character and of local defence of the frontiers. 5. In a coastal area 15 kilometers
deep, stretching from the Franco-Italian frontier to the meridian 9° 30' E.,
Italy shall not establish any new, nor expand any existing, naval bases or
permanent naval installations. This does not prohibit minor alterations to, nor
the maintenance in good repair of, existing naval installations provided that
their overall capacity will not thereby be increased."
Other examples of demilitarization of defeated states in Disarmament and Security, pp. 449 ff.
:

;

:

Marshall-Cornwall, op. cit., p. 175.
56. In April, 1923, with reference to the proposed Treaty of Mutual Guarantee,
Lord Robert Cecil submitted to the Temporary Mixed Commission on the Reduction of Armaments a memorandum which contained the following provisions:
"1. One of the principal difficulties in connection with the proposed Treaty
of Mutual Guarantee, which is under the consideration of the Temporary Mixed
Commission, consists in devising means for deciding at a moment of international crisis, when hostilities between two States may have begun, which
State is the aggressor. It is proposed, in the draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee
which the Commission is studying, that the Council should decide this point
55.

229
and that, failing other evidence, that State should be considered the aggressor
whose troops have violated the territory of another. 2. It is clear that decision on this point would be greatly facilitated if, on the frontier between the
two States about to go to war, there existed a demilitarized frontier zone into
which both of them had undertaken not to send their military forces. If,
further, the supervision of such a zone were in the hands of a Commissioner or
Commissioners appointed by the League of Nations, who could, if either State
sent its forces into the zone, so report to the Council of the League, the decisions of the Council would be immensely facilitated.

3.

The establishment

League supervision might, in other ways,
and concrete security against the danger of sudden attack to the
States on both sides of them. In the agreements under which such zones
would be established, provisions might be inserted which would have the effect
of such demilitarized zones under

give definite

of rendering military concentrations, preparatory to attack, very difficult,
if not impossible, to carry out.
These provisions, although they would not

render attack impossible, might cause such delay to the aggressor as to make
the position of the State attacked much stronger than it otherwise would
It is therefore perhaps worth while for the Temporary Mixed Commission
be.

examine how such zones might be established. 4. It may be suggested that
an agreement for the establishment of such a frontier zone might include
some or all of the following stipulations: (a) The zone should be at least
thirty miles in width,
(b) In this zone, no military fortifications or works
of any sort should be constructed,
(c) The conscription or military training
of the population of the zone should be forbidden,
(d) No military camps
to

or barracks should be situated in the zone,
(e) No depots of military stores
or ammunition should be allowed,
(f ) No manufacture of arms or munitions
of any sort should be carried out For ensuring that these obligations were

—

effectively carried out in the whole zone, the Council of the League should
appoint an impartial Commissioner or Commissioners who should reside in
the zone and who should have the necessary rights of inspection and inquiry.
Such Commissioners should be directly responsible to the Council and removable
by them alone." The memorandum contains also suggestions concerning the
use of railways in the demilitarized zones and the organization of a permanent
international police force to render more effective the provisions establishing
the demilitarized zones.
The Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance submitted by the Fourth Assembly
of the League of Nations on 25 October 1923 to the Governments concerned
contained the following article: "Article 9. In order to facilitate the application of the present treaty, any High Contracting Party may negotiate, through
the agency of the Council, with one or more neighbouring countries for the
establishment of demilitarized zones. The Council, with the co-operation of
the representatives of the parties interested, acting as members within the
terms of Article 4 of the Covenant, shall previously ensure that the establishment of the demilitarized zone asked for does not call for unilateral sacrifices
from the military point of view on the part of the High Contracting Parties

interested."

The General Convention to Improve the Means of Preventing War, signed at
Geneva, 26 September 1931, contains the following provisions: "Article 2. If,
in circumstances which, in the Council's opinion, do not create a state of war
between the Powers at issue which are parties to the present Convention, the
forces of one of those Powers enter the territory or territorial waters of the
other or a zone demilitarized in virtue of international agreements or fly over
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them, the Council

may

prescribe measures to ensure their evacuation by those

The High Contracting Parties undertake to carry out without delay the
measures so prescribed, without prejudice to the other powers vested in the
Council under Article 11 of the Covenant. Article 3. If the circumstances referred to in Article 2 have arisen, or if, in the event of a threat of war, special
conditions, and in particular the possibilities of contact between the forces of
the parties to the dispute, render it necessary, the Council may fix lines which
must not be passed by their land, naval, or air forces and, where necessary in
order to avoid incidents, by their civil aircraft. The High Contracting Parties
undertake to comply with the Council's recommendations in this matter. The
lines referred to in the previous paragraph shall, if possible, be fixed by agreement with the parties at issue. Failing such agreement, the Council shall fix
the lines with the consent of the party whose forces are affected, provided always
that this does not involve the withdrawal of the forces further back than the
exterior lines of the defense organizations existing on the frontier of the High
Contracting Parties concerned at the time when the Council of the League of
Nations takes its decision, and that the lines do not involve the abandonment of
any other work, position or line of communication essential to the security or
the supplies of the party concerned. It shall, in every case, rest with the Council
to determine the period within which the said lines shall be fixed under the
forces.

The High Contracting Parties further agree to give
commanders of their forces, if the Council so recommends, to

conditions specified above.
strict orders to the

take

necessary precautions to avoid incidents."
This is the definition which was presented by the Technical Committee
appointed by the National Defense Expenditure Commission established by
the General Commission of the League of Nations Disarmament Conference on
25 February 1932. Cf. Preliminary Report on the Work of the Conference.
Series of League of Nations Publications. IX Disarmament, 1936, IX. 3 (hereafter referred to as Preliminary Report on the Work of the Conference) p. 96.
all

57.

:

58.

As

to the question of the limitation of defense expenditures, the

Com-

mittee of Experts on Budgetary Questions constituted on 29 November 1926
by Sub-Commission B of the Preparatory Commission for the League of Nations Disarmament Conference was of the opinion "that a limitation of armaments through limitations of expenditures only would be an inadequate basis
for a

convention.

The Committee

of Experts

wondered whether the

limi-

tation of expenditure could not be regarded as a subsidiary measure forming a
useful supplement to the direct

method of disarmament.

.

.

."

Doc. A/AC.50/2,

p. 43.

The Draft Convention framed by the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference contained only one Article referring to limitation of the
material of land armament namely Article 10 which ran as follows "The annual expenditure of each High Contracting Party on the upkeep, purchase and
manufacture of war material for land armaments shall be limited to the figures
laid down for such Party, and in accordance with the conditions prescribed in
the annex ... to this Article.'* The Article embodied a decision taken by the
Preparatory Commission to apply to land war material the principle of indirect or

—

—

:

budgetary limitation. Preliminary Report on the Work of the Conference, p. 58.
59. Certain members of the Committee of Experts preferred total limitation
because it would involve less uncertainty than a limitation by categories. Doc.
A/AC.50/2, p. 43.
The Draft
60. Cf. Preliminary Report on the Work of the Conference, p. 97.
Convention contains in Part II, Section III (Expenditure) the following pro-
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vision formulated by the Technical Committee of the National Defense Expenditure Commission: "Article 1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to give

defense expenditure on a basis of
•reciprocity and in the manner and by the dates stipulated in the following
articles and in the Annex to this part of the Convention which includes a genSuch publicity shall
eral definition and a conventional list of such expenditure.
apply to all national defence expenditure, irrespective of the nature and origin
full publicity periodically to their national

—

which such expenditure is met."
"The most important part of the system submitted (by the Technical
Committee) for approval consisted of the Model Statement, in which all national defense expenditure would be entered in a uniform manner for all States.
The scheme had been unanimously adopted by the Technical Committee as a
framework in which both limitation and publicity might operate." Preliminary
of the resources out of
61.

Report on the

The

62.

lows

:

"1.

Work

of the Conference,

p. 98.

principles of this draft agreement (DC/SC.1/27) are formulated as fol-

The purpose

of the present agreement

is to institute

financial supervision

of military expenditure, together with a system of penalties, for the purpose of en-

couraging disarmament.

It provides for the allocation of the

funds thus

made

available for the improvement of levels of living and the development of under-

developed areas. 2. This form of financial supervision has an economic purpose.
ensuring the automatic transfer of part of the savings effected on military expenditure to orders for goods for peaceful purposes, the agreement averts the
threat of an economic crisis which might be brought about by mass disarmament
carried out within a short period of time. 3. The agreement provides certain
advantages for States which, in a form recognized as accurate and complete by
the supervisory body, submit evidence of the implementation of the budgetary
reductions which they have agreed to make. States will agree to reduce their
total military expenditure by a percentage that will increase from year to year,
the increase in the percentage from one year to the next being based on the
amount of the original defence budget. However, once evidence of the reductions
has been accepted as being accurate and complete, this percentage will, for the
current budgetary year, refer only to the actual amount of expenditure that
is to say, to a lower sum.
4. The amounts thus made available will be transferred to an international fund which will ensure that they are used in accordance with the criteria laid down by the agreement. 5. The computation, administration and distribution of these resources will be assured by an international
fund for development and mutual assistance, hereinafter called 'the Fund'.
6. Upon the entry into force of the convention for the reduction of conventional
armaments and armed forces, the abolition of weapons of mass destruction and
the setting up of a control, the percentage reductions in military expenditure envisaged in the agreement will be calculated in such a way as to correspond to
the reductions in conventional armaments and armed forces and the abolition
of weapons of mass destruction as provided for in connexion with each stage
of the disarmament convention."
Second Report of the Sub-Committee of the

By

—

Disarmament Commission, DC/71, Annex 16.
63. The Draft Convention contained the following provision
tion II

(Derogations)

in Part V, Sec-

:

Should any of the High Contracting Parties become engaged
in war, or should a change of circumstances constitute, in the opinion of any
High Contracting Party, a menace to his national security, such party may
suspend temporarily, in so far as he is concerned, any provision or provisions of
the present Convention, other than those contained in Articles 30, 34 and 47
to 62, provided that: (a) such High Contracting Party shall immediately notify
"Article 88.

;

232
the other High Contracting Parties, and at the same time the Permanent Disarmament Commission, of such temporary suspension and of the extent thereof
(b) in the event of the suspension's being based upon a change of circumstance,
the High Contracting Party concerned shall, simultaneously with the said notification, communicate to the other High Contracting Parties and to the Permanent Disarmament Commission a full explanation of such change of circumstances. Thereupon the other High Contracting Parties shall promptly

—

—

advise as to the situation thus presented. When the reasons for such temporary suspension have ceased to exist, the said High Contracting Party shall
reduce his armaments to the level agreed upon in the Convention and shall make
immediate notification to the other High Contracting Parties."
64. Sub-Commission A of the Preparatory Commission for the League of
Nations Disarmament Conference "reported complete disagreement on the question of the supervision

and control of armaments.

The delegations

of Chile,

Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States were of the
opinion 'that any form of supervision or control of armaments by an international body is more calculated to foment evil and suspicion between States
than to foster international confidence.' In their opinion, the execution of the
provisions of any convention foi the reduction and limitation of armaments
'must depend upon the good faith of nations scrupulously to carry out their
great obligations.' The delegations of Chile, Italy, Japan and the United States
were of the opinion that the inquiries contemplated would in general prove
'fruitless and illusory' and that, to be successful, such inquiries would have to be
carried out under strict and definite rules which would involve serious commitments in regard to military secrecy on the part of the State subjected to the
inquiry. The same delegations, except the United States, recalled the opinion
expressed by the Permanent Advisory Commission that 'the undertakings contained in Article 8 are based on a belief in the pledged word and the Permanent
Advisory Commission does not consider that it is either opportune or conducive
The French delegation,
to great efficiency to substitute mistrust for this belief.'
together with a number of others, did not agree that inquiries would be 'illusory
and ineffective.' They recalled the precedent of the Opium Convention, which
had introduced a system of supervision, and that of the Treaty for the Pacific
Settlement of Disputes between American States, signed at Santiago de Chile
on 3 May 1923. They also mentioned the League's right of investigation under
the clauses of the Treaties of Peace relating to the disarmament of the defeated
States, which showed that it was technically possible for armaments to be placed
under supervision. They concluded that all States must be given a guarantee
that the convention would be strictly observed, 'because, in the absence of such
a guarantee, those States which regulated their armaments in strict accordance
with the provisions of the convention would lack that adequate security upon
which such limitation of armaments as were accepted should properly be based.' "
Doc. A/AC.50/2, p. 45.
The Draft Constitution of International Organization, prepared by the Special
Committee appointed in 1943 by Secretary of State Hull (cf. supra, p. 137), contained in Article 10 the following provisions "6. Members of the International Organization undertake to keep the general level of their armaments
at the lowest point consistent with the effective discharge of their respective
obligations for maintaining international security, and consistent with their
internal domestic security. They accordingly agree that the Council, acting
on the advice of the General Security and Armaments Commission, and taking
into account the special responsibilities for security assumed by some states,
Italy,

:

:
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and the collective responsibility assumed by all, shall establish the minimum
and maximum limitations on armaments and the regulations of previously agreed
categories of armaments potential to be observed by all members. These limitations and regulations shall be subject to modification and amendment by the
Council. 7. The limitations and regulations established under paragraph 6 shall
be enforced by a system of inspection carried out by the Armaments Inspection
Commission under the direction of the General Security and Armaments Commission. Member States agree freely to accord to the Commission every facility
(Postwar Foreign Policy, pp. 478 f.)
for the effective discharge of its mission."
Disarmament Commission, the
United
Nations
65. In Committee 1 of the
French representative, discussing the concept of "control" found one of the diffiIn
culties "to be the different meanings of the word in different languages.
French 'control' comported the establishment of fact for a higher authority
which wished to know and verify the accuracy of what subordinate authorities
reported in the exercise of their duties.

In the

USSR

the separation of action

from control was even more clear-cut. On the other hand, in English-speaking
countries control implied an idea of direction and was, therefore, not so clearly
separated from action. In the Commission for Conventional Armaments, France
had argued for its conception of control, i. e., without participation in the direc-

management

The United Nations plan for the
word 'control' to include participation in management.
It might be useful to set down either in the Commission
or in a small committee the various meanings of the word "control," in order
to determine to what extent it might be possible to devise a plan better or no
less effective than the United Nations plan.
That alternative could not be the
USSR plan of 1947 which had already been judged to be less effective." Second
Report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, p. 52. The representative of the U.S.S.R. declared that the "USSR, like the French delegation, understood 'control' to mean verification and inspection, not management
and ownership, as it was understood by the United States." Ibid., p. 57.
In Resolution 191 (III), adopted on 4 November 1948, the General Assembly
approved the general findings (part II C) and recommendations (part III) of
the first report and the specific proposals of part II of the second report of the
Atomic Energy Commission "as constituting the necessary basis for establishing
an effective system of international control of atomic energy to ensure its use
only for peaceful purposes and for the elimination from national armaments of
atomic weapons in accordance with the terms of reference of the Atomic Energy
tion or

of the undertakings.

control of atomic energy, however, used the

Commission."

This

is

the so-called United Nations plan for control of atomic

The recommendations of the Atomic Energy Commission follow, in principle, the so-called Baruch Plan, that is, the United States Proposal for the International Control of Atomic Energy presented to the United Nations Atomic En-

energy.

ergy Commission by the United States Representative, Mr. Bernard Baruch, on
14 June 1946. In this plan the United States proposed "the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority, to which should be entrusted all phases
of the development and use of atomic energy, starting with the raw material and
including
1. Managerial control or ownership of all atomic-energy activities potentially

dangerous to world security.
2.

3.

Power to
The duty

control, inspect,

and

license all other atomic activities.

of fostering the beneficial uses of atomic energy.

4. Research and development responsibilities of an affirmative character
intended to put the Authority in the forefront of atomic knowledge and thus

:
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comprehend, and therefore to detect, misuse of atomic energy.
Authority must itself be the world's leader in the field of
atomic knowledge and development and thus supplement its legal authority with
to

enable

To be

it

to

effective, the

the great power inherent in possession of leadership in knowledge.''

The following measures were submitted as representing the fundamental
features of the Baruch Plan
"1. General.
The Authority should set up a thorough plan for control of

—

the field of atomic energy, through various forms of ownership, dominion,
licenses, operation, inspection, research and management by competent per-

provided for, there should be as little interference as may
be with the economic plans and the present private, corporate and state relaAfter this

sonnel.

is

tionships in the several countries involved.

—

2. Raw Materials.
The Authority should have as one of its earliest
poses to obtain and maintain complete and accurate information on world
plies of uranium and thorium and to bring them under its dominion.
precise pattern of control for various types of deposits of such materials

have

to

depend upon the geological, mining,

refining,

pur-

sup-

and economic facts

The
will
in-

volved in different situations.
The Authority should conduct continuous surveys so that it will have the most
complete knowledge of the world geology of uranium and thorium. Only after
all current information on world sources of uranium and thorium is known to

can equitable plans be made for their production, refining, and distribution.
Primary Production Pluns. The Authority should exercise complete
managerial control of the production of fissionable materials. This means that
it should control and operate all plants producing fissionable materials in dangerous quantities and must own and control the product of these plants.
4. Atomic Explosives.
The Authority should be given sole and exclusive
Research activities
right to conduct research in the field of atomic explosives.
in the field of atomic explosives are essential in order that the Authority may
keep in the forefront of knowledge in the field of atomic energy and fulfil the
objective of preventing illicit manufacture of bombs. Only by maintaining its
position as the best-informed agency will the Authority be able to determine
the line between intrinsically dangerous and nondangerous activities.
us

all

—

3.

—

5.

Strategic Distribution of Activities and Materials.

—The

activities en-

trusted exclusively to the Authority because they are intrinsically dangerous to
security should be distributed throughout the world. Similarly, stockpiles of
raw materials and fissionable materials should not be centralized.

—

A function of the Authority should be pro6. Non-Dangerous Activities.
motion of the peacetime benefits of atomic energy.
Atomic research (except in explosives), the use of research reactors, the
production of radioactive tracers by means of non-dangerous reactors, the use of
such tracers, and to some extent the production of power should be open to nations and their citizens under reasonable licensing arrangements from the
Authority. Denatured materials, whose use we know also requires suitable
safeguards, should be furnished for such purposes by the Authority under lease
or other arrangement. Denaturing seems to have been over-estimated by the
public as a safety measure.
7. Definition of Dangerous and Non-Dangerous Activities.
Although a
reasonable dividing line can be drawn between dangerous and non-dangerous
activities, it is not hard and fast.
Provision should, therefore, be made to assure constant reexamination of the questions and to permit revision of the
dividing line as changing conditions and new discoveries may require.

—
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—

Operations of Dangerous Activities. Any plant dealing with uranium
or thorium after it once reaches the potential of dangerous use must be not only
subject to the most rigorous and competent inspection by the Authority, but its
acual operation shall be under the management, supervision, and control of
the Authority.
9. Inspection.
By assigning intrinsically dangerous activities exclusively to
the Authority, the difficulties of inspection are reduced. If the Authority is the
only agency which may lawfully conduct dangerous activities, then visible operation by others than the Authority will constitute an unambiguous danger signal.
Inspection will also occur in connection with the licensing functions of the
Authority.
8.

—

10.

Freedom

of Access.

—Adequate ingress and egress for

all qualified repre-

must be assured. Many of the inspection activities
of the Authority should grow out of, and be incidental to, its other functions.
Important measures of inspection will be associated with the tight control of raw

sentatives of the Authority

a keystone of the plan. The continuing activities of prospecting, survey, and research in relation to raw materials will be designed not
only to serve the affirmative development functions of the Authority, but also to
assure that no surreptitious operations are conducted in the raw materials field
materials, for this

is

by nations or their

citizens.

11.

—The personnel of the Authority should be recruited on a basis
oy Stages. —A primary step in the creation of the system of

Personnel.

of proven competence but also so far as possible on an international basis.
12.

control

Progress
is

the setting forth, in comprehensive terms, of the functions, responsibili-

powers and limitations of the Authority. Once a Charter for the Authority
has been adopted, the Authority and the system of control for which it will be
responsible will require time to become fully organized and effective. The plan of
control will, therefore, have to come into effect in successive stages. These should
be specifically fixed in the Charter or means should be otherwise set forth in the
Charter for transitions from one stage to another, as contemplated in the resolution of the United Nations Assembly which created this Commission.
13. Disclosures.
In the deliberations of the United Nations Commission on
Atomic Energy, the United States is prepared to make available the information
essential to a reasonable understanding of the proposals which it advocates.
Further disclosures must be dependent, in the interests of all, upon the effective
ratification of the treaty. When the Authority is actually created, the United
ties,

—

States will join the other nations in

making available the further information
As the

essential to that organization for the performance of its functions.

successive stages of international control are reached, the United States will be

prepared to yield, to the extent required by each State, national control of
activities in this field to the Authority.
14.

International Control.

—There will be questions about the extent of con-

be allowed to national bodies, when the Authority is established. Purely
national authorities for control and development of atomic energy should to
the extent necessary for the effective operation of the Authority be subordinate
trol to

neither an endorsement nor a disapproval of the creation of naThe Commission should evolve a clear demarcation of the
scope of duties and responsibilities of such national authorities."
to

This

it.

is

tional authorities.

With

respect to violations, the

Baruch Plan suggested "In the agreement,
may wish and as immediate and
:

penalties of as serious a nature as the nations

certain in their execution as possible, should be fixed for
1.

Illegal possession or use of

370624—57
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an atomic bomb

;

:

;

;

;
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2.

Illegal possession, or separation, of atomic material suitable for use in

an

atomic bomb
3.

Seizure of any plant or other property belonging to or licensed by the

Authority
4. Wilful interference with the activities of the Authority
5. Creation or operation of dangerous projects in a manner contrary to, or
in the absence of, a license granted by the international control body."
The Intcrnationul Control of Atomic Energy. Groicth of a Policy. The
Department of State. Publication 2702, pp. 141 ff.
The Recommendations of Part III of the First Report of the Atomic Energy
Commission, approved by the Resolution 191 (III) of the General Assembly, contain a statement to the effect that the Convention should include provisions
"specifying the means and methods of determining violations of its terms, setting
forth such violations as shall constitute international crimes, and establishing the
nature of the measures of enforcement and punishment to be imposed upon persons and upon nations guilty of violating the terms of the treaty or convention.
The judicial or other processes for determination of violations of the treaty
or convention, and of punishments therefor, should be swift and certain. Serious
violations of the treaty shall be reported immediately by the international
control agency to the nations parties to the treaty, to the General Assembly,
and to the Security Council." Less serious infringements may be dealt with
by the control agency itself. Chapter 3 of Part II of the Second Report of the
Atomic Energy Commission (Official Records, Second Year, Special Supplement, p. 37) contains the following special proposal: "The Agency shall reserve
the power to modify regulations and to suspend or revoke licenses in case of
violation by the licensee. In case of refusal by the agency to grant a license
applied for by a nation, or in case of suspension or revocation of a license
granted, the applicant or licensee shall have the right of appeal to an international court, and the agency shall have the right to maintain its control
measures."
66. In a resolution adopted by the first Assembly of the League of Nations
in 1920, it was recognized that, while the final and general limitation of armaments was subordinate to certain preliminary conditions, the first step towards
disarmament should, nevertheless, be taken without delay. The Temoprary

Mixed Commission, considering that the ascertaining of the military strength
of different States was one of the preliminary conditions for the final and general limitation of

armaments, decided

to carry out a statistical investigation

on

the armaments of the various countries for the years 1913-1921. Under the
direction of the Temporary Mixed Commission, the Secretariat prepared the
"Statistical Enquiry on Armaments, First Series of Data," and the "Budget Expenditure on National Defence, 1913 and 1920-1922." The Third Committee, in
the report it presented to the Assembly on 22 September 1922 took the view that
the "Statistical Enquiry on Armaments" was of great scientific interest but of
no practical value to the subsequent work of the Temporary Mixed Commission.
The Committee found that the national security of each country depended very
largely on the existing military strength of other countries. It therefore proposed to the Assembly that the subject of the statistical inquiry should be the

existing military strength.

While expressing the view that potential military

strength should perhaps be studied at a later date, it proposed that for the time
being the investigation should be limited to the two following points peacetime
armaments and expenditure on armaments. Doc. A/AC. 50/2, p. 18.
:

:
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In accordance with the Assembly resolution of 27 September 1922 concerning
the exchange of military information between States, the Temoprary Mixed
Commission suggested on 15 August 1923 that
"The engagements undertaken by the signatories of the Covenant in the last

paragraph of Article 8 might now be begun by giving instructions

to the Secre-

number of data
regarding the matters referred to in the last paragraph of Article 8."
Pursuant to that suggestion, the Council adopted a resolution authorizing the
Secretariat to publish a year-book beginning with an experimental volume dealing with the figures for 1923, it being understood that the information would be
drawn solely from official publications. The objectives aimed at in the exchange
of information were summarized by the Commission in its report for 1923.
"Article 8 of the Covenant," declared the Commission, "was not drawn up with
a view to facilitating the work of general staffs. Its object was to improve
the political atmosphere by creating confidence." The Commission also considered that the exchange of information "would render it possible to nip in the
bud any campaign started by an alarmist Press and based upon the armaments
of countries considered as potential enemies."
The first edition of the Armaments Year-Book was published in September
1924, and the last in May 1940. The first volume contained information on
thirty-six countries, including all the great Powers, members and non-members
of the League. The next edition included practically all the countries of the
world, members and non-members of the League, all Colonies, Protectorates and
Mandated Territories. Doc. A/AC.50/2, pp. 19-20.
A resolution adopted by the Council in 1931 requested the Secretariat to prepare a special edition of the Armaments Year-Book for the use of the Disarmament Conference. That edition was based not only on official publications of
various governments but also on their replies to a special questionnaire approved
by the Council relating to the numerical strength of their respective forces.
At the request of the Temporary Mixed Commission, the Secretariat also published regularly a year-book containing statistical information on the trade in
arms, ammunition and implements of war. That request was made in connection
with the view expressed by the Temporary Mixed Commission, as early as 1921,
"that it was imperative to establish a control over the export and import of arms
and implements of war, and that it was essential for the League of Nations to
receive complete information as to the extent and character of the trade in arms."
The Year-Book on the Trade in Arms, Ammunition and Implements of War
included statistical information on practically all States, Colonies, Protectorates
and other territories of the world. The tables contained data on exports and
imports of arms and ammunition by categories and according to countries of
destination or of origin. The monographs were prepared by the Secretariat on
the basis of official publications and not as a result of any questionnaires. Doc.
A/AC.50/2, pp. 20-21.
On the question of the exchange of military information, as provided for under
Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, Sub-Commission A of the
Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference submitted a text which
was unanimously accepted. That text provided for the collection and periodical
publication by the Secretariat of the League of military information in an enlarged "Armaments Year-Book."
In addition to the Year-Book itself, SubCommission A considered the possibility of publishing a number of bulletins in
the course of the year. The delegation of Belgium, France and some others
proposed, in addition to the "Armaments Year-Book" and the periodical bulletins,
tariat periodically to publish a year-book containing a certain

:
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the preparation of objective reports on the carrying out of the convention for
the limitation of armaments, on the basis of periodic uniform statistical returns
by governments on their armaments, whether subject to limitation or not. The
reports prepared on the basis of those returns were to be discussed by a commission to be set

up by the Conference. The delegations of Chile, Italy, Japan,
Kingdom and the United States objected that that

Spain, Sweden, the United

proposal would raise the question of supervision or control. In their declaration
concerning supervision of armaments by an international organization, those delegations, except Spain, pointed out that "most unfortunate results, both political

They continued "It is
technical, would follow from these inquiries."
impossible to disregard the possibility that, in certain circumstances, one country
might bring a charge against another in order to obtain, unjustifiably, information about the secret defensive organizations of the country accused. Moreover,
and

:

the delegations of Chile, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States
are entirely unable to accept for their own governments anything in the nature
of itinerant inquisitorial commissions." Doc. A/AC.50/2, p. 46.
The Draft Convention framed by the Preparatory Commission contained in
Part IV three articles concerning information to be annually communicated in
respect to effectives. Article 30 provided for information to be exchanged
through the Secretary-General of the League of Nations in regard to the average
daily number of effectives reached during the course of the preceding year in
the land, sea and air armed forces and formations organized on a military basis
of each of the contracting parties, to be accompanied by an explanatory note
showing the elements on which the figures supplied were based. Article 31 provided for information to be exchanged as to the number of units compulsorily
receiving preparatory military training during the preceding year. Article 32
provided for an exchange of information at the end of the year concerning the
provisions of the respective laws of the contracting parties relating to the total
number of days comprised in the first period of service of effectives recruited
by conscription and the total duration in days of the ensuing periods. Preliminary Report on the Work of the Conference, p. 42.
67. At the first meeting of Committee 2 of the United Nations Disarmament
Commission, the representative of the United States submitted a Working Paper
(DC/C.2/1) containing proposals for progressive and continuing disclosure and
verification of armed forces and armaments on a continuing basis.
Under the heading "C. Inspection" the following statements are made
"The system of disclosure and verification is an integral part of the system
of safeguards which must be established to ensure observance of the overall
programme of regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and
armaments so as to provide for the prompt detection of violations while at the
same time causing the minimum degree of interference in the internal life of
each country. It will not be adequate to provide merely for the verification of
disclosed information. In addition, provision must be made for determining the
adequacy of the disclosed information, through broad general powers of 'on-thespot' inspection, through access to statistical data permitting independent confirmation of required reports and through aerial surveys. Extensive aerial
reconnaissance is obviously essential to the verification procedure in order
completely to determine the adequacy of disclosed information. It will be
obvious that aerial reconnaissance furnishes the easiest method of determining the existence of large undisclosed facilities and installations. Aerial

Survey will
procedure.

be
It

is

essential

in

all

stages

of

the

disclosure

and

verification

contemplated that 'on-the-spot' inspection will take place
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in all stages as a part of the verification procedure.

extensive in the
verification

first

Its use,

however, will be less

than in the later stages because of the greater ease of

through other methods of the items disclosed in the

first stage.

will of course be necessary at each stage to regulate inspection in such a

way

It

as

is to be withheld from disclosure and
Certain principles governing limitations
on the right of 'on-the-spot' inspections in early stages are set forth in Annex I
and II. Each State at the commencement of each stage should submit to the
Commission a general description of the nature and location of facilities falling
within the terms of reference for that stage. Access to such locations, reasonably
sufficient to verify the information disclosed, should be granted to inspectors.
Inspection in each stage should proceed in accordance with a previously accepted
plan. It is essential to an effective system of verification that the international
inspectors, in addition to examining declared installations and facilities, be permitted in all stages to have access to the entire national territory in order that
the Commission may determine within reasonable limits the accuracy and adequacy of the information disclosed. Accordingly, each State should be required
during each stage of the process of disclosure and verification to permit the
international inspectors such freedom of movement and to give them access to
such installations and facilities, records and data as may reasonably be required,
including the right to inspect physical dimensions of all facilities and installations

to prevent disclosure of information

which

verification during the particular stage.

wherever situated. Each State should facilitate the activities of the international
and furnish to them such assistance as they may reasonably require.
Procedure should be set up in order to permit a determination by the Commission
of the necessity for inspection of any facilities or installations access to which
is denied to the inspectors and where in the judgment of the inspectors such
inspection is required.
The inspectors should report to the Commission any
information indicating a major violation of any provisions of the treaties or
agreements respecting disclosure and verification. In the event of a Commission
determination confirmed by the Security Council, by the affirmative vote of any
seven members, of such a major violation during any stage and the failure of the
inspectors

State guilty of violation to repair the same within a reasonable specified period,
other States should be free to suspend the operations of the disclosure and verification system." Second Report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission,
pp. 25, 26.

On 21 April 1955, Canada, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the United States of America submitted to the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission a Joint Draft Resolution on the Principles of Control, in which the following principles were formulated
"A. The
control organ shall have, to the extent necessary to ensure implementation of the
treaty by all States, full responsibility for supervising and guaranteeing effective observance of all the provisions of the disarmament treaty including:
1. The limitations on levels of conventional armaments and over-all military
man-power, and on over-all military expenditures, both atomic and non-atomic
(paragraphs 6 (i) (a) and (b) of the four-Power draft resolution of 8 March
1955 [DC/SC.l/15/Rev.l]) 2. The major reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments (paragraphs 6 (ii) (a) and 6 (iii) (a) of the four-Power
draft resolution of 8 March 1955) 3. The total prohibition of manufacture and
use, and the elimination of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass
:

;

;

destruction, as well as conversion of existing stocks of nuclear materials to
peaceful uses (paragraphs 6 (ii) (b) and 6 (iii) (b) of the four-Power draft
resolution of 8 March 1955) 4. The continued supervision of permitted atomic
;
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energy installations and
responsibilities

be exercised in

In order to enable

facilities; B.

it

to carry out these

and functions, the control organ shall be accorded powers to
accordance with the terms of the disarmament treaty and which

1. To determine, within the limits established by
the disarmament treaty, the details of the methods and processes of supervising
and guaranteeing the effective observance of the various phases of agreed limita-

shall include the following:

and prohibitions, in order to ensure that the disarmament
programme is carried out as rapidly as possible and with safety and equity for
all; 2. To supervise and verify the disclosures of information required at each
stage of the disarmament programme laid down in the four-Power draft resolution of 8 March 1955, with respect to all armaments and armed forces and related
installations and facilities; 3. To ensure that installations, facilities, equipment, and materials, including stocks of nuclear materials, are disposed of or
utilized in accordance with the terms of the disarmament treaty 4. To organize
and conduct field and aerial surveys in connexion with the above functions and
tions, reductions,

;

and facilities have
been disclosed 5. To conduct such research as is necessary to keep itself in
the forefront of nuclear knowledge and to enable it to be fully effective in
eliminating the destructive uses of nuclear energy, so that such energy shall
be used only for peaceful purposes 6. To report and provide information to
the Security Council, the General Assembly and the States signatories and to
make recommendations concerning appropriate action by them in the event
of violation of the disarmament treaty 7. To take such measures provided for
in the treaty as may be necessary to deal with violations of the disarmament
treaty pending action by the Security Council, the General Assembly or the
States signatories, and to call upon the party concerned and its agents to comply with such measures, without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of
the party concerned C. In order to ensure that the international officials of the
control organ are continuously in a position to fulfil their responsibilities, they
will be granted the right 1. To be stationed permanently in the countries adhering to the disarmament treaty; 2. Of unrestricted access to, egress from and
travel within the territory of participating States, and unrestricted access to
all installations and facilities as required by them for the effective performance of their responsibilities and functions; 3. Of unrestricted use of communication facilities necessary for the discharge of their responsibilities; 4.
Of inviolability of person, premises, property and archives; D. The control
organ shall remain in being in order to ensure that the reductions, prohibitions
and eliminations are faithfully and permanently observed." Second Report
of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, Annex 14.
On 21 July 1955, at the Geneva meetings of the Heads of Government of
France, USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States, the President
of the United States made a statement in which he declared "that the priority
attention of our combined study of disarmament should be upon the subject of
inspection and reporting," and proposed "to give each other a complete blueprint
of our military establishments, from beginning to end, from one end of our countries to the other, lay out the establishments and provide the blueprints to each
other. Next, to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photography to
the other country we to provide you the facilities within our country, ample
facilities for aerial reconnaissance, where you can make all the pictures you
choose and take them to your country to study, you to provide exactly the same
facilities for us and we to make these examinations, and by this step to convince
the world that we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of
for the purpose of determining whether all installations
;

;

;

;

:

—

:
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Doc.
great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and relaxing tension."
Sub-Committee
of
the
DC/SC. 1/28, 29 August 1955. Second Report of the

DC/71, 7 October 1955, Annex 17.
In its Resolution 914 (X), adopted at its 559th plenary meeting on 16 Decemthat inspection and control
ber 1955, the General Assembly "Recognizing
of disarmament can best be achieved in an atmosphere which is free of fear and
suspicion, 1. urges that the States concerned and particularly those on the Subshould, as initial steps, give
Committee of the Disarmament Commission
priority to early agreement on an implementation of: (i) Such confidencebuilding measures as the plan of Mr. Eisenhower, President of the United States
of America, for exchanging military blueprints and mutual aerial inspection, and
the plan of Mr. Bulganin, Prime Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for establishing control posts at strategic centers, (ii) All such measures
of adequately safeguarded disarmament as are now feasible."
68. The Special Committee for the Regulation of the Trade in and Private and
State Manufacture of Arms and Implements of War, set up on 22 September 1932
by the General Commission of the League of Nations Disarmament Conference,
presented the results of its discussions in a report of which the following brief
analysis is contained in the Preliminary Report on the Work of the Conference,
pp. 125 ff
"(a) General Obligations and Definition of Categories. The Special Committee unanimously adopted texts stipulating that each contracting party would
assume, in the territories under its jurisdiction, full responsibility for the supervision to be exercised over the manufacture of and trade in arms, with a view
to ensuring the regular communication and accuracy of the information to be
supplied under the Convention. Each of the contracting parties, for the purpose
of securing publicity, undertook to forward to the Permanent Disarmament
Commission the texts of all laws, regulations or other legal provisions enacted
for the purpose of ensuring the execution of the Convention. The categories of
arms, ammunition and implements of war proposed by the Special Committee
did not secure unanimity. A Technical Committee on Categories, reporting to
the Special Committee, submitted the results of its work as an attempt at solution of a purely technical character, accepted by its members with reservations
as to the assent of their respective Governments. Five categories were proposed
by the Special Committee comprising (I) military armaments; (II) naval armaments; (III) air armaments; (IV) arms and ammunition capable of being
used for both military and non-military purposes; and (V) aircraft other than
those in category III.
Texts unanimously adopted by the Special Committee pro(b) Manufacture.
vided that the contracting parties should forbid in their respective territories
the manufacture of arms and implements of war as set forth in categories I, II
and III, unless the manufacturers had, in the case of private establishments,
obtained a license to manufacture issued by the government. The license to
manufacture was to be valid for a definite period, to be revocable at any time
and to be renewable for further periods at the discretion of the Government
concerned. Licenses to manufacture would give the name and address of the
manufacture, or the name, head office and principal works of the firm, together
with a designation of the articles by headings in categories I, II and III whose
manufacture was authorized by the license. Further, it was unanimously agreed
that the contracting parties should send to the Permanent Disarmament Commission, within three months from the entry into force of the Convention, a copy
of the licenses to manufacture already issued to private establishments and,

Disarmament Commission.

.

.

.

.

.

.

—

.

—

—

:

—
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within the thirty days following the end of each quarter, a return showing copies
of all licenses to manufacture granted, amended, renewed or revoked during
the previous quarter. In regard to naval armaments, the Committee unanimously adopted texts under which the contracting parties undertook to forward
to the Permanent Disarmament Commission, within thirty days of the layingdown of a war vessel in State or private shipyards within their jurisdiction, a
return showing the date of the laying-down of the keel, the classification of
the vessel, for whom the vessel was built, its standard displacement and principal dimensions and the calibre of its largest gun. They further undertook,
within thirty days of the date of the completion of each war vassel, to send a
return giving the date of completion, together with the foregoing particulars.
The above provisions in regard to the regulation of the manufacture of arms represented the minimum position adopted in the Committee. Texts provisionally
approved by the majority of the members of the Committee, on the basis of the
United States text, provided for a stricter system of control and a more extended
publicity.
It was stipulated, for example, that the manufacture of articles appearing in categories I, II and III should not take place in private establishments
unless the producer was in possession of 'bona fide orders, in each case duly notified in advance to the government, and further stipulated that licenses accorded
to manufacturers should state that all orders received by them were to be communicated immediately to the Government which had granted the license. These
provisions were not accepted by the delegations of the United Kingdom, Italy
and Japan. Further, the texts approved by the majority provided that the contracting parties should send to the Permanent Disarmament Commission, among
other particulars, a return at the beginning of each financial year showing the
quantities of articles in categories I, II and III whose manufacture or purchase
was contemplated in the course of the year a return showing the national defense expenditure proposed in respect of the manufacture and purchase of articles in categories I, II and III a return within fifteen days of orders placed with
State or private establishments for articles in categories I, III and V, with their
description, number and type, the name of the Government on whose account
the order was given, and the name and address of the private manufacturer a
description of the State establishment and, finally, a return within the month
following the end of the civil year of manufactures completed during the year
These provisions were not accepted by the
of articles in categories I to V.
Kingdom,
Italy and Japan. Texts going beyond
delegations of the United
these provisions in respect of the returns to be made to the Permanent Disarmament Commission were submitted by the delegations of France, Turkey, Afghanistan, Iraq, Spain, Czechoslovakia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and
China. An alternative text proposed by the United Kingdom, Italian and
Japanese delegations provided that, within sixty days of the end of the quarter,
a quarterly return of the total value under each heading of the categories of
the articles whose manufacture had been completed during the previous quarter
should be forwarded to the Permanent Disarmament Commission.
The texts of the provisions concerning the trade in arms and
(c) Trade.
implements of war were adopted subject to declarations by the minority delegations. Texts approved by the majority provided that the contracting parties
should prohibit, in their territories, the export of articles in categories I to V
inclusive, and the import of articles in categories I to III inclusive, without
an export or import permit issued by the Government. The export permit was
to contain a description of the articles, giving their number, aggregate weight
and type, with the name and address of the exporter and a reference to the

—

—

;

;

;

—

—

—

243
original order in cases

for

arms manufactured

where the order had been
in the country of export.

notified to
It

was

Geneva and was

also to give the

name

and address of the importing consignee, with a reference to the import permit
for articles in categories I, II and III. The import permit was to contain a
description of the articles in categories I to III inclusive whose import was
authorized, giving their number, aggregate weight and type, the

name and

address of the importer, a reference to the order and the name and address of
the exporter. The contracting parties further undertook to forward to the
Permanent Disarmament Commission copies of all import or export permits
prior to the entry or despatch of articles in categories I to III and similarly
copies of all export permits in respect of articles in categories IV and V.
Moreover, within a period of one month from the end of the year, the contracting parties were to forward a statement of all imports and exports effected during the year. The provisions relating to naval armanents provided
that, within thirty days of the end of each quarter, the contracting parties
would furnish a return in respect of each vessel of war acquired during the
quarter other than those constructed for their own account within their respective jurisdictions. The delegations of the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan
and Switzerland submitted alternative texts from which all references to orders
for manufacture were omitted. Further, the delegations of the United Kingdom, Italy and Japan submitted an alternative text, as a substitute for the
above provisions relating to returns, under which the contracting parties would
furnish to the Permanent Disarmament Commission, within sixty days of the
end of each quarter, a quarterly return giving the total values of the articles
falling within categories I to V imported and exported during the previous
quarter, showing the countries of origin and destination. Finally, the Soviet
delegation, supported in principle by the delegations of France, Spain and China,
submitted a proposal that the contracting parties should undertake not to issue
import, export or transit permits for implements of war in excess of qualitative
or quantitative limits to be fixed under agreements binding on the parties responsible for the permits."
Concerning supervision the Special Committee suggested the establishment
of a Permanent Disarmament Commission and the appointment of experts
by the Commission "to accompany its representatives and for the constitution of regional committees to be entrusted with the duty of permanently
following the execution of the Convention by the different States included in each
of the regional groups within their respective jurisdictions. They further provided that the Commission, for the purpose of its investigations, might take
into account any information reaching it from a responsible source which it
might consider as pertinent to the execution of its duties, and that it should
have the right to hear such witnesses as might voluntarily appear before it
or consult any person able to throw any light on a question under examination.
The Commission, moreover, might proceed annually, or more often if it so
determined, to examine on the spot the conditions in which the national control exercised by each government over the manufacture of and trade in arms
was organized and the accuracy of the information furnished by the governments, such inspections being effected through the regional committees. The
regional committees, if notified in the course of their inspections of certain
facts which appeared to call for the attention of the Permanent Disarmament
Commission, would be authorized to establish such facts and to report upon
immediately to the Permanent Disarmament Commission. Any contracting
party would be entitled to request the Commission to conduct, in its territory,

—

—

:
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such investigations as might be necessary, in order to verify the execution
of its obligations, and any contracting party of opinion that the provisions
of the Conventions had been infringed might address a complaint to the Commission. The Commission, on receiving such requests or complaints, would
be bound to consider the matter and determine whether a special investigation
was necessary. Special investigations undertaken under these provisions would
be carried out by a special committee created for the purpose, and the result
of such investigations would be embodied in a special report by the Permanent
Disarmament Commission, which might make recommendations addressed to
the contracting party. The procedure to be followed in carrying out such local
investigations

was

defined in detail.

The delegations
to

of the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan and Poland were unable
accept the articles which provided for a system of continuous and automatic

and supervision on the spot. These delegations submitted, in subby the Committee, a general article providing
Permanent
Disarmament
that the
Commission might call for explanations in
the event of it having reason to believe that an infringement of the Convention
had occurred or that information supplied to it by a contracting party was
incomplete or inaccurate. The contracting party would in that case furnish
explanations, either verbally by responsible officials or in writing as desired
by the Permanent Commission, and the Commission would draw up, as soon
as possible, a report embodying the result of its examination. The French
delegation, in addition to the measures adopted by the Committee, proposed
that each regional committee should apoint agents who would reside permanently in the territories of each of the states for which the committee was
competent. These agents would be accredited to the local authorities and
would have the necessary means of action to proceed at any moment to effect
such local inspection as might be required for the discharge of the duties
of supervision imposed on the regional committees.
The Polish and Latvian
delegations, moreover, proposed that the attention of the Permanent Disarmament Commission might be drawn by any one of the contracting parties to
unexpected increases in the manufacture, import or export of arms and munitions or implements of war which seemed to it to indicate a threat to peace,
the Commission being in such an event required to consider the matter and
to call for such explanations as it might consider necessary." Preliminary
inspection

stitution for the texts adopted

Report on the

Work

69. Cf. pp. 13

ff,

of the Conference, p. 138.

104

The Draft Convention contained

ff.

in

Part

V

the follow-

ing provisions

There shall be set up at the seat of the League of Nations a
Permanent Disarmament Commission composed of representatives of the Governments of the High Contracting Parties. Each such Government shall appoint
one member of the Commission. Each member may be a accompanied by substitutes and experts.
Article 69. It will be the duty of the Commission to watch the execution
of the present Convention. The Commission shall receive all the information
which the High Contracting Parties are bound to communicate to the SecretaryGeneral of the League of Nations in pursuance of their international obligations
in this respect.
The Commission may request the High Contracting Parties to
supply, in writing or verbally, any supplementary particulars or explanations
in regard to the said information which it may consider necessary.
Article 72. Any High Contracting Party whose observance of the execution of the present Convention may have been the subject of criticism shall be
Article

64.

.

.

.

:
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entitled to request the

Commission

conduct in

to

its territory

such investigations

as may be necessary in order to verify the execution of the obligations of the said
party under the present Convention. On receipt of such a request, the Commission shall meet at once in order to give effect to it, to determine the scope of the
investigation within the limits of the criticism which has been made, and to lay
down the conditions in which the investigation is to take place.
Article 73. At the request of one or more of the High Contracting Parties,
the Commission may decide to have investigations of alleged infractions of the
Convention conducted on the territory of any High Contracting Party. On the

—

—

receipt of such a request, the Commission shall meet at once in order to take
a decision upon it. The decision which will determine the scope of the investigation, if such is decided upon, shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of all
the members of the Commission, whether present at the meeting or not.
Article 74. The result of the investigations decided upon in accordance
with Articles 72 and 73 shall be embodied in each case in a special report by the
Commission. The High Contracting Parties shall promptly advise as to the

—

—

conclusions of the report.

The United States Working Paper on Methods of Implementing and Enforcing
Disarmament Programmes, submitted to the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament
Commission on 25 May 1954 (DC/SC. 1/5) suggested the establishment of a
United Nations Disarmament and Atomic Development Authority and, under
The Authis Authority a Disarmament and an Atomic Development Division.
thority should be composed in the same manner as the Disarmament Commission, that is, only one representative from each of those states represented on
the Security Council (and Canada when that State is not a member of the Security Council) but the inclusion of a limited number of representatives of additional states should be possible.
"Any State not a member of the Authority
;

would have an automatic right

to participate,

without vote, in Authority discus-

disarmament
would have the
Authority discussions of any question

sions of charges of violations by that State of provisions of the

programme

treaty.

Any

member

State not a

right to participate, without vote, in

of the Authority

brought before the Authority whenever the latter considers that the interests
The Disarmament Division would be
of that State are specially affected.
under the supervision and control of a Director-General, who might be appointed
for a fixed term, by the Authority. While the Director-General would be subject to control by the Authority, he should be allowed sufficient discretion in
carrying out the terms of the disarmament programme treaty and the instructions of the Authority to ensure effective operation of the Disarmament Division.
The Director-General would be required to refer to the Authority charges of
violations and other important developments but not routine day-to-day decisions
concerning the operations of the Disarmament Division.
The Atomic Development Division would be under the supervision and control of a Board of
Governors. Each permanent member of the Authority would appoint a member of the Board. Not less than six nor more than eight additional members
of the Board would be appointed by the Authority. Appointees would be expected to possess outstanding technical qualifications and would be appointed
for a term of five years. While the Board of Governors would be subject to
control by the Authority, it should be allowed sufficient discretion in carrying
out the terms of the disarmament programme treaty and the instructions of the
Authority to ensure effective operation of the Atomic Development Division."
The relations of the Authority to the main organs of the United Nations are
determined as follows
.

.

.

.

.

.
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"To the Security Council.

—The Authority would be required to submit sucb

reports as might be requested by any seven

The Authority's

members

of the Security Council.

findings in respect to violations, evasions, discrepancies or per-

tinent omissions should be referred, as appropriate with certification of facts

Findings would be accompanied by such recommendadeem appropriate. In this regard, provision would
have to be made for specific steps to be taken by the Security Council and/or the
General Assembly to bring about rectification of violations of the disarmament
to the Security Council.

tions as the Authority might

programme treaty.
To the General Assembly.

—

The Authority would transmit to the General
Assembly periodic reports and any findings in respect to violations, evasions, discrepancies or pertinent omissions which are submitted to the Security Council.
The Authority would be required to submit such reports as might be requested
by the General Assembly.
To the International Court of Justice. The Authority would be authorized
by the General Assembly to request of the International Court of Justice advisory

—

opinions on legal questions arising within the scope of the Authority's activities.
Proceedings before the Court, however, would not be permitted to delay the
taking of measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
To the United Nations Secretariat. The Authority would use the services
of the United Nations Secretariat to the extent mutually agreed upon.
Reports and other communications from the Authority to other organs of the
United Nations would be transmitted through the Secretary-General."
On 3 April 1956, the United States of America submitted to the Subcommittee
of the Disarmament Commission a Draft Working Paper for the First Phase of
a Comprehensive Agreement for Disarmament (DC/SC.1/42) which contains
among others the following provisions "1. Without delay and pending the report
on the preliminary steps, the five Powers members of the Subcommittee, while
continuing their work in the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission of
the United Nations, agree to organize a preparatory armaments regulation commission. All decisions of the preparatory armaments regulation commission shall
be taken by unanimous vote. 2. The preparatory armaments regulation commission shall agree upon the reduced level of conventional armaments, armed
forces and military expenditures of the five members to be accomplished in the
first phase,
(a) The reduced level of armaments shall be fixed by an agreed
application of the manpower levels as a basis for measurement applied to all
conventional armaments, (b) The reduced manpower level at the first phase for
illustrative purposes shall be: France
750,000, U.S.S.R.—2.5 million, United
million,
(c) The application of the manKingdom 750,000, United States 2.5
power measurement to the composition of the arms of each State shall be at the
discretion of the State involved, but such application as is decided upon by the
States shall be communicated to the preparatory armaments regulation commis-

—

:

—

—

—

sion prior to the beginning of any reductions, (d) The reduced level of military
expenditures shall be an agreed reflection of the reduced level of armaments

and manpower. 3. A control and inspection plan will be agreed upon which will
include the Geneva proposals of the President of the United States and of the
Chairman of the U.S.S.R., and will include ground control posts at ports, railway
terminals, airfields and main highways; aerial survey; mobile units; and an
This control and inspection system shall be
effective communications method.
reciprocally extended in an appropriate and effective manner with consent of the
States concerned to forces and facilities which the five Powers have outside their
own borders. This control and inspection system shall be designed to be capable

;
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of providing against surprise attack by any State and to be capable of verifying
the agreed levels of conventional armaments, armed forces and military expendi*
tures. 4. A committee of jurists shall be appointed to prepare a draft treaty to
carry out the first phase of a disarmament programme and to prepare for subsequent phases. The draft treaty will include a clause for suspension, partial
suspension, countering steps, or termination in the event of violation or upon the
occurrence of circumstances adverse to the continued successful operation of
the treaty. The draft treaty will also include a clause for appropriate reports to
the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly. 5. The preparatory
armaments regulation commission will prepare for the control and inspection
responsibilities principally through the use of member States as executive agents
designated for specific assignments. The executive agents, in the carrying out of
their assignments, shall use the nationals of at least five States of which at least
one State shall not be associated in any mutual defence agreements with the
executive agent. Sixty percent of the personnel used by an executive agent on
an assignment may be nationals of the executive agent's State. The assignments
as executive agent shall be made with the consent of the State to be inspected
and of the executive agent to be designated. 6. An effective world-wide control
communications network shall be established with major control communications
centres.
7. Upon the agreement of the members of the preparatory armaments
regulation commission on the reduced level of conventional armaments and
armed forces and military expenditures to be accomplished in the the first phase
and upon agreement on the system of control and inspection to be installed to
provide against surprise attack and to verify reductions in levels of armaments,
armed forces, and military expenditures the following three steps will be taken
interdependently and concurrently
Each State will provide to the prepara( a )
tory armaments regulation commission a 'blueprint' of its military establishments consisting of the identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of personnel units and equipment of all major land, sea, and air forces including organized reserves and para-military; and a complete list of conventional
military plant facilities and installations with their locations and the relevant
budgetary and appropriation documents for the year ended 31 December 1955
and for the current year, (b) Each State will carry out measures of a stabilizing
nature relating to the limitation of the main types of armaments and armed
forces, and accordingly will take steps not to increase its appropriations for
armed forces and armaments above the level of the expenditures effected for
those purposes during the year ended 31 December 1955. (c) The installation of
the inspection and control system will be initiated and expeditiously completed.
8. The praparatory armaments regulation commission will notify the member
States when the control communications centres are prepared to function and
thereafter each member State will give advance notice to the control communication centres of all projected movements of land, sea, or air armed forces through
international air or water or over foreign soil. The method and extent of the
notice will be in accordance with detailed reciprocal arrangements drawn up
for the purpose of increasing the effectiveness and reliability of the safeguards
against surprise attack by any State upon any other State. 9. The Disarmament
Commission of the United Nations will be requested to invite other States
having a significant military potential to join in an armaments regulation
organization,
(a) In each instance an agreed first phase reduced level of
armaments, armed forces, and military expenditures will be established, which
should be considerably below the levels fixed for the four major members of the
preparatory armaments regulation commission, account being taken of agreed
;

:

;
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criteria including demographic, geographic, economic and political factors, and
providing that the first phase levels of the armed forces of these States shall
not exceed 500,000 men unless special circumstances require an agreed exception,
and except that the first stage level of the armed forces of China shall not
exceed 2,500,000 men.
(b) Each State will be required to take appropriate
corresponding obligations for inspection, control, limitation, and reporting in all
respects similar to the obligations taken by the members of the praparatory
armaments regulation commission. 10. An armaments regulation organization
will be established, with an armaments regulation council including all signatories, an executive committee consisting of permanent and non-permanent

elected members, and a director-general. All decisions of the executive committee will be taken by a unanimous vote of the permanent members plus a
majority vote of the non-permanent members, (a) Upon the establishment of
the armaments regulation organization the preparatory armaments regulation
commission will transfer all of its functions and activities to the appropriate
bodies of the armaments regulation organization and will cease to exist. 11. All
signatory States will report to the director-general in the affirmative or negative
on the following four points (a) The possession of fissionable materials (b) The
production of fissionable materials (c) The possession of nuclear weapons and
(d) The planning of tests of nuclear weapons. 12 The control and inspection
system will be expanded so that it becomes capable of accounting for future production of fissionable materials and of monitoring the future testing of nuclear
weapons. 13. Upon the report of the director-general that the system is prepared
to verify the reductions in levels of armaments, armed forces, and military expenditures, and is prepared to provide against surprise attack; and upon the
acceptance of the report of the director-general by the executive committee and
upon the adherence to the treaty of the States considered by the executive committee as essential for a sound system the first phase reductions will be carried
out in all signatory States in accordance with an agreed and parallel time
schedule, (a) The destruction of existing armaments required by each State to
reduce to the agreed first phase levels will be done under the supervision of the
inspectors of the armaments regulation organization, and the salvage material
:

;

;

;

;

;

will be used for peaceful national purposes.

armaments and armed forces
agreed manner the first phase

14.

Appropriations by States for

will be reduced correspondingly to reflect in

reductions,

and the funds available through

an

this

reduction shall be used both to improve the well-being of the peoples of these
States and to furnish assistance particularly to the economically less-developed
countries. 15. Upon the report of the director-general that the inspection and
control system is prepared to account for future production of fissionable
materials, and upon the acceptance of this report by the executive committee, all
signatory States agree that future production of fissionable materials will not be

used for the manufacture of explosive weapons. 16. All signatory States possessing nuclear weapons will begin to make agreed regular reciprocal and equitable
transfers from past production of fissionable materials over to the use of such
transferred material for exclusively peaceful purposes, thereby progressively
reducing the amount of fissionable materials available for nuclear weapons
purposes. 17. The testing of nuclear weapons will be limited and monitored
in an agreed manner under the control of the armaments regulation council.
18. Upon a report of the inspector-general that the first phase of the disarmament programme has been successfully completed, and upon the acceptance of this
report by the executive committee, the executive committee will call a plenary
session of the

armaments regulation

council.

The

council will appraise the

:

249
status of world tensions, review the situation affecting major issues between
the States, consider the feasibility of further reductions of armaments, armed
forces,

and military expenditures, study the

or eliminating the nuclear threat, and

possibilities for further decreasing

make recommendations

to the executive

committee for further phases in a comprehensive disarmament programme.
The executive committee will take account of the recommendations of the
armaments regulation council, consider scientific, military, economic, and political factors, and decide upon further phases of a comprehensive disarmament
programme, which will best serve the objective of a just and durable peace, for
recommendation to the signatory States." Third Report of the Sub-committee of
the Disarmament Commission, Annex 6.
70. The Baruch Plan contained the following statement: "There must be no
veto to protect those who violate their solemn agreements not develop or use
atomic energy for destructive purposes." The International Control of Atomic
Energy, p. 142. The Recommendations of Part III of the first Report of the
United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, approved by the Resolution 191
(III) adopted on 4 November 1948 of the General Assembly, contains the following passage The treaty concerning control of atomic energy "shall provide
that the rule of unanimity of the permanent members, which in certain circumstances exists in the Security Council, shall have no relation to the work of the
international control agency. No Government shall possess any right of 'veto'
over the fulfilment by the international control agency of the obligations imposed
upon it by the treaty nor shall any government have the power, through the
exercise of any right of 'veto' or otherwise, to obstruct the course of control or
19.

:

inspection."
71. Georg Cohn, in a memorandum submitted to the International Studies
Conference on Collective Security {Collective Security, pp. 287 ff.), wrote: "It
may be that the tendency to war and to murder are innate in mankind. In
that case, considering the frightful consequences entailed in the carrying out
of this tendency, a much more energetic action should be undertaken with
a view to suppressing it and rooting it out from childhood. But it is also possible that we have here an unhealthy perversion of tendencies which are in
themselves healthy and useful, and that it may therefore be possible to combat
the madness of war also by medical means. Aside from this pedagogical and
medical struggle against the war spirit, it is possible, finally, to consider combating it by means of repressive measures of an international character against
incitement to war, either by parallel national legislation in the different countries, or by the establishment of penal dispositions of an international order
against States which do not repress with sufficient effectiveness the incitement
to war on their own territory."
72. Most of the measures mentioned above were suggested in a Memorandum
submitted by the Polish Government to the Disarmament Conference of the
League of Nations on 17 September 1931 (Series of League of Nations Publications IX. Disarmament 1931. IX, 19, pp. 1 f.) and Proposals of the Polish Delegation with regard to the gradual attainment of Moral Disarmament (Series of
League of Nations Publications IX. Disarmament 1932. IX, 18, pp. 1 f.)
The Political Commission of the League of Nations Disarmament Conference appointed on 15 March 1932 a special committee of 22 members selected
for their personal qualifications to study the question of moral disarmament.
This committee adopted on 17 November 1933 the following Draft of a Convention on Moral Disarmament

:
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"The High Contracting

moral disarmament is
one of the essential aspects of the general work of disarmament considering
that the reduction and limitation of armaments depend to a large extent upon
the increase of mutual confidence between nations considering that, as far
Parties, considering that

;

;

as public opinion is concerned, a sustained and systematic effort to ease tension
may contribute to the progressive realization of material disarmament; considering that the interdependence of States calls, not only for their cooperation
in the political sphere, but also for

an

effort of

mutual understanding between

the peoples themselves; being resolved to do whatever lies in their power to
induce their nationals to display in any public discussion a spirit of tolerance
and mutual respect being convinced that the success of the measures adopted
;

in one country to ensure moral disarmament is largely dependent on the applicarecognizing that the League of
tion of similar measures in other countries
Nations has placed at the disposal of the various States the Intellectual Cooperation Organization, which is particularly suited to the accomplishment of certain
tasks connected with moral disarmament, although a different procedure may
have to be adopted to meet special situations
Article 1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to use their powers or
their iniluence to see that education at every stage, including the training of
teachers, is so conceived as to inspire mutual respect between peoples and to
emphasize their interdependence, which makes international collaboration a
;

necessity.

The High Contracting Parties

will also do whatever lies in their
by these principles. School text-books
should be prepared in the same spirit those which are at variance with that
spirit should be revised.
The High Contracting Parties likewise agree to recommend to their competent authorities the inclusion of the following subjects in the
syllabus prescribed for entrance examinations to official posts which entail relations with other countries fundamental principles of international law, legal

Article

power

2.

to see that teachers are guided

;

:

bases of international relations, and outlines of the efforts made to consolidate
peace between nations. They undertake to recommend to their competent authorities that their country's history is taught in relation to the history of other
countries.

Article 3. The High Contracting Parties undertake to encourage, in accordance with the special system in force in their respective countries, the use of the
cinematograph and broadcasting with a view to increasing the spirit of good-will
between nations. With this end in view, they will also support any action taken
by the Intellectual Cooperation Organization, as well as by organizations having
the same object. In accordance with the special system in force in their respective countries, they will use their influence to avoid the showing of films, the
broadcasting of programmes and the organization of performances obviously
calculated to wound the legitimate sentiments of other nations.
Article 4. The High Contracting Parties will endeavor to facilitate, by the
most appropriate means, the cooperation in the work of moral disarmament of
government departments, intellectual circles and others working for peace on
a larger scale. With this end in view, they agree to encourage the creation and
activities of national committees for intellectual cooperation or other organiza(Series of League of
tions collaborating in the work of moral disarmament."
Nations Publications IX. Disarmament 1936. IX, 4, pp. 925 f.)
At its meeting on 25 June 1932 the Committee for Moral Disarmament decided
This Committee drew up a questionnaire on the
to set up a Legal Committee.
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various points to which its attention had particularly been directed and attached
to this questionnaire the draft of some articles, which ran as follows:
Article 1. (First Alternative) "The High Contracting Parties agree to consider, within the limits of the possibilities afforded by their public law, the adoption of constitutional rules formally embodying the obligation to refrain from
recourse to force as an instrument of national policy and not to attempt the
:

any difference or dispute by other than pacific means. The High
Contracting Parties who are Members of the League of Nations assume the same
obligation in respect of the stipulations of the Covenant of the League of Nations."
(Second Alternative) "The High Contracting Parties undertake to recognize as
fundamental laws the stipulation of the Pact of Paris, the Covenant of the
League of Nations (in the case of Members of the League of Nations) and of such
articles as may subsequently be specified of the General Convention for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. Each party further undertakes to ensure
that none of its laws, regulations or other provisions shall conflict or be at vari-

solution of

:

ance with the stipulations of the aforesaid international agreements.
Article 2. The High Contracting Parties undertake to adopt legislative
measures empowering them to penalize: 1. The preparation and carrying-out
in their respective territories of acts directed against the security of a foreign
power. 2. (First Alternative) Direct public propaganda urging the State to be
the first to commit, contrary to its international undertakings, any of the following acts: (a) declaration of war upon another state; (b) invasion by its armed
forces, even without declaration of war, of the territory of another State;
(c) attack by its land, naval or air forces, even without declaration of war, upon
the territory, vessels or aircraft of another State; (d) naval blockade of the
coasts or ports of another State; (e) assistance given to armed bands, organized
in its territory, which have invaded the territory of another State, or
refusal, in spite of the request of the invaded State, to take in its own territory
.

.

.

:

deprive the aforesaid bands of all assistance or protection.
(Second Alternative) Direct public propaganda urging the State to commit any
one of the acts of aggression enumerated in Article ... of the present Convention
relative to the definition of the aggressor.
(Third Alternative) Inciting public
opinion by direct public propaganda with a view to forcing the State to embark
upon a war of aggression. 3. Participation in or support of armed bands, organized
in the territory of the State, which have invaded the territory of another State.
4. The dissemination of false news, reports or of documents forged, falsified or
inaccurately attributed to third parties, whenever such dissemination has a
disturbing effect upon international relations and is carried out in bad faith.
5. Causing prejudice to a foreign State by maliciously attributing to its acts
which are manifestly untrue and thus exposing it to public resentment or contempt. 6. Acts contrary to the prohibitions laid down in Articles ... of the Convention.
(This text should be completed by provisions dealing more especially
with the case of persons who, contrary to the undertakings given by the State,
have been guilty of the private manufacture of or trade in arms or implements
of war and also of preparations, contrary to the provisions of the Convention,
for chemical, incendiary or bacterial warfare, etc.).
Article 3. The High Contracting Parties further undertake
to prevent
( 1 )
the activities of organizations committing any of the acts enumerated in Article
2 and to treat them as organizations pursuing illegal aims under the municipal
laws of the country; (2) to incorporate in their laws the necessary provisionsto permit of their giving effect to any provisions which may be embodied in
the Convention on the subject of immunities (the reference here is to the pro>370624—57
17
all possible steps to

:

:

:

;
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visions of the Convention

delegation's proposals)."

which may be elaborated in consequence of the French
Series of League of Nations Publications IX. Dis-

armament 1935. IX, 4, pp. 701 ff.
The General Assembly of the United Nations adopted at its 108th plenary
meeting on 3 November 1947 a Resolution 110 (II) concerning measures to be
taken against propaganda and the inciters of a new war which runs as follows:
"Whereas in the Charter of the United Nations the peoples express their
determination to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which
twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to practice
tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and
Whereas the Charter also calls for the promotion of universal respect for,
and observance of, fundamental freedoms which include freedom of expression,
all Members having pledged themselves in Article 56 to take joint and separate
action for such observance of fundamental freedoms,

The General Assembly
1.

is

Condemns

all

forms of propaganda, in whatsoever country conducted, which
any threat to the peace,

either designed or likely to provoke or encourage

breach of the peace, or act of aggression;
2. Requests the Government of each Member to take appropriate steps within
its

constitutional limits:

(a) To promote, by all means of publicity and propaganda available to
them, friendly relations among nations based upon the Purposes and Principles
of the Charier
(b) To encourage the dissemination of all information designed to give expression to the undoubted desire of all peoples for peace;
3. Directs that this resolution be communicated for the forthcoming Conference on freedom of Information."
The Resolution 176 (II) adopted by the General Assembly at its 123rd
plenary meeting on 21 November 1947 contains the following statement: "The
General Assembly Resolves to request the Governments of the Member states:
1, To take appropriate measures to extend the teaching of international law
in all ils phases, including its development and codification, in the universities
and higher educational institutions of each country that are under government
control or over which Governments have some influence, or to initiate such
teaching where it is not yet provided
2. To promote similar teaching regarding the aims, purposes, structure and
operation of the United Nations in conjunction with paragraph 1 above and in
accordance with Resolution 137 (II) adopted by the General Assembly on 17
November 1947, on the teaching of the purposes and principles, the structure
and activities of the United Nations in the schools of Member States."
A Resolution, 290 (IV), concerning essentials of peace, adopted by the General
Assembly at its 261st plenary meeting on 1 December 1949 contains the state"The General Assembly calls upon every nation. ... 8. To remove the
ment
barriers which deny to peoples the free exchange of information and ideas
essential to international understanding and peace."
On 17 November 1950 the General Assembly adopted at its 308th plenary
meeting Resolution 381 (V) concerning the condemnation of propaganda against
peace, which runs as follows:
;

:

"The General Assembly,
1.

and 290 (IV), paragraph 8, which conpropaganda against peace and recommends the free exchange of infor-

Reaffirms

demn

all

its

resolutions 110 (II)

;

;

:

;
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mation and ideas as one of the foundations of good-neighbourly relations between
the peoples

Declares that such propaganda includes
Incitement to conflicts or acts of aggression
(2) Measures tending to isolate the peoples from any contact with the
outside world, by preventing the Press, radio and other media of communication
from reporting international events, and thus hindering mutual comprehension
and understanding between peoples
(3) Measures tending to silence or distort the activities of the United Nations in favour of peace or to prevent their peoples from knowing the views of
other States Members."
In this connection also the International Convention concerning the Use of
Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace, 23 September 1936, and the Resolution of
the General Assembly 424 (V) of 14 December 1950, are to be mentioned. Cf.
supra, p. 89, note 8.
2.

(1)

(ee)

Economic cooperation.

war

caused not only by political but also by economic circumstances, a universal or quasi-universal international security organization must have institutions to bring about, as far as possible,
satisfactory economic conditions throughout the world, and thus its
If

is

constituent treaty

must provide for

The main question

so-called economic cooperation. 1

of the exact nature of the relationship between

economic circumstances and war is highly disputed. It is a specific
Marxian theory that the occurrence of war is exclusively, or at least
predominantly, due to economic causes, especially to the capitalistic
system. This view is rejected by an outstanding English economist,
Lionel Robbins, who tries to show that, although it would be an
exaggeration to say that wars have no economic causes or to deny
that conflicts of national economic interests may lead to war, these
conflicts are not the root cause. "The ultimate condition giving rise
to those clashes of national economic interest which lead to international war is the existence of independent national sovereignties. Not
capitalism, but the anarchic political organization of the world is
the root disease of our civilization." la He says further "We know
today that unless we destroy the sovereign state, the sovereign state
will destroy us." 2 Hence, according to Eobbins, the main purpose
of an international security organization is to restrict national sovereignty by imposing upon its members definite obligations, the fulfillment of which is guaranteed by effective sanctions.
However,
another and no less outstanding writer, Edward H. Carr, advocates
the opinion that international security is only a by-product of a
definite social organization.
"International peace
cannot be
achieved by the signing of pacts or covenants 'outlawing' war any
more than revolutions are prevented by making them illegal. A generation which makes peace and security its aim is doomed to frustra:

.

.

.
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tion.

... If the

victors in the present

war

[the second

World War]

are able to create the conditions for an orderly and progressive devel-

opment of human

society, peace

and security

will be

added unto

Further, he suggests that this "orderly and progressive
them."
development of human society" may be brought about by a "new
s

democracy" which

differs

from "liberal" democracy by the fact that

the ideals of equality and liberty are "re-interpreted in predominantly

economic terms," 4 by restricting the self-determination of the states, 5
which are to be placed within a more or less universal international
organization, and, last but not least, by abandoning the laissez-faire
policy of economic liberalism and adopting a policy of planned
economy, 6 that is to say, by socialism.
However that may be, it is now an almost generally accepted opinion
that economic cooperation is an important preventive measure which
may be applied by an international security organization. 7
That economic cooperation is a purpose of an international security
organization means that this organization should bring about, as far
as possible, a coordination of the economic policies of its members.
The activities of different subjects can be coordinated only with a
view to a definite goal. Economic cooperation of the members of an
international security organization is achieved if the governments of
these states adapt their activity to a certain pattern of economic policy
which is characterized by its end as well as by the means to be applied
with a view to realizing the end. There is no difficulty in answering
the question as to the end of economic cooperation. It is a satisfactory
economic situation of the states, an adequate status of world economy.
The usual formulas by which this goal is described are: "economic
health of every country," 8 "economic prosperity" (the opposite of
economic depression), "social security," 9 "economic stability and well
being," "high standard of living," 10 "economic advancement," n "economic progress," "full employment," 12 and the like. All these formulas are meaningless unless the specific means are indicated by which
these ideals may be realized. There is, in general, agreement concerning the ultimate ends of social life the greatest possible happiness
of the greatest possible number of individuals. The real problem,
and the main cause of conflict of opinion, is not the end but the means
by which the generally accepted end is to be realized. There are two
fundamentally different and directly opposite views concerning the
appropriate method of bringing about satisfactory economic conditions: economic liberalism, postulating private property in the means
of production and complete freedom of economic life, and rejecting
any governmental intervention; and economic socialism, postulating
:

the nationalization of the means of production, and the authoritative
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regulation of economic

life,

especially in the organization of economic

production and in the distribution of products. 13 If there is no agreement with respect to the specific methods determining the economic
pattern to which the members of an international security organization are to adapt their policy

—and

there

is

evidently not only no

—

agreement but the most passionate antagonism in this respect there
is not very much left to the activity of an international security
organization in the field of economic cooperation. Even apart from
this fundamental antagonism, economic cooperation is hampered by
the conflict of interests between states which are forced to secure their
national economy by protective tariffs and those the economy of which
requires a free trade. The most serious limitation of economic coop-

from the principle that the international organization
must not intervene in matters which are within the domestic jurisdiction of its members; and economic matters are usually considered to
eration results

be within the domestic jurisdiction of the states. 14

In view of these circumstances, it is not astonishing that the only
effective way of achieving economic cooperation within an international security organization: the establishment of a special organ
competent to impose by its decisions definite obligations upon the
member states with respect to their economic policy, is practically
out of the question. The organ or organs concerned may be endowed
only with the power of discussing the problems involved, of giving
advice, of making recommendations, of collecting and disseminating
useful information. 15 Positive results may be and actually have
been achieved on a more or less voluntary basis, especially through
agencies established by special conventions, in the fields of relief
and reconstruction, 16 international lending and monetary regulation, 17
food and agricultural organization. 18
The treaty constituting an international security organization may
provide not only for economic but also for social cooperation that
is, for cooperation in the fields of labor, health, drug control, education, and human rights in general. 19
It may contain provisions

—

—

—

concerning the treatment of non-self-governing peoples, especially
colonies, by placing their administration under a system of international control. 20 However, these functions are not diractly connected
with its main purpose the prevention of war 21 and therefore not
essential elements of a system of collective security in the strict sense
of this term.

—

—

NOTES
1.

Article I of

many Mutual Defense

Assistance Agreements refers to "the

principle that economic recovery is essential to international peace

and must be given clear priority."

and security

;

:
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1*.

15

ff,

Lionel Bobbins, The Economic Causes of War, (1939),

p.

99;

cf.

also pp.

57.

Bobbins, op. cit., p. 105.
Hallett Carr, Conditions of Peace (1942), p. xxiii.
4. Carr, op. cit., pp. 11, 30 ff.
5. Carr, op cit., pp. 12, 39 ff.
6. Carr, op cit., pp. 13 ff.
7. Economic cooperation was not a main purpose of the League of Nations.
The only provision of the Covenant referring to this subject matter was Article
23 (e) which provided: "the Members of the League
will make provisions
2.

Edward

3.

.

.

.

and maintain freedom of communications and of transit and equitable
treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League. In this connection
to secure

the special necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914-1918
shall be borne in mind."
However, as a matter of fact, the activity of the
League in the field of economic cooperation went far beyond the narrow limits

and

in December 1939, the Assembly approved the report
of a special committee the so-called Bruce Committee, named for its Chairman, S. M. Bruce, Australian High Commissioner which suggested the estab-

of this provision,

—

—

lishment of a Central Committee for Economic and Social Questions ( The Development of International Co-operation in Economic and Social Affairs. Report
of the Special Committee.
Special Supplement to the Monthly Summary of
the League of Nations, August 1939).
The outbreak of the Second World
War prevented the realization of this plan.
In the Charter of the United Nations, economic cooperation plays an important part. The preamble proclaims that the United Nations are determined
"to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom" and
to "employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social
advancement of all peoples." Article 1, paragraph 3, declares that it is a Purpose of the United Nations "To achieve international cooperation in solving
international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian charac."
Article 13, paragraph 1, letter b, confers upon the General Assembly
ter
the power to "initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of
promoting international cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, educa." and two Chapters
cational, and health fields
(IX and X) containing
Articles 55-72 are devoted to "International Economic and Social Cooperation"
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

and "The Economic and Social Council." The most characteristic provisions
of these two chapters are:
"Article 55. With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and wellbeing which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples, the United Nations shall promote
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic
and social progress and development
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
Article 61. 1. The Economic and Social Council shall consist of eighteen
Members of the United Nations elected by the General Assembly. 2. Subject
to the provisions of paragraph 3, six members of the Economic and Social Council shall be elected each year for a term of three years.
A retiring member
shall be eligible for immediate reelection. 3. At the first election, eighteen
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Economic and Social Council shall be chosen. The term of
office of six members so chosen shall expire at the end of one year, and of six
other members at the end of two years, in accordance with arrangements made
by the General Assembly. 4. Each Member of the Economic and Social Council
shall have one representative.
Article 62. 1. The Economic and Social Council may make or initiate
studies and reports with respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters and may make recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly, to the Members of the United
Nations, and to the specialized agencies concerned. 2. It may make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all. 3. It may prepare draft conventions

members

of the

for submission to the General Assembly, with respect to matters falling within
4. It may call, in accordance with the rules prescribed by the
its competence.
United Nations, international conferences on matters falling within its
competence.
Article 67. 1. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have
one vote. 2. Decisions of the Economic and Social Council shall be made by a
majority of the members present and voting."
8. President Franklin D. Roosevelt said in his address to the Monetary and
Financial Conference, Washington, D. C, on 29 June 1944 "Economic diseases
are highly communicable. It follows, therefore, that the economic health of
every country is a proper matter of concern to all its neighbors, near and disIn Louise W. Holborn, Ed., War and Peace Aims of the United Nations
tant."
(Boston World Peace Foundation, 1948), p. 288.
"The President of the United States
9. Atlantic Charter (14 August 1941)
of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's
Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make
:

:

:

:

certain common principles in the national policies of their respective
countries on which they base their hopes for a better future of the world.
.
Fourth. They will endeavor ... to further the enjoyment by all states, great

known

.

and small,

victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade

raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic
Fifth, They desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between
in the economic field, with the object of securing, for all,

ment and

social security.

.

.

.

.

and

.

to the

prosperity.
all

nations

economic advance-

."

.

55 of the U.N. Charter.
to the U.N. Charter.
12. Article 55 of the U.N. Charter.
13. When after the First World War the problem of the cooperation of the
United States and the United Kingdom for the economic reconstruction of
Europe became urgent, Bernard Baruch, on behalf of the United States, advocated the following opinion "The salvation of the world must rest upon the
initiative of individuals" (H. R. G. Greaves, The League Committees and World
Order, 1931, p. 66.)
This is a typical expression of economic liberalism. From
this point of view, economic cooperation as a function of an international organisation is possible only in a negative sense: Its main purpose is to induce the
governments of the members to remove all economic barriers. This was also the
view of President Wilson who in point three of his fourteen points program of
January, 1918, called for the "removal, so far as possible, of all economic
barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the
10. Article
11.

Preamble

:

258
."
nations consenting to the peace
{Cf. Daniel S. Cheever and H. Field
Haviland, Jr., Organizing for Peace, 1954, pp. 159, 160 ff.)
14. Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter of the United Nations stipulates:
"Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement
under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII." In its Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference (Department of State
Publication 2349, Washington, 1945, p. 44), Secretary of State Stettinius justi.

fied this provision
authority given to
Council. Without
that the Economic

.

as desirable "because of the amplification of the power and
the Assembly and, particularly, to the Economic and Social
this general limitation ... it might have been supposed
and Social Council could interfere directly in the domestic

economy, social structure, or cultural or educational arrangements of the member
states.
Such a possibility is now definitely excluded." Cf. also Cheever and
Haviland, op. oft., pp. 212, ff.
15. Cf. Article 13, paragraph 1 (b), and Article 62 of the U.N. Charter, p. 256 f.
16. In this respect the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) should be mentioned.
17. The International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development were established for these purposes.
18. The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations.
19. The following agencies operate for these purposes the International Labor
Organization, the World Health Organization (specialized agencies brought in
the Commission on Narcotic Drugs of
relationship with the United Nations)
the Economic and Social Council, which took the place of the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and other Dangerous Drugs of the League of Nations) the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (a
the Human Rights Commission of the Economic and
specialized agency)
:

;

;

;

Social Council.
20. Such as the mandate system of the League of Nations (Article 22 of the
Covenant) and the trusteeship system of the United Nations (Chapters XI and

XII of the Charter.)
of the U.N. Charter stipulates as an obligation of the
which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of terri-

21. Article 73

(c)

members
tories whose people have not

yet attained a full measure of self-government, the
obligation "to further international peace and security," and Article 76 (a)
characterizes one of the objectives of the trusteeship system by the same
formula. However, this is an obligation incumbent upon all members and not

a specific element of the political system established for non-self-governing territories in general

(f f )

and trust

territories in particular.

Universalism and regionalism.

In spite of their tendency towards universality, the Covenant of
the League of Nations and the Charter of the United Nations
both authorize the establishment of regional security organizations.
However, they do not contain a definition of this concept. 1 As a
matter of fact, there are different views as to the meaning of the term
"regional." la According to one, a regional organization is an associa-
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tion of neighboring states, that

of states which are united by the

is,

According to another,
the geographical element is not essential. States may form a regional organization even if their territories are separated by the territories of states not belonging to the organization or by the ocean.
Their unity is constituted by a common interest, e. g., by the fact that
they have a common enemy. That their organization is "regional"
means that it is not a universal but a partial association of states, comfact that their territories are contiguous.

prising only several but not all (or not almost all) the states of the
international community.

An

realization of the purpose for

additional criterion

may

which the organization

is

be that the

established

is

limited to an area precisely defined in the constituent treaty. 2
It stands to reason that territorial contiguity in itself

If states A,

of constituting a political unity.

B

regional organization even though the territory of
to that of

and

is

not capable

O may form

a

A is contiguous only

B and not to that of C whose territory is contiguous only to

that of B, then there

is

no reason

to exclude state

D

whose territory

E whose territory is contiguous

contiguous only to that of A or state
only to that of 6", and so forth. There

is

no answer to the question of

which

is

to be considered as the basis

is

where the

territorial contiguity,

of a "regional" organization, ends.

There must be an additional

factor constituting the unity of a regional organization, a

common

common interest,
as for instance defense against a potential aggressor, may unite states
whose territories are far distant from one another. It may be only
interest uniting the neighboring states, but such a

the territory of the potential aggressor which separates the states

united by an international organization established for the purpose
of collective defense.

Such an organization

the geographical sense of this term.

There can be

is

"regional" but not in

3

doubt that a universal or quasi-universal organization is the ideal solution of the problem of international security.
Regional security organizations are at best only partial solutions and
to some extent they are even a danger to international security.
For
this reason the framers of the Covenant as well as of the Charter were
not in favor of regional security organizations which were suspected
of being the old alliances in the disguise of mutual assistance agreements. 4 In order to differentiate alliances from regional security
organizations, the doctrine has been expounded that the latter
are by their very nature directed against an aggression which takes
place within the organization whereas the former are directed against
an aggression from the outside 5 and hence may be misused for offensive purposes.
There is, however, no sufficient reason to deny a treaty,
concluded by some states and imposing upon the parties the obligation
little

—
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to assist one another in case of an aggression

on the part of a state not

a contracting party, the character of a regional security agreement.

On

the contrary, only a regional

—in the sense of a non-universal

organization can be directed against aggression on the part of a state
not belonging to the organization and even an agreement which re;

stricts the obligation of the parties to

mutual assistance in case of

A

may

in-

be misused for offensive purposes.
state,
party to such an agreement, may very well be attacked on the part of
other parties under the pretext of being guilty of an aggression.
defensive alliance is always a regional security organization, and
even if restricted to the case of internal aggression, a regional security
organization is a defensive alliance of the non-aggressors against
the potential aggressor among them. It is true that an "alliance,"
in the specific sense of the term that is, a regional defense organization directed against aggression from the outside arouses the suspicion of aggressive intentions and leads, therefore, to counter alliances
and thus to a situation which is just the contrary of international
security.
However, it should not be ignored that the strongest motive
of uniting several states in a regional organization is the common
danger of aggression on the part of a third state and that the most important regional organizations are thus defensive "alliances" in the
specific sense of the term.
To refuse to call them "regional" is hardly
more than a terminological paradox.
ternal aggression

A

—

—

Regional security organizations outside or within a universal or
quasi-universal security organization are justifiable in so far as the

some reason, does not work satisfactorily and hence needs
be supplemented or strengthened by the former. If, or to the ex-

latter, for

to

tent that, a universal or quasi-universal security organization does

not

fulfill its

task to guarantee international peace, regional security

may

be useful. In addition, there are some functions
which regional organizations may perform without impairing the
security to be guaranteed by the universal or quasi-universal organorganizations

ization.

Among

these functions are,

first,

the peaceful settlement of

strictly local disputes, especially if the treaty constituting the univer-

with compulsory jurisdicRegional agreements
imposing upon the parties the obligation to assist one another in case
of aggression until a competent agency of the universal organization
takes action against the aggressor can hardly be excluded if the universal organization does not have its own armed force ready for immediate action at its disposal. 7 Within the limits just mentioned, such
regional agreements may even establish a central executive organ for
the purpose of collective self-defense. However, enforcement meassal organization does not establish a court
tions,6 and, secondly,

collective

self-defense.

—
261
ures to be taken as sanctions which go beyond this limit should be

reserved to the universal organization, which

may— if

appropriate
use the coercive machinery of regional organizations to execute sanctions against

a.

violator

of the constituent treaty. 8

Such an action

taken by a regional organization under the authority of the universal
is to be considered as a function of the latter, and not as

organization

a regional action.

—disarmament—can be

The most important preventive measure

ef-

Regional disarmament
as a permanent political system is possible only within a partial area
which is safe against aggression from the outside. Since there is no
longer such an area, regional disarmament is hardly a practical
fected successfully only on a universal basis.

consideration. 9

NOTES
1. Article 21 of the Covenant of the League of Nations refers to "regional
understandings." It runs as follows "Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed
to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the
:

maintenance of peace."
Chapter VIII (Articles 52-54) of the Charter of the United Nations deals with
"regional arrangements." It provides
"Article 52. 1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of
regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to
the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities
are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. 2. The
Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting
such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local
disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before
referring them to the Security Council. 3. The Security Council shall encourage
the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional
arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states
concerned or by reference from the Security Council. 4. This Article in no
way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.
Article 53. 1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such
regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority.
But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by
regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the
exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of
this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such
state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments
concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression
by such a state. 2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article
applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy
of any signatory of the present Charter.
Article 5If. The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of
activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by
regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security."
:

—
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229 ff.
Pierre Vellas, Le Regionalismc International et VOrganisation des Nations
I nics (Paris, 1948), pp. 32 ff., 147, referring to declarations made by La tin- American delegations at the San Francisco Conference (U. N. C. I. O., Vol. XII, p. 792,
la. Cf. pp.

2.

802), advocates the doctrine that a regional organization is the expression of
sociological solidarity, the legal order constituting the organization being the effect of the social reality.

If the solidarity is effective, the legal order is superdoes not exist, the legal order is ineffectual. It is true that there
must be a common interest and, in this sense, a certain solidarity inducing states
to enter an agreement establishing a legal order regulating the mutual behavior of
the contracting state. However, the sociological doctrine overlooks the fact that
the legal order may not only be the effect of a certain solidarity, but may, as a
fact in the minds of the men concerned, in itself have the effect of strengthening
the solidarity so that there is a correlation between solidarity as a social reality
fluous.

and

If

it

which is itself a social reality.
Neither the Covenant nor the Charter restricts regional organizations to
states whose territories are contiguous.
4. Cf. p. 39 ff.
legal order,

3.

5.

Vellas, op.

6.

Article 21 of the Covenant expressly mentions treaties of arbitration

cit., p.

46.
;

and,

according to Article 52, paragraph 2, of the Charter, regional arrangements shall
provide for the pacific settlement of local disputes. Article 95 authorizes the
members to entrust the solution of their differences to other tribunals than the
International Court of Justice, which implies that regional agreements for arbitration are compatible with the Charter.
7. The question as to whether treaties for the implementation of the provisions
of Article 51 concerning collective self-defense are to be considered as "regional
arrangements" within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the Charter is answered
in the negative as well as in the affirmative.
The main arguments for a negative answer are that Article 51 is not inserted into Chapter VIII, and that
enforcement actions in the exercise of self-defense are not mentioned in Article
53, paragraph 1, among the enforcement actions which may be taken under
regional arrangements without the authorization of the Security Council.
However, there can be no doubt at all that at the San Francisco Conference the
right of collective self-defense, as stipulated in Article 51, was considered by
many delegates, especially by the South American delegates, as a specific subject of regional arrangements.
(Cf. the declaration of the representative of
Colombia, U. N. C. I. O., Vol. XII, p. 680.)
Whether a treaty for the implementation of Article 51 is or is not a regional arrangement within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the Charter, it is
certainly a regional agreement within the meaning of the definition of this
concept presented above. Such a treaty may in accordance with Article 51
provide for mutual assistance not only in case of an aggression within the
organization but also in case of an aggression from the outside. It may even
provide for collective action against an aggressor which is not a member of the
United Nations; for the wording of Article 51 does not restrict the right of
individual and collective self-defense to the case of an armed attack on the
part of a member state and Article 53, paragraph 1 refers to enforcement
actions "taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies," that is,
by regional organizations, against former enemy states, which may not be
members of regional organizations and even not members of the United Nations.
If a treaty concluded for the implementation of Article 51 of the Charter does

—

;
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not constitute a "regional" arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the
Charter, Article 54, providing that "the Security Council shall at all times be
kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation" under the
treaty, does not apply.
This may explain the tendency to interpret Chapter VIII
of the Charter in a restrictive sense, so that treaties such as the North Atlantic
Treaty do not fall under the provisions of this Chapter.
Julius Stone, op. cit., pp. 247 ff., considers as an essential element of a regional organization that some relation to a "region" must be implied in the
arrangement, "but what it is is obscure." He expressly rejects the view that
the treaty constituting a regional security organization may provide for colThe state against
lective measures "against attack from another region."
which the enforcement action is directed may not be a contracting party to
the constituent treaty, but it must be "within the region" if the organization
constituted by the treaty is to be considered as a "regional" organization within
the meaning of Articles 52-54 of the Charter. That the state must be "within
the region" can only mean that its territory must be within the .region deter-

mined by the constituent

Stone justifies his interpretation first, by
treaty.
the natural meaning of the phrase 'appropriate for regional
action' in Article 52 [not 53, as misprinted], paragraph 1." However, an action
stating that "this

may

is

—in

—

not only when the
within the area determined in the constituent treaty but also when the action is restricted to this area insofar as
it is conditioned by an act of aggression which has taken place within this
area, even by a state whose territory is not within this area. This may be the
case when the attack takes place on the open sea on vessels of one of the contracting parties, a case expressly referred to in Article 6 of the North Atlantic
Treaty. Secondly, Stone says "if an arrangement for common action of one
region against a threat to peace from another region were within the articles,
the provision of Article 53, paragraph 1, that the Security Council may u?e
regional arrangements as agencies for enforcement under its authority, would
mean that the Council would invoke the military aid of one regional alliance
against another region."
Although Stone admits that "such a situation is
conceivable," he asserts that "it certainly seems inconsistent with the 'Purposes and Principles of the United Nations' as Article 52, paragraph 1, requires. It would arise as a stage in the breakdown of the Charter, not of its
application." If the Security Council may authorize an enforcement action
to be taken by a regional organization against an aggressor state which is
within the region, without violating the provisions of the Charter concerning
the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations, it is not understandable
why the Security Council could not, without violating these provisions, authorize
an enforcement action to be taken by a regional organization against an aggressor state which is not "within the region." All the more so as no provision
of Chapter VIII restricts enforcement action by a regional organization to actions directed against states within the region. Article 53 expressly refers to
enforcement actions "taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies" against former enemy states, whether these states are or are not "within
the region."
Since the Charter does not restrict enforcement actions to be
taken by a regional organization to actions against a state "within the region," the Security Council may, in applying Article 53, paragraph 1 of the
Charter, authorize a regional organization to take an enforcement action against
a state which is not "within the region."
Such an authorization would be
quite "natural" if in case of a conflict between a state member of a regional

be regional

state against

which

the "natural" meaning of this term

it

is

directed

is

—
;
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organization and a state which is not within the region, the Security Council
considered an enforcement action involving the use of armed force to be directed against the state which is not within the region as adequate, but still
has not yet at its disposal the armed forces referred to in Article 43, whereas
the regional organization disposes of such an armed force.
There is no
reason to assume that such a situation "would arise as a stage in the breakdown
of the Charter, not of its application."

provision of Article 53, paragraph 1, that enforcement action may be taken
by a regional organization only with the authorization of the Security Council,

The

restricted by Article 51. If a state, member of a rethe victim of an armed attack by a state which is not
"within the region," the regional organization, in the exercise of the right of

must be interpreted as

gional organization,

is

may take a collective enforcement action against the
aggressor until the Security Council intervenes. The latter may if it considers
this action adequate, applying Article 53, paragraph 1, authorize the regional
organization to continue its action. In this way Article 53, paragraph 1 may be
interpreted as complementing the provision of Article 39 concerning action to
be taken by the Security Council in case of a threat to or breach of the peace.
The third argument set forth by Stone runs as follows "The disputes, the
pacific settlement of which parties to regional arrangements are to assume, and
the Security Council is to encourage them to assume, are specified by Article 52,
paragraphs 2 and 3, to be 'local' only. It would be strange to limit the delegation
of the settlement function to intra-regional disputes, without a similar limit
on delegated peace enforcement." By "local disputes" Article 52, paragraph 2
can only mean disputes between parties to the treaty constituting the regional
organization.
For this treaty can impose only upon the contracting parties
the obligation to settle their disputes in a definite way, prescribed by the treaty.
A state which is "within the region," but not a contracting party, cannot be
bound by it. Hence "local" cannot mean "intra-regional." That a treaty constituting a regional organization regulates only the settlement of disputes between the members of the organization, but does not limit enforcement actions
to be taken by the organization to actions against an aggressor which is a member of the organization, is not strange at all. For also an enforcement action
to be directed against an aggressor which is not a member of the organization
whether it is or is not within the region may be provided for by the stipulation
of obligations imposed upon the member states. The provision concerning "local
disputes" does not support Stone's statement "The real question is not whether
the State against which enforcement action is directed is within the arrangement
Finally, Stone states that only
it is rather whether it is within the region,"
if his interpretation of the term "regional" is accepted the absurdity could be
avoided to apply Article 54 to organizations constituted by treaties providing
"If an alliance for defence
for military action against external aggression.
against a Permanent Member from outside the region were a 'regional arrangement,' even military staff plans would have to be disclosed in advance to the
potential aggressor; and the potential aggressor's own consent obtained before
he could be resisted. On the present view these absurdities are avoided, and
such outwardly orientated arrangements must justify themselves as preparation
collective self-defense,

:

—

:

for measures of self-defence, reportable only after they are taken, under Article
51."

If security organizations protecting their

members against aggression on

the part of states not members of the organization or not being within the region are not considered to be "regional," then, indeed, Article 54 does not apply
to them.
That its non-application to the organizations concerned is desirable,
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can certainly not be denied. But from this fact does not follow that the organizations concerned are not regional within the meaning of the Charter.
Such an interpretation can be based neither on the wording, nor on the intention of those

who

drafted the provisions, of Articles 51-54.

Article 53, paragraph

1, of the Charter contains such a provision.
In 1922 the Assembly of the League of Nations did not share this opinion.
On 27 September it adopted a resolution (XV) which runs as follows: "The
Assembly, whilst declaring that the reduction of armaments contemplated by
Article 8 of the Covenant cannot achieve its full effect for world peace unless
it be general, desires to emphasize the importance of regional agreements for
the purpose of reducing armaments agreements which, if necessary, might
even go beyond the measures decided upon in respect of general reduction and
requests the Council to ask the Temporary Mixed Commission to take into consideration, during its subsequent work, the possibility of recommending the
•conclusion of similar agreements to States which might be concerned."
A regional agreement for the purpose of reducing armaments was the Convention signed on 7 February 1923 by Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. It is characteristic that among the derogations expressly recognized by the treaty were "impending invasion by another state"
(Article I), and "threatened attack by a foreign state" (Article IV).
8.

9.

—

;

.

.
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